I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, I stood right here a few years ago against my party in favor of reform. I got scars on my back from standing for reform. But I heard John Tanner say…
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I stood right here a few years ago against my party in favor of reform. I got scars on my back from standing for reform. But I heard John Tanner say when I got to Congress that neither party has an exclusive on integrity and ideas, and I believe that is true.
I want to tell you tonight, on the same platform I stood a few years ago when I joined then minority in this reform, there is good reform and there is bad reform. This is bad reform. I don't care what you say about it, how kind you are about it, this is bad reform. It is not good for the institution. It is not workable.
Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record a four-page document by Ken Kellner, the senior counsel for your majority Ethics Committee, explaining all the problems.
Review of Task Force Proposal
Bill: I looked over the draft resolution forwarded by Rep.
Smith. I suggest you review it closely as well. Review of the
draft was not to critique the need for or merits of the
proposal, but to identify areas in which the proposal would
interfere with the operations of the Committee. We cannot
anticipate all plausible areas of concern prior to actual
implementation, but I did the best I could.
1. The new ``Office'' or ``Board'' is expressly authorized
to take up matters on its own initiative and to conduct
interviews and obtain testimony in its ``review'' of such
matters. See Section 1(c)(1)(A). This raises several
concerns, listed below:
As the Committee noted in its earlier feedback to the task
force, the interview of witnesses by both the new entity and
the Committee might result in conflicting statements that
would undermine the value of testimony from that witness.
Statements from witnesses would also likely be obtained
prematurely due to the time deadlines imposed on the new
entity. Sometimes there are valid investigative reasons not
to reveal the existence of an investigation to a witness
until other witnesses are interviewed or other evidence
obtained. In the course of its proceedings, the new entity
might reveal critical evidence or information to key
witnesses. The failure of those witnesses to keep this
information confidential may be very harmful to the integrity
of any future Committee inquiry.
The ``self-initiation'' discretion could undermine current
rules that limit complaints to those filed by Members. An
agent could provide information to the new entity that would
trigger review under its rules. There is no accountability as
to the source of information, unlike with respect to
``complainants,'' who must certify that the ``information is
submitted in good faith and warrants the review and
consideration of the Committee,'' and who must provide a copy
of the complaint and all attachments to the respondent. See
Committee Rules (d) and (e).
2. The new entity must ``transmit to the individual who is
the subject of the second-phase review the written report and
findings of the board[.]'' See Section 1(c)(2)(C)(ii). In
addition, the report will include ``findings of fact,'' ``a
description of any relevant information that it was unable to
obtain or witnesses whom it was unable to interview [] and
the reasons therefore,'' and a recommendation for the
issuance of subpoenas where appropriate.''
It is a bad idea for the Committee's purposes that the
``written report and findings of the board'' be transmitted
both to the Committee and to the individual under review.
This will provide information to a potential respondent at an
inappropriate stage, including alerting the respondent as to
witnesses who have been identified as potential recipients of
subpoenas. At a minimum, this would provide opportunities for
the coordination (or appearance of coordination) of
testimony. Potential respondents would also be alerted as to
difficulties encountered in obtaining information from
certain witnesses. This could discourage negotiated outcomes
if a respondent knows that certain individuals are not
cooperating witnesses.
This process is not sensitive to the need for
confidentiality of witness information at the early stages of
an investigation. Members, staff, and private individuals
should be able to provide information in confidence, at least
at the initial stages. The new rules may have an anti-
whistleblower effect and possibly employment ramifications
for individuals as well. For example, what if it is revealed
that a current employee is providing or refusing to provide
information about his or her employing Member? A previous
ethics task force was ``mindful'' of the need to ``protect
the confidentiality of a witness prior to publicly
disclosing'' a statement of alleged violation. Report of the
Ethics Reform Task Force on H. Res. 168, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 25 (June 17, 1997).
The proposal is also inconsistent with Committee rules and
practices that keep investigative information confidential.
Under Committee Rule 26(f), evidence gathered by an
Investigative Subcommittee that would potentially be used to
prove a violation ``shall be made available to the respondent
and his or her counsel only after each agrees, in writing,
that no document, information, or other materials . . . shall
be made public until'' a Statement of Alleged Violation is
made public by the Committee or an adjudicatory hearing is
commenced.
There is no rule or precedent in effect for the new entity
for dealing with concerns of the Department of Justice in
cases of concurrent jurisdiction. As noted, under the
proposed process, there is considerable potential for the
making of inconsistent statements by witnesses and for the
release of confidential information. It this occurs, it
could easily undermine active criminal investigations.
The Board may make ``findings of fact'' as part of their
submission. This is generally a
function for a trier of fact after an opportunity for a
defendant/respondent to cross-examine witnesses or challenge
the evidence. What if the findings differ from those reached
by the Committee?
3. There appears to be a requirement that the Committee
publicly disclose Board submissions to the Committee. See
Section 3(2). This would occur if the Committee declines to
empanel an Investigative Subcommittee or if one year has
passed from the date of the referral from the new entity.
This means that the Committee must release the Board's
findings, even if the Committee has already determined to
handle the matter non-publicly. This is inconsistent with the
discretion now with the Committee (and investigative bodies
generally) to exercise judgment as to what matters to address
in a non-public fashion. With the possibility of review by
the new entity and public disclosure of conduct, there will
be greatly reduced incentive for witnesses and investigated
parties to cooperate with the Committee or to do so with
complete cooperation and candor.
This procedure also may place artificial pressure on an
Investigative Subcommittee to complete its work in well less
than a year, regardless of the impact on the investigation.
While such a time period may be sufficient, neither the
Department of Justice nor other law enforcement entities and
regulatory bodies, are subject to such limitations as they
would generally impact adversely on the completeness of an
inquiry.
4. A provision in the proposal provides that the Office
will cease its review of a matter on the request of the
Committee ``because of the ongoing investigation of such
matter by the Committee.'' See Section 1(d).
This rule should be clarified to make clear that it
includes informal fact-finding efforts by the Chair and
Ranking Member of the Committee. Otherwise, this important
rule may only have effect in the unusual case of empanelled
subcommittees. New language could be ``because of the ongoing
review of this matter by the Committee in accordance with the
Committee's rules.'' Section 1(d) and Section 3(3) should be
revised.
5. If the new entity ceases such review at the request of
the Committee it will ``so notify any individual who is the
subject of the review.'' See Section 1(d).
There are valid circumstances under which the Committee
would not want to notify an individual that it is undertaking
review of a matter until it is ready to do so for valid
investigative and privacy reasons. In general, it is not the
routine practice of law enforcement entities to notify
individuals. Such disclosures could trigger protective
behaviors that might undermine an investigation, as well as
lead individuals to hire of attorneys (perhaps unnecessarily
and at considerable expense). [By analogy, would it be
appropriate in all cases to notify a respondent that the
Committee has referred evidence of criminal conduct to the
Department of Justice? In many cases, it is in the interests
of criminal law enforcement that such referrals be made in
confidence.]
6. The new entity must adopt a ``rule requiring that there
be no ex parte communications between any member of the board
and any individual who is the subject of
any review by the board.'' See Section 1(c)(2)(E)(iv).
This provision should be revised to prohibit communications
from any interested persons and any member of the board, as
well as make explicit that ex parte contacts include those
made by counsel. A useful provision to examine in considering
ex parte prohibitions is the provision contained in Federal
Election Commission regulations pertaining to contacts with
any Commissioner. See 11 C.F.R. Sec. 201.2.
Kenneth E. Kellner,
Senior Counsel, Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct.
They kept a lid on it till today, and the bill is up tonight, and here it is. It is bad reform.
If you think that the steroid and baseball hearings are a distraction over the business of the people of this country, wait until tomorrow when this goes into effect, when outsiders are firing political shots at each other, listening to people back home want us to quit bickering and sniping and firing shots at each other and get these important things done for them.
The gentlelady said she yields the customary time. This is not a customary process. The rule was shut down. There are no substitutes, there is no recommit, there are no alternatives, and there is no consideration of a bipartisan alternative by two people with integrity who have been working together for weeks to have a day to say, no, this is a better approach.
Have former Members, first time ever that outsiders are part of this process, but they are former Members. They have no ax to grind. They will call it like it is. Let's take a logical step.
But let me tell you, if this is based on trying to hold the House, that's a false strategy. When we put our reelection as a majority above the people's business and honor and integrity we lost, and we should have, and you are doing the same thing.
Don't do this, House. It's not good for this country, and it's not good for us.