Members of the House of Representatives, this issue has never gone before the House Judiciary Committee--never. I have a letter dated December 14 that says: ``There has been some debate over whether…
Members of the House of Representatives, this issue has never gone before the House Judiciary Committee--never.
I have a letter dated December 14 that says:
``There has been some debate over whether section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act merely restates existing law or would, for the first time, codify authority for the President to indefinitely detain, without charge, virtually anyone picked up in antiterrorism efforts, including United States citizens arrested on United States soil.
``Please find attached a letter from Judge William Sessions, a former Federal judge and former Director of the FBI under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, explaining that current law on this point is unclear, and that enacting section 1021 of this act would dangerously expand the power for indefinite detention.''
I would like to place in the Record sundry correspondence, including the letter from Judge Sessions.
The Constitution Project,
Washington, DC, December 9, 2011.
Dear Representative McKeon and Fellow Conferees, I am
writing to you with grave concern over the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA). It is highly regrettable
that the Senate passed the NDAA without first stripping it of
dangerous provisions regarding the treatment of detainees.
But it is not too late to act; as conferees, it is now your
task to remove these harmful provisions before the NDAA
becomes law. I strongly urge you to do so, and to preserve
both our constitutional traditions and our most effective
tools in the fight against terrorism.
If enacted, these detention provisions would for the first
time codify authority for methods such as indefinite
detention without charge and mandatory military detention,
and would authorize their application--on the basis of
suspicion alone--to virtually anyone picked up in
antiterrorism efforts, including those arrested on U.S. soil.
In effect, the U.S. military would become the judge, jury and
jailer of terrorism suspects, to the exclusion of the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies.
An astounding array of individuals from across the
political spectrum opposes the over-militarization of our
counterterrorism efforts, and for good reason. I have
attached Beyond Guantanamo: A Bipartisan Declaration,
organized by The Constitution Project and Human Rights First,
in which I joined with over 140 additional former government
officials and practitioners from across the political
spectrum in explaining that federal courts are the most
effective mechanism for trying terrorism cases, and that
indefinite detention without charge runs afoul of our
Constitution and would harm U.S. interests globally. As a
former federal judge, former U.S. Attorney, and former
director of the FBI, I myself can attest to the competence of
our nation's law enforcement officers and civilian federal
courts, as well as the urgency to preserve these tools for
use in our counterterrorism efforts.
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta similarly opposes this
transfer of responsibility to the military. Indeed, virtually
the entire national security establishment--including James
Clapper, the director of national intelligence; Robert
Mueller III, the director of the FBI; David Petraeus, the
director
of the CIA; White House Advisor for Counterterrorism John
Brennan; Lisa Monaco, the assistant attorney general for
national security; and Jeh Johnson, general counsel for the
Department of Defense--has warned that further restricting
the tools at our disposal to combat terrorism is not in the
best interest of our national security. I implore you to heed
their warning.
With regard specifically to Section 1031 from the Senate
bill, some have argued that Section simply reiterates current
law, and by doing so maintains the status quo. That is not
the case. This very dangerous provision would authorize the
President to subject any suspected terrorist who is captured
within the United States--including U.S. citizens and U.S.
persons--to indefinite detention without charge. The
provision does not limit such detention authority to people
captured on the battlefield. Importantly, although subsection
(e) of this provision states that the provision should not be
``construed to affect existing law or authorities'' relating
to detention of ``persons who are captured or arrested in the
United States,'' the reality is that current law on the scope
of such executive authority is unsettled.
In fact, on two occasions when this issue was on track to
come before the U.S. Supreme Court, the executive branch
changed course so as to avoid judicial review. Specifically,
in both the Padilla case in 2005-06 (involving a U.S.
citizen) and the al-Marri case in 2008-09 (involving a legal
permanent U.S. resident), the U.S. government claimed that
the President had the authority to detain a suspected
terrorist captured within the United States indefinitely
without charge or trial. In both instances, however, before
the Supreme Court could hear the case and evaluate this
claim, the Justice Department reversed course and charged the
defendant with criminal offenses to be tried in civilian
court. Thus, this extreme claim of executive detention
authority for people captured within the United States has
never been tested, and the state of the law at present is
unclear. Passage of Section 1031 would explicitly provide
this authority by statute for the first time, thereby
clearly, and dangerously, expanding the power for indefinite
detention.
I firmly believe that the United States can best preserve
its national security by maintaining the use of proven law
enforcement methods and our well-tested traditional criminal
justice system to combat terrorism. By contrast, enacting the
NDAA without first removing the current detainee provisions
could pose a genuine threat to our national security and
would represent a sweeping and unnecessary departure from our
constitutional tradition.
I therefore urge you, as conferees, to strip these
dangerous detainee provisions from the NDAA. Thank you for
your consideration.
Sincerely,
William S. Sessions.
Will the gentleman let me recognize him on his own time? I only have 3 minutes.
I would like to remind my colleagues that provisions within the conference report impact our civil liberties and should have been referred to the Judiciary Committee for review. The conference report dangerously expands existing authorizations pertaining to individuals detained by the United States government and the military.
First, Section 1021 grants broad discretionary authority that could permit the indefinite detention of United States citizens, areas of law that should have been referred to the Judiciary Committee.
Secondly, Section 1021 is not the current law of the land and instead is new and dangerously extensive detention authority that has its origins in case law that never involved questions of whether American citizens could be indefinitely detained.
Third, Section 1022 violates due process by permitting indefinite military detention without charge or trial.
Next, the conference report ignores the concerns of members of our intelligence community, domestic law enforcement, and former generals who have opposed these provisions because they would undermine the ability of the government to interrogate and prosecute suspected terrorists.
Lastly, the conference report displaces the legal expertise necessary for trying successful terrorism cases.
First, Section 1021 grants broad discretionary authority that could permit the indefinite detention of United States citizens. The indeterminate breadth of conference report provides little or no protection against the indefinite detention of United States citizens. In addition, it threatens our constitutional protections and civil liberties.
I would like to know why an amendment to exempt American citizens from indefinite military detention failed in the Senate. If we were concerned about preserving the civil liberties and constitutional protections for American citizens, why did it fail? In addition, if existing laws prohibit this, why did we not specify this in the bill? Although supporters of this bill continue to claim that this bill would not expand detention authority inside of the U.S., that is just not the case.
There are too many questions that affect our civil liberties in the conference report that should have been referred to the Judiciary Committee for review and clarification. For example, Section 1021 is broad in its definition of ``hostilities'', what constitutes ``directly supporting hostilities in aid of enemy forces,'' and does not address the question of when or how do we determine ``the end of hostilities.''
Former FBI Director under Reagan, Bush, and Clinton and former Judge, Williams S. Sessions, recently wrote to the conferees explaining that ``This very dangerous provision would authorize the President to subject any suspected terrorist who is captured within the United States--including U.S. citizens and U.S. persons--to indefinite detention without charge. The provision does not limit such detention authority to people captured on the battlefield. Importantly, although subsection (e) of this provision states that the provision should not be `construed to affect existing law or authorities' relating to detention of persons who are captured or arrested in the United States,' the reality is that current law on the scope of such executive authority is unsettled.''
With so much ambiguity, this bill could authorize detention--into perpetuity--United States citizens who in some instances--such as making statements protected under the First Amendment--could arguably be considered subject to indefinite detention under this provision.
In addition, Section 1021 does not expressly address whether U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens may be determined as ``covered persons'' subject to detention under the section. Although the conference report includes the amendment offered by Senator Feinstein, the conference report leaves definitions that are very broad of who can be detained without charge or trial.
Secondly, let me remind my colleagues that Section 1021 is not the current law of the land. The definition in Section 1021 was used by the Obama Administration to continue to detain indefinitely without charge or trial detainees at Guantanamo Bay, GITMO. This definition was used in court cases dealing with GITMO detainees, NOT American citizens. Thus, the question is whether this Congress wants the same GITMO detainee standard applied to American citizens? Do you want our government treating American citizens that way?
Section 1021 states that ``Nothing in the section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States.'' This does not mean that American citizens are protected.
I am very troubled today to have learned that when an amendment came up in the Senate to address these protections for American citizens, members of the Senate stated that they would want room in the law for an American citizen to fall under this new and broad definition.
No one at GITMO is an American citizen and the only cases that deal with this type of indefinite detention without charge or trial are GITMO detainee cases. So there is no good law out there.
Thus, if existing laws do impact the civil liberties of American citizens, then we need to be changing those laws instead of codifying them.
Thirdly, the conference report violates due process and rejects our American values. The United States Constitution grants specific due process rights to citizens that guarantee they will be charged and brought to trial in the event they are apprehended by law enforcement. However, Section 1022 militarizes our justice system and could allow United States citizens to be detained by the military without charge or trail.
We take an oath every Congress to uphold the Constitution and to guard its values and protections for American citizens. Earlier this year, members of this body stood before the American people and read the Constitution. Yet I must inquire whether that was theatrics or did we intend to follow through with our obligation? The broad definitions in 1022 could include American citizens under indefinite military detention, and thus must be opposed if we are to be protectors of the Constitution.
Next, this Congress has ignored the concerns of our national intelligence community. Changes into Section 1022 will undermine the ability of the government to interrogate and prosecute suspected terrorists.
The Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, CIA professionals, along with dozens of retired generals and professional interrogators have rejected this proposal because it is a militarization of our justice system and some have stated that these provisions are unwise and unworkable.
Members of the House claim that out of respect for our military we need to pass this authorization. However, passing this bill ignores
their concerns and will negatively impact operations that preserve our national security. Under the provisions of the conference report, intelligence and domestic law enforcement would lose authority to take further action with terrorist suspects in U.S. custody absent a wavier from the President--which still thwarts the information gathering that is crucial at that time of arrest.
This provision in the conference report will cause controversy and chaos in handling terrorism investigations. Tying the hands of our intelligence and law enforcement professionals would also cause unnecessary delays in justice.
These provisions also harm our national security by threatening the global reputation of the United States. Under President Obama, the image of the United States has been restored as well as the rule of law. However, the conference report rejects our national values of democracy, due process, and justice by authorizing the military's role in domestic law enforcement.
Lastly, the conference report displaces the legal expertise necessary for trying successful terrorism cases. A bi-partisan alliance of our national defense and intelligence community--including retired generals--have spoken out against provisions in Section 1022 that provide for military commissions to conduct terrorism trials.
The military has not even completed 3 percent of the case load that the Justice Department has completed. Military tribunals have completed six terrorism cases, compared to the Justice Department's case load of close to 400 cases with a 90 percent conviction rate to go along with that. To date, there is no record of any federal court unable to convict a terrorist.
This is not a responsibility the military wants, therefore Congress should not insist on the use of military tribunals in order to sound tougher on terrorists. We should not treat terrorists like warriors. Federal courts and our Justice Department can deliver harsher sentences and are better equipped to handle such cases. In addition, Article III Judges and the Department of Justice are more versed in the body of law that covers such cases.
I was also disappointed that the conference report failed to adopt Senate-passed language proposed by Senators Merkley, Paul, and Lee calling for expedited transition of responsibility for military and security operations in Afghanistan to the Afghan government.
Specifically, this amendment would have required the President to devise and submit to Congress a plan to expedite the drawdown of U.S. combat troops in Afghanistan and accelerate the transfer of security authority to Afghan authorities.
The conference report amended the amendment's language to change the focus from drawing down our troop footprint to empowering and building up the Afghan security forces. While a worthy goal unto itself, this language changed the focus of the amendment and undermined the the message expressed by the entire Senate through the Merkley Amendment. Including this provision would have sent an important message about our country's commitment to bringing the war in Afghanistan to a responsible end. It is unfortunate that the report does not reflect a position supported by a majority of the American people.
I also support efforts to enhance the ability of Customs & Border Protection to prevent counterfeit goods from being imported into the United States. However, Section 8 of this bill will disrupt the flow of genuine brand name products into the United States.
This is true because many of the goods which CBP inspectors view with suspicion are in fact genuine goods, lawfully moving in distribution streams parallel to the authorized distributors. These transactions are desirable because they provide U.S. consumers with price competition and wider distribution of brand name products.
However, the existence of these transactions is often under attack by trademark and copyright owners who actively seek to control resale pricing and downstream distribution of the products they have already sold into commerce. Section 8 will give anti-competitive companies a new tool by giving them confidential information about competing parallel imports at their times of arrival, while they are still detained by CBP and unavailable to the importer, and without giving the importer an opportunity to prove its goods are genuine, and without even giving notice to the importer that its information has been shared with a competitor seeking to prevent its lawful transaction.
This problem could be minimized if Section 8 is limited to goods raising national security concerns or purchases by the military. I believe that is the intent of this provision of the Department of Defense Appropriation bill.
This problem could also be minimized if this bill or CBP would adopt the safeguards which the Administration proposes be included in the Customs Reauthorization Act. This would be appropriate since Section 8 provides that it sunsets when the Customs Reauthorization is adopted. The safeguards include a requirement that the Secretary find there is a need for disclosing confidential information, and that CBP provide the importer with notice and an opportunity to respond before any confidential information is released to other private parties.
For some reason, we are adopting this provision in anticipation of a more thoughtful approach in the Customs Reauthorization Act. This is not a wise or needed course of action. CBP today can provide redacted samples to IP owners and very often that is sufficient to determine if they are genuine or counterfeit.
CBP today keeps suspicious goods out of U.S. commerce while it determines if they are genuine. The safeguards proposed by the administration will not put suspicious goods into commerce nor delay the final determination of CBP because there is an existing 30-day requirement that is not altered by any proposed legislation.
We must not be willing to compromise our civil liberties and American values for the false sense of enhancing security. I urge members to vote no on the Conference report and do what is right for America, its people, and the rule of law.