I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Schumer be granted 5 minutes to speak as in morning business,…
I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Schumer be granted 5 minutes to speak as in morning business, and the 5 minutes would come off our time on this side from the Iraq amendment.
That is correct.
Madam President, I would make the same statement on behalf of our side, that Senators who do wish to speak in support of my amendment let us know, and we will try to work in as many as possible. There is a great demand for time, but it would help us a great deal to know who it is who seeks to speak, and we will try to sequence people to the best of our ability for the convenience of everyone.
Madam President, I call up amendment No. 4320 and ask for its immediate consideration.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Madam President, the current open-ended commitment of U.S. forces in Iraq is unsustainable and counterproductive, contributing as much to Iraqi instability as it does to Iraqi security.
Our troops have performed magnificently in Iraq. We are all deeply grateful for their professionalism and their sacrifices. But, ultimately, as our military commanders have repeatedly said, stability in Iraq can only come through a political settlement by the Iraqis, and the best way to bring about that political settlement is to make it clear, in words not yet spoken by the administration, that our commitment is not open-ended, and that a phased redeployment of our forces from Iraq will begin by the end of this year.
The administration's refrain that we are in Iraq as long as the Iraqis need us is creating a dependency of unlimited duration and gives the Iraqis the impression that their security is more in our hands than in theirs.
The hallmarks of the administration's open-ended policy are the President's extraordinarily broad and vague description of our mission--nothing less than ``complete victory,'' as he put it, along with the President's explicit commitment to stay until the Iraqis can ``govern themselves, sustain themselves, and defend themselves.'' The President's statement that American force levels in Iraq ``will be decided by future Presidents'' reinforced that unlimited commitment, as did Secretary Rice's statement that we will stay in Iraq ``as long as we are needed.''
The President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, reflected the Iraqi perception of the administration's policy when he said that U.S. forces are ``ready to stay as long as we ask them no matter what the period is.'' That is what the President of Iraq says he understands our policy to be, that U.S. forces are ``ready to stay as long as we,'' the Iraqis, ``ask them, no matter what the period is.'' We must change that Iraqi perception and the open-ended commitment which led to it, and that is what our amendment would do.
Our amendment urges the President to begin the phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2006--to begin the phased redeployment of U.S. troops by the end of 2006. Our amendment also calls for a number of actions to help achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement so essential for defeating the insurgency and preventing all-out civil war.
It calls for adoption by the Iraqis of a fair sharing of political power and economic resources among all the Iraqi groups so as to invest them in the formation of an Iraqi Nation. That can be done by amendment to the Iraq Constitution or by legislation or other means, but it needs to be done within the timeframe provided for in the Iraqi Constitution; namely, 4 months from the beginning of the functioning of their parliament.
An international conference needs to be convened so as to more actively involve the international community and Iraq's neighbors in promoting a durable political settlement among Iraqis and by reducing regional interference in Iraq's internal affairs. It is also important to encourage more countries to contribute to Iraq's extensive needs and to ensure that pledged funds are forthcoming.
Our amendment also points out that it is critically important for the Government of Iraq to promptly and decisively disarm the militias and remove those members of the Iraqi security forces whose loyalty to the Iraqi Government is in doubt.
Now, what does our amendment urge the President to do relative to our troops in Iraq?
First, after consultation with the Government of Iraq, begin a phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of this year.
Second, submit to Congress a plan by the end of 2006 with estimated dates for the continued phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, with the understanding that unexpected contingencies may arise.
Third, expedite the transition of U.S. forces in Iraq to a limited presence and mission of training, providing logistical support, protecting U.S. infrastructure and personnel, and participating in targeted counterterrorism activities.
Our amendment does not establish a fixed ending date for redeployment. It doesn't set out fixed milestones once the phased redeployment has begun. So while it does not establish a timetable, it does establish a fixed, but not precipitous, time for the beginning of a phased redeployment--by the end of this year.
Beginning the phased redeployment of American troops in 2006 would send a very clear message to the Iraqis: We have been in Iraq over 3 years. We have lost 2,500 brave Americans and suffered more than seven times that number of casualties to make it possible for Iraq to become a free Nation. You, the Iraqis, must now decide whether you want a civil war or a nation.
Madam President, sending that message to the Iraqis and ending the open-ended U.S. policy towards Iraq will prod the Iraqis to take the necessary steps to end the dominance of the militias; will reduce the Iraqi dependence on the U.S. security blanket which deters tough choices by the Iraqis; will change the perception that we are permanently occupying Iraq, a perception which plays into the hands of terrorists; will reduce the number of U.S. targets for terrorists and insurgents; and will reduce the strain on U.S. forces.
Supporters of our amendment are just as determined to maximize prospects for success in Iraq as are the opponents of our amendment. We do not accuse opponents of our amendment of wanting failure or of advocating surrender to chaos and terror. We do believe that maintaining the status quo
and the open-ended commitment, which is the hallmark of that status quo and that open-ended commitment, and adhering to a bumper sticker slogan of ``stay the course'' is a recipe for continuing instability and failure.
Success isn't assured in any event, but letting the Iraqis know that we are not there for as long as they want us is key to avoiding a culture of dependency. The bottom line is that our open-ended policy and presence has become a deterrent to the very success that we want to bring about. Although the administration policy is aimed at providing security, it is a major contributor to instability.
The Iraqi leaders themselves have set a 6-month goal for making major progress in assuming their security responsibility. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki said on May 22 that his government could take over security for 16 of Iraq's 18 provinces by the end of this year.
On June 11, the Iraqi National Security Adviser, Mr. Rubaie said:
I believe by the end of this year the number of the
multinational forces will be probably less than 100,000 in
this country.
That amounts to a reduction of at least 30,000 U.S. forces by the end of this year. Mr. Rubaie repeated that position in an op-ed in yesterday's Washington Post. He, again, is the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. Our amendment's call for the beginning of a phased redeployment by the end of this year fits the very goals Iraq's leaders have set for themselves.
Listen to what Mr. Rubaie wrote about the many benefits of Iraq reducing the number of coalition forces. This is benefits to Iraq of our reducing the number of coalition forces in Iraq:
It will remove psychological barriers and the reason that
many Iraqis joined the so-called resistance in the first
place. The removal of troops will also allow the Iraqi
government to engage with some of our neighbors that have to
date been at the very least sympathetic to the resistance
because of what they call the coalition occupation.
``Moreover,'' Mr. Rubaie said:
the removal of foreign troops will legitimize Iraq's
government in the eyes of its people . . . the drawdown of
foreign troops will strengthen our fledgling government to
last the full four years it is supposed to.
Mr. Rubaie's words are similar to those of General George Casey, the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, who told Congress last fall:
Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of
occupation, contributes to the dependency of Iraqi forces on
the coalition, extends the time it will take Iraqi security
forces to become self-reliant, and exposes more coalition
forces to attack at a time when Iraqi security forces are
increasingly available and capable.
That is our commander talking about the disadvantages of having a large number of troops remain in Iraq.
Regardless of one's views on whether it was wise to attack Iraq--and I for one thought it was unwise, and so voted--and regardless of one's views on whether the war has been well managed--and I have been critical of the administration's management--all of us want to maximize the chances for success in Iraq. To maximize the chances for success in Iraq, the Iraqis must take control of their country. Our approach, our amendment, maximizes the chance for success.
Last year, by a bipartisan vote of 79 to 16, the Senate adopted an amendment stating that:
[C]alendar year 2006 should be a period of significant
transition to full Iraqi sovereignty.
The Senate language remained in the bill and was signed into law. Our amendment implements that policy direction. The Iraqis are standing up. U.S. and coalition forces have trained and equipped more than 250,000 Iraq security forces. More than two-thirds of Iraq's Army combat battalions are either in the lead or operating independently, according to the administration's May 2006 report to Congress. It is now time for the United States to set a date for the beginning--the beginning of a standdown.
Last fall, General Casey said that our presence in Iraq ``fuels the insurgency'' and that ``beginning to reduce our presence in Iraq'' as conditions warrant would result in ``taking away one of the elements that fuels the insurgency.'' That is our commander speaking. Conditions not only warrant the beginning of a reduction of our presence, conditions are such that only a phased, orderly redeployment beginning by the end of this year will maximize the chances of succeeding in Iraq.
By making clear that a phased redeployment of our forces from Iraq needs to begin this year, we will send a clear message to the Iraqis that our presence is not an open-ended security blanket and that they need to assume responsibility for their own future.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, am I responding on the time of the Senator from Virginia?
I am perfectly happy to engage in a colloquy at the instigation of the Senator from Virginia. Indeed, I will probably have some questions which I would want to propound to the Senator from Virginia.
On the other hand, I cannot agree that a colloquy which he instigates would be divided in terms of the time consumption. The usual policy around here is the persons who begin a colloquy have that colloquy charged to their time. I have more speakers than I have the time to allocate. It would be unfair to them for me to say that the time consumed in my answering the questions of the Senator from Virginia would come off the time for their remarks.
I am not only happy to engage in a colloquy, I look forward to it, but I would want to follow the usual procedure, which is that those persons who wish to ask questions of somebody have that colloquy taken from their time rather than from the time of the person of whom they are asking the questions.
If the Senator will allow a comment on that, we are not confined to that at all. I expect, when I ask questions of the Senator from Virginia or others who oppose this amendment, that their answers would come from my time and not from their time. I would apply the same rule to me as I suggest would be applied to the questions of the Senator.
Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. President, I am wondering if we could sequence speakers.
After Senator McCain is done, we would then seek to sequence the Senator from New York immediately after the Senator from Arizona.
And then Senator Salazar is here.
Let's leave it at that----
Because Senator Feinstein is now on the floor.
Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a unanimous consent request?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Rockefeller be added as a cosponsor of our amendment.
Mr. President, for the information of Senators--if I could get Senator Warner's attention--the order on our side will be Senators Clinton, Feinstein, and Salazar.
I yield 10 minutes to Senator Salazar.
Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. President, I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator.
Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. President, I understand that Senator Carper is on his way over. He is next on our side. I wonder if I may inquire how much time remains on both sides?
Mr. President, is the other side ready?
I wonder if I may list the sequence on our side so it would be understood that after Senator Carper, we would expect Senator Lautenberg and then Senator Murray, Senator Obama, Senator Biden, and Senator Durbin.
Mr. President, may I have 10 seconds? I wish to add my thanks to the Senator from Nebraska for his very constructive, positive remarks.
Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.
Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey.
I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Washington.
I yield 10 minutes to Senator Biden.
Mr. President, how much time remains on our side?
We started at 12:15. I would then yield for 10 minutes to Senator Biden. I then yield 8 minutes to Senator Obama, and then Senator Durbin will be next. Depending on how much time is left we can determine the time allocation.
No. We understand that.
Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Illinois 10 minutes.
I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
Mr. President, I ask, how many minutes remain?
I thank the Presiding Officer.
Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island, my cosponsor, Mr. Reed.
Mr. President, I yield myself the remaining time.
I thank the Presiding Officer.
Mr. President, there is much we all agree upon in this body. We have an interest in the stability of Iraq. And we want to improve the chances of success in Iraq. The disagreement is over whether the present course, with its open-ended commitment to maintain our military presence in Iraq, as we now have it, contributes to that stability or whether or not we must prod the Iraqis to do what only they can do-- come together to end the insurgency and to avoid an all-out civil war.
The President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, a few months ago, said the following about what Iraqis believe. He said that Iraqis believe that U.S. forces are ready ``to stay as long as we ask them, no matter what the period is.''
That perception on the part of the President of Iraq, reflecting the view, presumably, of many Iraqis, that the United States is ``ready to stay'' as long as the Iraqis ask us, no matter what the period is, is a perception which must end. It is a perception that was based on our administration's commitment, which was open-ended, unlimited, unconditional.
Iraqis must make a choice. It is a choice that our blood and our treasure has given them. The Iraqis, and the Iraqis alone, can unite to avoid all-out civil war, by making the political power sharing that needs to be done. Only the Iraqis can decide that they are going to divide the resources equitably so that they can bring in all the groups and the insurgency and avoid an all-out civil war. Only the Iraqis can unite to remove the militia control of the police.
Their unity can do that. We cannot do that for them. We have given them an opportunity. Mr. President, 2,500 American lives, 7 times as many American wounded, have given them an opportunity. They must make a choice: Do they want a nation or do they want civil war?
To maintain this open-ended commitment, which we now have, is contributing to a dependency of the Iraqis on us rather than forcing them, prodding them, to do what only they can do to build a nation.
The Levin-Reed sense-of-the-Congress amendment proposes that a phased redeployment of U.S. troops be begun by the end of this year. Our amendment does not establish a fixed ending date for redeployment. It does not propose a fixed timetable once the phased redeployment has begun. But while it does not establish a timetable, it does establish a fixed time for the beginning of a phased redeployment by the end of this year. It is not precipitous. It is by the end of this year begin a phased redeployment of American troops.
Mr. President, the National Security Adviser of Iraq has been quoted a number of times on the floor.
Do I have a minute?
I thank the Presiding Officer.
The National Security Adviser of Iraq said the following in yesterday's Washington Post: We envisage the United States troop presence by year's end to be under 100,000. That is a reduction of 30,000. That is totally in keeping with what the Levin-Reed amendment proposes. That is the Iraqi envisioned timetable. We want to hold them to that vision for their sake and for ours.
Then Mr. Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security Adviser, said the following--and these are words which every one of us should soak in-- that the removal of foreign troops will legitimize Iraq's Government in the eyes of its people.
Let us do that in a way which is thoughtful, orderly, and planned. And that is what the Levin-Reed amendment proposes.
I thank the Chair. And I thank my good friend from Virginia, our chairman, for the way in which this debate has been handled on both sides.
Mr. President, I would propose that the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Wisconsin control the time which has been allocated to them. And as to when they bring up their amendment, it would be up to them because, as I envision this, they and you or your designee would manage that time.
If the Senator would yield, I totally concur that this next amendment should be brought up and debated in an orderly way, but that being agreed upon, I would hope, between the sponsors of that amendment and the chairman, the Republican manager.
So I do not think there is any need for me, frankly, to intervene in that process. Perhaps you could hear from the Senator from Massachusetts as to what his plans are and how he plans to proceed. I think that would be helpful.
I suggest that the two Senators who need 10 minutes each be recognized now and that we try to negotiate these various time needs during their presentation.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
No objection.