Expressing condolences to the families of the victims of the February 27, 2010, earthquake in Chile, as well as solidarity with and support for the people of Chile as they plan for recovery and reconstruction.

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1146, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 248) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan, and ask for its immediate consideration.

I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in 2001 I joined the House in voting for the Authorization for Use of Military Force. In the past 8\1/2\ years, it has become clear that the Authorization for Use of Military Force is being interpreted as carte blanche for circumventing Congress' role as a coequal branch of government.

My legislation invokes the War Powers Resolution of 1973. If enacted, it would require the President to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from Afghanistan by December 31, 2010.

The debate today will be the first opportunity we have had to revisit the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which the House supported following the worst terrorist attack in our country's history. Regardless of your support or opposition to the war in Afghanistan, this is going to be the first opportunity to evaluate critically where the Authorization for Use of Military Force has taken us in the last 8\1/2\ years.

This 2001 resolution allowed military action ``to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.'' Those of us who support the withdrawal from Afghanistan may or may not agree on a timeline for troop withdrawal, but I think we agree that this debate is timely.

The rest of the world is beginning to see the folly of trying to occupy Afghanistan: The Dutch Government recently came to a halt over the commitment of more troops from their country. In Britain public outcry over the war is growing. A recent BBC poll indicated that 63 percent of the British public is demanding that their troops come home by Christmas. In Germany opposition to the war has risen to 69 percent. Russia has lost billions of dollars in the 9 years it spent attempting to control Afghanistan.

Our supposed nation-building in Afghanistan has come at the destruction of our own. The military escalation cements the path of the United States down the road of previous occupiers that earned Afghanistan its nickname as the ``graveyard of empires.''

One year ago last month, a report by the Carnegie Endowment concluded ``the only meaningful way to halt the insurgency's momentum is to start withdrawing troops. The presence of foreign troops is the most important element driving the resurgence of the Taliban.''

So with this debate today, Mr. Speaker, we will have a chance for the first time to reflect on our responsibility for troop casualties that are now reaching 1,000; to look at our responsibility for the costs of the war, which approaches $250 billion; our responsibility for the civilian casualties and the human costs of the war; our responsibility for challenging the corruption that takes place in Afghanistan; our responsibility for having a real understanding of the role of the pipeline in this war; our responsibility for debating the role of counterinsurgency strategies, as opposed to counterterrorism; our responsibility for being able to make a case for the logistics of withdrawal.

After 8\1/2\ years, it is time that we have this debate.

I reserve the balance of my time.

I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).

I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).

I yield the gentleman 30 seconds.

I just want to say that you can talk about how the Democratic leadership is bringing this up at the time that there is obviously a surge about to begin, but why question the timeliness of the debate when in fact my friend in the minority, their party didn't bring this up for 8 years of debate? Eight years. I mean I think it's timely. That is the whole point.

I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).

(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Could I ask, Madam Speaker, how much time is remaining on each side?

I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy).

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Speaker, I would like to respond to my friend that the authorization for the use of military force, which passed September 14, 2001, had in its provision this particular line: ``Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.''

So the war powers resolution is properly the subject of a debate and properly serves as a vehicle to bring this debate to the House of Representatives, and we don't need to cede our right under article I, section 8 at any time to determine whether or not we go to war. This is clearly a constitutional issue. And when I take an oath to defend the Constitution, I don't cross my fingers behind my back and say, Well, I will let the President make the final decision regarding war.

Our Founders didn't want to do that. Our Founders said in order to restrain the dog of war, they would put the ability to declare war in the legislative branch. They were very clear about that.

Do not disrespect this institution when it comes to the Constitution. Remember, the War Powers Act specifically was mentioned in the resolution that was passed on September 14, 2001. It was not superseded. And I might add that while I voted for the authorization for the use of military force because I believe America has a right to defend herself, I didn't give any President carte blanche to go and carry or prosecute a war wherever he or she, in the future, determines necessary.

I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan).

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).

(Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

I yield the gentlewoman an additional minute.

I want to thank Mr. Berman for agreeing to make this debate possible. I do appreciate it very much. You have been open to that, and I think the country should appreciate that about you.

I also want to say that this CRS study, Congressional Research Study, on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force makes it very clear in it that the War Powers Act is not superseded, and I would like to submit this for the Record.

Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks

(P.L. 107-40): Legislative History

[From the Congressional Research Service, Jan. 16, 2007]

(By Richard F. Grimmett)

Summary

In response to the terrorist attacks against the United

States on September 11, 2001, the Congress passed

legislation, S.J. Res. 23, on September 14, 2001, authorizing

the President to ``use all necessary and appropriate force

against those nations, organizations, or persons he

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the

terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or

harbored such organizations or persons. . . .'' The President

signed this legislation into law on September 18, 2001 (P.L.

107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). This report provides a

legislative history of this statute, the ``Authorization for

Use of Military Force'' (AUMF), which, as Congress stated in

its text, constitutes the legislative authorization for the

use of U.S. military force contemplated by the War Powers

Resolution. It also is the statute which the President and

his attorneys have subsequently cited as an authority for him

to engage in electronic surveillance against possible

terrorists without obtaining authorization of the special

Court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(FISA) of 1978, as amended. This report will only be updated

if events warrant.

On September 11, 2001, terrorists linked to Islamic

militant Usama bin Laden hijacked four U.S. commercial

airliners, crashing two into the twin towers of the World

Trade Center in New York City, and another into the Pentagon

building in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth plane crashed in

Shanksville, Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh, after passengers

struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft.

The collective death toll resulting from these incidents was

nearly 3,000. President George W. Bush characterized these

attacks as more than acts of terror. ``They were acts of

war,'' he said. He added that ``freedom and democracy are

under attack,'' and he asserted that the United States would

use ``all of our resources to conquer this enemy.''

In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the

President consulted with the leaders of Congress on

appropriate steps to take to deal with the situation

confronting the United States. These discussions produced the

concept of a joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the

President to take military steps to deal with the parties

responsible for the attacks on the United States. The leaders

of the Senate and the House decided at the outset that the

discussions and negotiations with the President and White

House officials over the specific language of the joint

resolution would be conducted by them, and not through the

formal committee legislation review process. Consequently, no

formal reports on this legislation were made by any committee

of either the House or the Senate. As a result, it is

necessary to rely on the texts of the original draft proposal

by the President for a use of military force resolution, and

the final bill, S.J. Res. 23, as enacted, together with the

public statements of those involved in drafting the bill, to

construct the legislative history of this statute. Between

September 12 and 14, 2001, draft language of a joint

resolution was discussed and negotiated by the White House

Counsel's Office, and the Senate and House leaders of both

parties. Other members of both Houses of Congress suggested

language for consideration through their respective party

leaders.

On Wednesday, September 12, 2001, the White House gave a

draft joint resolution to the leaders of the Senate and the

House. This White House draft legislation, if it had been

enacted, would have authorized the President (1) to take

military action against those involved in some notable way

with the September 11 attacks on the U.S., but it also would

have granted him (2) statutory authority ``to deter and pre-

empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the

United States.'' This language would have seemingly

authorized the President, without durational limitation, and

at his sole discretion, to take military action against any

nation, terrorist group or individuals in the

world without having to seek further authority from the

Congress. It would have granted the President open-ended

authority to act against all terrorism and terrorists or

potential aggressors against the United States anywhere,

not just the authority to act against the terrorists

involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and those

nations, organizations and persons who had aided or

harbored the terrorists. As a consequence, this portion of

the language in the proposed White House draft resolution

was strongly opposed by key legislators in Congress and

was not included in the final version of the legislation

that was passed.

The floor debates in the Senate and House on S.J. Res. 23

make clear that the focus of the military force legislation

was on the extent of the authorization that Congress would

provide to the President for use of U.S. military force

against the international terrorists who attacked the U.S. on

September 11, 2001 and those who directly and materially

assisted them in carrying out their actions. The language of

the enacted legislation, on its face, makes clear--especially

in contrast to the White House's draft joint resolution of

September 12, 2001--the degree to which Congress limited the

scope of the President's authorization to use U.S. military

force through P.L. 107-40 to military actions against only

those international terrorists and other parties directly

involved in aiding or materially supporting the September 11,

2001 attacks on the United States. The authorization was not

framed in terms of use of military action against terrorists

generally.

On Friday, September 14, 2001, after the conclusion of the

meetings of their respective party caucuses from 9:15 a.m. to

10:15 a.m., where the final text of the draft bill was

discussed, S.J. Res. 23, jointly sponsored by Senators Thomas

Daschle and Trent Lott, the Senate Majority and Minority

leaders respectively, was called up for quick consideration

under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement. S.J. Res.

23 was then considered and passed by the Senate by a vote of

98-0. As part of the Senate's unanimous consent agreement

that set the stage for the rapid consideration and vote on

S.J. Res. 23, the Senate agreed to adjourn and to have no

additional votes until after the following Wednesday. That

action effectively meant that if the House amended S.J. Res.

23, no further legislative action on it would occur until the

middle of the following week. After the House of

Representatives received S.J. Res. 23 from the Senate, on

Friday, September 14, 2001, the House passed it late that

evening, after several hours of debate, by a vote of 420-1,

clearing it for the President. Prior to passing S.J. Res. 23,

the House considered, and then tabled an identically worded

joint resolution, H.J. Res. 64, and rejected a motion to

recommit by Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.), that would have had

the effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report from

the President on his actions under the joint resolution every

60 days after it entered into force.

S.J. Res. 23, formally titled in Section 1 as the

``Authorization for Use of Military Force,'' was thus passed

by Congress on September 14, 2001, and was signed into law by

the President on September 18, 2001. The enacted bill

contains five ``Whereas clauses'' in its preamble, expressing

opinions regarding why the joint resolution is necessary.

Four of these are identical to the ``Whereas clauses''

contained in the White House draft joint resolution of

September 12, 2001. The fifth, which was not in the original

White House draft, reads as follows: ``Whereas, the President

has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter

and prevent acts of international terrorism against the

United States. . . .'' This statement, and all of the other

Whereas clauses in P.L. 107-40, are not part of the language

after the Resolving clause of the Act, and, as such, it is

not clear how a Court would treat such provisions in

interpreting the scope of the authority granted in the law.

Section 2(a) of the joint resolution, authorizes the

President ``to use all necessary and appropriate force

against those nations, organizations, or persons he

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the

terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or

harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent

any future acts of international terrorism against the United

States by such nations, organizations or persons.'' The joint

resolution further states, in Section 2(b)(1), Congressional

intent that it ``constitute specific statutory authorization

within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers

Resolution.'' Finally, Section 2(b)(2) of the joint

resolution states that ``[n]othing in this resolution

supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.''

A notable feature of S.J. Res. 23 is that unlike all other

major legislation authorizing the use of military force by

the President, this joint resolution authorizes military

force against ``organizations and persons'' linked to the

September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In its past

authorizations for use of U.S. military force, Congress has

permitted action against unnamed nations in specific regions

of the world, or against named individual nations, but never

against ``organizations or persons.'' The authorization of

use of force against unnamed nations is consistent with some

previous instances where authority was given to act against

unnamed states when they became aggressors or took military

action against the United States or its citizens.

President George W. Bush in signing S.J. Res. 23 into law

on September 18, 2001, noted the Congress had acted ``wisely,

decisively, and in the finest traditions of our country.'' He

thanked the ``leadership of both Houses for their role in

expeditiously passing this historic joint resolution.'' He

noted that he had had the ``benefit of meaningful

consultations with members of the Congress'' since the

September 11 attacks, and that he would ``continue to consult

closely with them as our Nation responds to this threat to

our peace and security.'' President Bush also asserted that

S.J. Res. 23 ``recognized the authority of the President

under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent

acts of terrorism against the United States.'' He also stated

that ``In signing this resolution, I maintain the

longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the

President's constitutional authority to use force, including

the Armed Forces of the United States and regarding the

constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.''

It is important to note here that Presidents frequently

sign bills into law that contain provisions or language with

which they disagree. Presidents sometimes draw attention to

these disagreements in a formal statement at the time they

sign a bill into law. While Presidential ``signing

statements'' may indicate that the President views certain

provisions to be unconstitutional, they do not themselves

have the force of law, nor do they modify the language of the

enacted statute. Should the President strongly object to the

language of any bill presented to him, he has the option to

veto it, and compel the Congress to enact it through voting

to override his veto. Once a bill is enacted into law,

however, every President, in accordance with Article II,

section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, is obligated to ``take

care that the laws be faithfully executed. . . .'' Thus,

unless its current language is changed through enactment of a

new statute that amends it, or its effect is modified by

opinions of the Federal Courts, the ``Authorization for Use

of Military Force'' statute, P.L. 107-40, retains the legal

force it has had since its enactment on September 18, 2001.

Text of Original Draft of Proposed White House Joint Resolution

(September 12, 2001)

Joint Resolution

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against

those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the

United States.

Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence

were committed against the United States and its citizens;

and

Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate

that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense

and to protect United States citizens both at home and

abroad; and

Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and

foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts

of violence; and

Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and

extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign

policy of the United States,

Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled--

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations or

persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored,

committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the

attacks against the United States that occurred on September

11, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of

terrorism or aggression against the United States.

Text of S.J. Res. 23 as Passed September 14, 2001, and Signed Into Law

Joint Resolution

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against

those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the

United States.

Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence

were committed against the United States and its citizens;

Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate

that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense

and to protect United States citizens both at home and

abroad;

Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and

foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts

of violence;

Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and

extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign

policy of the United States; and

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution

to take action to deter and prevent acts of international

terrorism against the United States; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin).

I yield the gentlewoman 1 additional minute.

I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Grayson).

I just want to say to the gentleman who just spoke, to Mr. Hunter, that we honor his service to our country both as a Member of Congress and in the military, as we honored your father's service. You have served this country well. You are well-spoken, and we appreciate that you are here.

I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Davis).

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis).

I would gently remind my colleague from Georgia that article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States places expressly in the hands of Congress the power to declare war. This resolution does not seek to usurp our Commander in Chief. It seeks to reset the balance in our Constitution so that we reclaim what the Founders rightly intended--that the war power be in the Congress and, by reference, that we have the power to determine not just when a war starts, but when a war stops. It is also telling that in this war, in this surge, we're essentially announcing to the Taliban where we are proceeding and when.

I reserve the balance of my time.

I yield myself 5 minutes.

To my friend from Indiana, who cited his disagreement based on law and facts and the troops, I would like to respond categorically.

First of all, section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Act requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When the President reports, he does so consistent with but not pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. That's nuance when we're speaking about reporting requirements, because if President Obama did submit a report pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, it would trigger a vote on withdrawal from Afghanistan. Or Congress, on the other hand, has the ability, as I have, to bring a privileged resolution forward.

Now, I have heard a lot of talk about the troops here. I don't take a backseat to anyone in support of the troops. There are some that believe the way that we support the troops is to keep them in Afghanistan. There are others who believe that the way to support the troops is to bring them home.

The Washington Post this week carried one of a series of presentations of what they call ``Faces of the Fallen.'' We owe our gratitude to each and every person who has served this country. We support those who served. But it is our obligation to be able to question the mission at any time. We should honor those who serve and those who have given their lives and made the supreme sacrifice. We owe it to them to continually critically analyze the cost of the war, the purpose of the war, and the continuation of the war.

I never had the opportunity to serve. I had a heart murmur during the Vietnam era. But my father was a World War II marine veteran who had his knee shot out in a campaign in the South Pacific. My brother Frank, who is now deceased, served in combat in Vietnam and came home with post-traumatic stress. It changed his whole life. My brother Gary, a Vietnam-era Marine veteran; my sister Beth Ann, who recently passed, an Army veteran; my nephew Gary, an Iraq combat veteran. I come from a family which believes in service. The American family, the large family of our Nation, believes in service to our country. Yet, it is true that the death toll, as The Washington Post reports in Afghanistan, is at least at 1,000, and we have to have this debate to either recommit to continuing the war and giving the reasons to the troops why we're doing that or to suggest that maybe this is the opportunity for us to take a new direction.

I reserve the balance of my time.

I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), who, you know, we do have a difference of opinion about this resolution, but we're united in the fact that this House should debate it, and any Member of this House, whatever their opinion is on this resolution, has the right to debate it. And to try to diminish this institution by saying, Well, this is not a proper subject for debate-- we're about to begin a surge. This is a proper subject for debate, and this is why we're here.

If we wait 8\1/2\ years to debate this, and people say, Well, why are we debating it now? Should we wait another 8\1/2\ years to have a debate? Or should we have it now before we commit more and more people into combat?

I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Serrano).

(Mr. SERRANO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

I yield myself such time as I may consume.

One of the things that really doesn't often get discussion here on this floor with respect to a war is the specifics about how it affects people back home. And because I come from Cleveland, I just want to share with you some things just about my community.

Cleveland, as some of you may know, was the epicenter of the subprime mortgage meltdown. Predatory lenders descended on neighbors in our community and were able to take people into contracts that eventually led them into foreclosure and losing their homes.

Now, I don't think that even the most powerful camera would be able to pick up the sea of red dots across our metropolitan area that represents foreclosures, but you get an idea that we have a desperate need not only in Cleveland but across the country for helping to keep people in their homes. And yet more and more, our priorities are to spend money not just on these wars but to increase the Pentagon budget.

I would like to point out that just with respect to the amount of money that is being spent, allocated by congressional districts--this is the National Priorities Project that I am quoting which includes the fiscal 2010 budget. They point out that taxpayers in the 10th Congressional District that I represent will pay $591.9 million for total Afghanistan war spending, counting all the spending since 2001.

And they go on to say, Here's what that money could have been spent for instead. It could have been used to provide 209,812 people with health care for 1 year. Or it could have been used to provide 13,404 public safety officers for 1 year, or 9,063 music and arts teachers for 1 year, or 68,299 scholarships for university students for 1 year. Or it could have been spent for 106,658 students receiving Pell grants of $5,550. Or it could have been spent to provide for 5,521 affordable housing units. It could be have been spent for providing 355,972 children with health care for 1 year, or 92,161 Head Start places for children for 1 year, or 9,433 elementary school teachers for 1 year, or 662,950 homes with renewable electricity for 1 year.

When we spend money on wars and we spend money expanding the budget for military spending, we may say we are making things safer at home, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the shift in allocation of funds and the shift for spending towards wars, which were off-budget for quite a while, have put our country in a position where we are not really able to meet our needs.

When you look at this, this is from the Friends Committee on National Legislation, they say for each dollar of Federal income tax we paid in 2009, the government spent about 33 cents for Pentagon spending for current and past wars; 27 cents supporting the economy, which is the recovery and the bailouts; 17 cents for health care; 11 cents responding to poverty; 9 cents for general government, and of that 7 cents goes for interest on the public debt; 2 cents for energy, science and environment; and a penny of the Federal dollar for diplomacy, development, and war prevention.

We are setting our priorities here constantly. When we remain silent about war spending, we actually have put ourselves in a position where we go headlong. And the headlong momentum that occurs from being silent about a war just carries us into all these reshaped priorities, whether we realize it or not. That is why I have asked this resolution to be brought forth, so we could talk about this.

I reserve the balance of my time.

I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the gentleman from Georgia for the collegial manner in which he has approached this debate, and also to suggest that I think that while this is a very emotional matter, that it is possible for us to talk about it in terms that are clear and logical. I also want to say to my friend that I think I probably joined you in voting against the Wall Street bailouts. That was the fiscal conservative in me.

I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland (Ms. Edwards).

I yield the gentlewoman an additional 1 minute.

Madam Speaker, I just would like to talk for a minute about the mission in the context of what is going on with the government in Kabul. The Washington Post did a story on February 25 which talks about ``Officials puzzle over millions of dollars leaving Afghanistan by plane for Dubai,'' and I will include that for the Record.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 25, 2010]

Officials Puzzle Over Millions of Dollars Leaving Afghanistan by Plane

for Dubai

(By Andrew Higgins)

Kabul.--A blizzard of bank notes is flying out of

Afghanistan--often in full view of customs officers at the

Kabul airport--as part of a cash exodus that is confounding

U.S. officials and raising concerns about the money's origin.

The cash, estimated to total well over $1 billion a year,

flows mostly to the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, where many

wealthy Afghans now park their families and funds, according

to U.S. and Afghan officials. So long as departing cash is

declared at the airport here, its transfer is legal.

But at a time when the United States and its allies are

spending billions of dollars to prop up the fragile

government of President Hamid Karzai, the volume of the

outflow has stirred concerns that funds have been diverted

from aid. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, for its

part, is trying to figure out whether some of the money comes

from Afghanistan's thriving opium trade. And officials in

neighboring Pakistan think that at least some of the cash

leaving Kabul has been smuggled overland from Pakistan.

``All this money magically appears from nowhere,'' said a

U.S. official who monitors Afghanistan's growing role as a

hub for cash transfers to Dubai, which has six flights a day

to and from Kabul.

Meanwhile, the United States is stepping up efforts to stop

money flow in the other direction--into Afghanistan and

Pakistan in support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Senior

Treasury Department officials visited Kabul this month to

discuss the cash flows and other issues relating to this

country's infant, often chaotic financial sector.

Tracking Afghan exchanges has long been made difficult by

the widespread use of traditional money-moving outfits, known

as ``hawalas,'' which keep few records. The Afghan central

bank, supported by U.S. Treasury advisers, is trying to get a

grip on them by licensing their operations.

In the meantime, the money continues to flow. Cash

declaration forms filed at Kabul International Airport and

reviewed by The Washington Post show that Afghan passengers

took more than $180 million to Dubai during a two-month

period starting in July. If that rate held for the entire

year, the amount of cash that left Afghanistan in 2009 would

have far exceeded the country's annual tax and other domestic

revenue of about $875 million.

The declaration forms highlight the prominent and often

opaque role played by hawalas. Asked to identify the ``source

of funds'' in forms issued by the Afghan central bank, cash

couriers frequently put down the name of the same Kabul

hawala, an outfit called New Ansari Exchange.

Early last month, Afghan police and intelligence officers

raided New Ansari's office in Kabul's bazaar district,

carting away documents and computers, said Afghan bankers

familiar with the operation. U.S. officials declined to

comment on what prompted the raid. New Ansari Exchange, which

is affiliated with a licensed Afghan bank, closed for a day

or so but was soon up and running again.

The total volume of departing cash is almost certainly much

higher than the declared amount. A Chinese man, for instance,

was arrested recently at the Kabul airport carrying 800,000

undeclared euros (about $1.1 million).

Cash also can be moved easily through a VIP section at the

airport, from which Afghan officials generally leave without

being searched. American officials said that they have

repeatedly raised the issue of special treatment for VIPs at

the Kabul airport with the Afghan government but that they

have made no headway.

One U.S. official said he had been told by a senior Dubai

police officer that an Afghan diplomat flew into the

emirate's airport last

year with more than $2 million worth of euros in undeclared

cash. The Afghan consul general in Dubai, Haji Rashoudin

Mohammadi, said in a telephone interview that he was not

aware of any such incident.

The high volume of cash passing through Kabul's airport

first came to light last summer when British company Global

Strategies Group, which has an airport security contract,

started filing reports on the money transfers at the request

of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, the

domestic intelligence agency. The country's notoriously

corrupt police force, however, complained about this

arrangement, and Global stopped its reporting in September,

according to someone familiar with the matter.

Afghan bankers interviewed in Kabul said that much of the

money that does get declared belongs to traders who want to

buy goods in Dubai but want to avoid the fees, delays and

paperwork that result from conventional wire transfers.

The cash flown out of Kabul includes a wide range of

foreign currencies. Most is in U.S. dollars, euros and--to

the bafflement of officials--Saudi Arabian riyals, a currency

not widely used in Afghanistan.

Last month, a well-dressed Afghan man en route to Dubai was

found carrying three briefcases stuffed with $3 million in

U.S. currency and $2 million in Saudi currency, according to

an American official who was present when the notes were

counted. A few days later, the same man was back at the Kabul

airport, en route to Dubai again, with about $5 million in

U.S. and Saudi bank notes.

One theory is that some of the Arab nation's cash might

come from Saudi donations that were supposed to go to mosques

and other projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, the

American official said, ``we don't really know what is going

on.''

Efforts to figure out just how much money is leaving

Afghanistan and why have been hampered by a lack of

cooperation from Dubai, complained Afghan and U.S. officials,

who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Dubai's financial

problems, said a U.S. official, had left the emirate eager

for foreign cash, and ``they don't seem to care where it

comes from.'' Dubai authorities declined to comment.

Previous to that, the Post did a story about money funneled through a Kabul bank and companies owned by the bank's founder to individual friends, family, and business connections of Hamid Karzai. When you consider the amount of corruption that is going on in Afghanistan, it can only be called, charitably, ``crony capitalism.'' In fact, The Washington Post printed an article on February 22, entitled ``In Afghanistan, Signs of Crony Capitalism,'' and I include this for the Record.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2010]

In Afghanistan, Signs of Crony Capitalism

(By Andrew Higgins)

Kabul.--Afghanistan's biggest private bank--founded by the

Islamic nation's only world-class poker player--celebrated

its fifth year in business last summer with a lottery for

depositors at Paris Palace, a Kabul wedding hall.

Prizes awarded by Kabul Bank included nine apartments in

the Afghan capital and cash gifts totaling more than $1

million. The bank trumpeted the event as the biggest prize

drawing of its kind in Central Asia.

Less publicly, Kabul Bank's boss has been handing out far

bigger prizes to his country's U.S.-backed ruling elite:

multimillion-dollar loans for the purchase of luxury villas

in Dubai by members of President Hamid Karzai's family, his

government and his supporters.

The close ties between Kabul Bank and Karzai's circle

reflect a defining feature of the shaky post-Taliban order in

which Washington has invested more than $40 billion and the

lives of more than 900 U.S. service members: a crony

capitalism that enriches politically connected insiders and

dismays the Afghan populace.

``What I'm doing is not proper, not exactly what I should

do. But this is Afghanistan,'' Kabul Bank's founder and

chairman, Sherkhan Farnood, said in an interview when asked

about the Dubai purchases and why, according to data from the

Persian Gulf emirate's Land Department, many of the villas

have been registered in his name. ``These people don't want

to reveal their names.''

Afghan laws prohibit hidden overseas lending and require

strict accounting of all transactions. But those involved in

the Dubai loans, including Kabul Bank's owners, said the cozy

flow of cash is not unusual or illegal in a deeply

traditional system underpinned more by relationships than

laws.

The curious role played by the bank and its unorthodox

owners has not previously been reported and was documented by

land registration data; public records; and interviews in

Kabul, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Moscow.

Many of those involved appear to have gone to considerable

lengths to conceal the benefits they have received from Kabul

Bank or its owners. Karzai's older brother and his former

vice president, for example, both have Dubai villas

registered under Farnood's name. Kabul Bank's executives said

their books record no loans for these or other Dubai deals

financed at least in part by Farnood, including home

purchases by Karzai's cousin and the brother of Mohammed

Qasim Fahim, his current first vice president and a much-

feared warlord who worked closely with U.S. forces to topple

the Taliban in 2001.

At a time when Washington is ramping up military pressure

on the Taliban, the off-balance-sheet activities of Afghan

bankers raise the risk of fmancial instability that could

offset progress on the battlefield. Fewer than 5 percent of

Afghans have bank accounts, but among those who do are many

soldiers and policemen whose salaries are paid through Kabul

Bank.

A U.S. official who monitors Afghan finances, who spoke on

the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to

comment publicly, said banks appear to have plenty of money

but noted that in a crisis, Afghan depositors ``won't wait in

line holding cups of latte'' but would be ``waving AK-47s.''

Kabul Bank executives, in separate interviews, gave

different accounts of what the bank is up to with Dubai home

buyers. ``They are borrowers. They have an account at Kabul

Bank,'' said the bank's chairman, Farnood, a boisterous 46-

year-old with a gift for math and money--and the winner of

$120,000 at the 2008 World Series of Poker Europe, held in a

London casino.

The bank's chief audit officer, Raja Gopalakrishnan,

however, insisted that the loan money didn't come directly

from Kabul Bank. He said it was from affiliated but separate

entities, notably a money-transfer agency called Shaheen

Exchange, which is owned by Farnood, is run by one of Kabul

Bank's 16 shareholders and operates in Kabul out of the

bank's headquarters.

The audit officer said Farnood ``thinks it is one big

pot,'' but the entities are ``legally definitely separate.''

A new economy

In some ways, Kabul Bank is a symbol of how much has

changed in Afghanistan since 2001, when the country had no

private banks and no economy to speak of. Kabul Bank has

opened more than 60 branches and recently announced that it

will open 250 more, and it claims to have more than $1

billion in deposits from more than a million Afghan

customers.

Kabul Bank prospers because Afghanistan, though extremely

poor, is in places awash with cash, a result of huge

infusions of foreign aid, opium revenue and a legal economy

that, against the odds, is growing at about 15 percent a

year. The vast majority of this money flows into the hands of

a tiny minority--some of it through legitimate profits, some

of it through kickbacks and insider deals that bind the

country's political, security and business elites.

The result is that, while anchoring a free-market order as

Washington had hoped, financial institutions here sometimes

serve as piggy banks for their owners and their political

friends. Kabul Bank, for example, helps bankroll a money-

losing airline owned by Farnood and fellow bank shareholders

that flies three times a day between Kabul and Dubai.

Kabul Bank's executives helped finance President Hamid

Karzai's fraud-blighted reelection campaign last year, and

the bank is partly owned by Mahmoud Karzai, the Afghan

president's older brother, and by Haseen Fahim, the brother

of Karzai's vice presidential running mate.

Farnood, who now spends most of his time in Dubai, said he

wants to do business in a ``normal way'' and does not receive

favors as a result of his official contacts. He said that

putting properties in his name means his bank's money is safe

despite a slump in the Dubai property market: He can easily

repossess if borrowers run short on cash.

A review of Dubai property data and interviews with current

and former executives of Kabul Bank indicate that Farnood and

his bank partners have at least $150 million invested in

Dubai real estate. Most of their property is on Palm

Jumeirah, a man-made island in the shape of a palm tree where

the cheapest house costs more than $2 million.

Mirwais Azizi, an estranged business associate of Farnood

and the founder of the rival Azizi Bank in Kabul, has also

poured money into Dubai real estate, with even more uncertain

results. A Dubai company he heads, Azizi Investments, has

invested heavily in plots of land on Palm Jebel Ali, a

stalled property development. Azizi did not respond to

interview requests. His son, Farhad, said Mirwais was busy.

Responsibility for bank supervision in Afghanistan lies

with the Afghan central bank, whose duties include preventing

foreign property speculation. The United States has spent

millions of dollars trying to shore up the central bank. But

Afghan and U.S. officials say the bank, though increasingly

professional, lacks political clout.

The central bank's governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat, said his

staff had ``vigorously investigated'' what he called

``rumors'' of Dubai property deals, but ``unfortunately, up

until now they have not found anything.'' Fitrat, who used to

live in Washington, last month sent a team of inspectors to

Kabul Bank as part of a regular review of the bank's

accounts. He acknowledged that Afghan loans are ``very

difficult to verify'' because ``we don't know who owns

what.''

Kabul Bank's dealings with Mahmoud Karzai, the president's

brother, help explain why this is so. In interviews, Karzai,

who has an Afghan restaurant in Baltimore, initially said he

rented a $5.5 million Palm Jumeirah mansion, where he now

lives with his family. But later he said he had an informal

home-loan agreement with Kabul Bank and pays $7,000 a month

in interest.

``It is a very peculiar situation. It is hard to comprehend

because this is not the usual way of doing business,'' said

Karzai, whose home is in Farnood's name.

Karzai also said he bought a 7.4 percent stake in the bank

with $5 million he borrowed from the bank. But

Gopalakrishnan, the chief audit officer, said Kabul Bank's

books include no loans to the president's brother.

Also in a Palm Jumeirah villa registered in Farnood's name

is the family of Ahmad Zia Massoud, Afghanistan's first vice

president from 2004 until last November. The house, bought in

December 2007 for $2.3 million, was first put in the name of

Massoud's wife but was later re-registered to give Farnood

formal ownership, property records indicate.

Massoud, brother of the legendary anti-Soviet guerrilla

leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, said that Farnood had always been

the owner but let his family use it rent-free for the past

two years because he is ``my close friend.'' Massoud added:

``We have played football together. We have played chess

together.'' Farnood, however, said that though the ``villa is

in my name,'' it belongs to Massoud ``in reality.''

Haseen Fahim, the brother of Afghanistan's current first

vice president, has been another beneficiary of Kabul Bank's

largesse. He got money from Farnood to help buy a $6 million

villa in Dubai, which, unusually, is under his own name. He

borrowed millions more from the bank, which he partly owns,

to fund companies he owns in Afghanistan.

In an interview at Kabul Bank's headquarters, Khalilullah

Fruzi, who as chief executive heads the bank's day-to-day

operations, said he didn't know how much bank money has ended

up in Dubai. If Karzai's relatives and others buy homes ``in

Dubai, or Germany or America . . . that is their own

affair,'' Fruzi said, adding that the bank ``doesn't give

loans directly for Dubai.''

Fruzi, a former gem trader, said Kabul Bank is in robust

health, makes a profit and has about $400 million in liquid

assets deposited with the Afghan central bank and other

institutions. Kabul Bank is so flush, he added, that it is

building a $30 million headquarters, a cluster of shimmering

towers of bulletproof glass.

The bank is also spending millions to hire gunmen from a

company called Khurasan Security Services, which, according

to registration documents, used to be controlled by Fruzi and

is now run by his brother.

The roots of Kabul Bank stretch back to the Soviet Union.

Both Fruzi and Farnood got their education and their start in

business there after Moscow invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

While in Moscow, Farnood set up a successful hawala money-

transfer outfit to move funds between Russia and Kabul.

Russian court documents show that 10 of Farnood's employees

were arrested in 1998 and later convicted of illegal banking

activity. Fearful of arrest in Russia and also in Taliban-

ruled Afghanistan, Farnood shifted his focus to Dubai.

In 2004, three years after the fall of the Taliban regime,

he got a license to open Kabul Bank. His Dubai-registered

hawala, Shaheen Exchange, moved in upstairs and started

moving cash for bank clients. It last year shifted $250

million to $300 million to Dubai, said the chief audit

officer.

The bank began to take in new, politically connected

shareholders, among them the president's brother, Mahmoud,

and Fahim, brother of the vice president, who registered his

stake in the name of his teenage son.

Fahim said two of his companies have borrowed $70 million

from Kabul Bank. Insider borrowing, he said, is unavoidable

and even desirable in Afghanistan because, in the absence of

a solid legal system, business revolves around trust, not

formal contracts. ``Afghanistan is not America or Europe.

Afghanistan is starting from zero,'' he said.

Fahim's business has boomed, thanks largely to

subcontracting work on foreign-funded projects, including a

new U.S. Embassy annex and various buildings at CIA sites

across the country, among them a remote base in Khost where

seven Americans were killed in a December suicide attack by a

Jordanian jihadiist. ``I have good opportunities to get

profit,'' Fahim said.

``Like wild horses''

Kabul Bank also plunged into the airline business,

providing loans to Pamir Airways, an Afghan carrier now owned

by Farnood, Fruzi and Fahim. Pamir spent $46 million on four

used Boeing 737-400s and hired Hashim Karzai, the president's

cousin, formerly of Silver Spring, as a ``senior adviser.''

Farnood said he also provided a ``little bit'' of money to

help Hashim Karzai buy a house on Palm Jumeirah in Dubai.

Karzai, in brief telephone interviews, said that the property

was an investment and that he had borrowed some money from

Farnood. He said he couldn't recall details and would ``have

to check with my accountant.''

Noor Delawari, governor of the central bank during Kabul

Bank's rise, said Farnood and his lieutenants ``were like

wild horses'' and ``never paid attention to the rules and

regulations.'' Delawari said he didn't know about any

property deals by Kabul Bank in Dubai. He said that he, too,

bought a home in the emirate, for about $200,000.

Fitrat, the current central bank governor, has tried to

take a tougher line against Kabul Bank and its rivals, with

little luck. Before last year's presidential election, the

central bank sent a stern letter to bankers, complaining that

they squander too much money on ``security guards and

bulletproof vehicles'' and ``expend large-scale monetary

assistance to politicians.'' The letter ordered them to

remain ``politically neutral.''

Kabul Bank did the opposite: Fruzi, its chief executive,

joined Karzai's campaign in Kabul while Farnood, its poker-

playing chairman, organized fundraising events for Karzai in

Dubai. One of these was held at the Palm Jumeirah house of

Karzai's brother.

The government has returned the favor. The ministries of

defense, interior and education now pay many soldiers, police

and teachers through Kabul Bank. This means that tens of

millions of dollars' worth of public money sloshes through

the bank, an unusual arrangement, as governments generally

don't pump so much through a single private bank.

Soon after his November inauguration for a second term,

President Karzai spoke at an anti-corruption conference in

Kabul, criticizing officials who ``after one or two years

work for the government get rich and buy houses in Dubai.''

Last month, he flew to London for a conference on

Afghanistan, attended by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham

Clinton and other leaders, and again promised an end to the

murky deals that have so tarnished his rule.

Also in London for the conference were Farnood, who now has

an Afghan diplomatic passport, and Fruzi, who served as a

financial adviser to Karzai's reelection campaign and also

owns a house in Dubai. ``If there is no Kabul Bank, there

will be no Karzai, no government,'' Fruzi said.

As a result, U.S. taxpayers and aid organizations are investing billions of dollars in Afghanistan, but the leaders of the country are investing in real estate in Dubai. We care about democracy. Try building democracy in a place which is rife with narcotraffic, crony capitalism, and villas in Dubai. What is this about? Why are we there? I mean, I am from Cleveland, Ohio. The people I represent are very basic people. When you tell them that the head of Afghanistan has his hands in all of these crooked deals, you start to wonder, We are going to build a democracy on this person's shoulders? I don't think so.

We are supporting a government where corruption is epidemic. Last year, USAID reported that corruption in Afghanistan is significant, a growing problem, and that pervasive, systemic corruption was at an unprecedented scope in the country's history. On November 17, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan as the second most corrupt nation in the world. And to compound the fears, in President Karzai's fraud-filled election late last year, he recently took over the country's election watchdog group. Is this the kind of person that we can trust to have a partnership with for democracy? I don't think so.

A January 2010 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reveals that Afghan citizens were forced to pay an estimated $2.5 billion a year in bribes. According to evidence collected through wiretaps and bank records, a senior border police official in Kandahar allegedly collected salaries of hundreds of ghost policemen and stole money from a government fund intended to pay orphans and widows. Is this the kind of environment where we can build a democracy?

Our troops in Afghanistan have to deal with corrupt officials on a daily basis. A commander of the Afghan border police offered to give the U.S. military prime land at a crossing with Pakistan to build a waiting area for supply vehicles needed for President Obama's troop increase. The same man, U.S. officials believe, earns tens of millions of dollars a year trafficking opium and extorting cargo truck drivers. Is this the kind of person that we can create movement toward a democracy with?

[From the Nation, Nov. 30, 2009]

How the U.S. Funds the Taliban

(By Aram Roston)

On October 29, 2001, while the Taliban's rule over

Afghanistan was under assault, the regime's ambassador in

Islamabad gave a chaotic press conference in front of several

dozen reporters sitting on the grass. On the Taliban

diplomat's right sat his interpreter, Ahmad Rateb Popal, a

man with an imposing presence. Like the ambassador, Popal

wore a black turban, and he had a huge bushy beard. He had a

black patch over his right eye socket, a prosthetic left arm

and a deformed right hand, the result of injuries from an

explosives mishap during an old operation against the Soviets

in Kabul.

But Popal was more than just a former mujahedeen. In 1988,

a year before the Soviets fled Afghanistan, Popal had been

charged in the United States with conspiring to import more

than a kilo of heroin. Court records show he was released

from prison in 1997.

Flash forward to 2009, and Afghanistan is ruled by Popal's

cousin President Hamid Karzai. Popal has cut his huge beard

down to a neatly trimmed one and has become an immensely

wealthy businessman, along with his brother Rashid Popal, who

in a separate case pleaded guilty to a heroin charge in 1996

in Brooklyn. The Popal brothers control the huge Watan Group

in Afghanistan, a consortium engaged in telecommunications,

logistics and, most important, security. Watan Risk

Management, the Popals' private military arm, is one of the

few dozen private security companies in Afghanistan. One of

Watan's enterprises, key to the war effort, is protecting

convoys of Afghan trucks heading from Kabul to Kandahar,

carrying American supplies.

Welcome to the wartime contracting bazaar in Afghanistan.

It is a virtual carnival of improbable characters and shady

connections, with former CIA officials and ex-military

officers joining hands with former Taliban and mujahedeen to

collect U.S. government funds in the name of the war effort.

In this grotesque carnival, the U.S. military's contractors

are forced to pay suspected insurgents to protect American

supply routes. It is an accepted fact of the military

logistics operation in Afghanistan that the US government

funds the very forces American troops are fighting. And it is

a deadly irony, because these funds add up to a huge amount

of money for the Taliban. ``It's a big part of their

income,'' one of the top Afghan government security officials

told The Nation in an interview. In fact, US military

officials in Kabul estimate that a minimum of 10 percent of

the Pentagon's logistics contracts--hundreds of millions of

dollars--consists of payments to insurgents.

Understanding how this situation came to pass requires

untangling two threads. The first is the insider dealing that

determines who wins and who loses in Afghan business, and the

second is the troubling mechanism by which ``private

security'' ensures that the US supply convoys traveling these

ancient trade routes aren't ambushed by insurgents.

A good place to pick up the first thread is with a small

firm awarded a US military logistics contract worth hundreds

of millions of dollars: NCL Holdings. Like the Popals' Watan

Risk, NCL is a licensed security company in Afghanistan.

What NCL Holdings is most notorious for in Kabul

contracting circles, though, is the identity of its chief

principal, Hamed Wardak. He is the young American son of

Afghanistan's current defense minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim

Wardak, who was a leader of the mujahedeen against the

Soviets. Hamed Wardak has plunged into business as well as

policy. He was raised and schooled in the United States,

graduating as valedictorian from Georgetown University in

1997. He earned a Rhodes scholarship and interned at the

neoconservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute.

That internship was to play an important role in his life,

for it was at AEI that he forged alliances with some of the

premier figures in American conservative foreign policy

circles, such as the late Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Wardak incorporated NCL in the United States early in 2007,

although the firm may have operated in Afghanistan before

then. It made sense to set up shop in Washington, because of

Wardak's connections there. On NCL's advisory board, for

example, is Milton Bearden, a well-known former CIA officer.

Bearden is an important voice on Afghanistan issues; in

October he was a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, where Senator John Kerry, the chair, introduced

him as ``a legendary former CIA case officer and a

clearheaded thinker and writer.'' It is not every defense

contracting company that has such an influential adviser.

But the biggest deal that NCL got--the contract that

brought it into Afghanistan's major leagues--was Host Nation

Trucking. Earlier this year the firm, with no apparent

trucking experience, was named one of the six companies that

would handle the bulk of US trucking in Afghanistan, bringing

supplies to the web of bases and remote outposts scattered

across the country.

At first the contract was large but not gargantuan. And

then that suddenly changed, like an immense garden coming

into bloom. Over the summer, citing the coming ``surge'' and

a new doctrine, ``Money as a Weapons System,'' the U.S.

military expanded the contract 600 percent for NCL and the

five other companies. The contract documentation warns of

dire consequences if more is not spent: ``service members

will not get food, water, equipment, and ammunition they

require.'' Each of the military's six trucking contracts was

bumped up to $360 million, or a total of nearly $2.2 billion.

Put it in this perspective: this single two-year effort to

hire Afghan trucks and truckers was worth 10 percent of the

annual Afghan gross domestic product. NCL, the firm run by

the defense minister's well-connected son, had struck pure

contracting gold.

Host Nation Trucking does indeed keep the US military

efforts alive in Afghanistan. ``We supply everything the army

needs to survive here,'' one American trucking executive told

me. ``We bring them their toilet paper, their water, their

fuel, their guns, their vehicles.'' The epicenter is Bagram

Air Base, just an hour north of Kabul, from which virtually

everything in Afghanistan is trucked to the outer reaches of

what the Army calls ``the Battlespace''--that is, the entire

country. Parked near Entry Control Point 3, the trucks line

up, shifting gears and sending up clouds of dust as they

prepare for their various missions across the country.

The real secret to trucking in Afghanistan is ensuring

security on the perilous roads, controlled by warlords,

tribal militias, insurgents and Taliban commanders. The

American executive I talked to was fairly specific about it:

``The Army is basically paying the Taliban not to shoot at

them. It is Department of Defense money.'' That is something

everyone seems to agree on.

Mike Hanna is the project manager for a trucking company

called Afghan American Army Services. The company, which

still operates in Afghanistan, had been trucking for the

United States for years but lost out in the Host Nation

Trucking contract that NCL won. Hanna explained the security

realities quite simply: ``You are paying the people in the

local areas--some are warlords, some are politicians in the

police force--to move your trucks through.''

Hanna explained that the prices charged are different,

depending on the route: ``We're basically being extorted.

Where you don't pay, you're going to get attacked. We just

have our field guys go down there, and they pay off who they

need to.'' Sometimes, he says, the extortion fee is high, and

sometimes it is low. ``Moving ten trucks, it is probably $800

per truck to move through an area. It's based on the number

of trucks and what you're carrying. If you have fuel trucks,

they are going to charge you more. If you have dry trucks,

they're not going to charge you as much. If you are carrying

MRAPs or Humvees, they are going to charge you more.''

Hanna says it is just a necessary evil. ``If you tell me

not to pay these insurgents in this area, the chances of my

trucks getting attacked increase exponentially.''

Whereas in Iraq the private security industry has been

dominated by US and global firms like Blackwater, operating

as de facto arms of the US government, in Afghanistan there

are lots of local players as well. As a result, the industry

in Kabul is far more dog-eat-dog. ``Every warlord has his

security company,'' is the way one executive explained it to

me.

In theory, private security companies in Kabul are heavily

regulated, although the reality is different. Thirty-nine

companies had licenses until September, when another dozen

were granted licenses. Many licensed companies are

politically connected: just as NCL is owned by the son of the

defense minister and Watan Risk Management is run by

President Karzai's cousins, the Asia Security Group is

controlled by Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the

president. The company has blocked off an entire street in

the expensive Sherpur District. Another security firm is

controlled by the parliamentary speaker's son, sources say.

And so on.

In the same way, the Afghan trucking industry, key to

logistics operations, is often tied to important figures and

tribal leaders. One major hauler in Afghanistan, Afghan

International Trucking (AIT), paid $20,000 a month in

kickbacks to a US Army contracting official, according to the

official's plea agreement in US court in August. AIT is a

very well-connected firm: it is run by the 25-year-old nephew

of Gen. Baba Jan, a former Northern Alliance commander and

later a Kabul police chief. In an interview, Baba Jan, a

cheerful and charismatic leader, insisted he had nothing to

do with his nephew's corporate enterprise.

But the heart of the matter is that insurgents are getting

paid for safe passage because there are few other ways to

bring goods to the combat outposts and forward operating

bases where soldiers need them. By definition, many outposts

are situated in hostile terrain, in the southern parts of

Afghanistan. The security firms don't really protect convoys

of American military goods here, because they simply can't;

they need the Taliban's cooperation.

One of the big problems for the companies that ship

American military supplies across the country is that they

are banned from arming themselves with any weapon heavier

than a rifle. That makes them ineffective for battling

Taliban attacks on a convoy. ``They are shooting the drivers

from 3,000 feet away with PKMs,'' a trucking company

executive in Kabul told me. ``They are using RPGs [rocket-

propelled grenades] that will blow up an up-armed vehicle. So

the security companies are tied up. Because of the rules,

security companies can only carry AK-47s, and that's just a

joke. I carry an AK--and that's just to shoot myself if I

have to!''

The rules are there for a good reason: to guard against

devastating collateral damage by private security forces.

Still, as Hanna of Afghan American Army Services points out,

``An AK-47 versus a rocket-propelled grenade--you are going

to lose!'' That said, at least one of the Host Nation

Trucking companies has tried to do battle instead of paying

off insurgents and warlords. It is a US-owned firm called

Four Horsemen International. Instead of providing payments,

it has tried to fight off attackers. And it has paid the

price in lives, with horrendous casualties. FHI, like many

other firms, refused to talk publicly; but I've been told by

insiders in the security industry that FHI's convoys are

attacked on virtually every mission.

For the most part, the security firms do as they must to

survive. A veteran American manager in Afghanistan who has

worked there as both a soldier and a private security

contractor in the field told me, ``What we are doing is

paying warlords associated with the Taliban, because none of

our security elements is able to deal with the threat.'' He's

an Army veteran with years of Special Forces experience, and

he's not happy about what's being done. He says that at a

minimum American military forces should try to learn more

about who is getting paid off.

``Most escorting is done by the Taliban,'' an Afghan

private security official told me. He's a Pashto and former

mujahedeen commander who has his finger on the pulse of the

military situation and the security industry. And he works

with one of the trucking companies carrying US supplies.

``Now the government is so weak,'' he added, ``everyone is

paying the Taliban.''

To Afghan trucking officials, this is barely even something

to worry about. One woman I met was an extraordinary

entrepreneur who had built up a trucking business in this

male-dominated field. She told me the security company she

had hired dealt directly with Taliban leaders in the south.

Paying the Taliban leaders meant they would send along an

escort to ensure that no other insurgents would attack. In

fact, she said, they just needed two armed Taliban vehicles.

``Two Taliban is enough,'' she told me. ``One in the front

and one in the back.'' She shrugged. ``You cannot work

otherwise. Otherwise it is not possible.''

Which leads us back to the case of Watan Risk, the firm run

by Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashid Popal, the Karzai family

relatives and former drug dealers. Watan is known to control

one key stretch of road that all the truckers use: the

strategic route to Kandahar called Highway 1. Think of it as

the road to the war--to the south and to the west. If the

Army wants to get supplies down to Helmand, for example, the

trucks must make their way through Kandahar.

Watan Risk, according to seven different security and

trucking company officials, is the sole provider of security

along this route. The reason is simple: Watan is allied with

the local warlord who controls the road. Watan's company

website is quite impressive, and claims its personnel ``are

diligently screened to weed out all ex-militia members,

supporters of the Taliban, or individuals with loyalty to

warlords, drug barons, or any other group opposed to

international support of the democratic process.'' Whatever

screening methods it uses, Watan's secret weapon to protect

American supplies heading through Kandahar is a man named

Commander Ruhullah. Said to be a handsome man in his 40s,

Ruhullah has an oddly high-pitched voice. He wears

traditional salwar kameez and a Rolex watch. He rarely, if

ever, associates with Westerners. He commands a large group

of irregular fighters with no known government affiliation,

and his name, security officials tell me, inspires obedience

or fear in villages along the road.

It is a dangerous business, of course: until last spring

Ruhullah had competition--a one-legged warlord named

Commander Abdul Khaliq. He was killed in an ambush.

So Ruhullah is the surviving road warrior for that stretch

of highway. According to witnesses, he works like this: he

waits until there are hundreds of trucks ready to convoy

south down the highway. Then he gets his men together,

setting them up in 4x4s and pickups. Witnesses say he does

not limit his arsenal to AK-47s but uses any weapons he can

get. His chief weapon is his reputation. And for that, Watan

is paid royally, collecting a fee for each truck that passes

through his corridor. The American trucking official told me

that Ruhullah ``charges $1,500 per truck to go to Kandahar.

Just 300 kilometers.''

It's hard to pinpoint what this is, exactly--security,

extortion or a form of ``insurance.'' Then there is the

question, Does Ruhullah have ties to the Taliban? That's

impossible to know. As an American private security veteran

familiar with the route said, ``He works both sides . . .

whatever is most profitable. He's the main commander. He's

got to be involved with the Taliban. How much, no one

knows.''

Even NCL, the company owned by Hamed Wardak, pays. Two

sources with direct knowledge tell me that NCL sends its

portion of US logistics goods in Watan's and Ruhullah's

convoys. Sources say NCL is billed $500,000 per month for

Watan's services. To underline the point: NCL, operating on a

$360 million contract from the US military, and owned by the

Afghan defense minister's son, is paying millions per year

from those funds to a company owned by President Karzai's

cousins, for protection.

Hamed Wardak wouldn't return my phone calls. Milt Bearden,

the former CIA officer affiliated with the company, wouldn't

speak with me either. There's nothing wrong with Bearden

engaging in business in Afghanistan, but disclosure of his

business interests might have been expected when testifying

on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After all, NCL

stands to make or lose hundreds of millions based on the

whims of US policy-makers.

It is certainly worth asking why NCL, a company with no

known trucking experience, and little security experience to

speak of, would win a contract worth $360 million. Plenty of

Afghan insiders are asking questions. ``Why would the US

government give him a contract if he is the son of the

minister of defense?'' That's what Mahmoud Karzai asked me.

He is the brother of President Karzai, and he himself has

been treated in the press as a poster boy for access to

government officials. The New York Times even profiled him in

a highly critical piece. In his defense, Karzai emphasized

that he, at least, has refrained from US government or Afghan

government contracting. He pointed out, as others have, that

Hamed Wardak had little security or trucking background

before his company received security and trucking contracts

from the Defense Department. ``That's a questionable business

practice,'' he said. ``They shouldn't give it to him. How

come that's not questioned?''

I did get the opportunity to ask General Wardak, Hamed's

father, about it. He is quite dapper, although he is no

longer the debonair ``Gucci commander'' Bearden once

described. I asked Wardak about his son and NCL. ``I've tried

to be straightforward and correct and fight corruption all my

life,'' the defense minister said. ``This has been something

people have tried to use against me, so it has been

painful.''

Wardak would speak only briefly about NCL. The issue seems

to have produced a rift with his son. ``I was against it from

the beginning, and that's why we have not talked for a long

time. I have never tried to support him or to use my power or

influence that he should benefit.''

When I told Wardak that his son's company had a US contract

worth as much as $360 million, he did a double take. ``This

is impossible,'' he said. ``I do not believe this.''

I believed the general when he said he really didn't know

what his son was up to. But cleaning up what look like

insider deals may be easier than the next step: shutting down

the money pipeline going from DoD contracts to potential

insurgents.

Two years ago, a top Afghan security official told me,

Afghanistan's intelligence service, the National Directorate

of Security, had alerted the American military to the

problem. The NDS delivered what I'm told are ``very

detailed'' reports to the Americans explaining how the

Taliban are profiting from protecting convoys of US supplies.

The Afghan intelligence service even offered a solution:

what if the United States were to take the tens of millions

paid to security contractors and instead set up a dedicated

and professional convoy support unit to guard its logistics

lines? The suggestion went nowhere.

The bizarre fact is that the practice of buying the

Taliban's protection is not a secret. I asked Col. David

Haight, who commands the Third Brigade of the Tenth Mountain

Division, about it. After all, part of Highway 1 runs through

his area of operations. What did he think about security

companies paying off insurgents? ``The American soldier in me

is repulsed by it,'' he said in an interview in his office at

FOB Shank in Logar Province. ``But I know that it is what it

is: essentially paying the enemy, saying, `Hey, don't hassle

me.' I don't like it, but it is what it is.''

As a military official in Kabul explained contracting in

Afghanistan overall, ``We understand that across the board 10

percent to 20 percent goes to the insurgents. My intel guy

would say it is closer to 10 percent. Generally it is

happening in logistics.''

In a statement to The Nation about Host Nation Trucking,

Col. Wayne Shanks, the chief public affairs officer for the

international forces in Afghanistan, said that military

officials are ``aware of allegations that procurement funds

may find their way into the hands of insurgent groups, but we

do not directly support or condone this activity, if it is

occurring.'' He added that, despite oversight, ``the

relationships between contractors and their subcontractors,

as well as between subcontractors and others in their

operational communities, are not entirely transparent.''

In any case, the main issue is not that the US military is

turning a blind eye to the problem. Many officials

acknowledge what is going on while also expressing a deep

disquiet about the situation. The trouble is that--as with so

much in Afghanistan--the United States doesn't seem to know

how to fix it.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr).

I yield the gentleman another 30 seconds.

I want to thank our majority leader for his participation and also for his cooperation in ensuring that this debate could happen. You and our Speaker and Mr. Berman are appreciated for your willingness to provide for this moment to happen so that the House could be heard from, so thank you.

I would ask, Madam Speaker, how much time remains in the debate? I am sure we're winding down here.

I yield myself 3 minutes.

One of the areas of concern that I have about our presence in Afghanistan that I haven't seen discussed that much deals with the role of oil and gas, particularly in Afghanistan. Paul Craig Roberts, who was an Assistant Secretary of Treasury under the Reagan administration, reported in November of last year on a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, who was fired from his job when he spoke out about documents he saw ``proving that the motivation for U.S. and U.K. military aggression in Afghanistan had something to do with the natural gas deposits in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.'' He continues, and these are his words, ``The Americans wanted a pipeline that bypassed Russia and Iran and went through Afghanistan. To ensure this, an invasion was necessary.''

I did some additional research on that and I found an article by Craig Murray where he claims that Mr. Karzai ``was put in place because of his role with Unocal in developing the Trans-Afghanistan Gas Pipeline project. That remains a chief strategic goal. The Asian Development Bank has agreed finance to start construction in spring, 2011. It is, of course, a total coincidence that 30,000 extra U.S. troops will arrive 6 months before, and that the U.S. (as opposed to other NATO forces) deployment area corresponds with the pipeline route.''

I have a map of the pipeline. It's probably not easily visible, but it starts on the west in Turkmenistan, goes through Afghanistan, south to Pakistan and India, and it touches near both Helmand and Kandahar province, which is exactly where our troop buildup is occurring. I will put this article by Mr. Murray into the Record.

Obama Is Wrong on Both Counts

(By Craig Murray)

Obama loves his rhetoric, and his speech on the Afghan

surge was topped by a rhetorical flourish:

``Our cause is just, our resolve unshaken''.

He is of course wrong on both counts.

The occupation of Afghanistan by the US and its allies is

there to prop up the government of President Karzai. Karzai's

has always been an ultra-corrupt government of vicious

warlords and drugs barons. I have been pointing this out for

years, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-469983/ Britain-protecting-biggest-heroin-crop- time.html#ixzz0VS78HVR1

The CIA is up to its usual tricks again supporting the drug

running of key warlords loyal to them. They are also setting

up death squads on the Central American model, in cooperation

with Blackwater.

Fortunately Karzai's rigging of his re-election was so

blatant that the scales have fallen from the eyes of the

public and even the mainstream media. Politicians no longer

pretend we are promoting democracy in Afghanistan.

Karzai comes directly from the Bush camp and was put in

place because of his role with Unocal in developing the Trans

Afghanistan Gas Pipeline project. That remains a chief

strategic goal. The Asian Development Bank has agreed finance

to start construction in Spring 2011. It is of course a total

coincidence that 30,000 extra US troops will arrive six

months before, and that the US (as opposed to other NATO

forces) deployment area corresponds with the pipeline route.

Obama's claim that ``Our cause is just'' ultimately rests

on the extraordinary claim that, eight years after the

invasion, we are still there in self-defence. In both the UK

and US, governments are relying on the mantra that the

occupation of Afghanistan protects us from terrorism at home.

This is utter nonsense. The large majority of post 9/11

terror incidents have been by Western Muslims outraged by our

invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Put bluntly, if we keep

invading Muslim countries, of course we will face a violent

backlash. The idea that because we occupy Afghanistan a

Muslim from Dewsbury or Detroit disenchanted with the West

would not be able to manufacture a bomb is patent nonsense.

It would be an infinitely better strategy to make out

theoretical Muslim less disenchanted by not attacking and

killing huge numbers of his civilian co-religionists.

Our cause is unjust.

We are responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of

civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for the further of

radicalisation of Muslim communities worldwide. That

threatens a perpetual war--which is of course just what the

military-industrial complex and the security industry want.

They have captured Obama.

Fortunately, our resolve is shaken.

The ordinary people of the UK and US have begun in

sufficient numbers to see through this perpetual war

confidence trick; they realise there is nothing in it for

them but dead youngsters and high taxes. That is why Obama

made a very vague promise--which I believe in its vagueness

and caveats to be deliberate deceit--that troops will start

to leave in 2011.

Today's promises of 5,000 additional NATO troops are,

incidentally, empty rhetoric. I gather from friends in the

FCO that firm pledges to date amount to 670.

A well-placed source close to the Taliban in Pakistan tells

me that the Afghan Taliban

and their tribal allies have a plan. As the US seeks

massively to expand the Afghan forces, they are feeding in

large numbers of volunteers. I suspect that while we may see

the odd attack on their trainers, the vast majority will get

trained, fed, paid and equipped and bide their time before

turning en masse. This is nothing new; it is precisely the

history of foreign occupations in the region and the purchase

of tribal auxiliaries and alliances.

I will also have this article called ``Unocal and the Afghanistan Pipeline'' submitted in the Record because he talks about how ``Unocal was not interested in a partnership. The U.S. Government, its affiliated transnational oil and construction companies, and the ruling elite of the West had coveted the same oil and gas transit route for years.

``A trans-Afghanistan pipeline was not simply a business matter, but a key component of a broader geostrategic agenda: total military and economic control of Eurasia.'' This is supposedly described in Zbigniew Brzezinski's book, ``The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives'' as ``the center of world power.''

``Capturing the region's oil wealth and carving out territory in order to build a network of transit routes was a primary objective of U.S. military interventions throughout the 1990s in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Caspian Sea.''

[From Centre for Research on Globalisation, March 2002]

Unocal and the Afghanistan pipeline

(By Larry Chin)

CRG's Global Outlook, premiere issue on ``Stop the War''

provides detailed documentation on the war and the ``Post-

September 11 Crisis.'' Order/subscribe. Consult Table of

Contents

Part One of a two-part series Players on a rigged grand chessboard:

Bridas,

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Argentine oil company

Bridas, led by its ambitious chairman, Carlos Bulgheroni,

became the first company to exploit the oil fields of

Turkmenistan and propose a pipeline through neighboring

Afghanistan. A powerful US-backed consortium intent on

building its own pipeline through the same Afghan corridor

would oppose Bridas' project.

The Coveted Trans-Afghan Route

Upon successfully negotiating leases to explore in

Turkmenistan, Bridas was awarded exploration contracts for

the Keimar block near the Caspian Sea, and the Yashlar block

near the Afghanistan border. By March 1995, Bulgheroni had

accords with Turkmenistan and Pakistan granting Bridas

construction rights for a pipeline into Afghanistan, pending

negotiations with the civil war-torn country.

The following year, after extensive meetings with warlords

throughout Afghanistan, Bridas had a 30-year agreement with

the Rabbani regime to build and operate an 875-mile gas

pipeline across Afghanistan.

Bulgheroni believed that his pipeline would promote peace

as well as material wealth in the region. He approached other

companies, including Unocal and its then-CEO, Roger Beach, to

join an international consortium.

Unocal was not interested in a partnership. The United

States government, its affiliated transnational oil and

construction companies, and the ruling elite of the West had

coveted the same oil and gas transit route for years.

A trans-Afghanistan pipeline was not simply a business

matter, but a key component of a broader geo-strategic

agenda: total military and economic control of Eurasia (the

Middle East and former Soviet Central Asian republics).

Zbigniew Brezezinski describes this region in his book ``The

Grand Chessboard--American Primacy and Its Geostrategic

Imperatives'' as ``the center of world power.'' Capturing the

region's oil wealth, and carving out territory in order to

build a network of transit routes, was a primary objective of

US military interventions throughout the 1990s in the

Balkans, the Caucasus and Caspian Sea.

As of 1992, 11 western oil companies controlled more than

50 percent of all oil investments in the Caspian Basin,

including Unocal, Amoco, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Exxon-

Mobil, Pennzoil, Texaco, Phillips and British Petroleum.

In ``Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in

Central Asia'' (a definitive work that is a primary source

for this report), Ahmed Rashid wrote, ``US oil companies who

had spearheaded the first US forays into the region wanted a

greater say in US policy making.''

Business and policy planning groups active in Central Asia,

such as the Foreign Oil Companies Group operated with the

full support of the US State Department, the National

Security Council, the CIA and the Department of Energy and

Commerce.

Among the most active operatives for US efforts:

Brezezinski (a consultant to Amoco, and architect of the

Afghan-Soviet war of the 1970s), Henry Kissinger (advisor to

Unocal), and Alexander Haig (a lobbyist for Turkmenistan),

and Dick Cheney (Halliburton, US-Azerbaijan Chamber of

Commerce).

Unocal's Central Asia envoys consisted of former US defense

and intelligence officials. Robert Oakley, the former US

ambassador to Pakistan, was a ``counter-terrorism''

specialist for the Reagan administration who armed and

trained the mujahadeen during the war against the Soviets in

the 1980s. He was an Iran-Contra conspirator charged by

Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh as a key figure involved

in arms shipments to Iran.

Richard Armitage, the current Deputy Defense Secretary, was

another Iran-Contra player in Unocal's employ. A former Navy

SEAL, covert operative in Laos, director with the Carlyle

Group, Armitage is allegedly deeply linked to terrorist and

criminal networks in the Middle East, and the new independent

states of the former Soviet Union (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,

and Kyrgistan).

Armitage was no stranger to pipelines. As a member of the

Burma/Myanmar Forum, a group that received major funding from

Unocal, Armitage was implicated in a lawsuit filed by Burmese

villagers who suffered human rights abuses during the

construction of a Unocal pipeline. (Halliburton, under Dick

Cheney, performed contract work on the same Burmese project.)

Bridas Versus the New World Order

Much to Bridas' dismay, Unocal went directly to regional

leaders with its own proposal. Unocal formed its own

competing US-led, Washington-sponsored consortium that

included Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil, aligned with Saudi Prince

Abdullah and King Fahd. Other partners included Russia's

Gazprom and Turkmenistan's state-owned Turkmenrozgas.

John Imle, president of Unocal (and member of the US-

Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce with Armitage, Cheney,

Brezezinski and other ubiquitous figures), lobbied

Turkmenistan's president Niyazov and prime minister Bhutto of

Pakistan, offering a Unocal pipeline following the same route

as Bridas.'

Dazzled by the prospect of an alliance with the US, Niyazov

asked Bridas to renegotiate its past contract and blocked

Bridas' exports from Keimar field. Bridas responded by filing

three cases with the International Chamber of Commerce

against Turkmenistan for breach of contract. (Bridas won.)

Bridas also filed a lawsuit in Texas charging Unocal with

civil conspiracy and ``tortuous interference with business

relations.'' While its officers were negotiating with

Pakistani and Turkmen oil and gas officials, Bridas

claimed that Unocal had stolen its idea, and coerced the

Turkmen government into blocking Bridas from Keimir field.

(The suit was dismissed in 1998 by Judge Brady G. Elliott,

a Republican, who claimed that any dispute between Unocal

and Bridas was governed by the laws of Turkmenistan and

Afghanistan, rather than Texas law.)

In October 1995, with neither company in a winning

position, Bulgheroni and Imle accompanied Niyazov to the

opening of the UN General Assembly. There, Niyazov awarded

Unocal with a contract for a 918-mile natural gas pipeline.

Bulgheroni was shocked. At the announcement ceremony, Unocal

consultant Henry Kissinger said that the deal looked like

``the triumph of hope over experience.''

Later, Unocal's consortium, CentGas, would secure another

contract for a companion 1,050-mile oil pipeline from

Dauletabad through Afghanistan that would connect to a tanker

loading port in Pakistan on the coast of the Arabian Sea.

Although Unocal had agreements with the governments on

either end of the proposed route, Bridas still had the

contract with Afghanistan.

The problem was resolved via the CIA and Pakistani ISI-

backed Taliban. Following a visit to Kandahar by US Assistant

Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphael in the fall

of 1996, the Taliban entered Kabul and sent the Rabbani

government packing.

Bridas' agreement with Rabbani would have to be

renegotiated.

Wooing the Taliban

According to Ahmed Rashid, ``Unocal's real influence with

the Taliban was that their project carried the possibility of

US recognition, which the Taliban were desperately anxious to

secure.''

Unocal wasted no time greasing the palms of the Taliban. It

offered humanitarian aid to Afghan warlords who would form a

council to supervise the pipeline project. It provided a new

mobile phone network between Kabul and Kandahar. Unocal also

promised to help rebuild Kandahar, and donated $9,000 to the

University of Nebraska's Center for Afghan Studies. The US

State Department, through its aid organization USAID,

contributed significant education funding for Taliban. In the

spring of 1996, Unocal executives flew Uzbek leader General

Abdul Rashid Dostum to Dallas to discuss pipeline passage

through his northern (Northern Alliance-controlled)

territories.

Bridas countered by forming an alliance with Ningarcho, a

Saudi company closely aligned with Prince Turki el-Faisal,

the Saudi intelligence chief. Turki was a mentor to Osama bin

Laden, the ally of the Taliban who was publicly feuding with

the Saudi royal family. As a gesture for Bridas, Prince Turki

provided the Taliban with communications equipment and a

fleet of pickup trucks. Now Bridas proposed two consortiums,

one to build the Afghanistan portion, and another to take

care of both ends of the line.

By November 1996, Bridas claimed that it had an agreement

signed by the Taliban and Dostum--trumping Unocal.

The competition between Unocal and Bridas, as described by

Rashid, ``began to reflect the competition within the Saudi

Royal family.''

In 1997, Taliban officials traveled twice to Washington,

D.C. and Buenos Aires to be wined and dined by Unocal and

Bridas. No agreements were signed.

It appeared to Unocal that the Taliban was balking. In

addition to royalties, the Taliban demanded funding for

infrastructure projects, including roads and power plants.

The Taliban also announced plans to revive the Afghan

National Oil Company, which had been abolished by the Soviet

regime in the late 1970s.

Osama bin Laden (who issued his fatwa against the West in

1998) advised the Taliban to sign with Bridas. In addition to

offering the Taliban a higher bid, Bridas proposed an open

pipeline accessible to warlords and local users. Unocal's

pipeline was closed--for export purposes only. Bridas' plan

also did not require outside financing, while Unocal's

required a loan from the western financial institutions (the

World Bank), which in turn would leave Afghanistan vulnerable

to demands from western governments.

Bridas' approach to business was more to the Taliban's

liking. Where Bulgheroni and Bridas' engineers would take the

time to ``sip tea with Afghan tribesmen,'' Unocal's American

executives issued top-down edicts from corporate headquarters

and the US Embassy (including a demand to open talks with the

CIA-backed Northern Alliance).

While seemingly well received within Afghanistan, Bridas'

problems with Turkmenistan (which they blamed on Unocal and

US interference) had left them cash-strapped and without a

supply.

In 1997, they went searching for a major partner with the

clout to break the deadlock with Turkmenistan. They found one

in Amoco. Bridas sold 60 percent of its Latin American assets

to Amoco. Carlos Bulgheroni and his contingent retained the

remaining minority 40 percent. Facilitating the merger were

other icons of transnational finance, Chase Manhattan

(representing Bridas), Morgan Stanley (handling Amoco) and

Arthur Andersen (facilitator of post-merger integration).

Zbigniew Brezezinski was a consultant for Amoco.

(Amoco would merge with British Petroleum a year later. BP

is represented by the law firm of Baker & Botts, whose

principal attorney is James Baker, lifelong Bush friend,

former secretary of state, and a member of the Carlyle

Group.)

Recognizing the significance of the merger, a Pakistani oil

company executive hinted, ``If these (Central Asian)

countries want a big US company involved, Amoco is far bigger

than Unocal.''

Clearing the Chessboard Again

By 1998, while the Argentine contingent made slow progress,

Unocal faced a number of new problems.

Gazprom pulled out of CentGas when Russia complained about

the anti-Russian agenda of the US. This forced Unocal to

expand CentGas to include Japanese and South Korean gas

companies, while maintaining the dominant share with Delta.

Human rights groups began protesting Unocal's dealings with

the brutal Taliban. Still riding years of Clinton bashing and

scandal mongering, conservative Republicans in the US

attacked the Clinton administration's Central Asia policy for

its lack of clarity and ``leadership.''

Once again, violence would change the dynamic.

In response to the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and

Tanzania (attributed to bin Laden), President Bill Clinton

sent cruise missiles into Afghanistan and Sudan. The

administration broke off diplomatic contact with the Taliban,

and UN sanctions were imposed.

Unocal withdrew from CentGas, and informed the State

Department ``the gas pipeline would not proceed until an

internationally recognized government was in place in

Afghanistan.'' Although Unocal continued on and off

negotiations on the oil pipeline (a separate project), the

lack of support from Washington hampered efforts.

Meanwhile, Bridas declared that it would not need to wait

for resolution of political issues, and repeated its

intention of moving forward with the Afghan gas pipeline

project on its own. Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan

tried to push Saudi Arabia to proceed with CentGas (Delta of

Saudi Arabia was now the leader). But war and US-Taliban

tension made business impossible.

For the remainder of the Clinton presidency, there would be

no official US or UN recognition of Afghanistan. And no

progress on the pipeline.

Then George Walker Bush took the White House.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

I would like to speak for a moment about civilian casualties in Afghanistan.

According to the United Nations, airstrikes continue to be a leading cause of civilian casualties. Days into the Marjah military offensive, 12 Afghans died when two rockets fired by NATO forces hit the wrong house. Ten of the 12 Afghans killed were from the same family. U.S. military officials initially apologized for the death of the civilians, but later backtracked, claiming they were insurgents. An Italian aid group working at a hospital just outside of Marjah accused allied forces of blocking dozens of critically wounded citizens from receiving medical attention at the hospital. A February 21 NATO airstrike conducted by U.S. Special Forces helicopters killed over 27 civilians and wounded dozens more after minibuses were hit by helicopters ``patrolling the area hunting for insurgents who had escaped the NATO offensive in the Marjah area,'' over 100 miles outside of Marjah in the southern province of Uruzgan.

The Wall Street Journal cited Afghan and NATO representatives, explaining that the air strike was ordered because it was believed that the minibus carried fresh Taliban fighters who were sent to help those under attack. However, the source of intelligence used to determine that the minibus carried insurgents has not been made known.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed the goal of the Marjah operation was to have no civilian casualties.

I submit for the Record a Brookings Institution 2009 report estimate that 10 civilians die for every militant killed in a drone strike.

I submit for the Record an article published in The Nation, written by journalist Anand Gopal, titled ``America's Secret Afghan Prisons,'' which reveals the existence of secret detention facilities at Bagram.

The daily night raids and indiscriminate aerial bombings must stop. The alleged torture of Afghans who are accused of supporting the Taliban who are captured in such night raids and the slaughter of innocent civilians in drone attacks only serve to embolden popular support against the United States.

[From the Brookings Institution, Mar. 10, 2010]

Do Targeted Killings Work?

(By Daniel L. Byman)

July 14, 2009.--Killing terrorist leaders is difficult, is

often ineffective, and can easily backfire. Yet it is one of

the United States' few options for managing the threat posed

by al Qaeda from its base in tribal Pakistan. By some

accounts, U.S. drone activity in Pakistan has killed dozens

of lower-ranking and at least 10 mid- and high-ranking

leaders from al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Critics correctly find many problems with this program,

most of all the number of civilian casualties the strikes

have incurred. Sourcing on civilian deaths is weak and the

numbers are often exaggerated, but more than 600 civilians

are likely to have died from the attacks. That number

suggests that for every militant killed, 10 or so civilians

also died.

To reduce casualties, superb intelligence is necessary.

Operators must know not only where the terrorists are, but

also who is with them and who might be within the blast

radius. This level of surveillance may often be lacking, and

terrorists' deliberate use of children and other civilians as

shields make civilian deaths even more likely.

Beyond the humanitarian tragedy incurred, civilian deaths

create dangerous political problems. Pakistan's new

democratic government is already unpopular for its

corruption, favoritism, and poor governance. U.S. strikes

that take a civilian toll are a further blow to its

legitimacy--and to U.S. efforts to build goodwill there. As

counterterrorism expert David Kilcullen put it, ``When we

intervene in people's countries to chase small cells of bad

guys, we end up alienating the whole country and turning them

against us.''

And even when they work, killings are a poor second to

arrests. Dead men tell no tales and thus are no help in

anticipating the next attack or informing us about broader

terrorist activities. So in any country with a functioning

government, it is better to work with that government to

seize the terrorist than to kill him outright. Arresting al

Qaeda personnel in remote parts of Pakistan, however, is

almost impossible today; the Pakistani government does not

control many of the areas where al Qaeda is based, and a raid

to seize terrorists there would probably end in the militants

escaping and U.S. and allied casualties in the attempt.

When arrests are impossible, what results is a terrorist

haven of the sort present along the Afghanistan-Pakistan

border today. Free from the threat of apprehension,

terrorists have a space in which to plot, organize, train,

and relax--an extremely dangerous prospect. In such a haven,

terrorist leaders can recruit hundreds or even thousands of

potential fighters and, more importantly, organize them into

a dangerous network. They can transform idealistic but

incompetent volunteers into a lethal legion of fighters. They

can also plan long-term global operations--terrorism

``spectaculars'' like the September 11 attacks, which remain

one of al Qaeda's goals.

Killing terrorist operatives is one way to dismantle these

havens. Plans are disrupted when individuals die or are

wounded, as new people must be recruited and less experienced

leaders take over day-to-day operations. Perhaps most

importantly, organizations fearing a strike must devote

increased attention to their own security because any time

they communicate with other cells or issue propaganda, they

may be exposing themselves to a targeted attack.

Given the humanitarian and political risks, each strike

needs to be carefully weighed, with the value of the target

and the potential for innocent deaths factored into the

equation. In addition, the broader political consequences

must be evaluated; the same death toll can have vastly

different political consequences depending on the context.

But equally important is the risk of not striking--and

inadvertently allowing al Qaeda leaders free reign to plot

terrorist mayhem.

We must not pretend the killings are anything but a flawed

short-term expedient that at best reduces the al Qaeda

threat--but by no means eliminates it. Even as U.S. strikes

have increased, Pakistan has suffered staggering levels of

terrorism as groups with few or limited links to al Qaeda

have joined the fray. Al Qaeda itself can also still carry

out attacks, including ones outside Pakistan in Europe and

even the United States. Thanks to the drone strikes, they are

just harder to pull off. The real answer to halting al

Qaeda's activity in Pakistan will be the long-term support of

Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. While this process

unfolds, targeted killings are one of America's few options

left.

Madam Speaker, I would like to speak about the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy.

The Brookings Institution recently reported that, in terms of raw violence, the situation is at an historic worst level with early 2010 levels of various types of attacks much higher than even last year at this time. Much of that is due to the recent Marjah campaign and, more generally, to the deployment of additional U.S. and Afghan troops to parts of the country where they have not been present before.

The President has called this war a just war. The framing of war as ``just'' is served to legitimize the slaughter of innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A 200-page report by the RAND Corporation is entitled, ``Counterintelligence in Afghanistan Deals a Huge Blow to our Ideas of Counterinsurgency.'' It reads: In many cases, a significant direct intervention by U.S. military forces may undermine popular support and legitimacy. The United States is also unlikely to remain for the duration of most insurgencies. This study's assessment of 90 insurgencies indicates that it takes an average of 14 years to defeat insurgents once an insurgency develops. Occupations fuel insurgencies. In other words, this assessment does not fit into the President's supposed rapid increase and the shaky plan to withdraw by the summer of 2011.

The Brookings report continues: Second, the United States and other international actors need to improve the quality of local governance, especially in rural areas of Afghanistan. Field research in the east and south show that development and reconstruction did not reach most rural areas because of the deteriorating security environment. Even the provincial reconstruction teams, which were specifically designed to assist in the development of reconstruction projects, operate inside pockets in east and south because of security concerns.

NGOs and State agencies, such as USAID and the Canadian International Development Agency, were also not involved in the reconstruction and development in many areas of the south and east.

The irony of this situation is that rural areas which were at most risk from the Taliban, which were unhappy with the slow pace of change, a population with the greatest unhappiness, received little assistance. The counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will be won or lost in the local communities of rural Afghanistan, not in urban centers such as Kabul, says the Brookings Institution.

Now, someone I'm not used to quoting, conservative columnist George Will, wrote in The Washington Post that the counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and level of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps, for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.

For how long are we willing to dedicate billions of dollars and thousands of lives before we realize that we can't win Afghanistan militarily? Our biggest mistake in the Afghanistan strategy is to think that we can separate the Taliban from the rest of the population. We cannot. The Taliban is a local resistance movement that is part and parcel of an indigenous population. We lost Vietnam because we failed to win the hearts and minds of local populations without providing them with a competent government that provided them with basic security and with a decent living. That message can and should be applied to Afghanistan.

The strategy for winning Afghanistan is simple: Stop killing the people and they will stop killing you.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

I yield myself 1 minute.

The more troops we send into Afghanistan, the more support the Taliban gains as resistors of foreign occupation. We say we want to negotiate with the Taliban in the future while, at the same time, conducting air strikes to take out Taliban strongholds across the country.

Just yesterday, The Washington Post published an article about the Zabul province and the pouring in of Taliban fighters following a retreat of U.S. Armed Forces from Zabul in December. If we accept the premise that we can never leave Afghanistan until the Taliban is eradicated, we may be there for a very long time.

The justification for our continued military presence in Afghanistan is that the Taliban, in the past, has provided a safe haven for al Qaeda, or could do so in the future. General Petraeus has already admitted that al Qaeda has little or no presence in Afghanistan.

We have to careful about branding al Qaeda and the Taliban as a single terrorist movement. Al Qaeda is an international organization, and, yes, they are a threat to the United States. The Taliban is only a threat to us as long as we continue our military occupation of Afghanistan.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).

I want to thank Mr. Berman and my colleagues for this opportunity to engage in this important debate.

At the current estimated deployment rate, the number of troops in Afghanistan will increase from about 70,000 at the end of 2009 to the stated goal of 100,000 by July of this year. My resolution calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. Armed Forces from Afghanistan no later than December 31 of this year. And it can be done. Unlike Iraq, where we have significant infrastructure built in and around the country to support our presence there, prior to last year, the United States invested very little in permanent infrastructure for U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

President Obama has called on the logisticians for the U.S. military to triple the amount of troops we have had in the country since the war started. If the administration expects the U.S. military to figure out a way for a rapid increase of troops on the ground, we can figure out how to have a method of rapid withdrawal.

Getting supplies into Afghanistan is one of the biggest obstacles to providing adequate support for troops on the ground. Due to frequent attacks on U.S. convoys traveling to Afghanistan through Pakistan, the U.S. is forced to deliver most of the supplies by air.

Madam Speaker, we have, in the last 3 hours, talked about 1,000 troop casualties; we have talked about a cost of a quarter of a trillion dollars and rising; we have spoken of civilian casualties and about the incredible amount of corruption that is going on in Afghanistan; we have spoken of the role of the pipeline, which is sure to deserve more critical inquiry; and we have talked about the failure of doctrines of counterinsurgency. That strategy doesn't work, and there are logistics of withdrawal that we can pursue.

The question is should the United States' people continue to bear the burden of this war when we have so many problems at home, with 15 million people unemployed, with millions of people losing their homes, with so many people without health care, with so many people not being able to send their children to good schools.

We have to reset our priorities. Our priorities should begin by getting out of Afghanistan, and then we can turn to getting out of Iraq.

Thank you very much for this debate. I urge approval of the resolution.

Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Madam Speaker, I was one of those Members who understood the horror of 9/11 and joined with the then-President of the United States to respond to an attack on the United States. Subsequently in the Iraq war, I voted against that war knowing that it had nothing to do with the attack on the United States on 9/11. So I do not stand on this floor with a heart that is not heavy-laden and an understanding of the importance of this resolution. This resolution is grounded in the Constitution and it has merit; for the question is, when we responded to 9/11, it was a war on terror.

Today, we find that this is a war of insurgents. There is no real documentation that al Qaeda still lingers in Afghanistan. But we do understand that we have lost 1,000 Americans to date--70 in 2010 and 316 in 2009--soldiers that we honor and respect. Never will there be one soldier that we don't call for an honor and respect of the United States. In fact, I filed legislation to have a day of honor for all of our returning soldiers. None of them should come home to silence. We should always provide great honor for them.

But here is where we are as it relates to the situation in Afghanistan. Today, although he has the right to do so, President Karzai is greeting the President of Iran. I hope they work together for peace. But the questions are: What are our soldiers doing to help impact the governance of Afghanistan? The governance that requires the fighting of corruption; the governance to fight for freedom and for human rights and the right to worship; governance to establish schools for the girls and boys and allow girls and boys to go.

Yes, we need nation building, but not with our soldiers out walking step by step trying to bypass IEDs, many times missing it and losing arms and legs and eyes. This is the time to give the President, who did do the right thing, who deliberated and who took time and responded to his generals--we salute him for that. But now is the time for the United States Congress and the constitutional separation of the branches of government to be able to assess whether or not this particular conflict must continue and whether there is a benefit to the American people.

I would make the argument there is much to do. There is much to do in cleaning up Afghanistan. There is much to do in providing for the opportunity of governance. We can do that in a way that will support the State Department with support staff from the military. And if there is a need to defend the United States, I have no doubt that the brave men and women of the United States military will stand at attention and will rise to the occasion. Now we owe their families,

these young men and women, 165,000 who came home from Iraq, many of whom are suffering from posttraumatic disorder.

When we send them into battle, we have the obligation of saying there is a beginning and an end. World War I, World War II, wars that we may have liked or disliked, but we knew as they went into battle that there was an ending. And how brave they were.

As we saluted the women who participated in the Air Army Corps for Women, the WASPs today, some hundreds of them, we know that there is no doubt that they are brave. But I would say to you, end this war with Afghanistan and end this partnership with Pakistan. There are ways to be able to support the structure of both governments without our soldiers losing their lives on and on and on.

This resolution says that if the President finds it necessary to extend, he can do so. But we are asking for the troops to be out by the end of this year. So many of us have spoken to that over and over again.

Madam Speaker, this is not something unusual. This is not a cause of the fearful. This is not a cause of those who are nonpatriotic. This is a cause for people who believe in the red, white, and blue, who stand here today loving their country and believe that our soldiers are owed this respect to bring them home as heroes. We ask that you support this resolution.

Madam Speaker, I rise in solemn opposition to a war that has cost too many American lives and too many American dollars. To date, over 1,000 Americans have lost their lives in the Afghan theatre, including 70 in 2010. In 2009, 316 Americans lost their lives. The war in Afghanistan should end as safely and quickly as possible, and our troops should be brought home with honor and a national day of celebration. I strongly believe that this can and must be done by the end of the year.

This stance is borne from my deeply held belief that we must commend our military for their exemplary performance and success in Afghanistan. As lawmakers continue to debate U.S. policy in Afghanistan, our heroic young men and women continue to willingly sacrifice life and limb on the battlefield. Our troops in Afghanistan did everything we asked them to do. We sent them overseas to destroy the roots of terror and protect our homeland; they are now caught in the midst of an insurgent civil war and continuing political upheaval.

Throughout the discussion of the administration's proposed surge, I expressed my concern for the cost of sending additional troops, as well as the effect that a larger presence in Afghanistan will have on troop morale. The White House estimates that it will cost $1 million per year for each additional soldier deployed, and I believe that $30 billion would be better spent on developing new jobs and fixing our broken healthcare system. Many leaders in our armed forces, including Secretary Gates, have said that it is optimal for troops to have two years between overseas deployments; yet, today, our troops have only a year at home between deployments. Expanding the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 30,000 will negatively impact troop morale and will bring us further away from the conditions necessary to maintain a strong, all-volunteer military. This is not President Obama's war and I applaud his thoughtful leadership--the Congress now needs to give counsel to have a time certain for the troops to come home.

I very strongly believe that our nation has a moral obligation to ensure that our veterans are treated with the respect and dignity that they deserve. One reason that we are the greatest nation in the world is because of the brave young men and women fighting for us in Iraq and Afghanistan. They deserve honor, they deserve dignity, and they deserve to know that a grateful nation cares about them. Whether or not my colleagues agree that the time has come to withdraw our American forces from Afghanistan, I believe that all of us in Congress should be of one accord that our troops deserve our sincere thanks and congratulations.

It is because I respect our troops that I am voting to bring them home from a war that has strayed far beyond its original mandate. The United States will not and should not permanently prop up the Afghan government and military. To date, almost $27 billion--more than half of all reconstruction dollars--have been apportioned to build the Afghan National Security Forces. The focus should be on strengthening the civilian government for it to lead. And we should continue to chase the real terrorists that are now lodged in Pakistan. We must support governments with a diplomatic surge--more resources for schools, hospitals, and government reform.

U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan will come to an end, and when U.S. forces leave, the responsibility for securing their nation will fall to the people and government of Afghanistan. Governance is more than winning elections, it is about upholding human rights, especially the rights of women; it requires fighting corruption. Governance requires fighting corruption. Governance requires providing for the freedom to worship. Governance requires establishing schools that provide education from early childhood through higher education.

Yet, Afghanistan has largely failed to institute the internal reforms necessary to justify America's continued involvement. The recent elections did not reflect the will of the people, and the government has consistently failed to gain the trust of the people of Afghanistan. The troubling reports about the elections that were held on August 20, 2009 were the first in a series of very worrisome developments. The electoral process is at the heart of democracy, and the disdain for that process that was displayed in the Afghanistan elections gives me great pause. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently released his quarterly report which detailed our nation's efforts to work with contractors and the Afghanistan government to prevent fraud and enhance transparency. This is the 8th report by the Special Inspector General, but as a recent series in the Washington Post showed, we are unable to stem the flow of corruption and waste within Afghanistan, despite our efforts at reforming our own contracting procedures. This money likely comes from the opium trade and U.S. assistance and, the Washington Post estimates, totals over one billion dollars each year.

The task of establishing legitimate governing practices remains formidable. A November 17, 2009 report from Transparency International listed Afghanistan as the second most corrupt country in the world, continuing its second straight year of declining in the corruption index. Such news is disparaging and provides an important dynamic to how we consider our strategy with regards to Afghanistan going forward. In January, a U.N. survey found that an overwhelming 59 percent of Afghans view public dishonesty as a bigger concern than insecurity (54 percent) and unemployment (52 percent). This is telling for a country with widespread violence and an unemployment rate of 40 percent.

As co-chair of the Congressional U.S.-Afghanistan Caucus, I have called for policies that allow the United States to provide benefits to the people of Afghanistan. Our effort must enhance our efforts at building both hard and soft infrastructure in Afghanistan. Change in Afghanistan is going to come through schools and roads, through health care and economic opportunity, and through increased trade and exchange. The Afghan people need our help to achieve these objectives, but I am not convinced that our military is the solution. If the Government of Afghanistan can demonstrate a responsible and non-corrupt commitment to its people, I believe that America should respond with appropriate and targeted foreign assistance.

I am also concerned that the United States is shouldering too much of the burden in Afghanistan. Although the terror attacks on American soil prompted NATO to respond with collective military action, no nation is immune from the threat of terrorism. Although the troops and resources provided by our allies have been invaluable to date, especially regarding development for the people of Afghanistan, questions must be raised about how long other nations will remain involved in Afghanistan. France and Germany, for example have already questioned whether or not to send additional troops. NATO resources must continue to focus on improving the livelihoods of the Afghan people, but if the support of these governments wavers, American troops and Afghan citizens will suffer the consequences.

I agree with our President that a stable Afghanistan is in the best interest of the international community, and I was pleased to see President Obama's outreach to our allies for additional troops. Currently, 41 NATO and other allied countries contribute nearly 36,000 troops. That number is expected to increase by nearly 6,000 with at least 5,000 additional troops coming from NATO member countries. Multilateralism is vital to ensuring that our operations in Afghanistan succeed.

Madam Speaker, today, we face difficult realities on the ground. The Taliban attacks our forces whenever and wherever they can. Agents of the Taliban seek to turn the people of Afghanistan against us as we attempt to provide them with help in every way we can. This situation is unsustainable. Afghanistan's history has earned it the nickname, ``The Graveyard of Empires,'' and I believe that we should not take this grim history lightly. By including a timetable for our operations in Afghanistan, we focus our mission and place it in a long-term context.

Although development to improve the lives of the Afghan people is important, defeating al-Qaeda and the threat they pose to America and our allies is the most important objective of our operations. To that end, I believe that Pakistan, not Afghanistan, is now the key to success and stability in the region. Over the past eight years, coalition forces have successfully pushed most of al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan. This has not only put them outside the mandate of our forces, but has also forced Pakistan to address an enlarged terrorist threat.

During his State of the Union Address, President Obama spoke of the importance of Pakistan when he noted ``America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.'' As the co-chair of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus, I know, firsthand, of the great potential of the Pakistani people, and I strongly believe that the recently approved assistance package to Pakistan will work to this end. U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan will improve Pakistan's capacity to address terrorist networks within its own borders, but I worry that a troop increase will cause even more refugees and insurgents to cross into Pakistan.

Ultimately, we in Congress must decide what is in the best interest of the American people. Fighting al-Qaeda was in the best interest of the American people in 2001, as it continues to be today. Yet, we are now fighting an insurgency--not al-Qaeda--in Afghanistan. This should not be their mission, and we must bring our troops home.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in strong opposition to this resolution. As we are all aware, U.S. forces at this very moment are engaged in battle against heavily armed enemy forces in a strategically important region of Afghanistan. Our brave men and women are making steady progress against a deadly foe, and are doing so at great risk to their lives.

This offensive is part of a new strategy in Afghanistan focused on the immediate goals of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, denying al Qaeda a safe haven, and reversing the momentum of the Taliban. This offensive is already producing dramatic success, including the capture of senior Taliban leaders, the routing of their forces, and the stabilization of key areas.

A winning strategy should be supported, not undermined. We must not give Taliban leaders and fighters a shield against U.S. forces that they otherwise cannot stop. No enemy was ever vanquished, no victory was ever secured by running away. Those who wish to destroy us would surely follow us, convinced that we had been beaten and eager to attack us wherever we go, as they would be confident that we can, in fact, be beaten again.

Mr. Speaker, let us dispel any myths or illusions about the consequences of a forced withdrawal. As General Petraeus has warned, ``I was in Kandahar. It was in Kandahar that the 9/11 attacks were planned. It was in the training camps in eastern Afghanistan where the initial preparation of the attackers was carried out before they went to Hamburg and flight schools in the U.S. It is important to recall the seriousness of the mission and why it is that we are in Afghanistan in the first place and why we are still there after years and years of hard work and sacrifice that have passed.''

One of the principal reasons that we have been spared a repeat of those attacks is that U.S. forces quickly toppled the Taliban regime that was protecting the terrorists and drove it and its al Qaeda allies out of their safety zone and into the remote mountains. Years of constant U.S. military pressure have forced them to turn their attention from planning more attacks against our homeland to fighting for their own survival.

To leave Afghanistan now would pave the way for the reestablishment of a vast and secure base from which al Qaeda and other deadly enemies could strike Americans around the world. Having withdrawn and abandoned our hard-won positions, to our allies and the people of Afghanistan, U.S. credibility would be significantly and perhaps irrevocably damaged. This, in turn, could leave the U.S. alone and more vulnerable than ever to the threats of radical Islamic extremists.

Our retreat would be seen around the world by friends and opponents alike as a surrender, as a sign that America no longer has the will to defend herself. We might attempt to fool ourselves into believing that it was merely a temporary setback, that we have suffered no long-term blow, but no one else would be fooled. It would be proof to every group that wishes to attack and destroy us that we can be fought and we can be beaten, that eventually America will just give up, regardless of the consequences.

We should support our troops by supporting their efforts to disrupt and dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban.

As many of you know, my daughter-in-law Lindsay served in Iraq and Afghanistan. I also have two committee staffers, one in the Army Reserves and one in the Marine Reserves, who are on their way now to Afghanistan. This is not their first time in battle. Both of these gentlemen have served bravely in Iraq, but the prospect of entering combat never becomes routine. They, like my stepson Douglas, who served as a Marine fighter pilot in Iraq, have recounted to me how the debates in Congress to mandate a withdrawal of our forces in Iraq demoralizes U.S. troops.

The request of my staffers to me as they embark on their mission to Afghanistan is to provide them with all of the tools and all of the support that they need to defeat the enemy and to win. They ask that we strengthen our commitment, our resolve, to the mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our enemies are redoubling their efforts. We must also.

In June of last year, Osama bin Laden noted that U.S. efforts had been, and I quote, ``transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, jihad must be directed at that region.''

Bin Laden later said in September, ``Not much longer, and the war in Afghanistan will be over. Afterwards, not even a trace of the Americans will be found there. Much rather, they will retreat far away behind the Atlantic. Then only we and you will be left.''

We must do everything possible to deny bin Laden and al Qaeda such a victory.

Mr. Speaker, the Afghan people are also listening to today's debate. For us to succeed in Afghanistan, we need their support. But the Afghan people will not be giving that support if they believe that we will abandon them.

As Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said, ``When I am in Afghanistan, I get the same question asked as when I am in Pakistan, which is, are you going to leave us again? Because they remember very well that we have in the past. And so there is a trust here. There is uncertainty through Afghanistan's eyes as to whether or not we will stay.''

In cooperating with us, in trusting us, they know that they are risking their lives and those of their families. Our troops are listening as well.

This debate today reminds me of the many times that I have come down to the floor to speak against a forced withdrawal from Iraq and the need to support our mission there.

Mr. Speaker, it is an illusion to believe that we can protect ourselves from our enemies by picking and choosing easy battles and turning away from those that require patience and sacrifice. This Congress cannot, must not, turn away from its responsibility to defend our country and our citizens simply because the task seems too difficult. The men and women in uniform who willingly risk their lives to defend our country do not believe that.

Mr. Speaker, as with all of my fellow Members and citizens, I hope for a

world one day without war. But in the world we live in, some wars are forced upon us. And we have no choice but to fight and to win them if we are to survive.

I urge my colleagues to resoundingly defeat this resolution.

I reserve the balance of my time.

At this time I'd like to yield 5 minutes to an esteemed member of our House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe).

I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. Speaker, I proudly yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon), the ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee.

Madam Speaker, I would like to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry), a member of our Committee on Foreign Affairs and the ranking member of the Agriculture Subcommittee on Department Operations and Oversight.

Madam Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida, Congresswoman Ginny Brown-Waite, a member of the House Committee on Ways and Means.

Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), a member of the Armed Services Committee, who, during his service with the U.S. Marine Corps, served a combat tour in Afghanistan. We thank him for his service.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dent), the ranking member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation, Security, and Infrastructure Protection.

I would like to yield an additional 30 seconds to Mr. Dent.

I'm so pleased to yield 6 minutes to the chairman of the House Republican Conference and a wonderful and esteemed member of our Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence).

(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk), a member of the Committee on Appropriations.

I yield an additional 30 seconds so Mr. Kirk can finish his thoughts.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Frelinghuysen), the ranking Republican member on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Kingston), the ranking member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA, and Related Agencies.

I am pleased to yield 30 additional seconds to the gentleman from Georgia.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Agriculture and Small Business Committees and the ranking member on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Roe), the ranking member of the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns), a member of the Veterans' Affairs and Energy and Commerce Committees.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to another Florida colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Rooney), a member of the Armed Services and Judiciary Committees.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes, the balance of my time, to the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren), the ranking member of the Committee on House Administration and a member of the Homeland Security and Judiciary Committees. I can think of no better person with whom to close the debate on our side.

Madam Speaker, in closing, I would like to build on something that our colleague from California (Mr. Hunter) had said earlier about the need to fight and defeat the enemy in Afghanistan so that our children or our grandchildren don't have to.

Our men and women in uniform are fighting for their families, for our families, for our Nation, for our future. They embrace their mission. They are honored by the opportunity to serve. They volunteered for it. Let us show our appreciation by voting ``no'' on this damaging resolution before us today.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution, and I yield myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I want to say I have quite enjoyed working with the gentleman from Ohio on this issue and a number of the issues we have had dealings with since I have become chairman, and I fundamentally agree with him and other supporters of the resolution that it is right for the House to have an open, honest debate on the merits of our ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, and outside, outside, the context of a defense spending bill or a supplemental appropriations bill. This is a good thing to be doing.

By vesting the power to declare war with the Congress, the Founders intended the United States would go to war only when absolutely necessary, and it is incumbent on this body to consider as thoroughly as possible the purpose and ongoing necessity of committing U.S. forces to battle.

Now, as a procedural matter, I take issue with the invocation of section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution as the basis for this debate, because that section authorizes a privileged resolution, like the one before us today, to require the withdrawal of combat forces when Congress has not authorized the use of military force.

There really can't be any doubt that Congress authorized U.S. military action in Afghanistan. The authorization for the use of military force passed by Congress in late September 2001 explicitly empowers the President to use force against the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks and those who harbored them. President Obama is doing just that.

But putting aside procedure, the notion that at this particular moment we would demand a complete withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year, without regard to the consequence of our withdrawal, without regard to the situation on the ground, including efforts to promote economic development, expand the rule of law, and without any measurement of whether the ``hold'' strategy now being implemented is indeed working, I don't think is the responsible thing to do.

Our troops are fighting a complex nexus of terrorist organizations-- al Qaeda, the Taliban--all of which threaten the stability of the Afghan Government, and they have demonstrated their ability to strike our homeland. If we withdraw from Afghanistan before the government there is capable of providing a basic level of security for its own people, we face the prospect that the Taliban once again will take the reins of power in Kabul and provide safe haven to al Qaeda. That would be a national security disaster.

I am keenly aware that even if we remain in Afghanistan, and here I want to emphasize this, there is no guarantee we will prevail in this fight. But if we don't try, we are guaranteed to fail.

President Obama has taken a very deliberative approach. He has examined numerous options over the course of several months and consulted with all relevant military leaders and allies. He really left no stone unturned and no issue unvetted as part of this review. He deserves an opportunity now to implement his strategy. He has given us the timeline for when he expects to see results, and there will be a reassessment of our strategy in 18 months.

General McChrystal, the commander of the U.S. and international forces, indicated that we have made progress since the new strategy was announced on December 1. We are witnessing the first major joint NATO- Afghanistan military operation in the city of Marja, considered a strategic fulcrum for ridding the region of the Taliban.

Our troops are working side by side with their Afghan counterparts. They retook Marja in 3 weeks of hard but well-executed efforts. They are making the Afghan people their number one priority, which is the basis for this counterinsurgency strategy. And to that end, the State Department and USAID have been working very hard to develop a concrete governance and development strategy.

I was here during the frenzied debate following 9/11 when Congress authorized the use of force against those responsible for the horrors of that day and those who chose to provide the perpetrators a safe haven.

I yield myself 30 additional seconds.

And I was here for the vote a year later to authorize military force against Iraq. Please don't conflate the two. The fight in Afghanistan is the fight against those who attacked us.

I am not endorsing an open-ended commitment. I am not advocating that we remain without assessing our progress. But I do believe this strategy of our President deserves support, and I urge opposition to the resolution.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 4 minutes to my very good friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of our committee, my friend from New York (Mr. Ackerman).

Madam Speaker, before I yield to the gentlewoman from California, I just want to take 15 seconds to make a point with respect to the gentleman from Ohio that, while the authorization for the use of force in 2001 certainly referenced the War Powers Act, our point is that, while this debate makes sense and is appropriate, it is truly not pursuant to the War Powers Act because the War Powers Act says the direction to withdraw comes when there has not been an authorization for the use of military force, and here there was an authorization for the use of military force. I am for the debate; I am against the basis on which the debate is being held.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the chair of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee.

I yield the gentlelady an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to a member of our committee, to the Chair of the organization of NATO parliamentarians, known as the North Atlantic Assembly, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).

(Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to my friend the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Sestak).

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to my friend and colleague from Georgia (Mr. Johnson), a member of the Armed Services Committee.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to deal with the comments of my friend, the previous speaker.

I would suggest that the decision to schedule this debate did not come out of a desire to make a gesture to the extreme left or any such particular move. It was rather some sense of fealty to the institution of Congress, the institution vested with the war-declaring authority, the oversight of how our expenditures are spent. And I don't understand why you and I, who both have feelings about the wisdom of pursuing the current strategy of this administration on this issue, should be afraid of that debate or wanting to attribute motivations to the willingness to have that debate other than the congressional responsibility to have such discussions and have such debate.

I would be happy to yield.

To reclaim my time, this is not a discussion of post offices. This is not a discussion of suspension legislation, and both parties seem to like naming post offices and introducing other kinds of resolutions. This is a discussion about the decision to send our forces into harm's way. It's worthy of a serious debate. There is nothing wrong with that debate. I don't believe our troops are going to get demoralized by our having that debate. I believe for the country, they are going to say, We are proud to represent a country that is willing to undertake that debate.

Madam Speaker, first I would like to yield at the end of the ranking member's time an additional 5 minutes from our time on the assumption that 2 of those 5 minutes will be given to someone from California.

Second, I would like to now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boccieri), one of only two Members of this body who actually have been deployed in our uniformed services in Afghanistan.

I yield the gentleman an additional minute.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the majority leader, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Madam Speaker, initially, I yield an additional 2 minutes of my time to that of the ranking member. It is to be added onto her time and is to be subtracted from our time.

Now I yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee, the delegate from American Samoa, Mr. Eni Faleomavaega.

I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Madam Speaker, because I have no further requests for time and I understand that the sponsor of this resolution has both the right and the intention of closing, I will yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution, which would urge the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, in my opinion, at great cost to America's security and, indeed, the Afghan people. But I want to rise as well to thank my friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), with whom I work closely. This issue needs to be debated. This issue needs to be raised. The American people have a right to have us debate this issue.

Their young men and young women are in harm's way. They are in harm's way at our insistence, or at least at our sufferance. So it is right to have this debate. And while I disagree with the gentleman from Ohio, I appreciate the fact that he provides this opportunity to discuss this very, very important issue.

Madam Speaker, after years in which Afghanistan was a secondary concern, in my view, President Obama has set our policy on a new course which is already showing significant results. I believe that this is not the time to change that policy.

There is vast agreement that an indefinite presence in Afghanistan or Iraq is unacceptable. In Iraq we have reached the transition point of handing over responsibility to the central Government to take care of its own people. We see positive signs, such as the recent Iraq election in which 62 percent of the voters turned out in the face of terrorist violence. Was it perfect? It was not. Are there concerns yet about who could run and who could not? There are, appropriate concerns. But nevertheless, we see progress.

Given the increasing stability of the Iraq Government, President Obama is proceeding with responsible troop withdrawals. Today, 96,000 American troops remain, down from 140,000 troops, and calculated and careful drawdowns continue. All American combat troops are set to leave Iraq by the end of August.

At the same time, the President conducted a comprehensive reevaluation of our Afghanistan policy, one in which all viewpoints were heard. Some thought it took too long; some of us believed it was a careful, thoughtful, and correct attention to an important decision.

The Obama administration came to the conclusion that a failed Afghanistan was the launching pad for terrorist attacks that killed thousands of Americans as well as a source of regional instability, and that a newly failed Afghan state could pose the same danger again. That is why we, in a bipartisan way, authorized troops to go to Afghanistan about a decade ago. That is why the President committed to a strategy of troop increases, not as an open-ended commitment, but as part of a limited strategy of counterinsurgency with withdrawals set to begin in the summer of 2011.

This is not a war we fight alone. Our allies understand that the threat of terrorism affects us all and have pitched in accordingly. Since the President's December 1 speech announcing his new policy, we have seen a sharp increase in international cooperation with our allies, pledging approximately 10,000 additional troops and more military trainees.

Our new Afghan strategy has already seen real success in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, which demonstrates that this resolution is especially ill-timed. Among the highlights of that success have been the capture of Mullah Baradar, the second-highest ranking member of the Taliban and most significant Taliban capture since the beginning of the war, and Mullah Abdul Kabir, a senior Taliban leader. Both were captured in Pakistan, which illustrates increased cooperation from the Pakistan Government, thanks in large part to the administration's careful diplomacy.

As The Washington Post put it on February 23, ``Pakistani security forces have long supported or turned a blind eye to Afghan Taliban members seeking sanctuary in Pakistan. The recent arrests seem to mark a change in that attitude.'' Clearly, success in Afghanistan will be posited on the success of those in Pakistan to act against sanctuaries. At the same time, the leadership of al Qaeda and Taliban has been severely damaged through strikes in Pakistan. And the new counterinsurgency strategy has been put to work in Marjah, an important district in Helmand province, where American, coalition, and Afghan troops have worked and fought successfully together to strengthen the central Government against Taliban fighters.

Let me say, the gentleman has made some comments about the Afghan central Government. All of us share the gentleman's concerns about the central Government. These are concerns that are properly raised and need to be addressed. However, there is no doubt that years of war against the Taliban and terrorists have imposed a heavy cost on the Afghan people. Despite those heavy costs, the Afghan people support the coalition's continued presence in their country, perhaps because they know that reprisals from an unchecked Taliban would be fierce and unforgiving. In fact, our failure to follow through when the Soviets withdrew resulted, very frankly, in the Taliban's presence.

According to a recent poll conducted by the BBC, ABC, and German television, 68 percent of Afghans want American troops to stay in their country and 56 percent of Afghans believe their country is headed in the right direction, compared to just 30 percent last spring. Just since last spring, we have seen almost a doubling of the view that Afghanistan is heading in the right direction on behalf of Afghan citizens.

Madam Speaker, there is no question that our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has suffered from neglect, poor planning, and minimal diplomacy, but passing this resolution would show that we've learned the wrong lessons from those years of relative neglect. Abandoning Afghanistan just when a new strategy and new leadership has begun to bear fruit I think would be a mistake. And although I appreciate the gentleman's leadership and incisive analysis, which bears listening to, on this issue we disagree.

I would urge, therefore, my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the resolution before us.