Flexible Spending Accounts Growth and Opportunities Act of 2007

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I again want to thank Mr. Cooper for introducing this legislation and working with us as it moved its way through the subcommittee and committee process; Mr. Towns for his leadership; and the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for his leadership as well.

Today, we take up H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act of 2007. This legislation is intended to enhance the independence of Inspectors General throughout the government to improve their ability to monitor and oversee executive branch operations.

Since the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, Inspectors General throughout the government have played an integral role in identifying waste and mismanagement in government. IGs have also been instrumental in aiding Congress and the executive branch to make government more efficient and effective.

We all agree IGs should operate independently, free from political interference. After all, both agency heads and Congress often rely on IG reports to provide frank assessments of the effectiveness of Federal programs.

However, Inspectors General should also be part of an agency's management structure, part of a team, albeit with some independence, rather than a ``fourth branch'' of the Federal Government. If we separate the IGs from the day-to-day operations of the agencies they oversee, IGs will cease to perform a constructive, integrated role and instead will become Monday morning quarterbacks with their function solely second-guessing decisions made by agencies.

Many of the provisions in H.R. 928 will help to enhance the effectiveness of the IGs in overseeing Federal agencies and programs. I am concerned that certain provisions of the legislation go further than I would like in isolating IGs, removing them from the agency decision- making process.

For example, during committee consideration of the legislation, I offered an amendment to exempt smaller agency IGs from the ``for cause'' removal provision in the bill, thereby reserving the ``for cause'' removal threshold only for Cabinet-level agency IGs. The purpose of this amendment, which was adopted, I might add, with the help of my friends on the other side, was to strike an appropriate balance between the need to ensure independence of our Inspectors General while at the same time preserving the President's authority over employers and officers of the executive branch.

I also have concerns with a provision that's in the current bill authorizing IGs to independently submit their budget requests to Congress outside of the traditional Federal budget process. My concerns with this new authority pertain more to the logistical nightmare this creates rather than any particular objection to increased IG independence. After all, having 60 separate budgets for individual offices accompanying the President's annual budget submission to Congress will only add unnecessary confusion to the already confusing Federal budget process. So when Members get the President's budget, under the way the law is currently written, they get the Federal budget submitted by the President and then 60 separate requests from IGs.

Now, I intend to offer an amendment, which I am hopeful the other side will accept, which goes at least part of the way toward addressing the legitimate concerns raised by the administration but getting to the points that the author of this bill wanted to get as well.

In closing, I believe the underlying legislation improves the laws governing our IGs. I think some additional changes need to be made as it moves forward, but I very much appreciate Mr. Cooper's efforts on this bill and his initiative in trying to identify these problems as we move through.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, let me talk, first of all, about what the legislation does. It establishes a 7-year term of office for the over 60 Inspectors General in the Federal Government. This gives them continuity from administration to administration, so they're not political lackeys, they are professionals. It limits the President's authority to remove a Senate-confirmed IG, and that's about half of them, except on certain grounds; for example, permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conviction of a felony, or conduct involving moral turpitude. That gives the IGs independence from pressure from the appointing administration.

At the smaller agencies, a different standard applies. There, an IG can be removed, but it will require 30-day advance notification to Congress before an agency head removes the agency's IG.

The legislation also authorizes IGs to submit their budget requests to Congress independent of the President's budget submission. This is something that I'm going to have an amendment on later that I think will clarify it.

This also codifies an executive order establishing the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. This is a coordinating council of Federal IGs, as well as an integrity committee to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by IGs. And unfortunately, we see that; these people are human beings as well.

It increases the salary of IGs and prohibits IGs from receiving bonuses. It enhances IG power by granting limited personnel authority, expanded subpoena authority, and increased ability to deputize IG agents.

It strengthens the GAO's authority to conduct investigations, for sworn testimony it requires congressional notification of agency noncooperation, and it expands IG ability to pursue false claims and recoup losses resulting from fraud.

Now, the administration has issued a negative statement of policy on this for two reasons. One, they don't like the limitation on the President's authority to remove executive branch officials. On that, I think we have gone overboard, working together, both parties, to try to put reasonable limitations, but at the same time maintaining a higher level of independence for IGs than you will find at other levels. And I think institutionally, as Members of this House, the changes in this bill I think are worth supporting, I would oppose the administration in that. The second concern is the independent submission of the IG's budget to Congress, and we are offering an amendment to try to clarify that, which I will speak on later.

Once again, this legislation was introduced by Representative Jim Cooper from Tennessee in February. It was approved by our committee by a voice vote in August. In addition to a substitute offered by Representative Cooper, which made a number of technical changes, the committee did adopt an amendment offered by me to limit the application of removal for cause in a way that I think we are all comfortable with.

So, again, I want to thank the players who have brought this to this stage.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), a cosponsor of this bill.

Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?

If the gentleman has no further speakers, I will take a minute and sum up and yield back.

Let me just say again, I want to thank the author of this legislation. I want to thank Mr. Towns for moving this through subcommittee and Chairman Waxman. I just want to note, for IGs to work successfully, they need to work with their agencies. I think however we write the law, the President that appoints and the Senate that confirms, we need to look for more accountants.

Frankly, we have seen a surge of people coming out of the U.S. Attorney's offices, and they make this more adversarial than it needs to be. A good IG is going to work with their agency to identify waste, fraud and abuse, not enter into a gotcha mentality. For government to work, you need them all working together. You need an independent IG, there is no question about that. But the person in that office ought to be right there with the agency head making sure that things work. That doesn't always happen. I don't think we can write any law that makes that happen. That is going to depend on the goodwill of the people, the agency heads and the IGs working together. But I think this legislation goes a long way toward establishing that independence, giving the IG the authority that they need. But the rest is going to be up to the appointing President and the confirming Senate to get the right people in these jobs, professionals who want to be a part of government and making it work efficiently for the taxpayer.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, as currently drafted, the Improving Government Accountability Act would authorize Inspectors General throughout the government, and more than 60 of these offices exist, to directly submit their budget requests to Congress. By doing so, this legislation would circumvent the long-standing process under which Presidents submit to the Congress a budget proposal on behalf of the executive branch.

While I understand the sponsor's intent in authorizing independent budget submissions by IGs, I have concerns with the way the authority is currently constructed. Our concerns pertain more to the logistical nightmare than any particular objection to increased IG independence.

First of all, according to the Congressional Research Service, no other offices or agencies within the executive

branch currently are authorized by statute to independently submit their budgets to Congress. H.R. 928 would not simply make an exception for one uniquely situated office, it would make an exception for all of the more than 60 IG offices currently in government. In other words, the President's annual budget would be accompanied by 60 separate IG budgets. This is inefficient; it is disorganized and unproductive.

Second, I am concerned that by authorizing IGs to submit their budgets independently to Congress, we are encouraging them to submit their wish lists to Congress rather than submitting budgets that take into account the limited resources that are available to agencies.

It doesn't take an active imagination to envision the increased government spending that this would cause. After all, if an IG submits its wish list to Congress, will Members of Congress have the stomach to appropriate an amount less than an IG requests? If we do, we could be painted as antioversight, a label none of us are interested in.

Because of these concerns, I have filed an amendment proposing an alternative approach to the budget issue. This amendment would authorize Inspectors General to notify Congress if the budget request submitted by the agency head would substantially inhibit the IG's ability to perform his or her duties. The President would be required to include in his budget submission the original amount requested by each IG.

This approach would give additional information to Congress, which is the intent, I think, of the legislation. It also encourages IGs to speak out if their agencies try to stifle the IG's independence by reducing the IG's budget request. But it would stop short of authorizing all 60 IGs to separately submit their own budget request to Congress outside of the traditional Federal budget process.

I think this amendment is a reasonable compromise which carefully balances the need for IG independence with the need for streamlined budget authority. We have enough problems enacting the Federal budget every year; we don't need to create 60 new ones. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, that is correct. Let me just add, I think that was the intent of the legislation, to make sure that the IGs weren't stifled and that Congress gets their eyes on that original request, and it would allow that.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to talk anybody out of it, so I yield back as well.

Mr. Chairman, although I am not opposed, I would like to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment would require agencies to include links on their Web pages to their IG's Web page. In addition, this amendment would require IGs to make public reports and audits conducted by the Inspector General immediately available on their Web sites, and it would require links for individuals interested in reporting waste, fraud and abuse.

To the extent any of this is not currently being done by agencies and IGs, I am fully supportive of Congress requiring such information to be made available in order to increase the transparency of Federal Government operations. We are prepared to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Towns).

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

I am in its present form.

Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit would require all agency Inspectors General to report annually to Congress and to the President whether the IG believes an abolishment, reorganization, consolidation or transfer of existing Federal programs and agencies is necessary to reduce Federal expenditures, increase efficiency of government operations, eliminate overlap and duplication in Federal programs and offices, abolish agencies or programs which no longer serve an important governmental purpose, or identify reductions in amounts of discretionary budget authority or direct spending which can be dedicated to Federal deficit reduction.

The IGs would be required to accompany those reports with proposed legislation in order to encourage Congress to act on those recommendations.

This legislation is borne out of frustration. How many more times are we going to hear about redundancy in Federal programs without doing anything about it? We have the IGs. We have made them more independent as a result of this. Let's utilize that expertise for suggestions in how we can reduce waste, fraud and abuse in government.

How many more times are we going to have to hear about the 70 programs located throughout 13 Federal agencies providing substance abuse prevention services for our youth? The over 90 early childhood programs scattered among 11 Federal agencies and 20 offices? The 40 different programs in the Federal Government having job training as their main purpose? The 86 teacher training programs in nine Federal agencies? The 50 different Federal homeless assistance programs administered by eight different agencies? The more than 17 Federal agencies monitoring and enforcing over 400 U.S. trade agreements? The 17 Federal Departments and agencies operating a total of 515 Federal research and development laboratories? Or the eight different Federal agencies administering 17 different programs just in the area of rural water and wastewater systems, each with its own set of regulations?

After all, the primary reason all these Federal programs exist in the first place is because Congress has this bad habit of haphazardly establishing new programs to achieve short-term solutions whenever a problem arises.

In fact, Paul Volcker, Donna Shalala and Frank Carlucci all testified before our committee in 2003 about a National Commission on Public Service report that they had recently released. The report concluded that, over the years, the ad hoc layering of agencies, Departments, and programs greatly complicated management, expanded the influence of powerful interests and diminished coherent policy direction. The Federal Government today is a layered jumble of organizations with muddled public missions.

Congress is as much to blame for this problem as anyone else. Admitting we have a problem is the first step in recovery. I am here to help our colleagues understand we have a problem. The extent of overlap and duplication in government is an issue the Committee on Government Reform has spent years investigating. Our hearings have focused on a range of Federal program areas, from child welfare programs to intelligence operations to Federal food safety oversight.

This motion to report forthwith, so it doesn't kill the bill, it reports right back, would provide a tool which could assist the Congress and the President in identifying ways to streamline government operations and make them as efficient and effective as possible. The motion to recommit should appeal to all Members who believe there are inefficiencies in the Federal Government requiring attention. All after, Congress never has and never will be a management body. We need the assistance, and this legislation does it, of independent, outside observers to tell us what programs we created years ago are not an efficient or effective use of taxpayer funds.

We have given the Inspectors General here authority and independence to call the balls and strikes and to make government more efficient. Let's utilize that. Let's help us make government more efficient. Let's support the motion to recommit.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act, focuses on the important role of the Inspector General in providing independent oversight within Federal agencies. By investigating and reporting waste, fraud and abuse to both agency leaders and to the Congress, Inspectors General play a critical role in maintaining checks and balances in the Federal Government.

When Congress created the Inspectors General nearly 30 years ago, the idea was that having independent officials inside the Federal agency would help detect and prevent wasteful spending and mismanagement. This concept has been a tremendous success. Investigations by IGs have resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars from companies and individuals who defrauded the Federal Government.

These investigations have led to thousands of criminal prosecutions, contractor debarments, employee suspensions, and in some instances, dismissals.

In sum, the work of IGs to expose criminal and abusive action in government has gone a long way to create the cleaner and more efficient government the taxpaying public expects and deserves.

Of course, even the best systems need some improvement from time to time, and that is the reason for this bill today, to effectively carry out that mission. Inspectors General must be independent and objective, which requires that they be insulated from improper management and political pressure.

To preserve the credibility of the office, Inspectors General must also perform their duties with integrity and apply the same standards of conduct and accountability to themselves as they apply to the agencies that they audit and investigate.

In recent years, there have been several episodes which raised questions about the independence and accountability of IGs. These episodes have been well documented in hearings of the Oversight Committee as well as other standing committees of the House. In some instances, IGs who are seen as too aggressive in pursuing waste at their agencies had their budget cut or were threatened with dismissal. In other cases, IGs who abused their authority remained in office in part because there were no statutory standards or procedures for removal. This bill is designed to address both of those problems. H.R. 928 creates fixed terms of office for Inspectors General and specific reasons for their removal. It allows IGs to submit their budget requests directly to the Congress. The bill establishes an Inspector General council and sets procedures for investigation of potential IG misconduct. And the bill increases the rank and pay of IGs as well.

This is a strong bill and a necessary bill. Passing this bill will send a message that Congress values the work of the Inspectors General and the oversight that they provide.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee, who has been very instrumental in bringing forth this legislation, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to Mr. Yarmuth, the gentleman from Kentucky.

I have no further speakers.

Mr. Chairman, I think this legislation is a giant step in the right direction. I would like to thank the chairman of the full committee, Congressman Waxman. I would like to thank Congressman Davis, the ranking member. I would like to thank subcommittee ranking member, Congressman Bilbray from California. Of course, I would like to thank Mr. Cooper for all of his work on this legislation. And I would like to thank the staff for all of their work in terms of making certain that we were able to come today. I want to thank the sponsors for this bill. Mr. Cooper and I and our colleagues across the aisle have been very open to getting input and making changes to this bill. This is what the legislative process is all about, exchanging ideas, sharing information, and trying to improve the legislation. I think the end result in this bill will increase the Office of Inspector Generals and give them the kind of independence that they need to be able to do the efficient work that is so required. I am excited about the possibilities, of course, and I encourage all my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very good amendment. It is especially important that the Department of Justice IG have the authority to examine a broad range of issues in that Department. Considering all the problems that congressional investigations have recently uncovered, I think that this is a very timely amendment. I really feel that we should aggressively get behind it and support it and encourage our colleagues also to support it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment, I think. I am not sure. Let me ask some questions and then I can make up my mind.

As I understand it, under your amendment, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), each Inspector General's appropriations request as originally made to his or her agency head would be noted in the President's budget submission to Congress.

Mr. Chairman, is that correct?

Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, with that in mind, I do support the amendment, and, of course, I am prepared to accept the amendment. It achieves the goal of the budget provision in this bill, which is to expose whether IGs are having their budgets slashed in retaliation of their investigations.

I look forward to working with you as this bill moves through the legislative process to clarify the language of the amendment to ensure that its intent is fulfilled.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, this is a well thought-out amendment. I want to

commend the gentleman from North Carolina for this. It makes it clear that the bill is not intended to protect poorly performing IGs from removal.

There was some question about an IG who managed his office so poorly that it caused most of the senior career staff to quit, and then the IG would still be there. At least this amendment addresses that issue as well by adding gross mismanagement and gross waste of funds and abuse of authority as grounds for removal. This amendment clarifies that an IG who is not an effective leader can be removed for that reason.

We also support the technical and procedural changes that Mr. Miller has included in this amendment. This is a very, very good amendment, and I hope that it has support coming from both sides of the aisle, because this is an amendment that is long overdue.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the committee also supports this amendment by Mr. Miller. One of the problems that we have seen is that recent IG appointments have had far more experience in politics than they have had in investigating and auditing.

The council created by this amendment is advisory, but it will provide an independent evaluation of whether a candidate for appointment has the professional background and experience to succeed in the IG role. This information should be valuable to the President and to the Senate as they fill IG vacancies.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is a fine amendment and I am hoping that both sides of the aisle will support it. This is what strengthening legislation is all about, dialogue on both sides and then supporting. So I am hoping this amendment gets a strong, strong vote. It is a good amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendment. I think it is a very good amendment because it deals with waste, fraud and abuse. I think anything that strengthens this bill, I am for. There is no question about it, my colleague from New York definitely improves the legislation. Therefore, I am in total support of the amendment, and would encourage my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House in the motion to recommit, I report H.R. 928 back to the House with an amendment.

I would first like to thank the subcommittee chairman, my friend, Mr. Towns, for doing an outstanding job on this and other legislation. I want to thank the ranking member, Mr. Davis, who has been particularly accommodating in working on this bill to do a better job for the Federal taxpayer. That's what this is all about, making government work better. If there has ever been a good government measure, this is it.

I also want to thank the full committee chairman, Mr. Waxman, who was so helpful in so many ways, and the outstanding staff of this committee, the Government Reform Committee. There is none better on the Hill, perhaps in the history of the Hill, so we are very proud of their work.

Finally, let me thank my personal staff, my legislative director, Cicely Simpson. She has been a tireless champion of this bill, and even her predecessor, Anne Kim.

Sadly, this good government measure has taken years to come to the floor and to be passed by the House of Representatives, but now we're making progress, and the Federal taxpayer will benefit as a result.

Now, why do I say this is such a good government measure? There are some 58 IGs scattered throughout the Federal Government. They are the fiscal watchdogs for the taxpayer. They are the first line of defense against fraud, waste and mismanagement in Federal Government. These IGs and their staff save many, many times more money than their salary cost or their benefit cost. These are the folks who see the fraud first and catch it before it gets too big.

Let me give you an example. In today's Washington Post, there is a new GAO study that comes out and it says, Federal officials too often flying first and business class, GAO finds, their leg room and your tax dollars.

The GAO has found that $146 million was spent just in the last year for improper Federal first class and business travel. They could go through agency after agency naming executives who have abused the Federal credit card. This is an outrage. Now, by Federal standards, this is a relatively small outrage, but this is the sort of stuff that needs to be caught and caught early.

This is also why we need Inspector General independence, because they're not going to be popular when they point out to their agency head or other senior officials in Federal Government that they shouldn't have been flying first class. That endangers the IG's position because that is not a popular thing to do.

One of the folks here was caught flying his entire family of eight from Washington, D.C. to Eastern Europe first class. That's wrong. And I'm sure the Federal executive wanted to take his whole family first class, but these are Federal tax dollars at stake.

So this is a very important bill. It is very important to update the original IG legislation. It has been on the books since 1978. Problems have occurred since then, and now we will fix those problems.

Now, it has been noted here today by the ranking member, and I appreciate his courage in opposing the administration veto on this, the veto threat. A SAP has been issued, a Statement of Administration Policy, and in my opinion, at least, the grounds for this threatened veto are remarkably flimsy. So I hope that the Members listening

back in their offices and their staff, particularly across the aisle, will pay close attention to the reasons that the administration says it objects to this reform legislation and to figure out whether those reasons are really valid.

There are two fundamental grounds. First of all, they object to ``for cause'' dismissal. I think perhaps the Bush administration feels this is somehow aimed at them. It's not. Everyone knows that by the time this legislation is fully administered, the next administration will be in place. This legislation is really designed to help all administrations, whatever their political stripe. So it's very important to realize that the ``for cause'' language that the administration objects to has already been removed at the urging of the ranking member, due to his excellent amendment in committee, for half of the IG agencies. It only remains for the Cabinet-level agencies. Why? Because those folks should have a 7-year term and have full political independence so that they can make the tough calls, even if it means denying a Cabinet Secretary first-class airfare to Europe. They need independence.

The second grounds that the administration has posed for objecting to this legislation is they shouldn't have separate budget submissions. Now, I was down eating lunch with one of my colleagues a few minutes ago, and he had the mistaken notion that somehow this would be an entire separate budget for the entire agency. That's not true. This is just the IG's own budget for the IG and his or her staff. So that's a very modest request, that the IG cannot be pressured by the agency head. So that, to me, also is a pretty flimsy ground for objecting to this legislation.

So, I would urge all Members to take a close look. This is good government legislation. This will save the taxpayer billions of dollars, according to the committee report. Just last year, IG recommendations saved $9.9 billion in audit recommendations and $6.8 billion in investigative recoveries. That's $15 billion-plus for the Federal taxpayer. We need to be saving much more money like this, and IGs and this bill can do it.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to take the time in opposition to the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate my friend, the gentleman from North Carolina, because he has been an excellent Member of this body for some time and has worked on the Science Committee and has contributed greatly to the work of this body. I am particularly grateful for his work on the IG issue.

I want to make it crystal clear to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that the gentleman's amendment essentially makes it easier to fire IGs. I support that. I think the gentleman's reasoning is sound.

I also think it is very important that Members on the other side the aisle realize that this largely should eliminate the President's veto threat, because the primary grounds in this Statement of Administration Policy for opposing this bill is that IGs may be too hard to fire. Well, the gentleman's helpful amendment adds additional grounds that makes it easier to get rid of errant IGs if they knowingly violate the law, rule or regulation, if they are guilty of gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds or abuse of authority. So that should obviate the administration's objections to this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I hope by accepting the gentleman from North Carolina's amendment we cannot only promote the cause of good government, we can also get the folks at OMB and in the administration to relax and realize what a good bill this is. So I would urge a huge and bipartisan majority vote for this legislation thanks to the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I speak as a Blue Dog Democrat, and I'm proud to see progressives and Blue Dogs, Democrats and Republicans coming together on this important good government cause. We've been working on it for 4 years now, and now it's about to pass. We're about to send it to the Senate, hopefully, with a huge vote, because Members on both sides of the aisle can agree that we need to cut out waste, fraud and abuse in government, and there's no better group to do it than our Inspectors General. That's what this bill does, empower Inspectors General. So I want to thank the chairman, Mr. Waxman, for his outstanding work with our ranking member. We've done a great job of moving this and other important legislation before Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, over the last year and a half, the Science and Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, which I chair, has been reviewing the work of the Office of the Inspector General of NASA and a related investigation of the NASA IG by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency's Integrity Committee, the procedure actually for investigating IGs themselves.

I appreciate Mr. Towns and Mr. Cooper, knowing my interest in this issue, including me very graciously in discussions of this legislation, and I commend them for their work on this legislation.

The purpose of this amendment is to smooth the transition between the old law and the new and to make sure that we do not disrupt some of the work of IGs that is now going well in our effort to get in place reforms to improve the work of IGs.

I fully support the goal of this legislation to make sure that Inspectors General are independent, that they can act without fear of political reprisal, and to accomplish that by establishing a set term. This amendment accomplishes other purposes perfectly consistent with that overall goal of the legislation.

First, it establishes the same qualifications for the selection of Inspectors General of the designated Federal agencies that are not subject to confirmation by the other body. There is no reason that there should be any different qualifications, and this brings the qualifications for those Inspectors General into line with the qualifications of those confirmed by the other body.

Second, the amendment expands the goals for removal of the Inspectors General, with criteria that the Inspectors General themselves, the IGs themselves, have agreed to should be the basis for removal, and would not undermine their independence by being a threat to their independence; so, removal for improper grounds. The additional grounds, and these are in the regulations now, the rules now: knowing violation of the law, rule or regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority. Those criteria for removal do increase the President's flexibility to get out of office inept or abusive Inspectors General.

Third, the amendment incorporates several provisions of two executive orders pertaining to the work of IGs, executive orders 12805 and 12993, which would no longer be in effect under this legislation, to maintain certain policies and procedures that are working well and make sure that there is not a gap when there are no procedures in place and to make sure that we will not have to recreate those procedures under the new legislation. It also directs the new council, the new Inspectors General council, to incorporate as much of the established policies that are working well as possible into the new rules. Again, those rules are developed by the IGs themselves over the years. They work very well. They do not need to be disrupted.

Fourth, the transparency of the Integrity Committee's investigations, the work of inspecting the Inspectors General themselves, the investigations into the investigators, has been a problem. This amendment would require the council to submit to Congress a report of their work in inspecting the work, to investigating the work of Inspectors General.

Finally, the amendment requires the office of OMB, the Office of Management and Budget, OMB, to continue to provide the Inspectors General council with the administrative support that the PCIE now has.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Towns).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment would require the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a committee of Inspectors General to review the integrity, the experience, the reputation, all of the qualifications of anyone the President appoints to serve as an Inspector General and to provide a report of that evaluation to the other body, to the relevant committee of the other body, before any confirmation hearings. It provides a similar procedure for agency heads who appoint Inspectors General without confirmation by the other body.

The amendment does not create any new bureaucracy. It uses an existing office or an office that will exist under this legislation. The evaluation of that committee is not binding in any way. It simply is an unbiased, informed evaluation that would be helpful to the other body in their consideration of confirmation of anyone appointed as an Inspector General to serve as an Inspector General, just as the American Bar Association's evaluations on the qualifications of judicial nominees are helpful in confirmation.

Mr. Chairman, most Presidential appointments are policy positions for which loyalty to the President is a proper consideration. In fact, it is a necessity. It is a requirement. And the other body has traditionally deferred to the President's judgment in confirmation. If the President wants to appoint a political operative, if he wants to appoint some political poohbah's worthless, otherwise unemployable brother-in-law, the other body usually goes along so the President can have his own people in policy positions.

As the debate on this bill has made very clear, Inspectors General are not jobs like that. Inspectors General are not the President's people. They are to be watchdogs who report both to the agency head and to Congress. They are not the President's people. IGs are not the President's people. They are our people, too. Congress needs to rely on the work of IGs in our oversight duties. IGs are Congress's people as much as they are the President's people.

The statute says now that IGs should be objective and independent and they are to be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration or investigation. In other words, Mr. Chairman, IGs can't just be some poohbah's worthless brother-in-law.

This amendment provides the other body with an informed evaluation of the integrity and qualifications of any potential IG to assure that IGs are up to the job, they understand what their job is, they are to identify waste, fraud, abuse or general inefficiency, and report to the agency head and to Congress without fear or favor. IGs must report with rigorous honesty even if their reports cause political embarrassment; especially when their reports cause political embarrassment.

This amendment will return to an earlier tradition of consulting well-regarded IGs before an appointment of an IG for suggestions of who would be good for that job.

Mr. Chairman, we have departed from that tradition, to our detriment. This amendment will return us to that tradition.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 298, the Improving Government Accountability Act. I would like to thank my colleague, Congressman Cooper, for introducing this important legislation, as well as the Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Congressman Waxman, for his leadership in bringing this important issue to the floor.

Mr. Chairman, Inspectors General play a vital role for the U.S. taxpayer. Their work is crucial in preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs. In 2006 alone, audits by Inspector General offices resulted in potential savings from audit recommendations of $9.9 billion and criminal recoveries of $6.8 billion. However, in order to effectively carry out their mission, Inspectors General must be independent and objective, which requires that they be insulated from improper management and political pressure.

The legislation we have before us today contains a number of important provisions designed to enhance the effectiveness and independence of Inspectors General, as well as provisions to enhance the accountability of the entire Inspector General system. It updates the Inspector General Act of 1978 to promote independence and accountability for Inspectors General in executive branch departments and agencies.

Mr. Chairman, there are many badly needed reforms to the Inspector General system that this legislation directly addresses. It defines the terms of office for Inspector Generals as fixed seven-year terms, helping to insulate Inspectors General from political retribution. It goes on to enumerate conditions for removal of Inspectors General, who currently serve at the pleasure of their appointing authorities, allowing for their termination before the end of their terms only for serious cause, such as malfeasance, permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, or conviction of a felony. Both of these provisions will go a long way in enhancing the ability of Inspectors General to remain politically independent.

In addition, this legislation requires Inspectors General to submit their budgets to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress. This provision is intended to deter officials in their respective agencies from slashing their funding in retaliation for unfavorable audits, further enhancing the independence of Inspectors General.

Mr. Chairman, recently, concerns have been raised about possible misconduct by certain Inspectors General. This legislation, therefore, includes provisions to raise the level of accountability of the Inspectors General system. To cite a recent example, last week seven current and former members of the State Department's Inspector General office alleged that Inspector General Howard Krongard repeatedly thwarted investigations into alleged contact fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan, including refusing to send investigators to Iraq and Afghanistan to investigate $3 billion worth of State Department contracts. These employees allege that Krongard's partisan political ties have led him to thwart these investigations in order to protect the Bush Administration from political embarrassment.

Mr., Chairman, as you are well aware, these are extremely serious accusations that go deep into the heart of our Inspector General system. If those we are entrusting to remain independent and objective are instead being swayed by political ties, then our Inspector General system is broken. In the wake of the recent Baghdad shootout involving U.S. contractors from the private firm Blackwater USA, in which 17 people were killed and 24 were injured, it is imperative that all agencies sending contractors to Iraq and Afghanistan be able to maintain sufficient oversight of these contracts. If Inspectors General cannot do their job because of political pressure or affiliation, it is our responsibility to fix the Inspector General system.

To do so, this bill contains provisions to hold Inspectors General themselves accountable for their decisions and actions. It also provides a mechanism for investigating and resolving allegations of misconduct by Inspectors General. The bill creates an Inspectors General Council and requires the Council to appoint an Integrity Committee, chaired by the Council's FBI representative. This Integrity Committee shall investigate any allegations of wrongdoing made against Inspectors General or their senior staff members and report substantiated allegations to the executive branch. Reports of Integrity Committee investigations must be submitted to both the Executive Chairperson of the Council and to Congress.

Mr. Chairman, we rely on the system of Inspectors General, and on the individuals who serve in this capacity, to serve as the principal watchdogs of the nation's major federal agencies. In 2006 alone, audits by Inspector General offices resulted in potential savings from audit recommendations of $9.9 billion and criminal recoveries of $6.8 billion. To effectively carry out this crucial mission, it is imperative that Inspectors General remain independent and objective, which in turn requires that they be insulated from improper management and political pressure.

This legislation is a crucial step forward. By enhancing the independence of the Inspectors General and improving the accountability of the Inspector General system overall, this legislation will have a positive impact on the integrity and accountability of our government. I strongly support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.