Well, thank you very much, Mr. President. It was in my enthusiasm that I neglected a few parliamentary housekeeping tasks. On April 23, when we had the vote in the Senate to vote on the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, we lost it by two…
Well, thank you very much, Mr. President. It was in my enthusiasm that I neglected a few parliamentary housekeeping tasks.
On April 23, when we had the vote in the Senate to vote on the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, we lost it by two votes. On that day, I said we would continue our fight and that we needed to--we the women of America and the men who supported us--square our shoulders, suit up to fight for a new American revolution. I called upon the other women of America to put their lipstick on and be ready to go. Well, today is ``go day.'' And we are actively debating this amendment.
One of the arguments that is often made is that this Fair Pay Act we are advocating could trigger either needless and enormous volumes of lawsuits or it creates a shifting ball of the statute of limitations. Both of those criticisms are false.
First, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act will not trigger more lawsuits. Because this bill the Democrats are advocating--and, oh, by the way, it is a bipartisan bill. We have over 54 cosponsors; Republicans are joining with us. It does not in any way trigger enormous lawsuits, because it simply restores the law, with greater clarity, that existed before the outrageous Supreme Court decision.
We were not flooded with volumes of lawsuits on wage discrimination. There was an orderly process that occurred.
The other is this floating statute of limitations argument. Well, that is a foggy term. But I tell you what is foggy is the Hutchison amendment.
Now, I so admire the gentlewoman from Texas. We have worked together, as I said, on many issues. I know her intentions are good, but her language is flawed. I should say, not her language, but the language of her amendment. It is foggy.
Let me go on to this a little bit. The amendment does not address the fundamental problem of the pay discrimination case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear, which created unreal and strict limitations for filing pay discrimination claims. It also fails to recognize that pay discrimination, unlike other kinds of discrimination, is repeated each time a worker receives an unfair paycheck.
I want to repeat that. The Hutchison amendment fails to recognize that pay or wage discrimination, unlike other forms of discrimination, is repeated each time someone receives an unfair paycheck. Instead, the Hutchison amendment creates a new confusing standard that requires workers to either be subject to the Ledbetter rule or prove they had no reasonable suspicion of discrimination when the employer first decided to pay them.
Well, you have to prove a negative. That is almost impossible. From the day you walk onto the job or the day your coworker who gets a raise, when the guys get it and the girls do not, you would have to be snooping around and creating a very hostile workplace, branded a troublemaker, because you were saying, well, you would have to every week say, well, what did you get paid, Mr. Udall? What did you get paid, Mr. Tester? What did you get paid?
Well, I know we get paid the same pay, and I know we are doing the same, equal work. But that is not true in the workplace. So we believe the Hutchison amendment actually creates more fog than solutions.
I want to continue the debate on this. I note that the gentlewoman from Texas has not come in, but I see the gentleman from South Carolina.
What I would recommend is kind of rotating back and forth every 5 minutes. That way everybody gets a chance to speak, everyone gets a chance to debate, and everyone will get a chance to vote at 11:30.
Mr. President, how much time remains in the debate?
Mr. President, I would like to comment on the arguments that have been made by the advocates for the Hutchison amendment. First, let me say this: If you are a business and you want to avoid a lawsuit, there is one clear remedy that does not require statutory action, and that is called give equal pay for equal or comparable work. If you don't want to end up in court, you don't want to end up at the EEOC, you don't want to end up with a tattered and tarred reputation, pay people equal pay. That is the way to avoid a lawsuit. Then you don't need a law.
But, no, there are those in our country who still think we are back in the 20th or 19th centuries, and we are not going to put up with it. We can talk about the 180-day rule and wage-setting decisions and so on. I am a pragmatic, pro-business, pro-fairness Senator. My grandmother ran a small bakery and was known as having the best doughnuts in Maryland--well, certainly in Baltimore. My father ran a small grocery store. We paid equal pay for equal work.
When we talk about small business, I know about small business.
I also know the Hutchison amendment would create more problems. For example, the discovery rule fails to hold employers fully accountable for ongoing discrimination. That is a very big deal. If workers suspect discrimination but delay filing the claim for fear of retaliation or hopes that things could be worked out without litigation, they should not be forced to suffer continued wage discrimination indefinitely. Wage discrimination continues with every new unfair paycheck. If harm is ongoing, the remedy should be as well, regardless of when a worker learned of it.
Doesn't this rule make things better for employers? No. The Hutchison amendment is very vague and foggy. The rule encourages premature claims which is going to increase litigation. Workers are going to feel compelled to file formal claims with the EEOC or take legal action for fear that they will be accused of delay. That is what the Supreme Court accused Lilly Ledbetter of. They didn't accuse Goodyear of discriminating in their paycheck. They accused Lilly Ledbetter of delay and Lilly Ledbetter lost out.
There is a new day coming, including on the Supreme Court. I can't wait for those votes. Workers will feel compelled, as I said, to file formal claims quickly.
The Hutchison amendment adopts an uncertain legal requirement that will increase litigation costs for workers and employers alike. It also creates an environment that is hostile. It means if you are a worker, you have to act on rumor or speculation. My gosh, this is like the French Revolution and letters of cachet, and it was rumored that they were not faithful to concepts of the Revolution. We can't have that in our workplace. We have to have a workplace that we are all in together. So the Hutchison amendment is well intentioned but deeply flawed in the very objective that it seeks to accomplish.
I hope we defeat the Hutchison amendment and move on with debating other amendments.
I also want to say to the Senator from Texas, if I may have her attention, we are going to have a vote, up or down, on her amendment. I will not move to table. I think she deserves a clear vote, the way we are talking about a new style of civility and openness and so on. At the conclusion, that would be the process, rather than going through a tabling motion. Is that agreeable with the Senator?
I yield the floor.
Withholding the right to object pending an inquiry, is it the Senator's purpose simply to call it up so we can consider it later today?
I have no objection.
Mr. President, I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Texas to speak on this issue. She has been an unabashed and----
Excuse me. The Senator from California. It is the big State, with big gals here.
The Senator from California has been such a longstanding and faithful advocate for those who have been left out and left behind and particularly an intrepid voice for women.
Mr. President, I control the time.
Mr. President, I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Montana, a very good friend on this issue.
Mr. President, how much time is remaining on my side?
Mr. President, while we are working this out, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time equally divided, while we establish our next steps forward.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, we are in the closing minutes of the debate on the Hutchison substitute. We know there is one more speaker besides the Senator from Mississippi. This is not going to be my last say for this bill, but I do wish to offer my concluding arguments on the Hutchison amendment.
First, I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record a Q&A on the question of the Hutchison amendment because when all is said and done, I wish for there to be a very clear record on congressional intent so we won't have the type of Supreme Court decisions that brought us here today.
So I ask unanimous consent to have a Q&A on the Hutchison amendment printed in the Record.
Now, let's get to the facts. The difference between the Hutchison alternative and the Lilly Ledbetter bill is this: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act restores the law to the way it was before the Supreme Court decision, Ledbetter v. Goodyear. The Hutchison alternative creates a whole new legal standard which regrettably is very vague and I am concerned will trigger a tremendous amount of lawsuits and further add to hostility and suspicion in the workplace. The issue of triggering more lawsuits as an argument for the Hutchison alternative is flawed because the Hutchison substitute will create confusion in the courts and for employers trying to interpret when employees should have known they were being discriminated against. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act establishes a legal framework that had been accepted by nine appellate courts and the EEOC, and it has been a standard that has stood essentially the test of time.
Let's go to the statute of limitations. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act says it is 180 days from the last unequal paycheck, not from the initial point of hiring or the initial point of a discriminatory pay raise. The Hutchison alternative goes 180 days from when employees have or should have been expected to have knowledge that they were being discriminated against. This ``expected to have'' is really what is so foggy. Also, as long as employers are discriminating, employees can get justice. Under the Hutchison alternative, employees have no remedy if the claim is not brought when they should have known. I don't know when you should have known.
Also, the Lilly Ledbetter Act gives workers a chance to figure out whether they are being discriminated against, approach the employer, and perhaps have an alternative dispute resolution on this before EEOC complaints, before going to court, and so on. I am concerned that the Hutchison amendment language ``should have known''--this ``should have known,'' where you would have to operate on rumor and speculation--will force many lawsuits as employees will sue before running out of time.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act also gives workers a chance to be able to resolve this. If an employer is currently paying women less than men, that is illegal. Under the Hutchison amendment, it forces employees to prove when they suspect discrimination. I have made that point over and over.
So in summary, I say to the private and nonprofit sector: If you don't want to be sued, don't discriminate. That is the best way to go. If you don't want to be sued, don't discriminate.
The other point I wish to make is that the Fair Pay Act doesn't only affect women, it affects anyone who might be discriminated against in wages. So that means yes for women, but this bill would cover you if you have been discriminated against on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, and the traditional forms
of discrimination that regrettably we have dealt with. So this bill is not a women-only bill. We women certainly wouldn't discriminate against other people.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act takes us to where we need to be to fully implement the Civil Rights Act of 1964. If we have a dream, I have one too: that we pass the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. President, we have now concluded the debate on the Hutchison amendment. It is time for change. It is time to turn the page rather than turn back the clock. It is time to defeat the Hutchison amendment and proceed with the bill. We have five pending amendments. We are fired up, and we are ready to go.
I yield back my time, and if the Senator does so, I will ask for the yeas and nays and then vote.
I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. President, first of all, I wish to thank the Senator from Wyoming, Mr. Enzi, for his cooperation in moving this bill on the floor. He has been a big help working with this side of the aisle and working with us and the respective leadership to line up these amendments so that we can actually offer them and discuss them, and we are going to be voting on them. I thank him for doing that.
Also, the distinguished Senator from Wyoming had a very content-rich presentation. He covered his amendments, the Specter amendments, and other comments. He even discussed the Hutchison amendment. What I am going to do is respond to sections 3 and 4 of the bill and his concerns about the words ``affected by.''
I oppose Senator Enzi's amendments to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Those amendments strike the words ``affected by'' from sections 3 and 4 of the bill. These amendments, I believe, are not necessary, and I am concerned that they could lead courts to mistakenly read this legislation in too narrow a framework.
The Senator from Wyoming argues that his amendments are necessary because the bill somehow expands the category of persons who may sue for discrimination under the civil rights laws referenced in the bill. His concern and his claim is that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would allow spouses and other relatives of the workers who suffer discrimination to file their own lawsuits, claiming that they have been affected by the discrimination of their relative.
I appreciate his concern. What we want, though, is to assure him, and I say to my colleagues that his concerns are not valid, that if you look at the legislation, this argument ignores the
plain language of the existing statutes and the actual language in the Ledbetter bill.
I am going to sound like a lawyer for a minute, but bear with me. The Ledbetter bill amends title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which outlaws job discrimination based on race, color, national origin, gender, and religion. The Ledbetter bill also amends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and applies those amendments also to the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 404 of the Rehabilitation Act.
These laws make crystal clear that the only persons who can file under the act are those who have suffered discrimination on the job or the Federal entities charged with enforcing the civil rights laws, not the relatives or friends of these workers.
I am going to make it crystal clear, I say unabashedly for legislative intent, that these laws make it crystal clear that the only persons who can file a suit under the act of discussion today are those who have suffered discrimination on the job or the Federal entities charged with enforcing these civil rights acts, not the relatives or friends of these workers. The citations are 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. 626(c)(1); 29 U.S.C. 791(g), 794(d); and 42 U.S.C. 12117(a).
I also wish to elaborate that the bill amends only the provisions of the respective statutes regarding timeliness of job discrimination suits and leaves unchanged current law regarding who may file a suit.
So the only thing we are dealing with is timeliness. Nothing in the Ledbetter bill would change the basic requirements that job discrimination suits under title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, or the Rehabilitation Act must be filed by the workers personally affected by workplace discrimination or by the Federal Government on their behalf.
In addition, for further clarification, the House Education and Labor Committee's report on this legislation states that the language in sections 3 and 4 of the bill is modeled on the text of section 112 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was adopted with overwhelming support in both Chambers of Congress to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Lorance v. AT&T. I repeat that decision: Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.
The Lorance fix has been around for nearly two decades, and it has not expanded the category of persons who can sue for job discrimination. Our bill will not change who may file the suit under the civil rights law it amends.
Finally, the Enzi amendments should be rejected because omitting the words ``affected by'' from the bill might actually lead a court to conclude that we intend the fix adopted in this legislation to be more narrow than the Lorance fix. Although the Ledbetter bill uses the term ``affected by,'' where the Lorance fix used ``injured by,'' the House report makes clear that this is a distinction without a difference. This is a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, if we followed the Enzi amendment, if we remove ``affected by'' from the Ledbetter bill, we run the risk that the courts might erroneously read this legislation as less comprehensive than the parallel provision of the 1991 act.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendments offered by our colleague from Wyoming. In a nutshell, the Enzi amendment only fixes half the problem, it does not cover discrimination, it has a delayed impact on workers' wages, and we know that anyone would not be able to sue even though they were still affected by this job evaluation business.
I am going to say more about this, but my initial argument is to lay to rest the concern that persons other than the one who is actually discriminated against would have standing to file under this bill, and I think I have clarified that.
I note that Senator Specter is here and he has his amendments, and I also note that there are other Senators on the other side of the aisle who wish to speak. So for now, I will conclude my arguments, and I yield the floor so that we may proceed with other Members.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time during the quorum be equally divided.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, how much time is remaining on my side?
Mr. President, I just wanted to say a few words.
First of all, let's go to the remarks that were made that, somehow or another, by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, we are going to further undermine our economy and our ability to hire people. I find it surprising--first puzzling, then surprising--to say that the way we are going to get out of this economic mess is if we continue the status quo--or the stacking quo--which is that if you have discrimination in the workplace, don't pass the law to do greater clarification. I think that is a flawed argument.
First of all, women of America already subsidize our economy. And you know what. We are mad as hell, and we don't want to take it anymore. Everyone needs to hear that: We, the women of America, are mad as hell, and we don't want to take it anymore. Now, why do I say that? We are already paid 77 cents for every dollar that men make, so we are already subsidizing the economy in the workplace. Then when you go into the home, our work is often undervalued and it is certainly not compensated. So somehow or another women's work doesn't quite count in the same way.
Well, we want to be counted, and we want what we do to be counted. We want the world to know that if we are doing equal work, we want equal pay. We do not want to subsidize the economy. We don't want any subsidies. We want fairness, we want justice, we want the law on our side, and we want the courthouse doors open to us.
Now, if business thinks the only way they can succeed is by continuing these practices, then business has a lot of lessons to learn. And by God, when you look at what the banks did, you can certainly see that. If business doesn't want lawsuits, there is one clear, right way of avoiding a lawsuit: don't discriminate. If you are an employer and you are paying equal pay for equal or comparable work, you will not be sued, you will not be challenged, and you have no need to fear.
If you want to have some economic stimulus, give us that 23-cent raise--all those single mothers out there; as Senator Lincoln spoke about earlier, all those Norma Rays, all those Lilly Ledbetters, all those people who have lined up through the ages. So 23 cents might not sound like a lot, certainly in Washington where we give zillions to banks and they do not even say thank you. They don't even promise they will send out more or promise they will join with our President and work through this.
So we are very clear that we want to be paid equal pay for equal work, and we want it in our checkbooks. But we know we have to get to that by having the Ledbetter bill in the Federal lawbooks.
I can understand some of the fine points, the concerns raised by Senator Enzi. I think I have presented a sound legal argument that shows that the only thing we mean by the ``affected party'' is that person who is actually discriminated against, or if a Federal entity sues on their behalf. I think we have clarified it. But I believe we also need to be clear why we are doing this legislation. We are righting a wrong, we are addressing a grievance, and we are ensuring those fundamental principles of our society, which are fairness, equality, and justice.
Mr. President, I am going to yield the floor, and I yield back my time.
Did I yield back my time?
I said, did I yield back my time?
At that time I was unaware that Senator McCaskill was coming to the floor. I ask unanimous consent for 5 minutes for Senator McCaskill to be able to speak.
Mr. President, what is the regular order?
Mr. President, I yield back my time. I know Senator Specter is waiting. He is also dealing with the nomination of Mr. Holder. We would like to move Mr. Specter along.
I yield my 1 minute back, if the Republicans yield back their minute.
First, let me say to my good friend from Pennsylvania, one, I wish to thank you for your cooperation on this bill. I wish to thank you for your cosponsorship in a previous Congress. We hope we do have the Senator's support at the conclusion of the amendment process.
I wish to say to my friend the bill does not change the law on the topics he has raised. But in all fairness, he is a superior lawyer. I am not a lawyer. Rather than me responding, kind of shooting from the lip, I would like to have a proper colloquy with the Senator at such time that I know we are on firm ground so we can clearly establish the legislative intent.
Could I suggest the absence of a quorum while the Senator and I discuss this and see how we can proceed?
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, earlier, I asked for a quorum call while the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania and I had a discussion on what is the best way forward to clarify some of his questions on waivers, estoppels, and laches in this bill. We were looking, trying to have colloquies or amendments and so on. What we concluded was that the clearest way to do this so legislative intent is firmly established in the Record is for him to offer his amendments, present his arguments, and I would offer rebuttal to that on that matter.
He also raised another issue on striking the phrase ``other practices.'' I would like to now talk about both of those amendments, but sequence them.
First, I will discuss the Specter amendment on adding a rule of construction on the equitable defense of waiver, estoppel, and laches.
Mr. President, I strongly oppose Senator Specter's amendment to add a rule of construction to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act regarding employers' equitable defenses on just what I said--waivers, estoppels, and laches. This amendment is unnecessary and unfair. These are technical legal terms, and I am going to be very clear that the language is unnecessary because nothing in the bill changes the availability of these longstanding equitable defenses. Parties have been able to raise equitable claims in employment discrimination cases, and nothing in the pending legislation would change that. Courts will be able to decide equitable claims under the same circumstances as they do now. I am going to repeat that. Courts will be able to decide equitable claims under the same circumstances as they do now, regardless of whether this legislation is passed. The bill does not mention equitable doctrines, and nothing in its language could fairly be implied to suggest that parties may not raise equitable claims.
In enacting legislation, Congress does not normally list all the things the bill does or does not or could or could not do. Doing so here could give courts the mistaken impression that Congress intended courts to look more favorably on equitable defenses than they currently do, thereby putting a thumb on the scale in favor of employers who raise such arguments.
Adopting the Specter rule of construction could also lead courts to conclude that Congress wanted to prevent assertions of equitable claims in other contexts not addressed in the bill, such as challenges to promotion, termination, or other benefits decisions. That result would hurt both employers and employees.
Neither of those interpretations is intended in this bill. The purpose of this legislation is not to upset the longstanding balance that courts have established regarding these equitable defenses. As explained in the findings, the bill's purpose is to overturn the Ledbetter Court decision--a decision that had nothing to do with equitable defenses.
This amendment is also unfair because it is one-sided. It mentions only equitable doctrines raised as defenses by employers, but ignores the arguments workers may raise based on equitable doctrines. Plaintiffs have always had the ability to raise equitable claims such as waiver, equitable tolling, and estoppel. The Supreme Court ruled long ago that the time limit in job discrimination cases is subject to equitable doctrines, and this legislation does not upset that ruling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 1982. Courts have ruled that employees may raise claims of equitable tolling when they were excusably ignorant of their duty to file a discrimination claim by a particular date.
In addition, courts have held that employers are estopped from asserting that a worker's job discrimination claim is untimely if the employer's conduct reasonably can be concluded to have induced the employee to miss the filing deadline. For instance, when workers fail to timely file a charge of discrimination because their employer's misrepresentations caused them to believe they had waived their claims, the employer is estopped from arguing the charge was untimely. See Tyler v. Unocal Oil Co. of California, 304 F.3d 379, 5th Cir. 2002. Likewise, if the employer induces a worker to delay filing a charge by falsely stating that the employee was fired because his or her position would be eliminated, the employer may be estopped from complaining that the worker missed the filing deadline. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 5th Cir. 1991, holding that employer was estopped from arguing that worker's ADEA charge was untimely, where employer concealed facts and misled employee into believing he had been discharged because his position was being eliminated or combined with another position, and that he might be rehired.
Yet the Specter amendment ignores this history and does not say that equitable claims also may be raised by plaintiffs alleging discrimination. This could lead to the perverse result that courts would look less favorably on workers' equitable claims in pay discrimination cases than they do now. This legislation intends to restore workers' ability to fight unfair pay discrimination, and we must avoid erecting new hurdles by adopting an amendment that could undermine workers' arguments based on equitable doctrines.
For decades, the courts have been considering these and other equitable claims by plaintiffs in job discrimination cases, as well as equitable claims raised by defendants. We should do nothing in this legislation to upset the balance courts have established in this area.
So when we do have our votes, I will urge my colleagues to join me in defeating the amendment by the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter.
Now, Mr. President, he also raises another issue related to ``other practices.'' I also strongly oppose that. I strongly oppose the amendment offered by Senator Specter to strike the words ``other practices'' from section 3 of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. This amendment is unnecessary and would seriously undermine the bill's goal of protecting employees who, like Lilly Ledbetter, were denied a fair chance to challenge pay discrimination in the workplace.
This issue, too, involves a rather complex and detailed legal argument, complete with references and citations.
To summarize in somewhat plain English--because this issue is complicated, and the Senator from Pennsylvania has raised very important and solid questions, and I want to further clarify why we oppose the amendment--Senator Specter's proposal to eliminate the term ``other practices'' from section 3 of the bill would defeat our legislation's purpose of overturning the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 2007. Lilly Ledbetter, the
plaintiff in that case, was paid significantly less than her male colleagues. This difference in pay came about because Lilly's employer based her pay on a bad evaluation they gave her because she was a woman. Now, I am going to repeat that. The difference in pay came about because her employer based her pay on a bad evaluation, but the bad evaluation they gave her was because she was a woman. And this has been established. The discrimination continued every time Ms. Ledbetter received a paycheck, and the difference in pay between her and her male coworkers grew more severe over time. If you listen to her speak, you can see how it affected her pay, her pension, her 410(k), and her Social Security.
If we adopt the Specter amendment, this legislation will no longer cover situations like Ms. Ledbetter's, where a discriminatory difference in pay is tied to a practice like job evaluations that contributes to the employer's decision to set a worker's pay at a certain level. That result is simply unacceptable.
The rule we enact in this bill must be workable and it must accurately reflect how job discrimination occurs in the workplace. Ms. Ledbetter's case--and many others--show that salary determinations often rely on other discriminatory actions.
Unfair differences in pay may be brought about not only be discriminatory job evaluations, but also by discriminatory decisions to classify a job in a particular way, or by discriminatory assignments to a particular location. See, e.g., Parra v. Basha's, Inc., 536 F. 3d 975, 9th Cir. 2008, Latino workers were paid up to $6,000 less annually than other employees performing the same duties based on their assignment to a store location with a predominately Latino workforce; Moorehead v. UPS, 2008 WL 4951407, employer claimed that differences in starting salaries for men and women were due to its evaluation system.
Because the factors that contribute to pay scales are solely within employers' discretion, we must not adopt a rule that encourages employers to link pay setting decisions to other personnel actions, such as evaluations, in order to avoid the civil rights laws. That would create an unacceptable loophole in what is intended to be a comprehensive solution of the problems created by the Ledbetter case.
If we adopt the Specter amendment, we would only help some victims of pay discrimination--and leave countless workers such as Lilly Ledbetter without justice.
Senator Specter has said that his amendment is necessary because the bill, as drafted, is overbroad and could apply to discrete personnel decisions, like promotions and discharges. That's not true. The bill specifically says that it is addressing ``discrimination in compensation.'' That limiting language means that it already only covers such claims--nothing more, nothing less.
Mr. President, I am going to yield the floor in order to recognize our colleague from North Dakota, Senator Dorgan.
Mr. President, before the Senator leaves the floor, first, he certainly knows his women's history and today he is going to help us write new history. We thank him for recalling--although it is a melancholy thing to recall--how brutal the retaliation was against women. Every time we have had to stand up, whether to exercise our right to vote or as is the case now--the brutal retaliation that occurs in the workplace, often sexual harassment, further discrimination and so on, simply because we pursue being paid equal pay for equal work. So we thank the Senator from North Dakota for his eloquence.
Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Kaufman of Delaware be added as a cosponsor of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
I thank the Chair, and I note the absence of a quorum, with the time to be equally divided.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, an inquiry: Has all time expired on the debate on the Enzi-Specter amendments?
Mr. President, I call up the Specter amendment on ``other practices'' and move that it be tabled. The amendment that I wish to call up is amendment No. 26, Mr. Specter's amendment.
I call up the amendment.
I move to table, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all the following votes be limited to 10 minutes in the agreed-upon sequence.
Mr. President, the Senator from Pennsylvania is a great lawyer, but his amendment is not. It only fixes half the problem. It does not cover personnel actions that still result in discriminatory wages. It strikes other practices which include job evaluations and classifications.
If we drop ``other practices,'' we leave out Lilly Ledbetter from getting the justice she deserves and all like her. I understand the Specter amendment is now pending.
I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, the Enzi amendment is unnecessary. The ``affected by'' language is not vague. Our bill only applies to workers and their employers.
Other parts of title VII that our bill does not change make this clear. The ``affected'' language is patterned after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It has been around for 17 years and no one has tried to interpret it to apply to grandparents, spouses, or children, or anyone else other than the worker.
I understand the Enzi amendment No. 28 is now pending. I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. President, I understand amendment 29 is now the pending business. I thank Senator Enzi for allowing us to dispose of his amendment through a voice vote. I move to table the Enzi amendment No. 29.
I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.