Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. David Scott). Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining? Mr.…
Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. David Scott).
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I do anticipate additional speakers, and I will be making comments myself.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, because I believe in truth in labeling, truth in titling, truth in the style of legislation, Mr. Speaker, I believe that this bill should be appropriately styled the Big Bank Bonus Bill.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be styled the Big Bank Bonus Bill.
Mr. Speaker, I am sorry?
A UC request.
Mr. Speaker, my friends on the other side have said much about Barney Frank.
Chairman Frank was a dear friend of mine. I knew him well. I still do know him well. Mr. Speaker, Chairman Frank has not endorsed this bill. The language that they have used would lead an unsuspecting person to conclude that Chairman Frank supports this piece of legislation. He does not.
I have in my hand a letter from Chairman Frank. I will read a portion of it. He indicates:
H.R. 3312 significantly increases the need for subjective
judgment by the regulators and very much weakens the ability
of financial institutions to rely on clear rules to guide
their decisionmaking.
Mr. Speaker, without question, Chairman Frank does not support this legislation.
My friends have made much to-do about the term ``arbitrary and capricious,'' a threshold that is arbitrary. What is more arbitrary than reducing the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent, which you just did? What is more arbitrary than reducing the individual tax rate from 39.6 percent to 37 percent, which you just did?
You are the masters of arbitrary and capricious numbers. That bill that you just passed is flush with arbitrary and capricious numbers.
Mr. Speaker, I would suggest that they examine their thoughts about arbitrary and capricious before we continue, because I have more to say about arbitrary and capricious numbers.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Sarbanes), my colleague.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to engage my friend from Minnesota, if I may, before he leaves. Would the gentleman please not leave?
Would Mr. Hensarling ask the gentleman not to leave? I want to engage him.
I would like to engage Mr. Emmer, if he will come back, please. I would like to engage with the gentleman for just a moment if I may.
The gentleman declines.
Is there anyone on the other side that I can talk to?
I ask Mr. Hensarling, is 39.6 arbitrary, reducing the taxes on individuals from 39.6 to 37? What is 37? Why is it not arbitrary?
Pardon?
I yield time. Yes, of course.
I yield.
I yield you such time as I may deem necessary, if you will take time.
Well, you may use your own time.
Mr. Speaker, the arbitrary numbers that they have they don't care to defend.
Let's talk about the one-size-fits-all accusation, if you will.
Mr. Speaker, I have a source, and it is the Department of the Treasury, which indicates that we have a tiered system, and we actually have five different tiers. These tiers will allow banks to be classified as small, midsize, regional, international active, and G- SIBs.
There is a tiering system, but within the tiering system, we have given the regulators the authority to tailor rules to fit banks within the system.
Mr. Speaker, my colleague mentioned institution failure. I was here. I know what happened in 2008. I understand why we have Dodd-Frank. We don't have Dodd-Frank because Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank woke up one morning and decided that they would like to regulate banks to the extent that they were regulated.
We have Dodd-Frank because we had a crisis. We had Dodd-Frank developed because of exotic products, the 327s and the 228s, which had teaser rates that would allow persons to get into loans that had fixed rates for 3 years or 2 years, and then they would have 27 years of variable rates or 28 years of variable rates.
This was the exotic product that a good many people had and could not get out of because, quite frankly, they also had a prepayment penalty that would coincide with these teaser rates.
It was a time of great crisis for banking.
We also had the so-called credit default swaps, which were just another way of laying off bets. Banks found clever ways to lay off their bets that they thought were risky.
We had no-doc loans, negative amortization. You could pay as much as you wanted and would add to the principal what you didn't pay, which means that you would end up paying a lot more for your loan than you initially started out owing.
We had interest-only loans: just pay the interest, let the loan continue to increase in value.
There was no firewall between commercial banking and investment banking. They finally got Glass-Steagall. Took them decades to do it, but they did.
Then we had the dastardly yield spread premium, which would allow the person who was servicing you, the loan originator, to qualify you for a loan at 5 percent, come out and shake your hand and say: Good news, you now have a loan for 10 percent.
That was all lawful, but Dodd-Frank ended all of this.
We have Dodd-Frank because we had a deregulation era, very much comparable to what we are about to go through now. Banks were regulated to the extent that they couldn't do all of these things, but we deregulated, just as we are about to do it now, and we will get back to the future, where banks will not have the liquidity necessary, where the credit risk that they take will be unreasonable.
This is a bill that belongs on the trash heap of history. I adamantly oppose the bill. I believe that it is time for us to take the stand that the American people want us to take, not the stand that the big banks would have us take.
This is a big bank bonus. The big banks love this bill. Thirty banks are going to be relieved of their obligation to let us know how to put them out of their misery in the event that they are about to bring the banking system down. Thirty banks. These are big banks, $500 billion max. Big banks.
These banks will continue to give us their stress test so that we can know what their liquidity is and understand their credit worthiness by virtue of the loans that they make.
This bill is what the big banks want, but not the American people.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters), the ranking member.
Mr. Speaker, what is the amount of time remaining?
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, this bill does not impact 99 percent, approximately, of the banks. Most banks in this country have assets--about 89 to 90 percent of them--of $1 billion or under.
This bill is for the big banks. The big banks are doing quite well. Last year, the banks made record profits of $171 billion. Community banks grew at 8.3 percent, and big banks grew at a 4.8 percent rate. They are lending to businesses at a record level.
So the contention cannot be that they are doing this because banks are losing money. It has very little to do with how much money they are losing. It has a lot to do with the fact that big banks would like to be deregulated so that they can get back to the business as usual that caused the crisis of 2008.
Mr. Speaker, there are 30 big banks this bill will impact worth more than $5 trillion in assets. This bill is not needed because, if this bill is implemented, it will cause the banks to no longer be placed under the $50 billion threshold, except by way of regulation from the prudential regulator, which won't happen easily.
MetLife is a pretty good example of what can happen. Currently, MetLife is in court. They are tied up in court, probably indefinitely, because the big banks have big bucks, and they are
going to fight being designated as SIFIs.
MetLife is fighting it. It is an insurance company, of course, but it is fighting it. If they are going to fight the designation, you have to have some way to put them under the stress test, under the living wills test. This has to be done.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.
If you don't have a trigger, it is not likely to be done, because the banks are going to fight you all the way through the courts and tie you up for years.
Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the amount of time I have remaining.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters).
Mr. Speaker, how much time does the other gentleman from Texas have remaining?
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Moore).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Maxine Waters).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I think that we have to reemphasize that Chairman Frank is not supporting this bill. I thought that the initial comment would be sufficient, but, again, I will read what Chairman Frank has delivered to us. He indicates that H.R. 3312 significantly increases the need for subjective judgments by the regulators and very much weakens the ability of financial institutions to rely on clear rules to guide their decisionmaking. Chairman Frank does not support this bill.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is not before the House because banks are losing money. Banks are making record profits: $171 billion last year. The big banks, a 4.8 percent growth rate; and community banks, an 8.3 percent growth rate.
This bill is before the House because the big banks want to again get back to business as usual, which will allow them to do many of the things that brought this economy to its knees.
Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
Mr. Speaker, we have 30 banks with assets in excess of $5 trillion. These banks have been designated as SIFIs for a reason. They ought to have to let the regulators know how they can be wound down in the event there is a crisis in the economy. They ought to undergo stress tests.
If a consumer wants a loan, the consumer has to demonstrate creditworthiness. If banks of this size are going to remain in business, they ought to let us know what their liquidity is and be required to have a certain amount of liquidity that will cause them to stay in business, even when we are faced with a crisis. They ought to be tested for their creditworthiness. That is what we currently have.
If the $50 billion threshold is released, then they will be placed under the designation of SIFI only by regulators; and MetLife is proof positive that it is difficult, if not impossible, to do.
AIG went under simply because it was already known to be a systemically important institution.
Mr. Speaker, we must defeat this bill. I call on my colleagues to vote against it. It is a big-bank-bonus bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to remind my colleague that he will have another chance to vote on impeachment and to ask for a recorded vote.