A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that no action should be taken to undermine the safety of the Armed Forces of the United States or impact their ability to complete their assigned or future missions.

Madam President, there are many statements in the resolution by the Senator from New Hampshire that are true. It is a true statement that the President has the power to ``deploy troops and direct military campaigns during wartime.'' But that presupposes that a war has been properly authorized by Congress because that power exists only in wartime, or in certain emergency circumstances. The President does not, however, have the power under the Constitution to initiate a war.

It is literally true that Congress has the power of the purse, and in that capacity has the moral responsibility to adequately support the troops in the field, once we are at war. This administration has failed in that responsibility in not equipping our soldiers in Iraq with adequate armor, in not having an adequate plan to stabilize Iraq after the initial invasion, and in not caring for our soldiers properly when they return home.

But this resolution is not balanced. It does not set forth a statement about Congress's powers under the Constitution to authorize the use of force under article I. Nor does it say anything about the authority of Congress to change the mission of U.S. forces, once a war has commenced. This silence about Congress's power might be interpreted to suggest that the President's powers as Commander in Chief to initiate war are unlimited, and that Congress's sole responsibility is to fund a war that the President initiates. That is not what the Constitution says, and I cannot vote for anything that might be so read.

Because the Gregg resolution lacks balance, I cannot vote for it. I will vote instead for the resolution by Senator Murray, which presents a more complete statement about the allocation of powers under the Constitution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, what I wish to do at this moment is address one of the arguments I have heard many of my colleagues make over the past 2 days of this debate. The argument I have heard when I was on the floor yesterday, and again I have heard it today, is that the joint resolution we are debating is an effort to micromanage the war by focusing the mission of U.S. Armed Forces on training Iraqis, denying terrorists a safe haven in Iraq, and force protection.

If you listen to my colleagues who oppose this, you hear them recount that as if somehow that is exceeding the power of the people to speak, through their Congress, as to what role American military forces are permitted to play. Many of my colleagues on the other side go on to argue we are somehow overstepping our constitutional boundaries in defining the purpose for which U.S. forces can be used in Iraq.

Well, that argument, I respectfully suggest, is dead wrong. Defining the overall mission of U.S. troops is entirely within the power of the Congress under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, not doing so would be an abdication of our fundamental duty under the Constitution, which clearly manifests war power in the hands of the Congress.

Now let me give you a few illustrations, if I may. In 2002, when we voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq, we defined the purpose. We defined the purpose for which the President was permitted to use American forces against Iraq. It was to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, and, further, to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

During the course of the negotiations on that resolution, in which I was deeply involved, Congress made it clear, at least on this side--as one of the several people speaking for the Democrats at the time in the Senate--we specifically and clearly rejected the Bush administration's initial proposal for using force in Iraq. President Bush sought what I believe to be, and the majority of the Senate eventually did, an overly broad authority to use force: to restore international peace and security in the region.

I read that at the time as a grant of authority to the President that far exceeded what arguably was necessary at all in Iraq. The function of our military force was not to restore international peace and security in the region. We struck that and said: The use

of force is to defend the national security of the United States against a continuing threat from Iraq, not the region; not the region.

After the President's attempted overreach here, we narrowed the geographic scope of the authority the Congress, under the Constitution, was willing to grant the President, and we narrowed the purpose for which he was allowed to use force. We did two things. We not only said, Mr. President, this is not about the region. You can only use force, if necessary, dealing with Iraq being a threat to the United States.

I remind everybody what we were being told at the time. We were being told by the Vice President that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program. Simply not true. It was not true when he stated it. Our intelligence community not only said he did not reconstitute the nuclear program, it said he had no nuclear program. That is not what we were told.

So we gave him authority, I remind everyone, to negotiate at the United Nations, to keep the pressure of the world on Iraq, to bring back the U.N. people, to determine what nuclear program or weapons of mass destruction he had, to get the inspectors back in, and to negotiate to do that, because at the time the argument taking place in the world was, was the U.S. embargo, was the world embargo, were the U.N. inspectors causing pain for innocent Iraqis?

Do you remember how many times we heard the argument that the reason why there was not enough medicine, the reason why children were dying, the reason why they did not have enough food, was because of this awful thing the United States was leading, the embargo on Iraq, the Food for Oil Program?

So to put this in context so everybody remembers, there were a lot of us on the floor willing to give deference to the President, who we thought was responsible in the exercise of power at the time, because he appeared responsible immediately after 9/11; he proceeded correctly relative to al-Qaida and the Taliban. He did not go off willy-nilly and start bombing people. He built the case. He sent his envoys all over the world. He made a compelling case for the right for us to invade Afghanistan. He even went so far as to worry about whether the Arab street would rise up if we attacked Muslims in Afghanistan. He engaged in public diplomacy. He did a fine job.

That was the context in which we gave him this power. But even then, as much as he had done well relative to Afghanistan at the time, we quite frankly did not trust him or any President to have this broad reach of authority which he asked for, which was to maintain peace, international peace and security in the region.

So we cut back the authority we gave him to negotiate at the U.N. Remember what he tried to do. He came and made the argument: There has to be a demonstration that all of the Nation support him in that we must keep pressure on Saddam. All Democrats and Republicans support him. That was the argument made to us. He did not come up here and make the argument to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee: We need to be able to attack. He argued we needed to be able to give him the moral authority to go to the United Nations and keep the pressure on, because the French were wavering, the Europeans were wavering, some Arab countries were wavering. And then as time went on, he built this argument about they reconstituted their nuclear weapons and the like. But even then we did not give him the authority he asked for.

Why am I dwelling on this? Well, we made a clear judgment as a Senate and as a House, as a Congress, that he did not have the geographic scope for the extended purpose he wanted. We said: Here is your writ, Mr. President. Here is the region you are allowed to, if need be, use force--in this constrained area called Iraq. Because you are telling us, Mr. President, it is a threat to the United States of America, not a threat to the region, it is a threat to the United States of America. So you have the authority to deal with that, if necessary.

Secondly, even within Iraq, you can only use the force to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. If memory serves me, there were 16, including resolutions relating to weapons of mass destruction.

So that was the rationale. We severely limited the authority he wanted because we thought it was an overreach. Now we know there were no weapons of mass destruction. Now we know--I will speak and say what I believe--hopefully the Intelligence Committee will show--not only did we have bad intelligence, but the good intelligence we had was misused by the administration, in my opinion. We will find out whether that turns out to be true.

In 2002, when we offered the authorization to use force, we defined the purpose. So I ask those who argue that we are now overstepping our bounds with this resolution, did we overstep our bounds in 2002 when we authorized the use of force against Iraq, when we limited what the President wanted to do? If, in fact, we do not have the constitutional authority today to limit what the President wants to do, how did we have the authority to do it in 2002? As I said, what is the rationale for the continued authority under the 2002 resolution? There are no weapons of mass destruction. All the U.N. resolutions are in compliance. And nobody argues the Iraqi Government is a threat to the United States of America. Are they going to invade us?

To those who have a problem with the mission we defined in this joint resolution before the Senate, I also say, listen to Prime Minister Tony Blair in announcing last month the redeployment of British forces from Iraq. Last month the mission the British Government assigned to those Brits who will remain in Iraq is precisely what we prescribed in our resolution. The new mission of the British forces in Iraq is the following: to transfer responsibility to the Iraqis; to train and support Iraqi forces; to help secure the border and supply routes; and to conduct operations against extremist groups, i.e., Al-Qaida. It is not to fight in the Iraqi civil war. It is not to be in the lead role in security operations in Basra, where they had authority, or in Baghdad, where they did not. In short, with the exception of denying terrorists sanctuary and training of Iraqis, the British forces are moving from the driver's seat to the backseat. This resolution proposes that very transition for our forces in Iraq.

So I ask again, rhetorically, does the Vice President think Prime Minister Blair's announcement of a ``redeployment,'' as the Vice President said, ``validates the al-Qaida strategy''? That is what he is accusing the Congress of. That is what he accuses me and Carl Levin of when we came up with this idea, that is now a leadership amendment; we are validating al-Qaida's strategy.

Are the British validating al-Qaida's strategy? Is he saying Tony Blair is validating Osama bin Laden? It is ridiculous. It is a ridiculous argument. It flies in the face of the facts. It comes down to this: Do we want American troops fighting an Iraqi civil war? Is that what we want these troops for? Is that why we sent them? Do you think, when we voted back in 2002, if we knew there were no weapons of mass destruction, if Saddam were gone, if they were in compliance with other U.N. resolutions, but if there were a raging civil war, do you think we would have voted on the floor of this body to send 150,000, 160,000, 170,000, 180,000 American troops to Iraq to help them settle their civil war? What do you think? I don't think so. We might have sent troops to Jordan. We might have done what we are trying now in Amman and the emirates. We might have beefed up Turkey. We might have accepted to go after al-Qaida sites. But I doubt very much we would vote now to get in the midst of a self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence, which is what it is. If you want American troops fighting a civil war in Iraq, if you want that, then vote against this resolution, do not vote for it. Do not vote for it.

You say that is not fair; we are not engaged in fighting in a civil war. Has anybody asked themselves the rhetorical question: Why is it that Sadr, who has been responsible for killing a lot of Americans, and his Mahdi army, which has been responsible for killing a lot of Americans, why is it that the Shia-led Mahdi army, particularly in Sadr City, has taken off their uniforms, hidden their weapons, and as of yesterday--I have not checked today--there were rumors that Sadr is no longer in Iraq?

Maybe he is back now. We do not know for sure where he is. Why is it that they took down the blockade? Is it because all of a sudden they turned peace loving?

I respectfully suggest, because inadvertently the 17,500 troops we are surging into the middle of Baghdad, we are surging them into 20- some neighborhoods that are Sunni.

They are bad guys, these former Saddamists, these former Baathists-- this insurgency--who were referred to until recently by the Secretary of Defense as ``a bunch of dead enders.'' I respectfully suggest the reason all of a sudden the Shia in Sadr City are lying low is because they are very happy the United States is doing their job for them, killing their enemy, killing the bad guys who are Sunnis. Does anybody think if we succeed in that mission that all of a sudden we are not going to see all those weapons come out of hiding in Sadr City? Does anybody think that all of a sudden it is going to be safe for Americans in that region? Does anybody think the uniforms aren't going to come back on and the roadblocks aren't going to go back up? These folks aren't dumb. It is not our purpose, but the effect is, we are engaged in this civil war.

The question is, What is the plan to responsibly end our participation in this war without leaving behind chaos, without having traded a dictator for chaos, without having left behind a cycle of self-sustaining sectarian violence that metastasizes in the fragmentation of Iraq and metastasizes in the region--Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia? What is the answer?

So far, I don't hear a plan. Notice, by the way, now the surge is really getting bumped up, as some of us predicted on this floor when he announced the surge and predicted in our committee, 17,000 people to 22,500, whatever the actual number was initially. Now they are saying they are going to need 30,000 people for the surge. Why? Because it is like squeezing a water balloon. The bad guys have left this area in part, and they have now gone to the province directly outside of Baghdad.

General Keane is a very bright fellow, an honest guy, a former four- star general, who testified before our committee. He came up with the original plan about surging. He said: In order for this to work, you are going to have to surge well beyond Baghdad. You are going to have to go into Anbar Province and beyond. He predicted what would happen.

They said: No, we are only talking about 22,500 troops.

What is the purpose of the surge? The purpose of the surge, we are told--in a humanitarian sense, it makes a lot of sense, except for the humanitarian interest of our troops--is to bring order to Baghdad, stop the killing and the chaos. Why? Because when that happens and they have--I think the phrase used is ``breathing room''--when they have that breathing room, what is going to happen? Then they can negotiate. Then they will sit down and negotiate an agreement among themselves. Has anybody asked the question, What will be the basis of that negotiation? What is the idea? What is the element? What is the political solution?

The President continues to insist on a well-intended but fundamentally flawed strategy. The flawed strategy is, it is possible to have a strong central democratic government. Before we went to war, I believed, and so stated, that there is not going to be a democracy there in any of our lifetimes, including the Presiding Officer, who is considerably younger than most of us. It is not going to happen. It is possible that we could leave behind a country secure within its borders, loosely federated, not a threat to its neighbor and not a haven for terror, but that is as good as it is going to get.

At least one and probably both of my colleagues in the Chamber were here during the Balkan crisis in Bosnia. What does history teach us and what does recent experience teach us? Wherever there is a cycle of self-sustaining genocide, self-sustaining sectarian violence, when in modern history has it ended other than any one of four ways:

One, a victor. They wipe out the other two sides or three sides or one side, and one of the ethnic groups prevails militarily on the battlefield.

Two, occupation by an outside force--the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire, the British Empire.

We can't afford the first to happen because that would have a devastating impact on the region because everybody knows the Sunni states will get more involved. If it goes the other way, the Shia states will be involved in Iran beyond what they are now. That is not a real option. We are not an occupying force. It is not in our DNA. We are not an empire.

The third option historically is a dictator, a strongman. Wouldn't that be the ultimate irony--us going to Iraq to take down Saddam and restoring a strong man, which, I respectfully suggest, we should consider might happen because eventually we are going to leave and the dysfunctional circumstances in Iraq are as likely to produce a strong military leader to take over as anything else, although there is no individual in sight right now. That is not an option available to us.

What is the fourth historical option? Federation, a federal system, a weak central government within the defined borders of a country that, in fact, gives the warring sectarian parties some control over the fabric of their daily lives, their local police force for their public safety, rules relating to marriage, education. That is the only other option which has ever worked. It doesn't work perfectly.

What does recent history tell us? Like many here, I was deeply involved in our Balkan policy. As my friend from Kansas may remember, I, to use the vernacular, beat President Clinton up and about the head to use force in the Balkans. I argued, after encountering Milosevic 2 years before he acted in his office--when he asked me what I thought of him, I said: I think you are a damn war criminal, and I am going to spend my career seeing you tried as one. I came back and wrote report after report, after close to a dozen visits. I saw what was happening in Brcko, in Tuzla, in Sarajevo, in Srebenica, more sectarian violence in the Balkans from Vlad the Impaler to Milosevic than ever occurred in what is now called Iraq.

So how did we end it? We ended it after they killed several hundred thousand people, mostly women and children. We ended it after we gathered all the neighbors, including Russia, a pro-Serbian force, France, all the nations in the region. We gathered in a room. We brought in the parties who were warring, including Milosevic, Tudjman, Croats, and other leaders representing the Bosniaks. What did we do? We then called the Dayton Peace Accords. What did we do there? We gave much more autonomy to each of those groups than ever was envisioned by what I am proposing.

We set up a thing called the Republic of Serbia in Bosnia with its own President. We had a Bosnian President and we had a Croatian President. For over 10 years, as my friend from Oklahoma can attest, who knows more about force structure than most of us know, there have been over 20,000 on average NATO forces there. To the best of my knowledge, none has been killed in anger with a shot fired.

What is going on in Bosnia today? Was everyone who was ethnically cleansed able to come back to their neighborhoods? No. A lot have. Is there still injustice? Yes. Is genocide continuing? No. What are they doing now? They are debating amending their Constitution to become part of Europe so they can join the EU down the road. We don't have to go very far for an example.

Let me ask the rhetorical question again: Can anybody name me a time, without empire, dictator or expiring, that self-sustaining sectarian violence within the borders of a country has resulted in a central federal control that is democratic? With all due respect to the President, arguably his dream at the outset made sense. That is why I called 3 years ago for 60,000 to 100,000 additional American forces. That is why I called for the need for at least 5,000 to 6,000 paramilitary police to be sent, because I believed--and I wrote at the time--if the genie ever gets out of the bottle, if we don't establish order quickly, there is no possibility of stopping a vicious civil war.

Senator Hagel and I got smuggled across the Turkish border before the war began, and went up to Arbil and met with the Brazani and Talabani clans to discuss with them whether

they would actually be with us if force was used. They had us each speak before the Kurdish Parliament, and they had already written a constitution that was the minimum they would, in fact, insist upon which allowed for significant Kurdish autonomy. They wanted a federal system.

A year ago January, my distinguished colleague from South Carolina and I went to Iraq for what was my sixth time. I have been there since. I don't know how many times it was. We went around and proudly put our fingers in the ink well, demonstrating that this was a free election. We came back and spoke to the President. We were debriefed by the President and his war cabinet. The President said it was a great democratic effort. I presumed to suggest it wasn't a democratic effort, it was a free election. It was a sectarian election. It turns out 92 percent of the vote cast was a sectarian vote. Kurds voted for Kurds. Shia voted for Shia. Sunni voted for Sunni. That is not democracy. Elections do not a democracy make. They are a necessary and ultimate condition to democracy. Democracy is about giving up things, about compromise.

I will never forget what Senator Graham, who has a great facility for words, said as I was trying to explain to the President about the militias--not that he did not know there were militias. After we got finished, the President turned to Senator Graham and Senator Graham said, with a bit of humor: Mr. President, it is kind of like when the recount was taking place in Florida, if the Republicans had their own army and the Democrats had their own army. That is the better analogy.

The genie was out of the bottle, and the genie came roaring out of the bottle when that shrine in the Shia area was devastated and ripped off the Earth.

Let me conclude by saying, it comes down to a simple proposition: Why do we want our troops in Iraq? Is it to fight a civil war or is it to provide a circumstance whereby we do the only thing that can help our interest, to prevent al-Qaida from occupying territory, to train the Iraqi forces, and to protect our troops. To do that we need a lot fewer troops.

Do we want to end this war responsibly? If we do, I respectfully suggest we vote for this resolution. If you prefer the President's plan, which offers no end in sight, I respectfully suggest you should vote against it. But, ultimately, there are a lot of proposals put forward, including the President's, and you have to ask yourself the rhetorical question, I believe: After it is implemented, then what? Then what?

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. President, it is my understanding the debate will start with our side. I encourage all Members who wish to be heard on our side on any of these resolutions to come to the floor and be heard.

Let me share some thoughts. This is a rather awkward situation we find ourselves in because we are debating three resolutions concurrently. Frankly, one of the three I have not even seen yet, so it is very difficult to debate something you have never seen. But I do know from the past discussions the type of concerns people have, the differences between, quite frankly, the Republican side and the Democratic side. I know it is not right down party lines, but let me share some concerns I have and some thoughts I have.

We heard from several Senators who expressed their concern over our micromanaging the war from this body and from the body of the other side. Five hundred and thirty-five people cannot be Commanders in Chief. It seems as if that is what is happening. Also, I observe, and I am only speaking for myself, that this thing has become highly politicized. When the war first started,

the whole idea of weapons of mass destruction was the media trying to make us believe that is what it was all about, but that isn't what it was all about.

I was on the Senate Armed Services Committee during that time, both before and after 9/11, and I observed what was going on. I observed what was going on in Iraq for a long period of time. I had the honor back in 1991 of going to Kuwait on what they called at that time the ``First Freedom Flight.'' There were Democrats and Republicans on that flight. We were the first ones to land in Kuwait. The Iraqis didn't even know the war was over at that time, and the oilfields were burning in Kuwait. I remember Tony Coelho was one of the Democrats who was on the trip, and Alexandria Hague was one of the Republicans on the trip.

He also had the Ambassador from Kuwait to the United States and his daughter on the trip, going back for the first time to Kuwait to see what damage was done by Saddam Hussein in Kuwait City. I remember so well--I don't recall the age of the daughter; maybe she was about 8 years old. I remember so well that when we landed, the oil fields were burning, Iraqis were still fighting, not knowing there had been an agreement and fires should have ceased by that time. They were still shooting at each other. When it calmed down, we went to their home.

Keep in mind the Ambassador to the United States from Kuwait was of nobility and he had a daughter with women. They had a mansion on the Persian Gulf, a beautiful place. We got there in time to see that their house had been used as one of the headquarters of Saddam Hussein. His young daughter wanted to see her bedroom, her stuffed animals and things girls want to see. We found out her room had been used for a torture chamber. There were body parts stuck to the walls, human hair and hands, where the torturing had been taking place.

I think sometimes people forget about how bad this guy was. We hear a lot about Adolf Hitler, and this guy was certainly the worst since the brutality of Auschwitz and Hitler and, of course, the Holocaust. If you had been there and looked down and seen the bodies in the open graves, if you heard the testimony from others whose daughters could not get married because they could not have weddings on the streets of Baghdad because, if they did, people would come in, the Iraqis, and Saddam Hussein's sons would come in and mob everybody and they would kill people and take the pretty girls and rape them and bury them alive. These atrocities that took place were inconceivable to people.

You don't hear about this in the media. They say they didn't find weapons of mass destruction. Well, you know, that is a moot point. There were weapons of mass destruction because they used weapons of mass destruction. They used them in the northern parts of Iraq. Saddam Hussein brutally, painfully murdered his own people, and the types of gases used in these weapons of mass destruction were the most painful kind that would torture people to death, burn them from the inside out. All the time this was happening, we heard testimonials about how Saddam Hussein was treating his people he thought perhaps were his enemies and didn't follow him after the war in 1991, and how they would put people to death, torture them, and drop them into vats of oil. The victims would be praying that they would put them in head first because their life would be over sooner. It was the same with the massive machines-- like what we call shredders in this country--where they would shred the live bodies of these individuals. They used the most brutal types of torture imaginable.

I thought once they get Saddam Hussein and once he is disposed of and is dead, people will realize this monster is not coming back. Unfortunately, there are other monsters who would take up the mantle. These things have gone undiscussed, unnoticed. Even if there had not been weapons of mass destruction--which there were, because they used them, either chemical or biological, which is just as cruel as nuclear, and effective, and it kills many people. Even if that had not been the case, America could not stand by and watch that type of thing happening.

I have had the honor of going back more times than any other Member of the Senate. I will be going next week. It will be my 13th trip to the area of responsibility in Iraq. Each time I come back, after seeing the progress that is being made, I read the newspapers, the press accounts, and there is no relationship between reality and the press accounts we get.

I had the honor of being in Fallujah during a couple of the elections. The Iraqi security forces--people are not aware of this, but they allowed them to vote a day in advance of the normal voting that took place. I was purposely at a couple of these elections in Fallujah because that was where the problems were supposed to exist. That is where our marines were. They conducted door to door and they did incredible and great work at that time. The Iraqi security forces were the first to go down and vote. I remember one night having them come back and talk about the threats that had been made on their lives. Some were shot during the process. They were willing to risk their lives to vote and then to help the people vote the next day. The next day, the other Iraqis came to vote. We all heard about the fingerprinting and holding up with pride their stained finger, which would be a death sentence on individuals. In this country, when such a small percentage of the people vote, and we look at those who are willing to risk their lives, I think how dear that privilege is and how we do not appreciate it as we should.

Anyway, they voted and, of course, they knew when they were going to vote, they would be in harm's way, and many were shot. There are heroic stories of Iraqis going to vote where they would lay down their lives and get in the line of fire to save somebody else. So these were experiences that we had, the real reasons for being there.

As we approach these resolutions--I see my friend from Missouri is here and I will soon yield to him whatever time he asks. As we discuss the resolutions, I want people to keep in mind the one thing those of us who believe the generals are more capable of running this war than are the individuals in this body, the 535 Members of the House and Senate--and of the 535, many of them want to be Commander in Chief; many are running. The generals make these decisions.

At this time, I ask my friend from Missouri how much time he wishes.

I yield 15 minutes to Senator Bond.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Missouri. A lot of people don't know it, but his family has made a personal sacrifice in their efforts in this war. We appreciate that very much. The Senator from Missouri outlined the consequences of surrender in a very articulate way.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any quorum calls during the debate on the Iraq resolutions be equally divided.

Mr. President, I see no speakers on the other side, so I will elaborate on my remarks. I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Missouri talked about specifically what would be the consequences of timelines or withdrawal. I can speak from personal experience, having spent time in Iraq. As I mentioned before, I plan to take my 13th trip to AOR in a couple of weeks. I believe what is not understood by people who are debating these resolutions is some of the good things about the Iraqi security forces.

I had the honor of being in Iraq when some of the new leadership took office. I remember Dr. Rubaie, who is the National Security Adviser, and Dr. Jassim--I believe he was the Minister of Defense at that time-- they articulated in a very effective way that most of the differences between the two major factors over there were Western concepts, were Western ideas. It appeared to me that was the case.

As we debate these resolutions, we need to remember how we got in there in the first place. Remember what happened prior to 1991, remember the monstrous commissions that were made by Saddam Hussein and the number of people, the volumes of people who died tragic, painful deaths.

As far as the Iraqi security forces are concerned, it is pretty obvious to me that these individuals want to be in charge. I get the idea, when I listen to some of the people on the other side, that the Iraqi security forces somehow are inferior, somehow they don't have the knowledge and the capability, the potential to become great fighters. Yet when I talk with them, they are the ones who are anxious to get themselves in a position where they are going to be carrying the load for us.

The whole idea of the embedded training is that we put our people in

the rear to advise the Iraqis on what to do and to train them while they are actually embedded and fighting with them. This has worked very effectively. It has been effective.

I happened to be there at a time when in one of the training areas for Iraqi security forces, there was an explosion. Some 40 were killed.

What the people over here don't understand is the commitment the Iraqis have to their own security. It happens that 40 families of those who were killed in this blast all supplied another member of their family to go in and carry the load for the deceased trainee.

These individuals are committed. They are as anxious as we are to get to the point where they have the capability of offering the security against the terrorists. From time to time, they have gotten that way. There was a time when the entire western one-third of Baghdad was under security control by the Iraqis themselves. They were just not in a position to sustain that control.

We saw the commitment the Iraqis had in Fallujah, when a general who had been the brigade commander for Saddam Hussein--this guy hated Americans; he was a brigade commander for Saddam Hussein, until we went into Fallujah with our Marines and they started the embedded training, the embedded training referred to by my friend from Missouri. It was so successful and they enjoyed each other so much that this man, this general, his name is Mahdi, he looked me in the eyes and said: I hated Americans before all this happened. I certainly hated the Marines. When they came in and started embedded training, I learned to love them so much that when they rotated out, we all got together and we cried.

This is the commitment the Iraqis have. When you get into one of the helicopters and go from place to place, maybe 50 feet off the ground, and you see the commitment of these individuals in the small towns and the kids who are down there--a lot of times the people who are supporting our troops send over candy, cookies, and this type of thing don't realize that when our troops get them, they normally repackage them, and then as they are in these helicopters going across the triangle and other places, you can see the little Iraqi kids out there waving American flags and our troops are throwing them candy and cookies. This is the type of relationship we don't see in this country.

Mr. President, while we are calling to make sure that some of them get down to the floor from both sides, let me suggest the absence of a quorum.

I wish to inquire how much time we have remaining on our side.

Fine. We are next going to hear from the Senator from South Carolina. I wish to say, after the conclusion of the remarks, I am going to be trying to line up, by unanimous consent, several speakers. It is my understanding Senator Byrd wants to come down and speak. But between the next speaker and Senator Byrd, we are going to try to get some lined up for a period of time. That will be our intention.

First of all, let me thank the Senator from South Carolina, who has been steadfast all the way through this, and who has made such great contributions. In addition to what he said, I think it is worth observing that this is working.

In this morning's Washington Post, there is an article about the successes that are taking place. The top U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad said the number of sectarian killings has dropped since the operation began in mid-February.

Then on the other side, GEN Qassim al-Mousawi, who is the Iraqi military spokesman, also offered an upbeat assessment of the Baghdad security plan and how well it is working now. So I think, frankly, this is sooner than I thought we would be getting some positive results.

Let me also make one observation before going on to the next speakers. That is, after receiving rather late the resolution by Senator Murray, 107, in reading it, unless I misread it, it appears to me she is outlining some things that are pretty consistent with what is in the Gregg resolution. So I do not know--with the three resolutions we have--the order. That is going to be determined, but right now we are not sure of it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, be recognized for 20 minutes, followed by Senator Ensign for 7 minutes, followed by Senator Tester for 10 minutes, followed by Senator Kyl for 7 minutes, then any intervening Democrat, to be followed by Republican Senators Brownback, Warner, and Vitter for 7 minutes each.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, before the Senator leaves, as it is right now, we have 10 minutes left on this side. There is 1 hour left on the Senator's side. We want very much to get some speakers down here, if we could. I understand we are trying to reserve 20 minutes for leadership time and 10 minutes on each side. If the Senator has speakers, this would be a good time to have them down here.

Madam President, rather than to speak myself, since there is going to be equal time coming off for both sides until a speaker gets down here, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the last quorum call time be taken from the Democrats' time, and that future quorums come from the Democrat side.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Madam President, it is my understanding on this side we have 18 minutes. I am going to reserve 10 minutes for leadership time. That leaves 8 minutes I yield to the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Brownback.

Madam President, I understand we have 10 minutes. I wish to retain the remainder of our time.

Madam President, ironically, I agree with the Senator from Washington, although I disagree with the characterization of this resolution.

First of all, the resolution does essentially the same thing the Gregg resolution does. No. 1, the Gregg resolution uses the language that ``Congress should not take any action that will endanger United States military forces in the field.'' That is exactly the same language that is in the Murray resolution: ``Congress should not take any action that will endanger the Armed Forces.''

The Gregg resolution talks about article II, section 2, of the Constitution, in terms of the President's constitutional powers, and article I, section 8 of the power of Congress; and the Murray resolution does essentially the same thing, except it doesn't cite it. It merely says Congress and the President should continue to exercise their constitutional responsibilities.

So I am going to vote for the Murray resolution and vote for the Gregg resolution. I don't see any difference in them. I think we are supporting the President, and this is the right thing to do.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, the Senate is now engaged in a historic debate about what the United States of America should do with respect to the conflict in Iraq. We are scheduled to vote on three resolutions at 3:45 this afternoon. I was advised early this morning, about 8 a.m., that we would have four resolutions to vote on and that there would be a time agreement of some 6 hours, with votes to occur late this afternoon. Two of the resolutions among the four were not in existence, one of the resolutions has since been dropped, and the fourth resolution was made available less than an hour ago. This kind of a timetable, it seems to me, is not conducive to the kind of deliberation and thought necessary to make intelligent decisions on the momentous questions which we are facing.

We are asking the U.S. military to adopt a timetable to clear out of Iraq no later than a year from now, and we have a tough time establishing even a timetable as to what the Senate will do in the course of a single day.

As I review the proceedings, it seems to me that the Congress is not prepared to act on this subject on this state of the record. It may be that the Congress is not competent to act on this kind of an issue. There is a maxim that you can't manage effectively by committee, and what this concurrent resolution seeks to do is to have management by two committees--that is perhaps twice as bad as trying to manage by one committee--a committee of 435 in the House of Representatives and a committee of 100 here.

Yesterday, I spoke briefly about S. Res. 9, which has been cosponsored by 41 Democrats, no Republicans. I think it is regrettable that there appears to be a partisan divide on this subject. This matter is too important to be determined by party loyalty. Perhaps a more important aspect of noting that the resolution is supported by 41 Democrats is that it is not supported by 9 Democrats, with 50 Democrats in this body. So perhaps it is significant that it is not supported by 9 Democrats.

I would be prepared to cross party lines, as I have done in the past when I thought it warranted, if I agreed with the thrust of the resolution. Seven of us joined with the Democrats in voting for cloture several weeks ago to move ahead with the debate and try to come to a resolution on the Iraqi issue, and I was one of the seven. I would not hesitate to do so again if I agreed, but I cannot agree with the proposal which would require that not later than 120 days after enactment to have phased redeployment of U.S. forces, with the goal of redeploying by March 31, 2008, all U.S. combat forces in Iraq except for three conditions: to protect U.S. and coalition personnel, training and equipping Iraqi forces, and conducting targeted counterterrorism operations.

The thrust, however, is to leave Iraq in about 1 year, and that is to ensure defeat. Setting a timetable simply enables our opponents to wait us out.

I think beyond that, the idea of having the Congress of the United States micromanage the war is simply not realistic, and perhaps it may even be unlawful. As I noted yesterday, in the case of Fleming v. Page, in 1850, the Supreme Court said:

As Commander in Chief, he is authorized to direct the

movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at

his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem

most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.

That is a fairly forceful statement that it is not up to the Congress to micromanage a war but that it is up to the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.

That is not to say that the Congress does not have authority in the premises. Yesterday, I put into the Record a lengthy letter which I had written calling for additional hearings by the Judiciary Committee on the relative powers, authority of the Congress under the Constitution, with our power of the purse and our power to maintain and direct armies, contrasted with the President's power as Commander in Chief.

I believe, however, it is of questionable legal authority to micromanage, and it is definitely impractical for us to seek to micromanage if the consequences of giving an order to the President would just enable the enemy to wait us out. That is not to say that at some time in the future it may be necessary, and there may be a considered joint judgment by the Congress, to use the extraordinary power of the purse to implement our constitutional authority to maintain armies to effectuate a withdrawal.

Yesterday, I commented on the Senate floor that it would be most helpful to have an update from the Department of Defense and the Department of State as to whether, since General Petraeus went to Iraq, implementing a new strategy as he articulated it to many of us in the Congress in meeting with him, whether there have been improvements, so that there was some realistic prospect of victory, which is what we want. The consequences of defeat are disastrous, but that does not mean that we can be in Iraq forever.

The President, in his State of the Union speech, set two objectives for the Iraqis. One was to end the sectarian violence and, secondly, to secure Baghdad as indispensable prerequisites for maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq. The Iraqis have shown neither the capacity nor the will to carry out those objectives. In evaluating the strategy of General Petraeus, it would be helpful to know if there have been any positive signs or negative signs, giving us some clue as to the prospects of victory.

Through staff, I made an inquiry of the Department of Defense for some updated material, and none was available. Similarly, through staff, I made an inquiry of the Department of State, asking if there had been any results from the change in policy to negotiate

with Iran and Syria, at least on a multilateral basis. One part of the resolution that is supported by 41 Democrats, calling for a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy, has been implemented by the Department of State, at least in the incipient stages. Even in the absence of any indication of any progress, it seems to me unwise, on this state of the record, to set a timetable which would just embolden and empower the enemy to win by waiting us out.

The power of the purse is the ultimate constitutional authority of the Congress. Even there, as I noted yesterday in the case of United States v. Lovett, in 1946, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot use its appropriations power indirectly to accomplish an unconstitutional objective. That still leaves substantial parameters to decide what to do.

The second resolution is the one submitted by Senator Gregg, and Senator Gregg articulates a resolution that all of us agree with:

That it is the sense of Congress that Congress should not

take any action that will endanger United States military

forces in the field. . . .

That would be unthinkable. No one disagrees with that. Then the Gregg resolution goes on to say:

. . . including the elimination or reduction of funds for

troops in the field.

That phrase could be interpreted to mean that Congress does not have the authority to stipulate an elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field so that we couldn't say to the President to reduce the troops by a certain date. Or perhaps it should be read in conjunction with taking no action to endanger to say you have to be down to a certain number by a certain date, as Congress did in legislation in 1974, saying that when the war in Vietnam was winding down, there could be no more than 4,000 troops in the field in 6 months and no more than 3,000 troops in the field in a year. That congressional legislation was signed by President Ford, although he expressed some reservations. So perhaps the Gregg resolution does not purport to totally eliminate the authority of Congress to act by cutting off funding if it can be done in a way which does not endanger the troops in the field. Certainly the thrust, the gravamen of the Gregg resolution is one where there would be no disagreement, we simply could not endanger the troops in the field or take any action which would endanger them.

Then the third resolution--which was filed less than an hour ago by Senator Murray--sounds very much like the Gregg resolution. It is intended, I think, to provide an alternative to the Gregg resolution, but it is very close. The Murray resolution provides:

The President and Congress should not take any action that

will endanger the Armed Forces of the United States and will

provide necessary funds for training, equipment and other

support for troops in the field as such actions will ensure

their safety and effectiveness in preparing for and carrying

out their assigned missions.

We all agree with that. Then it goes on to say:

The President, Congress and the Nation have an obligation

to ensure that those who have bravely served this country in

time of war receive the medical care and other support they

deserve.

No one could disagree with that. It is a reference to what has happened at Walter Reed. Then the third clause in the resolution.

Resolved: The President and Congress should continue to

exercise their constitutional responsibilities to ensure that

the Armed Forces have everything they need to perform their

assigned or future missions.

We can't disagree with that. And then:

. . . review, assess and adjust United States policy and

funding as needed to ensure our troops have the best chance

for success in Iraq and elsewhere.

That also is apple pie, motherhood, and milk. There is a little implication, on ``review, assess and adjust,'' perhaps a change in policy, but it does not say anything definitive.

There was supposed to have been a fourth resolution offered by Senator Warner, who had an earlier resolution which was not taken up by the Senate. Senator Warner is to be commended for his service to the country, heading the Armed Services Committee, 28 years in this body, Secretary of the Navy, served in World War II. He was searching for some alternative. But in the absence of any resolution having been filed, the inference arises that the search continues. That is where I think we are on this issue.

The electorate spoke last November in disagreeing with United States policy in Iraq. The House of Representatives has spoken, disagreeing with United States policy in Iraq. The Senate is about to speak, but it is highly doubtful--virtually impossible that a forced withdrawal within a year will be approved by 60 Members of this body. The resolutions by Senator Gregg and Senator Murray are not twins, but they are first cousins. But we are still groping for what to do.

My own sense of the situation is we need to pursue some preliminary reports that things are improving and find out if in fact that is true. As I look at Iraq--and I used the metaphor yesterday--it is a tunnel and we can't see the end of the tunnel. Certainly there is no indication that there is a light in the end of the tunnel. I don't like being in the tunnel, but I don't know where else to go at the moment.

I am not going to go with a resolution to leave Iraq, micromanage the war, tell the President what to do when we frankly don't know what to do. But we are groping. Just as we are unprepared to deal with these resolutions in a limited time, by 3:45, we are unprepared to tell the military what to do in a year. So I think we need to go back to the drawing boards and I think we need to find out more facts. It may be General Shinseki was right in 2003, that job required a lot more personnel, into the hundreds of thousands, under the Colin Powell doctrine of overwhelming force. Maybe that was the course which should have been followed. Certainly we don't want to deploy more troops now, in those quantities. For General Shinseki's brilliance, he got himself fired, ridiculed and fired. We are trying to find out what to do.

I had an opportunity to visit the Mideast and talk to President Assad of Syria last December. President Assad advanced the idea of having an international conference before the idea was advanced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. I carried that message back and conveyed Assad's suggestion to Condoleezza Rice. Whether that had any impact on her idea, I don't know. But I do believe--and I said this in a lengthy speech on the Senate floor last June, and in an article which appears in the current issue of the Washington Quarterly--that dialog should be undertaken with Iran and Syria. We have seen the multilateral dialog with North Korea, supplemented by direct contracts, bilateral negotiations, produce what appears to be an answer to diffusing North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. We don't know for sure because that is a very tentative basis, but we made a lot of progress and we appear to have an answer.

I think there is cause for hope that the multilateral talks with Iran and Syria, and perhaps bilateral talks, will produce something there. So I am going to oppose S. Res. 9 and I am going to support the first cousins, the Gregg resolution and the Murray resolution. They say something which is obvious. We are not going to take any action to endanger the American troops. But that does not mean we are without power in the future to use the appropriations power, the power of the purse, to put Congress's imprimatur and decision on what is going on.

The President said for a long time he was the decider. I think he has wisely receded a little from that assertion. It is a joint, shared responsibility between Congress and the President. There has been a lot of talk. I think the American people ought to know there has been a lot of--it is more than talk; there has been a lot of very serious thought which has been undertaken by the Members of the Congress, both the Senate and the House, trying to find a way to have a victory in Iraq. Our statements of disagreement with the President do not mean we ought to tell him what to do when in fact we do not know what to do.

For myself, I think we need to find out more about what is happening now, both militarily and diplomatically; going back to the drawing board and seeing if we can come up with a better answer than the one we are facing at the present time.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma, who is managing the bill.

I yield the floor.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, we are debating a serious proposal with respect to the future of our involvement in Iraq and the future of Iraq and, indeed, that region of the world. I believe the proposal Senator Harry Reid of Nevada advanced is a sensible way to begin to change our policy, so it can be sustained over time and it can lead to a successful termination of our operations in Iraq but, more importantly, give the Iraqis the opportunity to establish a stable government in a very difficult part of the world.

The elements of the proposal that Senator Reid has advanced, are right on target. First, to define the mission in a way that they can be fully supported by the United States and also that they are congruent with our best interests in the region and the world. Next, obviously, is force protection. We have to be able to assure our forces that they can protect themselves at all times. Third, to continue to develop the Iraqi security forces--not just to put guns in their hands but to develop their capacity to do other things, such as civil affairs, intelligence operations, those critical military skills that will allow them to be an effective force in their country, to bring not just stability but a sense of competence, coherence to the operation of their Government.

The next mission is the constant attention to counterterrorism. This is a mission that I believe transcends every border in the world. Wherever there are those elements that are actively plotting to attack us or our allies, we should be prepared, together with local authorities, if they are cooperative, to take these elements out very dramatically, preemptively. That is essentially what we did in Somalia, without the presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops in Somalia. But we had the special operations capacity, intelligence, and the cooperation of local parties so we could do that.

Those are the three critical missions I believe we have in Iraq that will be longer term. But I think, also, when recognizing those missions, we can begin to recognize and begin to redeploy our combat brigades that are there. They are essentially now engaged in a civil war, a sectarian battle between the Sunnis and Shia in Baghdad, but not just there. These forces we have to begin to redeploy away from Iraq. Initially, they could be redeployed within the country, to adjacent countries, and at some time back to their home stations. I think this is the wisest course.

I hope, as the legislation suggests, we could at least have as a goal March of 2008 for the redeployment of these combat brigades, understanding that these residual missions--force protection, training Iraqi security forces, and counterterrorism--will endure. That is a wise policy that is consistent with our national security objectives and also consistent with our ability and the ability of the American people to sustain these efforts over many months.

The continued course of simply adding more troops and hoping for the best, which is the President's strategy, is not going to work. More importantly, I cannot see it being sustained indefinitely by the American people or supported by a terribly overstretched military force, particularly our Army and Marine Corps.

This whole approach to Iraq, I believe, from the very beginning, was a flawed strategy. It disregarded fundamental aspects of any coherent strategy--identify the most serious threat and apply adequate, very robust resources to the threat. Iraq wasn't the most serious threat in that region. Iran is much more powerful and much more potentially dangerous and, also, at that juncture, the most serious threat, and still lingering are the international terror cells.

But this administration, against my judgment, entered into this conflict in Iraq. Not only did they have a flawed strategy, but the execution has been horrific, incompetent. Today, we are left with very few good choices. One of the most revealing aspects of why the strategic decisions made by the administration were so faulty was given a few weeks ago when I asked Admiral

McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence: What is the most likely source of an attack on the United States, groups in Iraq or groups in Pakistan? His answer, without any delay, immediately, was: ``Pakistan, of course.'' So we have invested billions and billions of dollars, 140,000-plus troops, over 3,000 Americans killed in action, many more seriously wounded, and yesterday, the highest intelligence official in the country says the most serious potential threat to our homeland, an existential attack on the order of 9/11, is from our ally Pakistan. That is because, once we focused on Iraq, we took our focus off Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have allowed the Taliban to rehabilitate itself. The Pakistanis have been unable to deny a safe haven to bin Laden, Zawihiri, and other key elements of al-Qaida's leadership who are not only surviving but beginning to reorganize and reassert themselves as directors or aspirers or at least coconspirators with other terror groups around the world. That is a stunning indictment of the strategy that this administration has unveiled.

There are other costs to this strategy. You will recall the ``axis of evil.'' The President boldly announced that it was Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. Well, frankly, after ignoring the North Koreans for many years, now the administration is seeking to cut a deal with them with respect to their nuclear weapons. But this is a much worse deal than the administration had when it stepped into office. In 2000, their plutonium was capped by international inspectors on the ground. But through a series of miscues, the administration allowed the North Koreans to take away their plutonium, create up to 10 nuclear devices, we think, test long-range missiles and, in a shocking act, detonate a nuclear device, becoming part of the nuclear club. Now we are offering them essentially the same terms that could have been had, without all this damage, many years ago.

With respect to Iran, we know one of the consequences, one of the costs of our operations in Iraq is that Iran is in a much more secure strategic position today. They have colleagues and cohorts who are integral parts of the Government in Baghdad. The people we rely on, the Maliki Government, has huge support from people who have spent years, who have fought alongside the Iranians against the Iraqis. Yet we are supporting, as we must, the Maliki Government. But we should all recognize the huge influence Iran has today as a result of this strategy.

Now, these costs are strategic costs, but there are some obvious costs in terms of dollars and cents. We are spending in Iraq about $8.4 billion a month. That level of effort is difficult to sustain. In Afghanistan, we are spending less but still significant dollars. All these costs are being funded from the supplemental. We are borrowing the money from the next generation of Americans to pay for these efforts.

The President already set up another supplemental request that will be pending in a few days. It includes $93 billion for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will bring the total for this fiscal year-- what was in the original budget, together with the supplemental--to $145 billion. We will likely see totals such as that in succeeding years.

In the 5 years the United States has been engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan--Iraq particularly--we have spent about $530 billion. That is a huge sum of money. That is very difficult to sustain. We can also see the cost in terms of supplying the Army. We have a situation where units are without equipment. Our National Guard is in disarray. Now we are going to, once again, put a huge demand on our military forces to support this escalation. It has been suggested to me that, shortly, upward of nine brigades of National Guard and Reserve forces will be notified for redeployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Once again, our citizen soldiers will be taken from their homes and sent overseas. When they go this time, they will not have quite the same equipment as they did the last time because National Guard equipment is in disrepair, even worse than the regular forces. Their training will likely not be as authentic because of the difficulty in getting out to the national training centers. They might do most of the training at their home stations. We are beginning to see this accumulation of costs reflected in many ways.

A few days ago, the Boston Globe published a story in which it showed that because of the retirement and resignations of captains in the Army, senior NCOs in the Army, promotion rates have been going up astronomically to fill these vacancies. That is probably the worst potential trend for any military force, because without those capable company grade leaders, we will not be able to assure the American public we have the same level of professional skill that we have today.

I believe, for all these reasons, the resolution proposed by Senator Harry Reid is the right course of action. But there will be an alternative approach, and that is a proposal by Senator Gregg with respect to funding. A few points can be made about that. The Gregg resolution misinterprets the Constitution by saying the Congress's only role is simply to rubberstamp what the President does--or worst case, they can only take funds away. That is not the case at all.

As I mentioned on the floor yesterday, way back in 1799, the Supreme Court of the United States clearly said that Congress had the right to make decisions with respect to national policy involving foreign affairs. In fact, their decision essentially said the Congress could pass a law that would allow the President to stop ships going into certain ports but not leaving certain ports.

Many of my colleagues on the other side came down and talked about us micromanaging. That is micromanaging. It is constitutionally permissible, perhaps, but it is not something we will do. It is not something we would want to do. We want to give the President the latter two that he needs but for missions that are consistent with our national security.

Under the Gregg resolution's interpretation of the Constitution, Congress's only responsibility seems to be to fund whatever the President asks.

That I don't think is appropriate constitutionally or with respect to our obligations as thoughtful participants in the policy process along with the President.

Senator Murray will offer an alternative, and that alternative strongly supports our troops but also properly interprets the Constitution by stating the President and the Congress have shared responsibilities for the decisions involving our Armed Forces.

I suspect if you took the Gregg logic to the extreme, if the President sent up a funding bill and we thought it was inadequate, then I suspect we couldn't do anything because, after all, all we can do is either agree with the President or cut off the funds. That is not the case at all.

I can recall the President sending up to the Senate budgets that did not have enough resources for armored humvees, body armor, et cetera. It was this Congress that put more money in because we have a role when it comes to funding the operations of the military.

When it comes to Presidential policy, it is not simply accepting it or taking away the money; it is altering that policy if it is wrong, it is redefining missions, and it is fully resourcing those missions which are the product of this interaction between the President and the Congress.

A quote from Senator Murray's resolution:

. . . the President and Congress should not take any action

that will endanger the Armed Forces of the United States, and

will provide necessary funds for training, equipment, and

other support for troops in the field, as such actions will

ensure their safety and effectiveness in preparing for and

carrying out their assigned missions.

That I think is a much more accurate, appropriate, and sensible approach to the issue of shared responsibility.

In addition, the Murray resolution makes it clear that the Constitution gives Congress the responsibility to take actions that help our troops and our veterans. We have had a lot of talk about not funding the troops. But wait a second, it was the President who sent in forces without a plan. It was the President who sent in forces without adequate armored humvees. It was the President who sent in forces without body armor. It was the President and his Department of Defense who weren't aware of the travesties that were taking place at Walter Reed when it comes to veterans. It is the President's Veterans Administration that refused a

few years ago to ask for adequate money for the Veterans Administration hospitals because of the new demand from veterans.

If anyone over the last several years failed to fund the troops properly, it is the President. So our concerns should be directed at his failures to fund the troops rather than that of Congress.

This is a collaborative process that both the White House and the Congress have to ensure our forces have the resources they need, but we also have to make sure they are performing the missions most important to the United States. By endorsing the Murray resolution, we are sending a clear message of our joint responsibility to fully fund our soldiers in the field, and by supporting Majority Leader Reid's resolution, we are sending a signal that the right policy, phased redeployment, carefully defined missions, providing a stable regional approach to Iraq and, in the long term, redeploying troops so we can face with more flexibility the challenges of a North Korea, of an Iran, of places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and places perhaps at this moment we are not aware of but will suddenly burst onto the front page because of the presence of terrorists or other destabilizing activities.

I urge strong support of the resolution supported by Majority Leader Reid and the resolution supported by Senator Murray.

I yield the floor.

I would like 15 minutes.

Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Oklahoma. I appreciate the opportunity to talk about this very important subject. Some have said we don't want to debate the war in Iraq, but we have been doing that and I am happy to debate it.

We are at war. One of the jobs of this body is to support our troops when we are at war. As such, we should be taking up the supplemental war funding bill that will directly support and aid our service men and women and support the efforts underway in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I regret the Democratic leadership has chosen to delay acting on funds our troops in the field need and must have by the 1st of May. Here we go, talking about resolutions. We are taking up nonbinding resolutions. The key one is nonsensical; it would serve only to undermine the morale of our service men and women and boost the morale of our enemies. S.J. Res. 9 has a clear message, if not to Americans reading the news, certainly to our enemy: America has been defeated. America does not have the will to win. Or we cannot defeat American troops on the streets of Iraq, but we can defeat America in the halls of Congress. That is what they will be saying.

Out of the 17 different resolutions the majority has worked with and introduced, they have decided to debate S.J. Res. 9--one in a litany of defeatist, micromanaging resolutions that have been offered by the other side.

Like so many of the others, it calls for a retreat and it ensures defeat. Such a retreat, in its wake, would create a bastion of instability, violence, regional conflict, and a launching point for future attacks on our allies and this Nation such as that witnessed after 9/11. The intelligence community, in public testimony before our committee in January, publicly stated that the very real three-pronged threat of turning Iraq over to the chaos is a serious challenge we all should consider.

Fortunately, those of us who believe the generals ought to run the war have the Constitution on our side, which specifies that the President--not those of us in the 535 Members of Congress--is Commander in Chief. The proponents of S.J. Res. 9 to set deadlines must now believe they are more equipped, better informed, and have better judgment than the leaders and military commanders they recently and unanimously confirmed.

Is the American public to believe that the legislators in these beautiful halls, 8,000 miles away from the front, are better equipped to develop strategies than General Petraeus, whom this body confirmed unanimously to lead U.S. forces?

I think the Founding Fathers were right at the time and they are right now. We do not fight wars in the Halls of Congress. We cannot win this war by resolutions we pass, but we can lose the war in the Halls of Congress. My colleagues on the other side of the aisle continue to cite public opinion polls about Iraq as well as a reason why we should pull out. What may be perceived to be popular in the short run, regrettably, will in the long run compound into an even bigger problem that will end up costing us and our allies far more blood and treasure.

Further, when it comes to national security, we ought to be governing on principles, not on public opinion polls.

The American people want victory, not defeat. They are demanding progress, which the new security plan was designed to produce. Incidentally, this new plan fits almost exactly with the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton committee, which so many people on both sides of the aisle said would be the ultimate solution. Well, General Petraeus and the administration are carrying out the details of the Baker-Hamilton plan, and now we are changing our mind. Why? Well, some, I fear, may be inspired by a loathing of President Bush. But even to those of you who do, I appeal to you to recognize the President is not the enemy. The enemy is ruthlessly chopping the heads off innocent civilians in front of cameras, blowing up schoolchildren, blowing up places of worship. One Army officer recently e-mailed me and said:

I proudly served in Iraq. I know who the enemies of America

are. I have met them in person. Our President is not the

enemy.

This would not be George Bush's defeat or victory. It will be an American defeat or victory, and the sooner we understand that, the sooner perhaps we can be united.

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, recently wrote a piece in the Washington Post describing the sad state of current political affairs. It was entitled ``Grand Illusion.'' In the piece he asserted:

Democratic and Republican members of Congress are looking

for a different kind of political solution: the solution to

their problems in presidential primaries and elections almost

2 years off.

This is coming, as he indicates in his article, just as ``American soldiers are finally beginning the hard job of establishing a measure of peace, security and order in critical sections of Baghdad.''

He goes on to say that ``they've launched attacks on Sunni insurgent strongholds and begun reining in Moqtada al-Sadr's militia.''

This is appropriate advice. He says:

Politicians in both parties should realize that success in

this mission is in their interest, as well as the nation's.

Here's a wild idea: Forget the political posturing, be

responsible, and provide the moral and material support our

forces need and expect.

Despite many people's dissatisfaction with the war, I don't think a majority of Americans want us to withdraw, to retreat and admit defeat.

Throughout the debate, we have also heard references and comparisons made to Vietnam, that this is a quagmire, that the war is unjust, poorly managed, it threatens our individual liberties, it is unwinnable, and the only option is to pull out. All of the very same things were said during the campaign against President Lincoln in 1864, with well over one-quarter of a million dead Americans; after the Union suffered 7,000 casualties in 30 short minutes at Cold Harbor; and until Sherman won in Atlanta.

If you look at our history, anybody getting 24-hour television news during the battles Americans fought against the British in 1776, you would have had to say we were in worse shape than we are now.

When you look at the conditions our troops were in before D-Day and all the things that went wrong, 24-hour news coverage would have convinced an overwhelming majority of the American people to forget it, pull the plug, let the Nazis have it. But if somebody used Vietnam as a model--and it should be used completely--I think it reminds people of the image associated with Vietnam that too many ignore.

I suspect this is a historical photo that many of our murderous enemies dream would be superimposed over the rooftops of Baghdad. These are the people left behind. We left behind people. Some 2.5 million were murdered after we pulled out of Vietnam.

This is, of course, the final, classic departure, people trying to get away. Those who didn't were slaughtered.

Our enemies throughout the radical Islamist world are all too familiar with immediate withdrawal and retreat. We withdrew from Vietnam, we withdrew from Beirut, and we withdrew from Mogadishu.

These repeated withdrawals signaled to our enemies all over the world that if they inflict enough damage on our most heroic citizens, the Marines will never surrender but Washington will.

And make no mistake about it, they are watching. They are watching to see what we will do in Iraq.

These repeated withdrawals invited the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the bombings of our embassies in Africa, the USS Cole, the Khobar Towers, and eventually 9/11. None of these actions occurred because of our action to liberate Iraq. Five or six of these attacks occurred before President Bush took office, and George Bush did not invent the danger from radical Islam.

Further, the notion of separating al-Qaida from the sectarian killers can only be contemplated from as far away as Washington because al- Qaida is targeting the mixed neighborhoods and has overtly promised sectarian violence to undermine the Iraqi Government and to weaken U.S. Government resolve.

The Democratic resolution before us now is precisely what our enemies want to hear and, sadly, are expecting to hear.

Here are some quotes from one of the people we ought to be reading more frequently, Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden said:

We found that out from our brothers who fought the

Americans in Somalia. They did not see it as a power worthy

of any mention. . . . God gave them and the mujahideen

success in Somalia and the United States pulled out, trailing

disappointment, defeat and failure behind it. It achieved

nothing. It left quicker than people had imagined.

That is what Osama bin Laden said on October 21, 2001.

In addition to that statement, he said on February 14, 2003:

It has been made clear during our defending and fighting

against the American enemy that this enemy's combat strategy

is heavily dependent on the psychological aspect of war . . .

which hides the cowardice and lack of fighting spirit of the

American soldier. . . . Likewise, let me remind you of the

defeat of the American forces in Beirut in 1982, soon after

the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when the Lebanese resistance

was personified by a truck laden with explosives that struck

the main military base of the U.S. Marines in Beirut, killing

242 soldiers--towards hell was their destination and what an

evil destination that is.

This is what Osama bin Laden thinks of us. He stated many times that Americans don't have the stomach for conflict and this Democratic resolution embodies that very notion.

What Osama bin Laden and the enemies we are fighting against expect to see is Vietnam. Let's give General Petraeus more confidence. General Petraeus was confirmed unanimously. He stated that the effort in Iraq will have to be sustained to achieve its desired effect and that more troops are vital to advancing security. We confirmed him unanimously. Give him a chance.

He reported last week that nine Iraqi reinforcement battalions have entered Baghdad. He pointed to a decrease in sectarian killings, the discovery of numerous weapons caches, and the capture of al-Qaida members. Al-Sadr has fled Sadr City, and al-Baghdadi was recently reported caught.

Associated Press reporter Robert Reid recently reported General

Petraeus walking through the streets of Hit, a Sunni city with a bloody past. Last month in the article, he reported:

Iraqi police backed by U.S. troops swept through the city

of about 120,000 people, arresting suspected insurgents and

establishing three new police stations in the downtown area.

Since then, the number of violent incidents has dropped from

an average of 5 per day to 1.3 per day.

Now that a relative level of security has been established, the important political and economic development work must begin.

In the past, the United States had claimed similar victories in Hit, but those gains were lost because of lack of enough troops to sustain the province.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, while it is far too premature to declare that the new strategy has succeeded, it does indicate there is a possibility. As General Abizaid once testified, despair is not a policy. It must be given a chance to succeed, and this resolution would do nothing to achieve victory. The alternative of retreat and defeat would be disastrous.

What are my colleagues who wish to see us leave Iraq thinking will happen once we do? The arguments for retreating before relative security is established because we grow tired of the war, because mistakes were made or because Americans allegedly want us to leave all ignore what the consequences will be if we do leave precipitously on a political withdrawal timetable.

Those who are advocating for retreat and departure from Iraq absolutely must address this very difficult question. In other words, what is ``Plan Bravo,'' plan B, for those mandating retreat? Are we to redeploy forces back home only to have to redeploy them in much larger numbers 3, 4, 5 years from now, once Baghdad has turned into a base of operations and safe haven for al-Qaida? Will we endure the transfer of Islamofascist terrorism and violence occurring in the Middle East back to the homeland?

Mr. President, I ask for an additional 60 seconds.

Mr. President, are we going to bear witness to a conflict between Sunnis and Shiites that would spread into a regional war throughout the Middle East? Will we sit idly by while a regional conflict ensues that would result in the death of thousands of civilians? What will happen when the price of oil goes up? Will we see radical Islam taking over more parts of the world? Will we hand them Iraq on a silver platter? Will we have to again deploy troops to the Middle East?

To ignore these considerations and questions simply because they are not politically palatable is shortsighted at best and dangerous at the worst. Those who are attempting to end the war don't want to talk about the fact that the war in Iraq will do anything but end. In fact, it will only grow more dangerous.

Mr. President, I suggest that Mr. Kagan had it right. In his article, he also said there ought to be a plan B for the Washington Post and others who have projected and counted on defeat. What is your plan B if General Petraeus's works and you predicted so successfully it won't work?

We need to put the money behind our troops, give General Petraeus the support for the new plan with money and support that effort underway. Our 130,000 to 150,000 American troops and their families at home are depending on us. They have a direct stake in this historic event, and I believe that fighting is necessary to prevail over evil.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.