Mr. President, reserving the right to object, is this dividing the hour of debate on the motion to proceed? Mr. President, next Tuesday will mark the start of the fifth year of the war in Iraq. Our…
Mr. President, reserving the right to object, is this dividing the hour of debate on the motion to proceed?
Mr. President, next Tuesday will mark the start of the fifth year of the war in Iraq. Our Nation has spent almost $400 billion now in Iraq and is spending an average of almost $9 billion in U.S. taxpayers' funds per month. More importantly, we have lost almost 3,200 American service men and women and have suffered almost 24,000 wounded.
The resolution before us is aimed at turning the responsibility for the future of Iraq over to the Iraqis themselves. Last year, we adopted a resolution which said that calendar year 2006 was going to be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for a phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq. That was over a year ago.
We were supposed to be through a year of significant transition by now. It has not happened. The only way it is going to happen is if this Congress makes it happen.
Many of us have long maintained it was necessary that pressure be placed on the Iraqis to come together politically because only a political settlement could bring about the end of sectarian violence in Iraq and the defeat of the insurgents.
I have recounted how Ambassador Khalilzad and even President Bush have told me a number of statements that many of us have made--that we should begin to reduce our presence in Iraq--were, indeed, useful statements, useful in an effort to prod the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.
Those words--the words of President Bush, Ambassador Khalilzad, and recently Secretary Rice--words prodding the Iraqis to take responsibility, telling the Iraqis the open-ended commitment is over, telling the Iraqis we must begin to reduce our presence in 4 to 6 months are useful words for the Iraqis to hear.
The problem is it is not the President who is speaking those words. The problem is the administration has not adopted those words as a matter of policy. Now it is time for Congress to explain to the Iraqis: It is your country. We cannot save you from yourselves. It is time for us, the Congress, to tell the Iraqis as a reminder that it is their own Prime Minister, Mr. Maliki, who acknowledged the following when he said a few months ago:
The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the
cycle of aggravation and bloodletting are the [Iraqi]
politicians.
A few weeks ago, Ambassador Khalilzad said in an interview on television that the congressional debate is ``useful in one way. It does send a message to the Iraqis that the patience of the American people is running out, and that is helpful to my diplomacy.''
I wish to repeat this because there are a number of Members of this body and there are a number of members of the administration who have attacked this debate as somehow or another undermining our troops. It is quite the opposite. We support our troops when we give them our best thinking as to how to succeed in Iraq. It is good for our troops to have a debate in this democracy about whether a course is failing or succeeding and, if it is not succeeding, to offer our best thoughts as to how to make it succeed.
Our troops deserve everything we can give them. They haven't gotten it. They deserve the best equipment. They didn't get it. They deserve treatment when they come to our hospitals. They didn't get it. They deserve our best thinking, our honest thoughts as to how we can succeed in Iraq, how can we change course from a failing course to one which succeeds.
We know there is no military solution in Iraq, there is only a political solution, and that must be achieved by the Iraqis themselves. We cannot save the Iraqis from themselves. It is their country. After 4 years of shedding American blood and American treasure, it is long overdue that the Iraqi leaders be told, not just by this Congress, although we alone apparently will do it, but by the administration that they and they alone have the responsibility, the capability, and the power to make Iraq a country instead of a place of civil strife.
This resolution we are about to embark upon will end the open-ended commitment of American military forces that is not working. We must change this course. Only the Iraqis can save their country, and we will be helping to force them to do that. It shouldn't be necessary, but it is. We will be helping to force the Iraqi leaders to save their country if we step up finally and say: We have been there longer than we were in World War II. We have been in Iraq longer than we fought the Korean war. Iraqis leaders, only you, and you alone, can decide: Do you want a civil war or do you want a nation? We hope you choose a nation.
I yield the floor.
I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, after 4 years of fighting and the loss of almost 3,200 American lives, 24,000 wounded, $350 billion spent on this war, it is long past time for a new approach in Iraq. Everybody who participates in this debate wants to maximize our chances of success in Iraq. Even those of us who voted against going to war and those of us who have disagreed with how this war has been conducted want to see a stable Iraq which enhances our own national security.
But continuing the current course and surging along the current course does not do that. The President's current course of action, of putting more U.S. military personnel in the middle of a growing civil war in Iraq, does not enhance our security and it does not maximize the chances of success.
The President's plan has a fundamental flaw because what is needed in Iraq is a political solution among the Iraqi leaders, not a military solution. Our troops perform bravely and brilliantly, but American military firepower will not end the civil war in Iraq. It has been apparent for a long time that there is no military solution in Iraq, that an Iraqi political solution is necessary to end the violence. GEN Peter Chiarelli, commanding general of
the multinational force in Iraq, said the following in December:
We need a commitment by all Iraqis, of all of the ethno-
sectarian groups to commit first to nonviolence and to
resolving their differences through the political process . .
.
And he continued:
I happen to believe that we have done everything militarily
that we possibly can.
At his confirmation hearing in December, I asked our new Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates:
Do you believe that the end to violence in Iraq requires a
political settlement, and that we need to communicate a sense
of urgency to the Iraqis to pressure them to reach a
settlement that only their politicians can reach?
Dr. Gates replied:
Yes, I do.
The Iraq Study Group stated that:
The violence in Iraq cannot be stopped or even contained if
there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about
the future of their country.
Perhaps most telling was Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's acknowledgment recently on this essential point. This is what Iraq's own Prime Minister said:
The crisis is political. And the ones who can stop the
cycle of aggravation and blood-letting of innocents are the
Iraqi politicians.
The real battle for Baghdad is not a military battle, it is a political one, and that battle can be resolved only by Iraqi politicians and not by our military.
So how do we pressure the Iraqi leaders to reach the political settlement that is essential? We can start by ending our open-ended commitment to Iraq. The President has changed his rhetoric about ending our open-ended commitment, but he has not changed his policy. In fact, he sent the opposite message when he sent more troops to Baghdad.
Our objective in Iraq, and the objective of this resolution, must be to shift responsibility to the Iraqis, both politically and militarily, for their future. For that to happen, we must end the open-ended commitment that has been made by this administration to Iraq of the presence--without decision by us, leaving it up to the Iraqis for how long and how many--of American troops.
We must make clear to the Iraqis that their future is in their hands, not ours. We must make it clear to the Iraqis they must reach a political settlement among themselves and, if they do not, we cannot save them from themselves.
As General Abizaid said in November:
It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future.
General Casey made the same point in early January when he said:
The longer we in the U.S. forces continue to bear the main
burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the
government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about
reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the other
thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq's
problems, which are at base their problems.
The Iraq Study Group specifically drew the connection between the importance of ending the open-ended commitment of American troops and persuading the Iraqis to make political compromises. There is a connection between the two, the Iraq Study Group said, between ending the open-ended commitment and getting the Iraqis to resolve their political differences. Here is the way they put it in the Iraq Study Group's report:
An open-ended commitment of American forces would not
provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take
the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of
quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an
incentive, the Iraqi government might continue to delay
taking those difficult actions.
That is the Iraq Study Group.
Columnist Tom Friedman put it succinctly recently in the New York Times:
Right now everyone in Iraq is having their cake and eating
it--at our expense. We have to change that.
But instead of putting pressure on the Iraqis, the President is putting his faith in the Iraqis to meet certain benchmarks they have set for themselves. But look at the track record of the Iraqi Government in meeting some of the benchmarks and promises it has set for itself and it has made.
Iraqi President Talibani said in August of 2006 that Iraqi forces would ``take over security in all Iraqi provinces by the end of 2006.'' That pledge surely has not been kept.
Prime Minister Maliki said last June he would disband the militias and illegal armed groups as part of his national reconciliation plan, and in October he set the timetable for disbanding the militias as the end of 2006. That commitment has not been kept.
The Iraqi Constitutional Review Commission was to present its recommendations for changes in the constitution to the Council of Representatives within 4 months of the formation of the Iraqi Government last May. Well, the commission has yet to formulate any recommendations.
Prime Minister Maliki put forward a series of reconciliation milestones to be completed by the end of 2006 or early 2007, including approval of the provincial election law, approval of a new de- baathification law, and approval of a new militia law. Not one of those laws has been enacted.
On January 30, Secretary Rice wrote to me about these benchmarks. She said the Iraqi Government had adopted a lot of benchmarks, and she attached those benchmarks to her letter called ``Notional Political Timeline.''
Here is what she said about the benchmarks attached to her letter:
. . . Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed
upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks
and an associated timeline in September 2006.
Then she said:
These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October
16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the
relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the
President of Iraq's website.
The posted document shows one benchmark after another, starting in September 2006, going through March of 2007, and I am going to read them off.
By September 2006:
Form a Constitutional Review Committee;
Approve the law and procedures to form regions;
Agree on political timetable;
Approve the law for Independent High Electoral Commission
(IHEC);
Approve the Investment Law.
By October 2006:
Approve provincial elections law and set date for
provincial elections;
Approve a hydrocarbon law.
By November 2006:
Approve a de-Ba'athification law;
Approve provincial council authorities law;
Approve a flag, emblem and national anthem law.
By December 2006:
Approve Coalition Provisional Authority . . . concerning
armed forces and militias;
Council of Representatives to address amnesty, militias and
other armed formations;
Approve amnesty, militias and other armed formations law.
By January 2007--this was the timeline--
Constitutional Review Committee completes its work.
By February 2007:
Form independent commissions in accordance with the
Constitution.
By March:
Constitutional amendments referendum (if required).
Now, there may have been one or two of those guidelines met. If so, I am not sure what they are, but I want to at least allow the possibility that a flag, emblem, and national anthem law was adopted. But of those perhaps 15 milestones--and a timeline for them--to be adopted by the Iraqi Presidency, not more than one--but maybe two--of the 15 have been adopted. And none of the important ones have been adopted.
We are told by Secretary Rice, that was on the Web site of the President of Iraq. Then suddenly and mysteriously it disappeared from that Web site a few months ago.
When I asked Secretary Rice--I wrote her a letter asking: You said, Madam Secretary, this was on the Web site, but it disappeared from the Web site. Can you find out why? We have not heard back from the Secretary of State about that problem.
So much for the promises and commitments and milestones of the Iraqi leadership. They post them on a Web site month by month what these promises and commitments and milestones and benchmarks are, and then-- poof--they disappear from the Web site, just as though they were not made. That is the problem with milestones, benchmarks which have no consequences when they are not met.
The President talks about benchmarks, and yet he has not outlined any consequences for the Iraqis if they fail to meet these new benchmarks. I have little hope they will meet benchmarks they lay out unless they see no alternative. It is time to go beyond the toothless benchmarks and to make clear to the Iraqi leaders their dawdling must end and that their nation is in their hands, and we cannot decide for them how to build a nation, whether to build a nation, or whether they prefer to have a civil war.
The administration says our debate on this bill would embolden the enemy. But what that shows is a serious lack of understanding of the situation we face. Congressional debate over Iraq policy does not embolden the enemy. The enemy is already emboldened. The enemy is emboldened by an open-ended presence of western troops in a Muslim country's capital, which serves as a magnet for extremists and gives a propaganda club to our enemies.
The enemy is emboldened by an invasion of Iraq without the support of the international community, and with no plan for a violent aftermath. The enemy is emboldened by a million and a half Iraqi refugees, with thousands more being added each day. The enemy is emboldened by a surge of American troops into a civil war that postpones the day when Iraqi leaders will take responsibility for their own future.
And now our responsibility as a Congress. What is our responsibility? What this resolution does is implement our responsibility by working to make the day when Iraqi leaders take responsibility for their own nation come sooner rather than later. The most recent intelligence estimate says ``the current security and political trends in Iraq are moving in a negative direction.''
Our resolution is the best way to stop the Iraqi leaders from continuing to fiddle while Baghdad burns. It would seek to pressure the Iraqi leaders to achieve a political solution by requiring our President to promptly transition the mission of American forces in Iraq to protecting United States and coalition personnel and infrastructure, to training and equipping Iraqi forces, and to conducting targeted counterterrorism operations.
Our resolution would require the President to begin the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq not later than 120 days after enactment, with the goal--I emphasize ``goal''--of redeploying all United States combat forces by March 31, 2008, except for--except for--those that are needed to carry out the three missions which are described in the resolution, and which I have just outlined. That goal and the three limited missions are the same as the goal and the limited missions recommended by the Iraq Study Group.
Passing this resolution would deliver a cold dose of reality to the Iraqi leaders and would tell them we are not going to be their security blanket without end. When they finally understand our military presence in Iraq is neither permanent nor unconditional, then--and only then-- are they likely to take the political steps necessary to deal with sectarian violence and to defeat the insurgency.
By shifting responsibility to the Iraqis for their own future and their own country, this resolution does what is needed the most--it puts pressure on the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.
As we consider the future of our involvement in Iraq, we must always be mindful of the price our military and their families are paying as a result of multiple deployments of units and people to Iraq. We must be mindful that the lack of attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan has allowed al-Qaida and the Taliban to regroup and strengthen. We must also be mindful that our nondeployed forces lack the equipment and other resources needed to maintain an acceptable level of readiness, and, as a result, the risk our Nation faces has substantially increased.
We must be tragically mindful, always, that the pledge to take care of those courageous soldiers and marines, who have sustained serious physical and mental injuries in combat, has been broken by this administration.
In recent days, there have been statements suggesting a debate in Congress on the war in Iraq is undermining the troops. Just last Monday, Vice President Cheney said, among other things, that:
When Members of Congress pursue an antiwar strategy . . .
they are not supporting the troops, they are undermining
them.
Contrast the Vice President's statement with statements Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Pace made recently on February 7 before the House Armed Services Committee.
Here is what Secretary Gates said:
I would tell you that I think that our troops do understand
that everybody involved in this debate is looking to do the
right thing for our country and for our troops, and that
everybody is looking for the best way to avoid an outcome
that leaves Iraq in chaos. And I think our troops are
sophisticated enough to understand that that's what the
debate's really about. It's about the path forward in Iraq.
Here is what General Pace said, and contrast this to what Vice President Cheney said--how worthy Secretary Gates' statement is--and listen to how worthy General Pace's statement is compared to the stale and unworthy comments of the Vice President of the United States about what this debate signifies.
General Pace:
There is no doubt in my mind that the dialogue here in
Washington strengthens our democracy. Period.
And then he added:
From the standpoint of the troops, I believe that they
understand how our legislature works and they understand that
there is going to be this kind of debate.
When I listened to the Vice President and his unworthy remarks, it reminded me of not only how worthy our troops are and how they are professional enough to understand what their duty is, but also that they are loyal Americans to know and understand that it is our duty to debate this war. For those of us who think it is leading in the wrong direction and going nowhere, it is on a road to failure, it is our duty to try to change that course.
Contrast our troops and their honor and their loyalty to the principles upon which this Nation was founded, reflected, interestingly enough, in a poll taken of our military by the Military Times. This poll was printed in the Army Times a few months ago. The question that was asked of our troops was whether they approve of the President's handling of the war in Iraq. Forty-two percent of our troops disapproved of the President's handling of the war in Iraq. Thirty-five percent of our troops approved of the handling of the war by their Commander in Chief. They are divided as Americans are divided. We should not only respect their bravery, we should respect their intelligence and their commitment to this debate in the Congress. That is what they are fighting for: that we can debate a mission and we can debate how to best secure this country so that we can debate how to best succeed in Iraq.
That is what our troops believe in. That is what they are fighting for. It is insulting to them. It is insulting to them to say, as the Vice President of the United States said, that a debate in the United States Congress as to how best to succeed in Iraq, how best to change the course in Iraq, somehow or other undermines the troops.
So we have before us an opportunity, an opportunity which can only be achieved if this debate can advance beyond the motion to proceed. We will be voting on that motion later on today or tomorrow. I hope that Senators, regardless of our views on this war, will allow this Senate to once again debate the direction in Iraq. The last real vote we had was one that denied us this opportunity to proceed. I hope there will be enough of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle who will recognize the importance of this debate to this future--the future of this country, to the future of this world, perhaps; to the lives of so many of our gallant, brave troops and their families, and perhaps, indeed, to the future well-being of this institution because this institution surely should be about debating issues as transcendently important as our future in Iraq.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some correspondence between myself and Secretary Rice, and Senator McCain and myself with Secretary Rice be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Rhode Island would yield.
There is no order that has been established, No. 1. I would like very much to establish an order for the convenience of all Senators, but I would have to know more about the other side in terms of what their wishes are. I know Senator Schumer wanted to begin at about 1:45, and then I know Senator Dorgan was in the queue--it is an informal queue. I believe, if my memory is correct, although I don't have the sheet of paper in front of me, Senator Dorgan wanted to come out between 3:00 and 4:00.
We will do everything we can to accommodate Senators, and if Senators could let me know, for those who want to speak in favor of the motion to proceed, when they would like to be here and about how long they need, I would be most appreciative, and I will try to put together an order.
Can we put in an order now that Senator Reed has the floor, and we would be happy to alternate if a Republican shows up. Let me ask Senator Dorgan. I did tell Senator Schumer that we would try to fit him in at 1:45. Can we put Senator Specter in immediately after Senator Schumer? Could we put the Senator from Pennsylvania in immediately after Senator Schumer because I have not specified with him the amount of time he needs. But I would prevail upon him to see if he could end close to 1:55. Let me raise that with Senator Schumer.
Could I ask the Senator from Rhode Island about how much time he needs?
As always, he is most accommodating. The Presiding Officer apparently also wishes to have time. Could we put the Senator from New Jersey in after the Senator from Pennsylvania? Why don't we set up the next three Senators on this side to be Senator Reed, Senator Schumer, and then Senator Specter, and then Senator Menendez.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Bill Nelson be recognized next and Senator Graham be recognized after Senator Nelson, and then we return to Senator Dorgan.
Mr. President, I would ask unanimous consent that Senator Cardin be recognized for 5 minutes and then Senator Kennedy be recognized immediately after the remarks by the Senator from Maryland.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Utah is finished with his remarks, on this side, the order then be Senator Dodd, Senator Brown, and Senator Dorgan.
Mr. President, after Senator Dodd is recognized, we had previously indicated that Senator Brown and then Senator Dorgan would be recognized. We are trying to see whether it might be possible to substitute Senator Kerry for Senator Brown, leaving Senator Dorgan in the same position. We are trying to determine that right now. For the time being, it will be Senator Dodd, then Senator Brown or Senator Kerry, and then Senator Dorgan.