Floor Statements

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the

joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the

joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes to speak on the nomination of Dorrance Smith to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

I oppose this nomination for a very critical reason, which is that Dorrance Smith has spoken out against the very media in the United States that he would be involved with, engaged in, as the public affairs official for the Department of Defense.

Mr. Smith has shown in his writing and in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believes that our media undermines our national security when they perform their legitimate role of providing newsworthy information to the public about what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has gone so far as to accuse our major networks of acting in partnership with al-Qaida.

That extreme position is not appropriate for the spokesperson of the Department of Defense. This is what Mr. Smith said in his April 25, 2005, article in the Wall Street Journal, entitled ``The Enemy on Our Airwaves,'' in which he complained about what he called ``the ongoing relationship between terrorists, Al-Jazeera, and the [major U.S. television] networks.'' The basis of this alleged relationship is the fact that the networks played video of hostages in Iraq, which Al- Jazeera allegedly obtained from terrorist sources.

The text of Mr. Smith's article leaves little doubt about his belief that the ``enemy on our airwaves'' are our major television networks themselves, all of them--ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, CNN--all of them. Here is what Mr. Smith said in this article:

Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and al-Qaida have a

partner in Al-Jazeera and, by extension, most networks in the

U.S. This partnership is a powerful tool for the terrorists

in the war in Iraq.

That is the view taken by the proposed spokesperson for the Department of Defense--that our networks are partners with Osama bin Laden, the man who orchestrated the slaughter on 9/11.

The smear then continues as Mr. Smith raises ``ethics'' issues about the conduct of the media.

The arrangement between the U.S. networks and Al-Jazeera

raises questions of journalistic ethics. Do the U.S. networks

know the terms of the relationship that Al-Jazeera has with

the terrorists? Do they want to know?

What if one of the networks had taken a stand and refused

to air the [video of an American hostage] on the grounds that

it was aiding and abetting the enemy, and from that point

forward it would not be a tool of terrorist propaganda?

Mr. Smith is entitled to his views. I will defend that right any day and any place. But we should not confirm him to represent the Department of Defense to the very media that he calls a partner with our deadly enemy, al-Qaida. That is over the top. It is extreme. It is not the kind of view that should be represented by the Department of Defense in their dealings with the media.

The Armed Services Committee held a hearing on Mr. Smith's nomination on October 25, 2005. At that time, I asked Mr. Smith about his statement that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida ``have a partner in Al- Jazeera and, by extension, most networks in the United States.'' Mr. Smith testified that he still believes this statement to be a fair characterization of the relationship between the networks and al-Qaida. He insisted that ``there is a relationship that exists'' and ``the relationship is a cooperative one.''

I pressed him:

Does this ``relationship'' make the networks partners of

our terrorist enemies, as you wrote? Do you really believe

this, that they are partners?

Mr. Smith declined to provide a direct answer to that question.

I then asked him about his rhetorical question:

What if one of the networks had taken a stand and refused

to air the [video of an American hostage] on the grounds that

it was aiding and abetting the enemy, and that from this

point forward it would not be a tool of terrorist propaganda?

Mr. Smith testified he does not believe that the networks aid and abet terrorism by showing film of hostages. He insists that he was ``raising the point that you never know where this video comes from and that . . . simply because it plays on al-Jazeera does not mean that it should necessarily play on any given network.''

That is not being straight with the committee. That is not what his question clearly implied. There is only one implication from the question which he wrote, and that is that networks are aiding and abetting terrorism by airing this video. So if Mr. Smith does not believe this to be the case, it appears that Mr. Smith was willing to smear our television networks by implying something that he does not actually believe.

On December 13, 2005, the committee met with Mr. Smith in executive session to afford him a further opportunity to explain his position. And while I cannot quote from Mr. Smith's statements in closed session, I believe it is fair to say that it was consistent with his testimony in open session.

Mr. President, the free press in this country is not our enemy. Freedom of the press is not only guaranteed in our Bill of Rights, it is a fundamental part of what we stand for as a country. Every one of us disagrees with stories and characterizations that appear in the press from time to time, but to label our networks as partners with those who attacked us on September 11 is over the top, it is extreme, it is unacceptable, and it is not the kind of position that is going to be useful for a representative of the DOD with our media.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is the primary Department of Defense official responsible for providing timely and accurate information to the press and to the public about the activities of the Department of Defense. A person who believes that the U.S. media is the enemy is not the right person for this position. A person who shows a willingness to try to intimidate the press, to try to limit or color its cover, is not the right person to serve in this position. That is why I urge my colleagues to oppose this nomination.

I yield the floor.

No, this matter.

Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield? I don't know how much time I used on the previous comments.

I yield myself 2 minutes more on Mr. Smith.

Mr. President, I have no better friend in the Senate, nor have I ever had a better friend in the Senate than John Warner. I know of no finer Senator and no finer gentleman. We have a disagreement on this nomination, and we respect each other's points of view.

As he has pointed out, we have been partners, and we are partners. And the use of the word by Mr. Smith, ``partner,'' carries very special meaning. For him to say in writing, in a prepared op-ed piece, that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida have a partner in al-Jazeera and, by extension, most networks in the United States--and he rattles them off: ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, CNN, and MSNBC--is absolutely indefensible, it is extreme, it is over the top, and it is unbecoming somebody who is going to be representing the Department of Defense with the media.

If any one of us had said this on the Senate floor, that FOX News is a partner with the people who attacked us on 9/11, we would think that person not only owed FOX an apology but would probably owe every single victim of 9/11 an apology. I find this such an extreme statement. And the use of the term ``partner'' and his defense of that when we pressed him on it I find to be one of the most extreme, irresponsible, and reckless kinds of statements anyone can make. Again, I will defend Mr. Smith's right to make it; that is not the issue here. He can write any article in the Wall Street Journal or any other paper and I will defend his right to do so. But the issue here is whether someone who has this position--this position--on the issue of whether tapes of al-Jazeera should be played on American television is, it seems to me, the wrong representative for our Department of Defense.

I want to thank my friend from Virginia. As always, he is putting differences in context. We have very few of them, and when we do have them, we deal with them with great respect for each other and our points of view, and I will always not only admire him for that, but always relish this particular relationship which we have had for so many years.

Mr. President, how many minutes remain?

Mr. President, I want to explain to my colleagues why the Senate should not proceed to the nomination of Peter Flory to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

At its core, this is an issue of the executive branch refusing to provide the Senate with documents that are relevant to the confirmation proceeding.

This issue dates back to the summer of 2003 when I directed the minority staff of the Committee on Armed Services to conduct an inquiry into the flawed intelligence prior to the war in Iraq. As part of that inquiry, I wrote a request to the Department of Defense in November of 2003 seeking documents relating to the activities of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith concerning Iraq. Mr. Flory was a part of that office. It took 18 months of struggle to get as many documents as I could. I did not receive all the documents that were relevant to the inquiry and which are now relevant to the Flory nomination.

The Department of Defense has refused to produce key documents regarding the efforts of that office to develop and disseminate an alternative intelligence assessment which exaggerated the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida. That assessment went directly to senior administration policymakers, bypassing the ordinary intelligence community procedure. These documents are critical to understanding exaggerated statements which were made by senior administration officials that al-Qaida and Iraq were allies, despite the conclusion of the intelligence community that there was no such link between the two.

Here is the critical connection between the Feith office and Mr. Flory: Mr. Flory worked in the office of Under Secretary Feith at the time the alternative assessment was developed and disseminated. Some of the internal e-mails we have been able to obtain indicate Mr. Flory requested and received briefings on the collection of intelligence from the Iraqi National Congress in December 2002. The INC material should have been evaluated by the intelligence community and filtered through their screen. Instead, it went to the Feith policy shop, which included Mr. Flory.

Mr. Flory was also a member of Mr. Feith's briefing team which came to the Senate in June of 2003 to explain to the Senate Committee on Armed Services staff the origins and work of the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation group. Those were the two entities within Secretary Feith's office that were very much involved in characterizing the prewar intelligence.

In addition to the denial of relevant documents, the inspector general of the Department of Defense is currently conducting a review to determine whether Mr. Feith's office conducted unauthorized, unlawful, or inappropriate intelligence activities. We do not know what, if anything, that review may reveal about the role Mr. Flory may have played in such activities. What we do know is that his name appears in a number of relevant documents we have been able to obtain so far.

Before the Senate proceeds to his nomination, the Defense Department should provide the documents they have previously denied, or resolve the matter in a satisfactory manner, and the inspector general's office should be allowed to complete its investigation of the activities of Under Secretary Feith's office. That investigation may shed additional light on Mr. Flory's activities. It may show absolutely nothing about Mr. Flory's activities, but we will have to await its conclusion to know.

This is not a case of blocking Mr. Flory from occupying the office to which he has been nominated. I want to emphasize this for our colleagues: Mr. Flory has received a recess appointment. He occupies the office. He is currently serving in the position to which he was nominated. So there should be no argument that we need to give up a vital institutional right to obtain documents relevant to our carrying out of our confirmation function. Again, Mr. Flory occupies the office to which he has been nominated. The issue here is whether we are going to have access to documents that are relevant or may be relevant to this nomination.

I want to provide a little bit of additional background and context for this issue to indicate the seriousness of these matters to this institution's obligations and responsibilities. In the period before the war, the intelligence community did not find a substantial link between Iraq and al-Qaida. The intelligence community stated that the relationship ``appears to more closely resemble that of two independent actors trying to exploit each other,'' and that ``al-Qaida, including bin Laden personally, and Saddam were leery of close cooperation.'' Nonetheless, senior administration officials alleged at times that Iraq and al-Qaida were ``allies'' and that there was a close connection and cooperative context between Iraqi officials and members of al-Qaida.

How could that happen? How could there be such a disconnect between what the intelligence community believed and what some of the senior administration officials were saying? For one thing, there is evidence that there was an alternative intelligence assessment, an alternative assessment that did not go through the intelligence community or the CIA; an alternative assessment that was prepared by Under Secretary Feith and his office, and that this was an important source for those administration statements. For example, the Vice President specifically stated that an article based on a leaked version of the Feith shop analysis was the ``best source of information'' on this issue. The Feith assessment was presented directly to senior administration officials by Secretary Feith, including White House officials, a very different assessment from that of the CIA.

This issue of the alleged Iraq-al-Qaida connection was central to the administration's efforts to make its case for war against Iraq. And according to public opinion polling, more than 60 percent of Americans believed there was a connection between Saddam and the horrific attacks of 9/11, although there has never been any evidence of such a connection. The Feith

operation product, which bypassed the intelligence community, went directly to top leaders and, it quite clearly appears, had a major impact on the lives of Americans and on the course of events in Iraq.

The process of seeking the relevant documents on this matter from the Department of Defense has been painfully slow and laborious. I have written many letters and raised the issue of the Department's insufficient response and slow response on numerous occasions. I have also raised the issue at hearings of the Committee on Armed Services with senior Defense Department officials. I raised it with Mr. Flory at his nomination hearing in July 2004, but the Department was still slow to respond. Sometimes the Department of Defense indicated there were no additional documents responsive to my request, only to be followed by acknowledgments that there were more documents. Documents were dribbled out. It was always a struggle. This chart behind me indicates the list of some of the efforts that were made to get documents relating to the Feith operation of which Mr. Flory was a part, and some of the documents that we have been able to receive in which Mr. Flory is named.

I finally met with Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England in June of 2005 to discuss the documents I was seeking. Secretary England was able to provide a large number of additional documents in July. He also stated at that time they were the last documents the Department would release, and that there were 58 additional documents the Department would not release. So that is what it came down to: 58 documents that they have, responsive to my continuing requests, which may--may--like some of the documents we did receive, relate to Mr. Flory. We don't know until we get the documents. We have a right to the documents. The Senate, to the last person, should insist upon relevant documents. This should be an institutional issue where we all defend each other's rights to get documents that are relevant to a confirmation.

In late July 2005, I offered to lift my objection to proceeding with the Flory nomination if the administration would simply provide a list of the 58 documents they are not going to provide. Just give us the list, together with an indication that the President's senior advisors would recommend that he invoke executive privilege with regard to these documents, because that is what we were told orally. All we wanted was the accounting, the inventory. We didn't need the substance. Just tell us: What are the 58 documents? Who wrote whom on what date? Don't give us the substance, we will get along without that, providing you tell us that senior administration officials are going to recommend to the President that executive privilege be asserted.

Defense Department officials, by the way, indicated their willingness to do this, but it was the administration that declined to agree.

Then Mr. Flory received a recess appointment. So once again, he is in office. By the way, I want to thank my friend from Virginia. He has tried on a number of occasions to help me obtain these documents.

The administration has had the opportunity to resolve this matter in a very simple way. It has chosen not to. I offered the compromise which I have just outlined that the administration finally rejected.

Mr. Flory was a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Feith office. That office produced an alternative intelligence assessment. That is No. 1. That is his connection to the Feith office.

Second, he is mentioned in a number of the documents which have been made available, and he participated in briefing the Senate Armed Services Committee on behalf of that office, relative to the subject matter we are talking about here today.

I have said that I believe the Senate as an institution should insist on access to documents which may be relevant to a confirmation process. This should not be a partisan issue. We have supported each other's rights to documents consistently. As long as I have been here, we have defended each other's rights to access to documents.

Senator McCain last year or the year before held up promotions and transfers of senior officers in the Air Force because the Department of Defense refused to provide information he sought which was relevant to a proposed Air Force lease of tanker aircraft. We supported him. He was right; he is entitled to that information.

We all supported the nominations, or most of us did. But it was the way in which he chose to obtain relevant information, and we--I think probably every member of the Armed Services Committee--stood up for his right to get documents. That is what this issue is about. Are we as an institution going to stand up for the right of Senators to get documents that are relevant to a confirmation process or which may be relevant to a confirmation process? That is the issue here.

The issue here is this body and what we have a right to, or whether the executive branch--and I don't care who is in the executive branch, Democrat or Republican--can stiff us, can stonewall us in terms of producing documents that may be relevant to a confirmation process.

There is example after example where Senators have taken the position that we should not vote on the confirmation of nominees until documents have been provided. In 1986, Senators said they didn't want to vote on the confirmation of William Rehnquist to be a Supreme Court Justice until after documents were provided. The administration finally provided the information.

Senator Helms in 1991 blocked the nomination of an ambassador until he received State Department cables in which one of Senator Helms' aides was accused of leaking U.S. intelligence to the Pinochet government.

Mr. President, how much time does Senator Harkin have?

He has indicated his willingness to me, and I ask unanimous consent, that I have 3 of those minutes at this time.

That is the existing unanimous-consent agreement.

If cloture is obtained, I would be willing. I have to make sure that is acceptable to others.

I was perfectly content to have these votes occur immediately after the recess. I am the last one who wants to hold up our colleagues from leaving, and I will abide by the suggestion of the good Senator from Virginia.

Senators Helms, Kennedy, Jeffords, all of us--not all of us, many of us at times--have said we should not vote on a nomination until relevant documents have been obtained by the interested Senator, relevant to that confirmation process. We have supported those Senators in getting those documents. It has been an institutional position that Senators should be able to get documents that relate to a confirmation of a particular nominee.

These are documents which relate to this nomination or may relate to this confirmation process. We don't know until we see the documents, but we do know two things, that Mr. Flory was a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Feith office and he was actively involved in the discussions and the matters to which these documents pertain and that he is named in a number of the documents we have been able to obtain as being involved in this subject matter. That much we know. That is more than enough, it seems to me, for this body to insist that these documents be made available before we vote on his confirmation.

Finally, he is in office now. We are not blocking him from going into that office. He got a recess appointment.

To reiterate, there is nothing novel or unique about holding up a nomination in order to obtain information that is being withheld by executive branch officials. This defense of Senate prerogatives goes back a long way, probably to our beginning.

In 1972, Senator Sam Ervin insisted that the Senate would not vote on the nomination of Richard Kleindienst to be Attorney General until the administration provided information on a deal to drop an antitrust case against ITT in return for a $400,000 campaign contribution. The administration eventually provided the information and the nomination was confirmed,

In 1991, Senator Helms blocked the nomination of George Fleming Jones to be U.S. Ambassador to Guyana until he received State Department cables in which one of Helms' aides was accused of leaking U.S. intelligence to the Pinochet government. The administration eventually provided the information and the nomination was confirmed.

In 2004, Senator Jeffords placed a hold on nominations for four top jobs at the Environmental Protection Agency because of 12 unmet requests for documents over the previous three years. The documents in question related to the Bush administration's changes to air pollution rules.

In short, the Senate has a longstanding practice of holding up nominations in order to obtain documents relevant to confirmation and oversight responsibilities. This has been done by Senators of both parties, in Senates controlled by both parties, and with administrations controlled by both parties.

It is in the interest of the Senate as a whole to uphold our right to documents. It is at times essential to our obtaining the information we need to do our jobs. All colleagues should protect the right of any colleague to documents relevant to a nominee in a confirmation process.

This information that we seek is directly relevant to the nomination of Mr. Flory. The entire Senate should, as an institutional matter, insist on access to the relevant information before we act on his nomination. We should speak with one Senatorial voice against executive branch stonewalling on access to relevant information.

Mr. Flory has received a recess appointment to the position to which he has been nominated. By refusing to act on his nomination until we receive this information, we are not preventing this individual from carrying out his executive duties. On the contrary, it is the Executive Branch which is obstructing the Senate's ability to carry out our confirmation responsibilities when they deny us relevant documents.

I hope every member of the Senate will stand together to defend the right of the Senate to have access to the relevant documents that bear on this nomination.

If the Senator will yield, and I apologize for being distracted and not able to hear the Senator, but apparently it was announced already that this would be the last vote today. I think we have to leave it at that.

The last two votes today.

I apologize. I think the Senator is correct. It has been announced these will be the last two votes, depending on the outcome of the second vote.

Let me see if we can accomplish that. Mr. WARNER. I see the Senator from Rhode Island.

Whether cloture is invoked or not, we have agreed this will be the last vote.

I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. President, I support the nomination of Gordon England to the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Secretary England has been the Department's problem-solver for the last 5 years. In this brief period of time, he has served as Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary of the Navy again, and--after being under consideration to serve as Secretary of the Air Force--as Deputy Secretary of Defense. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, he has also taken on such critical jobs as designing the new National Security Personnel System and overseeing the review of the status of DOD detainees at Guantanamo.

Secretary England has always made himself available for hearings, meetings with Members, and discussions with the wide array of others who have interests and concerns about the operations and activities of the Department of Defense. He is a good listener, open to compromise, willing to take on tough problems--characteristics which are always in great demand and short supply at DOD.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves in a position of awesome responsibility. He is the alter ego of the Secretary. In this capacity, the Deputy Secretary plays a key role in determining how our country will face critical national security challenges.

At the same time, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has traditionally served as the chief manager of the Defense Department. A wide array of management challenges, including financial management, acquisition management, and human capital issues, cut across functional areas in the Department to such an extent that no official other than the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary has the authority needed to address them.

Fortunately, Secretary England brings the kind of strong management background and commitment to addressing these issues that are needed in the Deputy Secretary position.

For the last several months, Secretary England has served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under a recess appointment by the President. I believe that his service to the Department and the Nation over the last 5 years merit a favorable vote on his nomination by the full Senate.

Mr. President, over the past few weeks, the Senate has engaged in an important debate that is long overdue. Our current immigration system is broken and has been broken for many years. Although this problem is complex, the need for reform is clear, and I am pleased that the Senate is moving forward on the issue.

We need to make comprehensive, responsible, and commonsense reforms that will stem the tide of illegal immigrants, will be fair to those who are here legally, and will deal realistically with the millions of illegal immigrants already here. I believe U.S. immigration policy should establish clear procedures for determining who can enter this country legally. And it must provide the tools for apprehending those who enter the United States illegally and to punish those who hire them at the same time. We must honor our traditions as both a nation of laws and a nation of immigrants, enriched by the diversity of newcomers.

The Senate Judiciary Committee worked hard to create a bipartisan package that would accomplish many of those goals. The bill before us today would strengthen security at our borders through advanced technology, increased border patrol, and heavier fines. It would create a sustainable temporary worker program to help fill the lowest wage jobs, which pay little and are short of American takers. And it would provide a path to citizenship that does not bump anybody who is here legally but would allow law-abiding, hard-working undocumented immigrants to go to the end of the line.

I am pleased by the inclusion of the AgJOBS bill in the Specter substitute amendment. The agriculture industry is the second largest industry in Michigan, behind manufacturing, and it depends upon the work of immigrants. The AgJOBS provision would provide protections for both the immigrant and American workers. It is estimated that without a guest worker program that allow for agricultural workers, the State of Michigan would lose hundreds of millions of dollars. In short, the AgJOBS provision is vital to the economic health of Michigan.

The security provisions in this bill are also important for Michigan and for the Nation. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out in its final report, the northern border has traditionally received dramatically less attention and resources from the Federal Government. I am pleased that the language passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee and included in the Specter substitute amendment authorizes an additional 12,000 Border Patrol agents over the next 5 years, and requires that at least 20 percent of these agents be stationed along our northern border.

I was also pleased that Senator Collins is joining me in an amendment to help ensure our Border Patrol agents and other Federal officials involved in border security--including police officers, National Guard personnel, and emergency response providers--have the capability to communicate with each other and with their Canadian and Mexican counterparts.

The Levin-Collins amendment would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish demonstration projects on the northern and southern borders to address the interoperable communications needs of those who have border security responsibilities. These projects would identify common frequencies for communications equipment between United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico and provides training and equipment to relevant personnel.

Overall, this legislation would be a step forward on a challenging and pressing issue. It contains important bipartisan provisions that will enhance our security and our prosperity while being fair.

Mr. President, in each of the last 4 years, amendments have been inserted in the Commerce, Justice,

Science, CJS, Appropriations Act by the House of Representatives which severely handicap the efforts of those working to stop the flow of guns from reckless gun dealers into the hands of criminals. These amendments prohibit the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF, from disclosing important information from the Firearms Trace System Database to local law enforcement and government officials unless it is connected to a ``bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution'' and prohibiting release for purposes of civil lawsuits.

According to published reports, these amendments have directly impacted a lawsuit by the city of New York against several gun manufacturers and distributors who it alleges have adopted sales and marketing practices which facilitate the transfer of guns to criminals. The city received ATF firearms trace data from 1998 to 2003 but has been unable to attain data from subsequent years because of the prohibition inserted in the law on its release for the purposes of civil lawsuits.

Legislation has recently been introduced in the House of Representatives which would make the restrictions on ATF firearms trace data permanent. On March 28, 2006, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg testified before the House Judiciary Committee against this bill and said that it ``would make it immeasurably harder to stop the flow of illegal guns to criminals, and depriv[e] local governments and their law enforcement agencies of the tools they need to hold dealers accountable. Specifically, these obstacles would take the form of severe restrictions on our use of ATF trace data, which is perhaps the most effective tool we have in combating illegal gun trafficking.''

Mayor Bloomberg also expressed concern regarding provisions in the bill and current law which limit the ATF firearms trace data available to local law enforcement officials to data regarding the local geographic data. Mayor Bloomberg testified that 82 percent of the guns used in crimes in New York City were purchased outside of New York State. As Mayor Bloomberg pointed out in his testimony, restricting the access of law enforcement officials to firearms trace data from other jurisdictions severely limits their ability to take action against reckless gun dealers in other States.

I am hopeful the House of Representatives will defeat efforts to continue restrictions on law enforcement and local government officials' access to important ATF firearms trace data. In addition, I am hopeful that the Senate will take up and pass legislation introduced last week by Senator Menendez to repeal restrictions in current law. ATF firearms trace data related to reckless gun dealers should be made easily available to those who have a responsibility to protect our families and communities from the threat of gun violence.

Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the ``Great Lakes Restoration Implementation Act'' with Senator Mike DeWine and our co- sponsors, Senators Debbie Stabenow, George Voinovich, and Hillary Rodham Clinton. I also want to thank Representatives Vern Ehlers and Rahm Emanuel for introducing similar Great Lakes restoration legislation in the House today.

The Great Lakes are vital not only to Michigan but to the Nation. Roughly one-tenth of the U.S. population lives in the Great Lakes basin and depends daily on the lakes. The Great Lakes provide drinking water to 33 million people. They provide the largest recreational resource for their neighboring States. They form the largest body of freshwater in the world, containing roughly 18 percent of the world's total; only the polar ice caps contain more freshwater. They are critical for our economy by helping move natural resources to the factory and to move products to market.

While the environmental protections that were put in place in the early 1970s have helped the Great Lakes make strides toward recovery, a 2003 GAO report made clear that there is much work still to do. That report stated: ``Despite early success in improving conditions in the Great Lakes Basin, significant environmental challenges remain, including increased threats from invasive species and cleanup of areas contaminated with toxic substances that pose human health threats.''

The Great Lakes problems have been well-known for several years, and, for the past year, 1,500 people through the Great Lakes region have worked together to compile recommendations for restoring the lakes. These recommendations were released last December, and, today, I am introducing this legislation to implement those recommendations.

This bill would reduce the threat of new invasive species by enacting comprehensive invasive species legislation and put ballast technology on board ships; it specifically targets Asian carp by authorizing the operation and maintenance of the dispersal barrier. The bill would restore fish and wildlife habitat by reauthorizing the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act. It would provide additional resources to States and cities for their water infrastructure. It would provide additional funding for contaminated sediment cleanup and would give the EPA additional tools under the Great Lakes Legacy Act to move projects along faster. The bill would create a new grant program to phase-out mercury in products. It would authorize additional research through existing Federal programs as well as our non-Federal research institutions. And it would authorize coordination of federal programs.

The Great Lakes are a unique American treasure. We must recognize that we are only their temporary stewards. If Congress does not act to keep pace with the needs of the lakes, and the tens of millions of Americans dependent upon them and affected by their condition, the current problems will continue to build, and we may start to undo some of the good work that has already been done. We must be good stewards by ensuring that the federal government meets its ongoing obligation to protect and restore the Great Lakes. This legislation will help us meet that great responsibility to future generations.

Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the ``Great Lakes Restoration Implementation Act'' with Senator Mike DeWine and our co- sponsors, Senators Debbie Stabenow, George Voinovich, and Hillary Rodham Clinton. I also want to thank Representatives Vern Ehlers and Rahm Emanuel for introducing similar Great Lakes restoration legislation in the House today.

The Great Lakes are vital not only to Michigan but to the Nation. Roughly one-tenth of the U.S. population lives in the Great Lakes basin and depends daily on the lakes. The Great Lakes provide drinking water to 33 million people. They provide the largest recreational resource for their neighboring States. They form the largest body of freshwater in the world, containing roughly 18 percent of the world's total; only the polar ice caps contain more freshwater. They are critical for our economy by helping move natural resources to the factory and to move products to market.

While the environmental protections that were put in place in the early 1970s have helped the Great Lakes make strides toward recovery, a 2003 GAO report made clear that there is much work still to do. That report stated: ``Despite early success in improving conditions in the Great Lakes Basin, significant environmental challenges remain, including increased threats from invasive species and cleanup of areas contaminated with toxic substances that pose human health threats.''

The Great Lakes problems have been well-known for several years, and, for the past year, 1,500 people through the Great Lakes region have worked together to compile recommendations for restoring the lakes. These recommendations were released last December, and, today, I am introducing this legislation to implement those recommendations.

This bill would reduce the threat of new invasive species by enacting comprehensive invasive species legislation and put ballast technology on board ships; it specifically targets Asian carp by authorizing the operation and maintenance of the dispersal barrier. The bill would restore fish and wildlife habitat by reauthorizing the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act. It would provide additional resources to States and cities for their water infrastructure. It would provide additional funding for contaminated sediment cleanup and would give the EPA additional tools under the Great Lakes Legacy Act to move projects along faster. The bill would create a new grant program to phase-out mercury in products. It would authorize additional research through existing Federal programs as well as our non-Federal research institutions. And it would authorize coordination of federal programs.

The Great Lakes are a unique American treasure. We must recognize that we are only their temporary stewards. If Congress does not act to keep pace with the needs of the lakes, and the tens of millions of Americans dependent upon them and affected by their condition, the current problems will continue to build, and we may start to undo some of the good work that has already been done. We must be good stewards by ensuring that the federal government meets its ongoing obligation to protect and restore the Great Lakes. This legislation will help us meet that great responsibility to future generations.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, unfortunately the U.S. Congress is not addressing the issue of gun violence prevention, and several States have enacted laws which have made communities, and especially the children who live in them, less safe. Earlier this month, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence released its 9th annual Report Card on State Gun Violence Prevention Laws and highlighted the inadequacy of many state laws relating to gun safety.

Each year, the Brady Campaign report assigns individual states a grade of ``A'' through ``F'' on seven types of gun safety laws that protect children from gun violence. The Brady Campaign includes in its analysis such questions as: Is it illegal for a child to possess a gun without supervision? Is it illegal to sell a gun to a child? Are gun owners held responsible for leaving loaded guns easily accessible to children? Are guns required to have child-safety locks, loaded-chamber indicators and other childproof designs? Do cities and counties have authority to enact local gun safety laws? Are background checks required at gun shows? And, is it legal to carry concealed handguns in public?

The grades assigned by the Brady Campaign show that State gun laws around the country continue to fall well short of what is needed to adequately protect children from gun violence. While six States received an ``A,'' unchanged from last year, 32 states received a grade of ``D'' or ``F,'' an increase of one. Only one State improved its grade from last year, while three others took actions that will make communities less safe from the threat of gun violence.

The Brady Campaign notes a few positive developments in State legislatures, including the consideration of state-level assault weapons bans by at least four states. Despite bipartisan support for its reauthorization, the 1994 Federal assault weapons ban was allowed to expire in 2004 due to inaction by the President and Republican leadership in the Congress.

Fortunately, the lack of Federal leadership on the assault weapons ban and several other gun safety issues has not discouraged citizens from working within their own communities and urging State legislatures to address the problems associated with gun violence. The Brady Campaign specifically recognized the importance of gun violence prevention advocates and leaders in several major cities, including Detroit, for their grassroots efforts. These efforts by local community leaders are needed now more than ever. Congress should take up and pass commonsense gun safety legislation to reauthorize and strengthen the assault weapons ban and help keep other dangerous firearms out of the hands of criminals and children.

Mr. President, I opposed the Ensign amendment on earmarks because I believe that it would have done more to hide earmarks than to expose them. Under the bill before the Senate, an earmark is defined as a provision, that specifies a non-Federal entity to receive assistance and the amount of that assistance. The Ensign amendment would have revised the language to include assistance provided to any entity, whether Federal or non-Federal. Every item of discretionary spending is directed to some entity. Most is directed to Federal entities, such as funding provided to the Department of Justice, the Department of State, or the Department of Defense, all of which are Federal entities. As I read the Ensign amendment, it would have categorized every item of Federal discretionary spending as an earmark. That would make the term meaningless. It would also hide the real earmarks in a huge list of routine funding provisions that none of us consider to be earmarks. The amendment is simply too broadly drawn, and that is why I opposed it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed in morning business for 15 minutes.

Mr. President, I returned on Saturday evening from a trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, and England. The trip was led by a very dear friend of mine and a great leader of this Senate who happens to be the Presiding Officer at the moment, Senator Warner of Virginia, and it included Senator Sessions, Senator Thomas, Senator Bingaman, Senator Salazar, in addition to myself.

I know if the Presiding Officer was allowed to speak in the position in which he sits that he would be the first to acknowledge that this was one of the most extraordinary trips either one of us has ever taken in the 28 years we have served together in the U.S. Senate.

The focus of the trip was to assess the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. We also conveyed to the men and women of our Armed Forces the extraordinary support for them in the Congress and throughout the Nation, regardless of our debates and differences over Iraq policy.

In meeting with our troops, including many from my home State of Michigan, it was they who lifted our spirits. As always, I came away deeply impressed by the professionalism, dedication, and high morale of our troops. They are truly America's finest.

The situation in Afghanistan is hopeful. President Karzai has led his nation with a firm and steady hand. He has successfully, albeit gradually, neutralized the warlords and demobilized and disarmed their forces. The Taliban has indeed regrouped to some extent and, together with a much weakened al-Qaida, are capable of causing casualties among the Afghan Army and coalition and NATO forces, but they are not a threat to the Afghan nation.

Meanwhile, the Afghan Army is growing stronger, the training of the Afghan police is improving, a large number of provincial reconstruction teams are helping with local governance, and NATO is assuming more of the burden of providing security throughout the country. Serious work does remain, including the need to deal with poppy cultivation and the drug traffickers. But overall the situation in Afghanistan provides grounds for optimism.

Sadly, the same cannot be said of Iraq. The situation in Iraq is deeply troubling and threatens to grow worse. Since the recent attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra, there has been a huge increase in sectarian violence. The increase is so significant that our senior military leaders in Iraq say it has replaced the insurgent attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces as the No. 1 security problem there.

Although there has been some progress in training the Iraqi Army, even a stronger Iraqi Army cannot prevent a civil war. Only the political and religious leaders and the police can do that. The police are not making significant progress in coming together as a cohesive force. In some critical areas, including Baghdad, where the militias continue to dominate, the police are not reliable and are still likely to respond to the sectarian calls of the clerics and the militias instead of the government.

Do we need to succeed in Iraq now that we are there? Yes, because the outcome there will have a major effect on the region and on our own security. I define success as a stable Iraq with a government of national unity supported by a reliable national army and police who are not weakened by sectarian fissures.

To achieve that success, General Casey, the Commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, reiterated to us that there is no military solution to the violence without a political solution.

We need to do everything we can to help the Iraqis achieve a prompt political solution, which means the quick formation of a government of national unity involving representatives of the three main Iraqi factions. It also means a highly sectarian individual would not be heading up the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior. The alternative to a prompt formation of a government of national unity by Iraqi leaders is a continuation of this drift to all-out civil war.

In Baghdad we met with Prime Minister Jaafari, who was nominated by the dominant Shiite faction--the United Iraqi Alliance--as their candidate for Prime Minister in the new government. Although he was confident that a national unity government would be formulated by the end of April, his optimism was not widely shared by others we met. Moreover, his one-vote victory for the nomination to continue on as Prime Minister is being contested from both within and without the Shiite coalition. I shared with him the letter to President Bush that Senators Collins, Jack Reed, and I had written, the bottom line of which is that:

A prompt political settlement is not only essential to the

Iraqis, it is a condition of our continued presence.

I told him his ``end of April'' commitment to President Jaafari, in my judgment, met that test of a prompt political settlement.

We also met with leaders from the two main Sunni Arab parties: Mr. Hashimi and Mr. Samarai of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Mr. Mutlak of the Iraqi Dialogue Council. They were not optimistic about the negotiations and forcefully advocated a decisional role rather than a facilitating role for the United States in the negotiations. Mr. Mutlak argued:

You are responsible for this mess and you must correct what

you have done. You have to dictate the result.

The Sunni leaders were also of the view that Iraq has been in the midst of a civil war between the militias and the innocent Iraqis for some time, and they voiced their concern about Iranian influence over the Shiite parties. I told them, and I know the other members of our codel, of our delegation told them as bluntly as we know how that their dictator was removed at a great loss of American blood and treasure and that the Iraqis and only the Iraqis will decide their own fate, and that our continued presence should depend on their promptly choosing a path of reconciliation and unity against violence and terror.

On our second day in Iraq we met with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad. One constant theme we found in Iraq and elsewhere in the region was the high regard with which all hold our Ambassador, Mr. Khalilzad. Unfortunately, although the parties are finally talking, more than 3 months after the elections, Ambassador Khalilzad was not encouraging that a political solution is in sight. He is putting modest pressure on the Iraqis. For instance, he told the Iraqis our response to continued deadlock of Iraq's political leaders might not be to their liking. He has told the Iraqi political leaders: It is your decision, and after you make it, we will make our own decision in response.

Although his statement is on the right track, it is still too subtle. It is too oblique. The political leaders of Iraq are deadlocked, feuding while Iraq descends toward all-out civil war. There is little chance of achieving a government of national unity without our pointedly and forcefully persuading the parties to make the compromises necessary to achieve it.

But what is the leverage that could be used to pointedly persuade the Iraqi leaders to make those needed compromises? We can't dictate to them

who should be their leaders. That would undermine the President's belatedly arrived at explanation for his decision to attack Iraq, which is replacing a brutal dictator with a democracy. Yes, there should be a need to apply pressure. The prospect of sectarian clashes and the specter of civil war should be sufficient incentives on their own to end the deadlock. But, so far, they don't appear to be.

To help break the political gridlock, a combination of carrots and sticks is required. The carrot is the provision of economic development funds, particularly from neighboring wealthy countries, on the condition that a national unity government is created and produces a coherent economic plan. The biggest stick is clearly telling the Iraqis that our continued presence in Iraq is dependent upon their promptly putting together a government of national unity.

Sadly, the rhetoric of the President and the administration has often worked against the pressure which needs to be applied against the Iraqi leaders.

The President recently asked the American people, for instance, for their patience. I believe instead he should be telling the Iraqi leaders bluntly and openly that the American people are understandably downright impatient with Iraqi leaders fiddling while Baghdad is burning.

The Secretary of State has said we are in Iraq as long as needed. I believe she should be telling the Iraqi leaders that our continued presence is dependent upon their doing what only they can do: reach an agreement on a government of national unity. That political settlement is not only the best hope, it is the only hope of ending the insurgency and the sectarian strife. The pressure to reach an agreement on a government of national unity needs to be applied clearly and forcefully, pointedly and publicly, not just by President Bush but also by the leaders of Iraq's neighbors.

In our meeting with the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, we urged him to do just that, and he said he would. The leaders of all of Iraq's neighboring countries need to do the same because an unstable and civil war-torn Iraq threatens them even more than us.

Is there a risk in this course of forcefully pressing Iraqi leaders to agree on a national unity government? Is there a risk in following that course? The answer is yes. But there is a greater risk in continuing on the current course of political gridlock while sectarian fires threaten to burn out of control.

The President needs to act based on the reality that we confront in Iraq. He recently said if there were a premature departure of American troops that ``Iraq would become a place of instability.''

Would become? Iraq is a place of grave instability, and to use the words of Ambassador Khalilzad in an interview he gave with a London newspaper: ``Iraq is moving towards civil war.''

My conclusion is this: President Bush needs to forcefully transmit a message to the Iraqis in plain and simple language: your survival as a nation depends on your working things out together. Your survival as a nation is in the hands of your political leaders, not our military. Along with Senator Collins and Senator Jack Reed, as I indicated, we wrote the President on March 10, 2006, and ended with the following thoughts:

We urge you to make it clear to the Iraqis how important it

is to us that they achieve a political settlement, form a

unity government, and make the necessary amendments to their

Constitution. We believe it is essential that the Iraqi

leaders understand that our continued presence is not

unconditional, and that whether they avoid all-out civil war

and have a future as a Nation is in their hands. If they

don't seize that opportunity, we can't protect them or save

them from themselves.

We ended:

The bottom line is this: The United States needs to make it

clear to Iraqi leaders that a prompt political settlement is

not only essential to them, it is a condition of our

continued presence.

We all want to succeed in Iraq, regardless of the positions we took going in. Whether we favored or opposed our intervention, and whether we are critics or supporters of the administration's policies since then, we all want to succeed. We all want to try to leave Iraq in better condition, obviously, than we found it. But to maximize the chances of success, we need to maximize pressure on the leaders of Iraq to end their political deadlock. The insurgents and outside terrorists are not going to be defeated and civil war is not going to be averted if Iraqi leaders are at war with themselves. They should know that if they squander the chance to bring political unity to Iraq, we cannot and will not protect them from their own folly.

Let me close by thanking our Presiding Officer for leading, again, one of the most extraordinary visits to a foreign country that I have ever participated in. His leadership was essential to making the visits that we were able to make and for all of us to come back with greater information and with thoughts about where the future lies.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this time that the letter that I referred to from the three Senators be printed in the Record.

I thank the Chair again for his leadership, not only on this one trip but for his leadership in the Senate on so many matters of national security, including the ongoing effort that all of us are participating in to find a positive outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.