Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1534, I call up the bill (H.R. 7321) to authorize financial assistance to eligible automobile manufacturers, and for other purposes, and ask for its…
Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1534, I call up the bill (H.R. 7321) to authorize financial assistance to eligible automobile manufacturers, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
Mr. Speaker, at the outset I ask that all Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on this bill and include extraneous remarks and material thereon.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, we consider this bill in a context, a context framed by the report last Friday of a massive loss of jobs in the American economy. This economy is in the worst shape that it has been in since the Great Depression.
We are facing a double hit, a credit crisis brought on by a variety of factors, but resulting now in a serious lack of confidence on the part of investors and a deterioration in the physical parts of the economy, which have combined to cause a serious, deep recession.
That is relevant because there have been suggestions that we could afford to allow the three domestically owned auto companies to founder, that there are other sources of automobiles, that they could be required to declare bankruptcy, to, therefore, not pay suppliers, to cut back substantially on money owed dealers, to reduce by large amounts the workforce and the compensation of the workforce, to take one of the major factors of the American economy and substantially reduce its economic impact.
I think that would have been a mistake in any economic period, but to contemplate the severity of that blow to our economic activity at this time is to invite further deterioration of an economy that has already deteriorated beyond what people expected and beyond what the American people ought to have to tolerate.
The bill is a limited bill. It is the product of a compromise, the terms of which were largely dictated by the President of the United States. I am struck, Mr. Speaker, by the lack of confidence that has been expressed on the Republican side of this House, not in the auto industry, but in George Bush and the people he has and will appoint.
The amount of money here, $15 billion, is a loan. It is a loan far more likely to be repaid than many of the much larger amounts that the Bush administration and the Federal Reserve, working with them, have advanced to Citigroup and AIG and the number of other entities.
It is $15 billion because the President said no new money, not even money from the $700 billion troubled assets fund, the TARP. This Congress voted a month or two ago, 2 months ago, to advance $25 billion to the auto industry to promote innovation, which everyone agrees is necessary. It wasn't just to the Big Three, it was to any applicant who was going to use this money to try to innovate.
The President said, to our dismay, he would veto any legislation trying to keep the auto industry out of bankruptcy that used any funds other than that $25 billion that had already been voted for that purpose. The Speaker, to her credit, resisted what I think was a strong temptation to engage in a dispute with the President that would have killed any effort to get legislation and instead, perhaps to his surprise, she agreed with him and said we would live with that constraint.
So the amount of money that is here is both in amount and, in short, exactly what George Bush wanted. This is an amount of money that George Bush told us we could make available.
We have made it available in a form that makes it overwhelmingly likely that it will be repaid. It is a loan with the American Government in a super senior position in terms of repayment and where there were some potential problems with that because of clauses in other agreements, heavy collateral.
So this $15 billion is very likely to be returned if the program fails. That's the worst case.
We will have advanced $15 billion, we will get it back in 3 months because disaster cannot be averted, but we are not willing to say that disaster cannot be averted without trying.
What this bill then says is the President of the United States, George Bush, shall designate an administration official to preside over a process of hard negotiation with all of those who have a share in this industry, the companies, of course, the bondholders, the workers, the suppliers and the auto dealers, and make it clear to them that if they are not willing and able to come together and reduce costs and put in place a program that makes it possible to envision a future in which more efficient cars are made and sold with a great likelihood of success, then not only will there be no more money than the $15 billion, but the $15 billion will have to be repaid.
Well, apparently my Republican colleagues, again, do not think that the Bush administration has within its ranks anyone capable, with all the help that they have been given, of beginning that process. Some have said, no, make them go bankrupt.
There is nothing about bankruptcy that cannot be accomplished within the framework we have said except the ability to unilaterally say ``no'' to this or that class of people who are owed money. All of the powers that you could accomplish in reorganization in a bankruptcy are given here, and the enforcement power is that the money will be withdrawn if this is not done and the entities will collapse.
We have provisions in here that make it impossible, if the Bush administration and then the Obama administration coming after them, say so to have money that was, in part, provided by the American taxpayer, used to finance activity in other countries. That doesn't mean American investors should never be in other countries. It does mean that taxpayer dollars made available in these circumstances shouldn't go to other countries. Then the question is, then, well, why the haste? We are hastily reacting to very fast-moving events.
A month ago it did not appear that the car companies would be in such dire straits. Car companies all over the world have been hurt by the credit crisis. Automobiles are paid for by credit. As credit has tightened up substantially, and as people have lost their jobs, there has been a greater than anticipated fall off in auto sales. Of course, the auto companies have made mistakes in the past, a lot of people in the industry have, including consumers.
But we find that the rapid deterioration in the general economy, it hasn't caused the problem for the automakers, but it has exacerbated them and greatly shortened our time horizon.
This bill is intended to keep them from going bankrupt between now and March 31. It does it in a way that will allow us to recapture the money if that effort fails. It does express the belief that, done properly, in conjunction with other things, things that could unstick the credit market, funds that we hope will be made available under the troubled assets program to auto dealers, who have a very real claim here, and we will be pushing for a program that will include them and funding be made available. Several Members of this House have spoken out strongly in favor of doing that.
We believe it is possible, and likely, that as the economy gets better, and as they continue the movements they have already made towards cars that are likely to sell and be more energy efficient, that we can survive this.
There are some Members who have consistently opposed any intervention, but this administration sent over $100 billion to AIG. Citigroup has been the recipient of very large amounts of money. I do not understand how people can have not made any effort to undo the administration's intervention with AIG, well over $100 billion, and then try and stop about one-seventh of that sum as a loan to the auto companies.
Yes, credit and finance are important, but the physical work done by working class and middle-class Americans in auto companies, in car dealerships, in the small businesses that are other suppliers, cumulatively, are just as important. To give up now on the auto industry would be to condemn the American economy at one of its most vulnerable periods in our economic history to a degree of further hurt, and the American people deserve better.
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, December 10, 2008.
Hon. Barney Frank,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Frank: This is to memorialize the provisions
in H.R. 7321, the ``Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring
Act,'' that fall within the rule X jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Judiciary. In particular, there are several
provisions in section 12(d) and (e) that alter the normal
operation of the bankruptcy laws; section 19(c) provides the
annual cost-of-living salary adjustment for the federal
judiciary: and section 19(d) precludes private antitrust
suits regarding certain consultations between a covered
automaker and its employees, dealers, suppliers, and
creditors.
In agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of
the bill, in order that it may proceed without delay to the
House floor for consideration, the Judiciary Committee does
not waive any jurisdiction over subject matter contained in
this or similar legislation. We also reserve the right to
seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this important legislation,
and would ask your support if such a request is made.
I would appreciate your including this letter in the
Congressional Record during consideration of the bill on the
House floor. Thank you for your attention to this request,
and for the cooperative relationship between our two
committees.
Sincerely,
John Conyers, Jr.,
Chairman.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to note that I am surprised to hear my friend argue that the bankruptcy courts have more automotive expertise and engineering and finance and industrial policy expertise than is present in the whole Bush administration. I think he is too pessimistic about that and too much supportive of the bankruptcy process.
Second, I would also just recall the very thoughtful remark of our colleague from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee, who noted that those who thought bankruptcy was a disaster for mortgages appear to see it as a panacea for automobiles. Many of us fail to see how that transformation took place.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Detroit (Ms. Kilpatrick).
(Ms. KILPATRICK asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I now yield 3 minutes to the dean of the House and a great expert over time on the auto industry, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell).
(Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Speaker, I think we've gotten an imbalance of time here, so if it is all right with the gentleman from Texas, I would reserve and defer to him for another speaker or two to even out the time.
I would continue to reserve.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to say that my friend from Georgia apparently doesn't trust the auto companies to know what's in their own interest. He says that the provision in our bill that gives the administrator the ability to cancel a decision, which we have in there as protection against money being sent overseas, is way too interventionist, and instead, they'd be better off with bankruptcy. That's a choice they will be free to make under this bill.
This bill doesn't force anybody to apply for the money. Any company that thinks the provisions of this bill are too burdensome and too interventionist retains the full authority to run to bankruptcy.
I will say this. I yield myself 15 seconds. They think bankruptcy is a lot less attractive than the gentleman from Georgia. But understand, he says, protect the companies from this intervention which keeps money from being sent overseas. Let them go bankrupt.
None of them want to make that choice, but if they do, this bill leaves them free to do it. It doesn't force them to take the money. They still have the joys of bankruptcy which the gentleman from Georgia explained to them.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
I yield the gentleman 30 seconds.
I would reserve again. We have got an imbalance that we created.
I yield 1 minute to another long-time distinguished expert in the field, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Kildee).
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, I will take 30 seconds to say that my friend from Arizona says how can we assume that one bureaucrat would know more than the marketplace. Well, it's not harder to do that than to assume that one bankruptcy trustee would know more than the marketplace. Bankruptcy is a suspension of the marketplace. I am puzzled by this double standard here. Let's leave it to the market by appointing a bankruptcy trustee--a total abnegation of the concept of the market--and the appointment of a lawyer who is less likely, it seems to me, to have the expertise than the whole Bush administration might be able to find in industrial matters.
I yield 1 minute to the long-suffering and extremely patient gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay).
(Mr. CLAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
I yield 1 minute to a member of the committee, to the Chair of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
Well, I am personally prepared to close. I would not be allowed to, so I have several more speakers.
I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan, who has been, as I can personally testify, the most ardent advocate in responding to this automobile crisis, Mr. Levin.
If the gentleman would yield, the answer is, yes, that clause does apply. We would want an automobile manufacturer to be able to use any of its existing unfunded credit facilities as a source of liquidity. So we clearly intend for the savings clause in the subordination provision of the legislation to cover unfunded committed credit facilities in effect as of December 2.
Let me inquire of the gentleman: Does he have only one speaker remaining?
Then I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland, the majority leader.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Perlmutter).
Mr. Speaker, I will now speak, and I will have one speaker after that. So when I'm through, it will be the turn of the gentleman from Texas to do his closing because I'm retaining one speaker after myself.
I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
Here is the dichotomy: Bankruptcy versus a piece of legislation which says to the administration--the incoming and outgoing--you do what you hope to accomplish in bankruptcy but with more flexibility, with a greater pool of people to call on.
We've heard mocked the notion that either this administration or the next would have within its ranks expertise in economics and industrial organization, and we're told, ``No, no. That doesn't work. Find a bankruptcy trustee.'' I think they get the worst part of that argument if they listen to it.
Beyond that, we have consumer marketing issues. The three companies are convinced--and almost every expert I talked to agrees with them--if they declare formal bankruptcy, their ability to sell cars is damaged. People buying cars want to know they will have a continuing relationship with an entity that will service the cars and make parts for the cars.
So this continuing longer term relationship makes bankruptcy far more of a problem for them than for an airline where your contingency was just to buy one seat and nothing further.
But again, the greatest illogic is to argue that somehow in the bankruptcy courts with a bankruptcy trustee, we were going to tie it to the lawyers. You get a far greater degree of expertise than either one of the two Presidential administrations could find within its ranks of economists and engineers and others. Therefore, we believe that our solution is the preferred one.
Mr. Speaker, in very shaky opposition, I start out claiming the time, but I am open minded on the subject, so I claim the 5 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, as evidence of my open- mindedness here and being willing to listen, I will yield 2 minutes to our very able committee colleague and cosponsor of this amendment, Mr. Green.
If the gentleman will yield, yes, we will have a recorded vote on this.
I believe I have 3 minutes remaining?
Well, I intend to use the 3\1/2\ minutes to speak enthusiastically for this amendment now for a couple of reasons.
First, the merits of the amendment. We were told by the Treasury Department that they would get more lending done. Some people unfairly said that the bill we passed didn't have good oversight. It had a number of pieces of oversight, including the best oversight you can have in this Federal Government, the Government Accountability Office, an outstanding organization.
We worked with them, and they were there on the first day of this program. We had a briefing with them. They have given us a report, and the report said that Treasury was not doing a good job of seeing whether the people who received the capital injections were, in turn, lending.
We heard that anecdotally, we got a confirmation that Treasury wasn't measuring. What particularly distressed me was Treasury didn't say, well, you don't understand how hard it is. Treasury said, you are right, we are not going to try, that we will judge the overall success of the program without doing that.
Now, I will give Mr. Kashkari credit. Today, at a hearing we held-- and we called a hearing just to deal with this
issue--he indicated they now do plan to do it. But I think given the initial reluctance, this amendment is very important.
For Members who voted for the TARP and want to see that vote vindicated, you need to vote for this amendment, because it makes it valid. But there is one other thing you have to do. Let me ask you another procedural question. This is the last train out of the legislative station this year.
So I would advise Members, if you believe that we need to put pressure on the Treasury to have the TARP do more lending, you have to do two things. You have to vote for the LaTourette amendment, but then you have to vote for the underlying bill. Because I would advise Members, if you vote for the LaTourette amendment, and you then vote against the bill, Mr. Speaker, I would caution Members going back to their districts and taking credit for having voted for an amendment into a vehicle which they then crashed into the sea.
So the only way the LaTourette amendment will have any effect, and I hope it will have effect because it's important, is if the bill to which it is about to be attached passes.
So I congratulate the gentleman on an extraordinary amendment. I am envious that I didn't think of this strategy to help get the bill passed, but I will acknowledge my strategic better in this case. That may sound ironic, but it's the case.
If you vote for the LaTourette amendment--which I think does a very important job of improving the TARP--and you then vote against this bill, you have completely and totally negated it.
Now you may, Mr. Speaker, have Members here who find it of value to be on both sides of this issue, to take credit for improving the TARP in theory, but disimproving it in practice, but I would hope that most of us would not want to be in that position. So I urge Members to vote for this, and having voted for this important thing, the gentleman is right, the gentleman from Ohio, he did put it in a separate bill. But that separate bill is not going anywhere.
There will be no further legislative work. So if you believe that we need to have the banks who have not been lending, and who have received part of the TARP, relend, vote for the amendment, and vote for the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.