Providing for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 1) to provide for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

Mr. Speaker, September 11 was a very important day in Boston history. Mohammed Atta and nine other terrorists hijacked two planes with hundreds of people on them 2 miles from my house and flew them into the World Trade Center, killing not only the people in the World Trade Center, but all of the people on those two planes from Logan airport.

For the last 5 years, we've had a fight over whether or not we should screen

the cargo which goes on passenger planes in our country. Yes, each of us has to take off our shoes, our bags have to go through, we have to take off our wristwatches, children's baby carriages have to be inspected. But, believe it or not, then the cargo is placed right under our feet, and it's not screened. Billions of pounds of cargo not screened.

And so this cargo loophole has been fought by the cargo industry, opposed by the Bush administration, but now it is in this legislation. And henceforth, all of the cargo which goes onto passenger planes in our country, placed next to the bags of passengers, placed under the feet of passengers on planes, will also be screened. And so now cargo will have this on it. Screened, safe to place upon those planes. It is a huge moment in security. This bill is historic.

And secondly, although the Bush administration has opposed it, this legislation also includes my language which is going to require the screening of cargo on ships coming into ports in the United States.

Right now cargo with a nuclear bomb in it, which we know is al Qaeda's top goal, to obtain a nuclear weapon from someplace in the former Soviet Union, move it to a port in the world and move that ship with the cargo into New York, into Long Beach, into Boston, and then detonate the nuclear bomb before it is taken out of the cargo hold of that ship, destroying that American city. Because of the language in this bill, that cargo will now be screened in the port overseas before it ever leaves for our country. It will be screened for a nuclear bomb overseas, thwarting the highest objective which al Qaeda has, which is to detonate a nuclear bomb.

Now, I can understand the Bush administration's misgivings about it, and I understand that many of the Senators, Republican Senators will not sign this conference report because of this requirement. I think they're making a historic mistake. This is at the top of the terrorist target list. This is what they want to do to American cities, detonate a nuclear bomb on a ship already docked in a port in the United States before it's ever taken off that ship.

This legislation is historic. I congratulate Chairman Thompson. I congratulate the staff. I congratulate the bipartisan nature for the vast majority of this legislation. It is overdue. It is overdue.

We must put in place the defense, now, against al Qaeda returning to finish their plot against us here in the homeland.

Al Qaeda came to Boston to begin this attack. There's no reason to believe they can't return to those very same planes, to those very same docks where al Qaeda came in. They came in through the ports of Boston to, in fact, wreak this catastrophic event on our country.

Vote ``yes'' on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, as the principal author of the air cargo security provision in Section 1602 of the conference report--Screening of Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft--I want to make several points clear.

While the House version of the bill used the term ``inspected'' and the Senate version used ``screened'', neither bill actually defined these terms. The language in the final version of the bill does define ``screening'', and it makes clear that screening does not mean what DHS currently considers screening--reviews of manifests, information about shippers (Known Shipper program), etc.

To make clear what is meant by screening, the final bill states that:

The system used to screen 100 percent of cargo carried on passenger planes must provide a level of security on par with the level of security for passengers' checked bags. Specifically, the language states that the system ``shall require, at a minimum, that equipment, technology, procedures, personnel or other methods approved by the Administrator of TSA are used to screen cargo carried on passenger planes to provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage.'' (emphasis added). A 3-year deadline is established to get to 100 percent, with an interim benchmark of 50 percent of cargo within 18 months of enactment.

Screening means an examination of the cargo's contents, not just information about the cargo, consistent with the mandate that the cargo screening must be on par with the security standard for screening of passengers' checked bags. The bill stipulates the cargo screening methods TSA is to use to meet this standard: ``Methods of screening include x-ray systems, explosive detection systems, explosive trace detection, explosive detection canine teams certified by the TSA, or a physical search together with manifest verification.'' These are methods currently used for checked bags.

While TSA may approve additional methods, they cannot be solely data checks, and must also utilize physical checks. As the final language makes clear: ``The Committee is also concerned about TSA using data checks of cargo or shippers . . . as a single factor in determining whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security. The Conference substitute, therefore, requires that if such data checks are used, they must be paired with additional physical or nonintrusive screening method approved by TSA that examines the cargo's contents.'' (emphasis added).

There has been some discussion in the media about Congress's intent in passing this provision. I want to address these points and make clear the intent of the provision.

One concern that was raised is that as much as 60 percent of air cargo could be exempt from a mandatory physical inspection at airports, under a new program to be called Certified Shipper.

As noted above, the language in the final version of the bill requires that the system for screening all cargo on passenger planes must ``provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage.'' All cargo on passenger planes must be physically examined before it is loaded onboard, a major departure from current practice. While TSA may be considering a so-called ``Certified Shipper'' program that would require physical examination of all cargo in a location off the airport grounds and then a sealing of the cargo containers with tamper-proof seals, this plan, and any such system developed by TSA, must provide a level of cargo security on par with the level of security for checked bags, which includes the requirement that the contents of all the cargo must be physically checked.

The final version of the bill mandates that the Department of Homeland Security issue a rule to implement a system consistent with the bill's 100 percent cargo screening requirement. Congress, along with stakeholders who have been working to require 100 percent screening of all cargo carried on passenger planes, will be watching TSA's plans closely to ensure that the implementation of the cargo screening mandate in the bill is performed in a manner that complies with the mandate in the final version of the bill. If TSA's system does not ``provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage'' as required in the bill, it will not be in compliance with the congressional mandate in the final version of the bill, and therefore will be in jeopardy of being halted or modified by Congress to bring it into compliance with the law.

Another concern that has been raised is that companies that participate in the Certified Shipper program would still have to follow security rules, including conducting their own package inspections and putting special tamperproof seals on containers, but packages handled by these companies, which will probably represent the bulk of the air cargo industry, would generally be exempt from mandated electronic, canine or other physical inspections at the airport.

Again, a so-called ``Certified Shipper'' program or any other program that TSA develops to implement the mandate to screen 100 percent of the cargo on passenger planes must meet the standard that it provides a level of security on par with the level of security for passenger checked bags. At this point, it is unclear whether a program that screens and then seals cargo outside the airport perimeter would meet this standard.

In an April 2007 report requested by Representative Markey and other Members, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that the Department of Homeland Security is conducting pilot programs to test a number of currently employed technologies used in other areas of aviation and transportation security, as well as new technologies. These pilot programs include an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the viability of potential security countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security seals. According to GAO, TSA anticipates completing its pilot tests by 2008. (GAO-07-660 Aviation Security). Before implementation of any TSA air cargo program relying on seals, a thorough, comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of such seals will have to be conducted. Again, if such a system does not ``provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage'' as required in the bill, it will not be in compliance with the congressional mandate in the final version of the bill, and therefore will be in jeopardy of being halted or modified by Congress to bring it into compliance with the law.

Another concern that has been raised is that a program similar to Certified Shipper that is

used by Customs and Border Patrol for ship cargo has frequently been criticized. Auditors have found that companies in this program are sometimes permitted to move their goods more quickly even though there is insufficient proof that they have a robust security system in place.

The program referred to above is called the Customs--Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). I have criticized C-TPAT for many of the same reasons cited above. In fact, in addition to the air cargo screening requirement, the final version of the bill also includes a requirement that 100 percent of maritime cargo must be screened and sealed overseas before it arrives in U.S. ports. Clearly, with the inclusion of this mandate in the final version of the bill, Congress rejected C-TPAT as a substitute for 100 percent scanning of maritime containers. It did not intend, nor would it permit, a program for screening 100 percent of air cargo that is based on the flawed C- TPAT program.

By establishing the standard that TSA's system for screening 100 percent of cargo on passenger planes must ``provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage'', the final version of the bill creates requirements much more stringent than the C-TPAT program. C-TPAT uses risk-based process, not mandatory, comprehensive screening. Specifically, C-TPAT security guidelines state that ``C-TPAT recognizes the complexity of international supply chains and endorses the application and implementation of security measures based upon risk analysis. Therefore, the program allows for flexibility and the customization of security plans based on the member's business model. As listed throughout this document appropriate security measures, based on risk, must be implemented and maintained throughout the Air Carrier's supply chains'' (emphasis added, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial _enforcement/ctpat/security_guideline/ guideline_air_carrier.xml)

The air cargo provision requires 100 percent screening, not risk assessment. The air cargo provision mandates screening of all cargo carried on passenger planes within 3 years. Under the air cargo provision in the conference report, no risk calculation is permitted to determine whether or which cargo to screen; rather, all cargo is presumed to present a risk and must be screened, just as all of passengers' checked bags must be screened under the current policy.

The C-TPAT program relies on data and manifest information, not physical checks. C-TPAT guidelines advise program participants in the procedural security measures they should use for the shipping and receiving of cargo. These procedures rely on data and manifest checks, not the physical screening of the cargo to determine and evaluate its contents. Specifically, the C-TPAT guidelines state that: ``Arriving cargo should be reconciled against information on the cargo manifest. The cargo should be accurately described, weighed, labeled, marked, counted and verified. Departing cargo should be checked against purchase or delivery orders.'' (emphasis added)

Whatever system TSA establishes to implement the 100 percent air cargo screening requirement in the bill will be subjected to close congressional scrutiny to ensure that it meets the standard established in the bill; namely, the system must provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage, as stipulated in the bill. Again, any TSA system that fails to meet this standard will not be in compliance with the congressional mandate in the final version of the bill, and therefore will be in jeopardy of being halted or modified by Congress to bring it into compliance with the law.

Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege, as the first Democratic chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, to rise in strong support of this rule and the underlying bill.

At the direction of the Speaker, I authored H.R. 1, legislation to complete the unfinished business of the 9/11 Commission. It had 200 original cosponsors.

H.R. 1 was the first bill of the 110th Congress. It passed the House by a vote of 299-128; 32 House conferees on a bipartisan basis, including Ranking Member King, signed the conference report. Late last night the Senate passed it by a vote of 85-8.

It would seem that 6 years after the 9/11 attacks and 3 years after the release of the 9/11 Commission report, Congress is finally embracing what the 9/11 families have been saying all along. It takes more than vigilance for our Nation to be more secure against the threat of terrorism. It takes a willingness to do things a different way.

The 9/11 Commission challenged the administration, Congress and the American people to think a different way and take concrete steps to deter and prevent future attacks. Over the past 3 years, some progress has been made, most notably, the reforms in the intelligence community. However, until today, many of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission remain unfulfilled.

The conference report on H.R. 1 ensures that most grant funding is allocated based on risk. It authorizes $1.6 billion for an interoperability grant program to improve communications for first responders. It provides over $4 billion in rail, mass transit and bus security grants to ensure that our at-risk communities have the security they deserve.

Additionally, the conference report on H.R. 1 puts in achievable benchmarks for ensuring that 100 percent cargo carried on passenger planes is screened. It also mandates the screening of all U.S.-bound ships in foreign ports for 5 years, but gives the Homeland Security Secretary flexibility to delay implementation in certain cases.

The conference report requires a new electronic travel authorization system to screen visitors from companies participating in the Visa Waiver Program. This bill also strengthens a board that oversees privacy and civil liberties issues.

It requires the President and Congress to publicly disclose total spending requested and approved for the intelligence community for 2 years. The bill provides civil immunity to those in good faith who report suspicious activities that threaten the safety and security of passengers on the transportation system, or that could be an act of terrorism.

Before I yield back, I want to say on the record that the provisions I authored to give TSA screeners collective bargaining rights and whistle-blower protections was not included in the final bill. Though not an explicit 9/11 Commission recommendation, I believe that giving voice to the eyes and ears in the airports will make America more secure. I will keep working to get them the protections they deserve.

That said, the bill that is being considered today will make America more secure.

I strongly urge a ``yes'' vote on the rule, as well as the underlying bill.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 1) to provide for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members would have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks.

Mr. Speaker, it is indeed historic, this conference report we have before us at this point.

Almost 3 years ago, 10 American patriots came forward and spoke with one unified bipartisan voice. What they said in their 567-page report fundamentally changed America's views of its security. Quite simply, Mr. Speaker, the 9/11 Commission did its job and told us what must be done to deter and prevent future terrorist attacks on our Nation.

When Congress didn't do its job to implement their recommendation, the 9/11 Commission stayed vigilant and formed the 9/11 discourse project. They did so, as they explained, because the perils of inaction are far too high and the strategic value of the Commission's findings too important for the work of the 9/11 Commission not to continue.

Unfortunately, the project's December 2005 report card found little progress was being made on addressing known vulnerabilities and gaps in our Nation's security. Still, Mr. Speaker, the 109th Congress did not do its job.

On January 5, however, at the direction of Speaker Pelosi, I introduced H.R. 1, a bill to complete the unfinished business of the 9/ 11 Commission, with 200 of my fellow colleagues. Today, I'm privileged to present a bipartisan conference report that finally fulfills the recommendations.

This report passed the Senate just last night before midnight by a vote of 85-8. When H.R. 1 is law, Mr. Speaker, Homeland Security grants will finally be allocated based on risk. Targeted communities will get the Federal help they so richly deserve. First responders will have interoperable communications. When H.R. 1 is law, information necessary to uncover terrorist plots will be exchanged between Federal and local law enforcement. Would-be terrorists will not be able to exploit the Visa Waiver Program. Privacy and civil liberties will be central in how we approach homeland security. Our rail, mass transit and aviation systems will be more secure. When H.R. 1 is law, 100 percent of U.S.- bound cargo will be scanned in a commerce-friendly manner.

Though I'm disappointed that collective bargaining and whistle-blower rights for TSA screeners were not included in the final report, I applaud Senator Lieberman and the 42 other conferees who stood with us on this legislation. Their hard work, combined with the leadership of Speaker Pelosi, Majority Leader Hoyer, assured that this effort came to fruition.

Frederick Douglass once said, ``The life of a nation is secure only while the nation is honest, truthful and virtuous.'' Thank you to the 9/11 Commission for exemplifying these values. And thank you to the 9/ 11 families, and everyone else who would not let us forget what was at stake if we did not act.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to suggest to Mr. King that it would have been nice to have four conferees, but it was a 900-page bill, so we had 60. It worked, and I'm happy to see the process go forward.

I would like to yield 1 minute to the chairman of the Intelligence Subcommittee on Homeland Security, the gentlelady from California (Ms. Harman).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), one of the conferees, as well as the chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the majority leader of the House of Representatives.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 1 minute to the Speaker of the House.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the next speaker, who perhaps can answer some of the questions raised by the previous speaker, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), who has been a champion of inspection and screening ever since he has been here. As the Speaker indicated, his district was hit on 9/11.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to a member of the Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Etheridge).

(Mr. ETHERIDGE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I'm proud to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey), who's also a member of the Homeland Security Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Green), a member of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton), a member of the Homeland Security Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).

(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), who is a member of the committee.

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, it is quite clear that there is substantial support for the bill as well as substantial support to get on the vote for the bill.

I would like to thank my colleague, Ranking Member King, for his support as well as his staff. They have been very good. I would like to recognize the Democratic staff: Jessica Flanigan, Rosaline Cohen, Michael Stroud, everybody. I have something to insert in the Record to recognize their value.

Mr. Speaker, it is quite clear that this is a good bill. It is in the best interest of the country. It is completion of the 9/11 vulnerability report. I urge its adoption.

Mr. Speaker, while I commend the work on H.R. 1, I rise today to express my disappointment that the provision to afford our Transportation Security Officers, TSOs, the collective bargaining rights and whistleblower protections they deserve is excluded from the Conference Report. Mr. Speaker, our TSOs are not second class citizens and should not be treated as such.

In 2001, when the Transportation Safety Administration, TSA, was created, Congress vested power to set TSO compensation, leave, and other basic employment rights with the Secretary of Transportation. When TSA was moved to the Department of Homeland Security, this authority remained. While this authority was helpful in getting TSA up and running, the TSOs now need to be treated like all other TSA employees--fairly and equitably. This provision would have restored the labor rights of approximately 43,000 TSOs and provided them with veterans' preference, anti-discrimination protections, retirement, whistle-blowing, and collective bargaining rights.

Restoring basic employment rights is critical to recruiting and retaining TSOs. We do not need to look far to see what low morale can do to the health, recruitment, and retention of the Department of Homeland Security workforce. According to a GAO report released this month, TSOs account for approximately a third of the total workforce and their attrition rates are higher than the normal for the Federal Government. It is unfortunate that we are failing to provide the most basic labor protections to our front line workers who perform an important job and work to keep us all safe; rights that are afforded to thousands of workers in the Federal Government.

I commit to my colleagues today that as Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security I will continue work to ensure that our TSOs are afforded the rights and protections they deserve.

Additionally, Mr. Speaker, let the record reflect that in addition to the staff that I recognized earlier, the following individuals did a service to our Nation in helping the Conference develop legislation to make America more secure.

Michael Stroud

Denise Krepp

Craig Sharman

Tom Finan

Veronique Pluviose-Fenton

Alison Rosso

Jacob Olcott

Chris Beck

Matt Washington

Jeff Greene

Erin Murphy

Michael Beland

Erin Daste

Tamla Scott

Tyrik McKeiver

Stephan Vina

Diane Bean

Brian Turbyfill

Angela Rye

Thank you, Mr. Speaker, for affording me the opportunity to recognize the good work of Majority staff of the Committee on Homeland Security.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for your important leadership on this committee and to the ranking member. It's been a pleasure for me to work cooperatively in a bipartisan way.

I rise in strong support of the conference report which will make us safer by increasing the amount of risk-based homeland security grants, screening 100 percent of maritime and aviation cargo and improving intelligence collection and information-sharing capabilities.

I would also like to highlight the title on interoperability grants which completes the three-pronged interoperability proposal I put forward following September 11.

The dedicated grant program will significantly enhance the ability of public safety agencies to plan, build, and maintain communications networks as they will no longer have to make impossible decisions such as whether to purchase personal protective equipment or radios. It will ensure that first responders will have more advance resources than those used by Paul Revere.

This bill is a great victory for first responders.

I rise in strong support of the conference report, which implements many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, actions that should have been taken years ago.

As a member of the Homeland Security Committee and the conference committee that resolved differences with the Senate, I know that many of us put a great deal of work into creating this legislation. I would like to thank Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King for their tireless work. I would also like to thank our leadership for making this the House's top priority.

I would like to briefly outline a few of the many reasons why this bill makes our country safer. First, it mandates 100 percent scanning of all maritime cargo before it enters the U.S. The current system of scanning only some cargo when it has already entered the U.S. is inadequate. AI Qaeda and other terrorist organizations must be prevented from using a maritime cargo container to conceal a nuclear weapon.

Many have stringently opposed this provision and have stated that they will not support the conference report because of the perceived impact on business. I would respond to this argument by stating the job of Congress is to protect the American people, not stand in the way of commonsense security measures to make it easier for the business community to ship containers. The cost to scan each container is minimal compared to the cost of value of goods shipped in each container. And the cost is nothing compared to the consequence of what would happen if terrorists were able to detonate a nuclear weapon in the U.S.

Second, the bill greatly enhances aviation security efforts. Today, a great deal of cargo is placed on commercial aircraft without being screened. The bill closes this security loophole. It also authorizes $450 million per year for in-line explosive detection systems and provides a process for passengers who have been misidentified and placed on the ``no-fly'' or ``selectee'' lists to clear their names.

Third, it augments intelligence collection and information sharing. The bill properly organizes intelligence gathering agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, to enable them to better communicate potential threats with local first responders. One of the best ways to prevent an attack is to increase our intelligence gathering capabilities. This bill will help to provide assistance to State and local fusion centers and counter-terrorism officials. The excellent work of the New York Police Department's counter-terrorism division to detect and prevent potential terrorist plots exemplifies what can be accomplished by local law enforcement agencies.

Fourth, the bill advances our efforts to identify and protect critical infrastructure, one of the fundamental purposes of the Department of Homeland Security. The conference report includes provisions I proposed to review and update the National Asset Database and the subset National At-Risk Database. It also requires the Department to conduct annual critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments.

These are only four of the many examples of how the bill makes our country more secure. I would like to detail two particular provisions which have been two of my highest priorities since the September 11 attacks--interoperability grants and the first responder funding formula for homeland security grants.

Title III of the conference report completes the three-pronged interoperability proposal I first put forward following September 11. The Department of Homeland Security now has an office that coordinates first responder emergency communications efforts. It is in the process of implementing a national communications strategy, and this bill creates an interoperability grant program.

Communications problems have plagued first responders in every major emergency in the last 15 years. We witnessed this 12 years ago in Oklahoma City. It resurfaced at Columbine in 1999. It slowed our response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. On September 11, it proved to be a deadly problem.

Of the 58 firefighters who escaped the North Tower of the World Trade Center and gave oral histories to the Fire Department of New York, only three heard radio warnings that the North Tower was in danger of collapse. We will never know how many of the 343 firefighters who died that day while heroically rescuing thousands of workers were in the North Tower. Nor will we know how many of these lives would have been spared if they had had effective, interoperable communications equipment to receive the evacuation order.

The provisions in the emergency communications grant title are long overdue. More than 10 years ago, the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee stated that, ``unless immediate measures are taken to promote interoperability, public safety agencies will not be able to adequately discharge their obligation to protect life and property in a safe, efficient, and cost effective manner.''

The 9/11 Commission included interoperability as one of its recommendations and the Public Discourse Project found that the Federal Government had made minimal progress on this priority. This legislation finally responds to the widely acknowledged vulnerabilities posed by poor communications capabilities.

A dedicated grant program, which I first proposed following September 11, will significantly enhance the ability of public safety agencies to plan, build, and maintain communications networks as they will no longer have to make impossible decisions such as whether to purchase personal protective equipment or radios.

This bill will not solve all of our interoperability problems. However, it will help to ensure that in the next emergency, our first responders are not left to the same strategies used by Paul Revere in 1775, which was sadly the case during Katrina just 2 years ago. This is a great victory for first responders.

A second item which I have been fighting for years to improve is the first responder funding formula. Title I of the conference report increases the percentage of DHS grants that are allocated on the basis of risk. For far too long the Department has awarded 40 percent of formula grants to State governments without any consideration of risk. The conference report will eventually lower this amount to 18.52 percent in 5 years.

On four occasions, the House passed legislation to increase the amount of risk-based

funding, including an amendment that I added to the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization bill. The compromise we are considering today, while far from perfect, is the product of several years of negotiations between the two chambers. Even with the conference report, I will continue my efforts to improve the manner in which grants are awarded.

As the old saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. After September 11, we experienced the cost of not being adequately prepared--the loss of almost 3,000 lives and tremendous economic impact. We must distribute homeland security funding on the basis of risk now so that areas most at risk have the resources to prevent and effectively respond to any potential attacks.

Attacks against New York, Madrid, London, and Mumbai illustrate that terrorists target the areas in which they can inflict the most damage. The Federal Government's efforts to prepare and respond to terrorism should reflect this reality. In addition, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to allocate resources to the areas most vulnerable to any type of emergency situation. We cannot afford to use homeland security funding as a type of revenue sharing.

This was one of the most prevalent recommendations from the 9/11 Commission. In 2005, the Commission gave the Federal Government an ``F'' for failing to allocate funding where it is needed. Had the provisions in the conference report been implemented prior to the date the report card was issued, this grade would have been better.

Regardless of the amount of the percentage of risk-based funds, the Department must do a better job calculating risk. In the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program allocation process, the Department made many decisions that resulted in awarding what were supposed to be risk-based funds to areas that do not face a high threat of being attacked. I plan on introducing legislation that would improve the manner in which DHS calculates risk and awards funds, strengthening the first responder funding formula provisions in this conference report.

In addition, I am disappointed that the conference report dropped the provisions that would have provided collective bargaining and other worker protections for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). These provisions were included in both the House and Senate versions of the bill but were dropped from the conference report due to the President's misguided veto threat.

Transportation Security Officers are on the front lines protecting our airports and airplanes. They should be given the basic worker protections enjoyed by other DHS personnel. They perform a crucial and often grueling job that requires training, experience, and patience. We need workers who have mastered the job and will make a career of helping to protect the flying public and our skies.

That is why I am introducing stand-alone legislation today to provide the 42,000 screeners with basic worker protections. This would replace the increasing turnover and dissatisfaction with professionalism and a career path our screeners will pursue long-term. Highly trained and seasoned TSOs are part of our smart, comprehensive, and cost-effective efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and protect America's transportation system.

In its July 2004 report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that we are safer than we were prior to September 11, 2001, but we are not safe. The same is true today. While we will never be able to eliminate all threats or vulnerabilities, the implementation of this conference report is a substantial step forward.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this rule and to the woefully incomplete conference report that the Democrat majority is bringing to the House floor today.

Despite the repeated campaign promises made by Democrat leaders to the American people that they would take action on all of the remaining 9/11 Commission recommendations, that is not what is being done and not what is being brought to the floor of the House today.

It now appears that those claims were nothing more than just a hollow campaign promise because, as anticipated, they have failed to address a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.

While the Senate included a simple sense of Congress that congressional operations should be streamlined so that overlapping and duplicative oversight issues could be addressed, even this simple symbolic measure was dropped from the final legislation.

The 9/11 Commission stated: ``Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need.''

It went on further to say: ``Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.''

In the 109th Congress, House Republicans provided the responsible leadership needed on this issue by making the Committee on Homeland Security a standing committee, but there are still 10 other House committees that have overlapping and redundant oversight over the Department of Homeland Security.

House Democrats could have enacted this change with a simple rules change at the start of the 110th Congress. They failed to do so then; and with this legislation, they are once again ignoring this important issue entirely, including a campaign promise.

Thankfully, Mr. Speaker, this conference report is not a complete failure. Thanks to the leadership of President Bush and House Republicans, two important provisions were fixed in this conference report that will help keep Americans safe and improve our ability to combat terror at home.

First, this legislation wisely does not contain a mandate that collective bargaining rights be required for the Transportation Security Administration screeners. This dangerous provision was originally buried in the House Democrat leadership's version of this legislation; and thanks to President Bush's veto threat, it has been removed from the legislation that we are considering today.

The 9/11 Commission did not recommend collective bargaining for TSA screeners. In fact, to the contrary. The commission stressed the need to improve airport security and screening procedures. Collective bargaining would have prevented implementing fluid operations for protecting our country by requiring TSA management to consult with union bosses before making critical homeland security decisions.

As Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff explained, ``Marines don't collectively bargain over whether they're going to wind up being deployed in Anbar province in Baghdad. We can't negotiate over terms and conditions of work that go to the heart of our ability to move rapidly in order to deal with the threats that are emerging.''

Secretary Chertoff also noted that the proposed negotiations with unions would have seriously threatened operations such as the interception of the London bombing plot or a response to Hurricane Katrina. Thankfully, in what may be the first missed opportunity for increasing the power of labor bosses this year in the House, good sense prevailed and this provision did not survive the legislative process.

Additionally, good sense and Republican-proposed policy prevailed in this conference through the inclusion of a provision to protect vigilant observers who support suspicious terror-related activity. By including these John Doe provisions, my good friend, the Homeland Security Ranking Member Peter King, won a great victory on behalf of the American people.

As Congressman King recently noted, in a post-9/11 reality, vigilance is essential to security. Despite the Democrat opposition to this Homeland Security measure, common sense has prevailed and heroic Americans who report suspicious activity will be prevented and protected from frivolous lawsuits. The American people were heard, and our country is safer because of it.

I commend Congressman King and other Republicans that served on this conference committee for insisting that Congress not let trial lawyers and the fear of litigation get in the way of promoting one of our best and most dynamic lines of defense against domestic terrorism, having everyday Americans report potential threats and terrorist activities to the proper authority.

While the Democrat party may not trust American men and women to use their good sense in reporting suspicious activity, I know as Republicans that's what we will do, and I really do appreciate Pete's efforts for this hard work.

I also appreciate all the hard work that was put into developing the conference reports on both sides of the aisle. I am also pleased to note that this conference report represents the first time that labor bosses and trial attorneys have been denied their every wish on this House floor. Unfortunately, I am not confident that we will see another commonsense bill that puts the safety and well-being of the American people over these special interests any time soon.

I also appreciate the Democrat leadership's attempt at almost fulfilling one of their many unfulfilled campaign promises by bringing this legislation back to the House floor today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Florida, the ranking member of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Mr. Mica.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to engage the gentlewoman, if I can, since she is an expert on this important piece of legislation if she would. And the question I would like to ask the gentlewoman:

Republicans tried our very best, other than demanding, that the terrorist watch list would be applied to trains and passengers for people like on trains and Amtrak. And I wonder if the gentlewoman can tell me whether that was added in this conference report.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, people stand up and talk about what a great job they are doing to protect this country, but they fail to get the essence because it might be a privacy concern. The fact of the matter is that all the people that are on our trains, Amtrak, that we are spending billions of dollars that are being spent for more security officers; and yet the Democrats fail to do the simplest thing, and that is, at the time you buy a ticket, seeing if you are on the terrorist watch list.

It is incredibly arrogant that this Congress would stand up and say we are doing all we can do, and yet we do not even apply the terrorist watch list to people who would be on our trains.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes at this time to the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).

Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to know how much we're protecting this country and what's included in this bill.

I think what the gentlewoman also forgot to say is that in committee they denied CBP the ability to even look at passengers' names who are coming in on rail from other countries to the United States. Once again, another failure from this Democrat Congress.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I'd like to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).

Mr. Speaker, at this time I'd like to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I will be asking for a recorded vote on the previous question for this rule. If the previous question fails, I will ask the House to amend the rule to provide for the separate consideration of H.R. 3138, which would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to update the definition of electronic surveillance.

Mr. Speaker, our country is facing a serious problem that must be addressed before the House adjourns in August. And to date the Democrat majority has continued to shirk their responsibility

to keep America safe by ignoring the seriousness of this threat.

Today the Rules Committee met to pass a rule for the Eightmile Wild and Scenic River Act; however, this Democrat leadership cannot seem to find time to schedule consideration of legislation that clarifies one very simple and critical thing, and that is that the United States Government will no longer be required to get a warrant to listen to foreign terrorists who are not even located in the United States.

Mr. Speaker, repeatedly Members of this House have come to the floor for weeks and weeks and weeks asking for that ability to make sure we can get this done to protect the American people. The Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, and the Director of the CIA, Michael Hayden, have testified to Congress that under current law their hands are tied. As Director McConnell recently testified, FISA is outdated and has been made obsolete by technology. I might also say, and the laws governing that. And today our intelligence community is forced to obtain warrants to listen to terrorists outside our Nation, and as a result we are actually missing, we are missing, a significant portion of what we should be getting. Mr. Speaker, it is one thing to be asleep; it is a different thing not to even wake up and see what you need to do.

If my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are serious about facing down the threat, they will join me in defeating the previous question so the House will be able to address this very real and serious threat immediately.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include my amendment and extraneous materials in the Congressional Record.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, 3 years ago, the 9/11 Commission made a series of recommendations to Congress and the administration designed to ensure the safety of Americans while protecting the liberties that form the core of our democracy. This important legislation addresses issues that reach across all aspects of the lives of Americans.

The 9/11 Commission recommended that Congress ensure that first responders be able to communicate with each other across jurisdictions--firefighters with police officers, emergency medical professionals with State officials, local with State and Federal personnel. Title III, Ensuring Communications Interoperability for First Responders, establishes a grant program designed to achieve this important goal. As structured in this legislation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program will complement the interoperability program already underway at the Department of Commerce.

Under statute, DHS's expert on all matters relating to emergency communications is the Director of Emergency Communications. Title III of this Conference Report recognizes this statutory directive by ensuring that the Director of Emergency Communications will design and implement the grant programs' policies and guidelines. The Director will be in charge of ensuring that grant program funds are used to establish a forward-looking, nationwide, interoperable system to ensure the safety and efficient functioning of all of our first responders as they respond to natural disasters and other calamities. The Committee on Energy and Commerce looks forward to overseeing this program and receiving continual updates from the Director on the progress of DHS towards achieving nationwide interoperability through this program.

I am also especially pleased that the legislation ensures that the overwhelming majority of the interoperability grant funds will be passed through to localities, because it is at the local level that our first responders are working to ensure our safety and well-being. Importantly, the legislation ties the grant funds to the implementation of statewide plans and a national plan that will act as a road map towards statewide and national interoperability. As we have learned, natural disasters and incidents do not recognize international borders. To help our first responders address trans-border incidents, Title III also establishes border interoperability pilot projects to help us ensure that our first responders are able to communicate with our neighbors to the north and south.

Title IV addresses credentialing workers involved in ensuring America's safety. The Conference Report states that the DHS shall consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services when developing credentialing standards for healthcare personnel. It is imperative that the Secretary of Health and Human Services not only be involved but also have a leadership role in developing standards for credentialing of healthcare professionals. Failing to utilize the public health expertise of the Department of Health and Human Services to its fullest extent could jeopardize efficient care and support for Americans who have been exposed to a terrorist attack or natural disaster. I look forward to working with Chairman Thompson to ensure that the required consultation is to the degree and of the depth merited by the importance of the public health of all of America's people.

I want to thank the gentleman for some important clarifications that have been added to Title IX of the bill, which addresses voluntary national private sector preparedness standards. When we voted on this bill in January, I noted that Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act establishes a mandatory regulatory program regarding the accidental releases of hazardous chemicals. As part of that program, the owner or operator of a covered facility must prepare and implement a risk management plan to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases and to provide a prompt emergency response to any such releases. I asked for clarification at that time that the bill's voluntary program was not intended to interfere with this mandatory Clean Air Act program. The conference report before us today provides that clarification. Rules of Construction, as well as requirements for consideration and coordination with other Federal agencies' preparedness programs or standards, have been included in the two new sections of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that address private sector preparedness. These provisions clarify that the private sector must continue to meet the Clean Air Act Section 112(r) requirements, and that the voluntary preparedness standards are not intended to supersede or interfere with the mandatory Clean Air Act program.

Another important area of concern addressed by this legislation is cargo screening. One of the major security vulnerabilities facing this Nation is the threat from the detonation of a nuclear device smuggled into a port through a cargo container loaded on a ship. It is a nightmare we must prevent. Section 1701 establishes a 5-year goal of 100 percent screening for radiological devices or material in cargo containers leaving foreign ports before they ever enter the waters of the United States. This is a worthy priority, and to ensure adequate flexibility, the DHS Secretary is given authority for 2-year waivers should there be major impediments to its implementation.

Section 1701 also authorizes the DHS Secretary to ``establish technological and operational standards for systems to scan containers; to ensure that the standards are consistent with the global nuclear detection architecture developed under the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and to coordinate with other Federal agencies that administer scanning or detection programs.''

The need for coordination between agencies is essential, particularly given the advanced work carried out by the Department of Energy (DOE) in setting up radiation portal monitors at ports, airports, and rail stations around the world. The DOE's ``Megaports'' program provides radiation detection equipment to key international seaports to screen cargo containers for radioactive materials, including Greece, Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Spain, Singapore, and the Netherlands. Approximately 70 ports worldwide are targeted for implementation, and installation efforts are underway at ports within Belgium, China, Dubai, Honduras, Israel, Oman, the Philippines, Thailand, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Taiwan. Additionally, the Megaports program is teaming with the ``Container Security Initiative'' to implement the ``Secure Freight Initiative'' pilot program at ports in the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Honduras. The DOE's ``Second Line of Defense'' program installs radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and feeder ports in Russia, former Soviet Union states, and other key countries. Approximately 350 sites have been identified to receive detection equipment installations.

Even though this legislation authorizes the DHS Secretary to set minimum container scanning technology standards, the Conference Report properly notes that DOE has inherent capabilities to assess, through its cooperative agreements with numerous countries and port authorities, the adequacy of technical and operating procedures for cargo container scanning.

To ensure the smooth continuation of DOE's cooperative relationships with numerous countries and the further expansion of the Megaports program, the Conference Report makes clear that these two agencies shall closely coordinate their activities, and requires that DHS shall consult with DOE prior to the establishment of technological or operational standards that would affect screening activities in foreign ports. As part of the coordination requirement in this section, the Conference Report directs that where the scanning technology standards affect the DOE's Megaports and SLD programs, the Secretary shall invite the DOE to participate in the development and final review of such standards, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall seek the concurrence of the Secretary of Energy. Should differences arise, I would expect that DOE and DHS would notify the relevant committees of jurisdiction in Congress. The American people are counting on the agencies carrying out cargo screening at our ports and borders to ensure that there are technically sound decisions in setting standards and selecting equipment, and that there is seamless coordination between agencies with responsibility and expertise.

Title XXII makes an important modification to the Department of Commerce's interoperability grant program by including strategic technology reserves as eligible for funding. This modification recognizes the importance of a resilient and redundant network of emergency communications. In Title XXII, Congress also recognizes the expertise of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with regard to the Nation's communications and information infrastructure and directs the FCC to conduct a vulnerability assessment. This title also establishes a joint committee and a pilot project to improve communications for emergency medical and public healthcare committee. Title XXII also requires an important report on the progress of the re- banding efforts in the 800 megahertz band. As such, this title recognizes Congress's clear intent that this process proceed as expeditiously as possible so that our first responders in border areas may effectively utilize the spectrum to which they are moving. I also support the changes in Title XXIII because I believe that it will enhance and expedite the ability of our Nation's 911 centers to be able to automatically locate callers whether they are using traditional land line or mobile phones.

I appreciate the Chairman's willingness to work with me, the members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and our staff as we have used our expertise to improve the legislation in this Conference Report.