Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Arrington). Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bean). Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman…
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Arrington).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bean).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Moran).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Kennedy).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Kiley).
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I remind this body that the reason why these COVID-era tax credits expired is because the Democrats focused all their resources on helping their wealthy environmentalists with permanent tax credits for electric vehicles and solar panels.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a bombshell GAO report documenting evidence of widespread fraud, with billions of dollars going to fraudulent enrollees, including as many as 58,000 dead people.
U.S. Government
Accountability Office,
Washington, DC, December 3, 2025.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preliminary
Results from Ongoing Review Suggest Fraud Risks in the
Advance Premium Tax Credit Persist
Hon. Brett Guthrie,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives.
Hon. Jim Jordan,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives.
Hon. Jason Smith,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
provides premium tax credits to those who purchase private
health insurance plans and meet certain income and other
requirements. Individuals may have the federal government pay
this credit to their health insurance issuers in advance on
their behalf, known as the advance premium tax credit (APTC),
which lowers their monthly premium payments.
Millions of consumers have purchased health insurance plans
through the marketplaces established under PPACA. The Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for
maintaining the federal Marketplace and overseeing state-
based marketplaces. Under PPACA, states may elect to operate
their own state-based marketplace or to use the federal
Marketplace. These marketplaces determine eligibility for
APTC, based in part on income, and allow individuals to
compare and choose among insurance plans offered by
participating private health care coverage issuers. CMS
estimated it paid nearly $124 billion in APTC for about 19.5
million enrollees for plan year 2024.
Consumers can enroll in health insurance coverage through a
marketplace independently or with assistance, such as from an
insurance agent or broker. As discussed later in this report,
agents and brokers can help a consumer apply for coverage,
including for related financial assistance, and enroll in a
plan. Assistance from an agent or broker is of no cost to a
consumer. Rather, agents and brokers are allowed to receive
compensation directly from health insurance issuers in
accordance with agreements with those issuers and any
applicable state requirements.
Indictments from December 2024 and February 2025 highlight
concerns about agent and broker practices in the federal
Marketplace. Specifically, the indictments allege that bad
actors enrolled consumers in insurance through the federal
Marketplace by falsifying information on their applications.
Additionally, according to CMS, the agency received
approximately 275,000 complaints between January and August
2024 that consumers were enrolled in a plan or had their plan
changed without their consent. Such practices can result in
wasteful federal spending on APTC for enrollees who are not
eligible. Further, such practices can result in harm and
unexpected costs for consumers. These can include loss of
access to medical providers and medications, higher
copayments and deductibles, or repayment of APTC if income or
other eligibility was misrepresented.
We previously reported that APTC is at risk of fraud. For
example, in September 2016, we found that federal and state
marketplaces approved coverage for our fictitious applicants.
Nearly all of these fictitious applicants remained covered
after we sent fictitious documents or no documents to resolve
issues with our applications. Further, in July 2017, we found
that CMS did not design processes to verify eligibility for
APTC, including preventing duplicate coverage.
You asked us to review issues related to fraud risk
management in APTC. This report is based on preliminary
results and analyses from that ongoing work. Specifically,
this report addresses preliminary results from our
1. covert testing of federal Marketplace enrollment
controls for plan years 2024 and 2025,
2. analyses of federal Marketplace enrollment data for plan
years 2023 and 2024, and
3. evaluation of CMS's fraud risk assessment and antifraud
strategy for APTC.
To perform covert testing of federal Marketplace enrollment
controls, we created 20 fictitious identities and submitted
applications for individual health care coverage in the
federal Marketplace. We submitted applications for four of
these fictitious identities in October 2024 for coverage
through December 2024, which was the remainder of that plan
year. We pursued coverage for plan year 2025 for all 20
fictitious identities, including the four identities for
which we already submitted applications. Our covert testing
for plan year 2025 is ongoing, since the plan year is not yet
complete. As a result, we will describe additional details of
the 2025 applications in a future report.
Our covert testing included applications submitted
independently through HealthCare.gov, which is the federal
Marketplace's website, and applications submitted with
assistance from an insurance agent or broker. For all our
applicant scenarios, we sought to act as an ordinary consumer
would in attempting to make a successful application. For
example, if, during online applications, we were directed to
make phone calls to complete the process, we acted as
instructed.
For applications for plan year 2024, our covert tests
included fictitious applicants
who provided invalid (i.e., never issued) Social Security
numbers (SSN). Additionally, we stated income at a level
eligible to obtain APTC. As appropriate, we used publicly
available information to construct our applications for
coverage and subsidies. We also used publicly available
hardware, software, and materials to produce counterfeit
documents that we submitted, if appropriate for our testing,
when instructed to do so. We then observed the outcomes of
the document submissions, such as any approvals received or
requests to provide additional supporting documentation. The
results of our covert testing, while illustrative of
potential enrollment control weaknesses, cannot be
generalized to the overall enrollment population.
To examine federal Marketplace enrollment for plan years
2023 and 2024, we obtained and analyzed federal Marketplace
enrollment and payment data, including APTC information, from
CMS. We also matched enrollee SSNs in the data to two
additional data sources: (1) Social Security Administration's
(SSA) full death file, a database containing records of death
that have been reported to SSA, as of November 2024 and (2)
April 2025 data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on
APTC reconciliation from tax forms filed for tax year 2023.
We assessed the reliability of all data sets by performing
electronic tests to determine the completeness and accuracy
of key fields. We also reviewed agency documentation and
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the
reliability of the data. Overall, we found that the data were
reliable for our purposes.
To examine CMS's fraud risk assessment and antifraud
strategy for APTC, we reviewed documentation of CMS's
policies and fraud risk management activities related to
APTC. This included CMS's 2018 fraud risk assessment for
APTC. Additionally, we interviewed agency officials about
CMS's fraud risk management activities in this program. We
reviewed relevant reports from GAO and HHS's Office of the
Inspector General. We evaluated information from relevant
documentation and interviews of agency officials against
relevant leading practices in GAO's A Framework for Managing
Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework).
To support all three objectives, we interviewed CMS
officials and representatives from seven stakeholder
organizations that represent agents and brokers, state
insurance regulators, researchers, and one of the entities
that CMS approved to host a non-marketplace website where
consumers can apply for and enroll in a plan offered through
the federal Marketplace.
The ongoing work upon which this report is based is being
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
preliminary findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. Additionally, our related investigative work is
being conducted in accordance with standards prescribed by
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Background
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Haridopolos).
Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I will remind the body that the reason why these enhanced subsidies are expiring is because the Democrats are the only ones in this Chamber who voted for them to expire on December 31. Apparently, they regret that vote because they focused most of their dollars on making permanent environmental tax policy in the Green New Deal.
Mr. Speaker, they are the only ones who have voted to take away these subsidies. It is laughable, Mr. Speaker, when you hear Members on the other side say that the Republicans created this healthcare crisis.
Guess what. It was the Democrats who wrote the Affordable Care Act that is being debated on the floor right now. They are upset because, as of December 31, it reverted back to the Affordable Care Act, which they have championed, what they passed, not Republicans, Democrats.
Mr. Speaker, the healthcare crisis is clearly created by the Democrats.
We have highlighted the fraud and waste within the exchanges. More than half of the people on the exchanges did not even file one medical claim last year, but those insurance companies were being subsidized.
I want to remind the American people that not $1 goes to them. It all goes to the big health insurance companies that have been doing very well, while premiums for every single American have been rising for the last decade and a half.
Mr. Speaker, with that, I urge this body to vote ``no.''