I thank my friend from South Carolina for working on this matter as hard as he has. The Senator from Arizona has also worked hard. Many Members on this side have worked on this issue as well as the Republican side. There is a lot of…
I thank my friend from South Carolina for working on this matter as hard as he has. The Senator from Arizona has also worked hard. Many Members on this side have worked on this issue as well as the Republican side. There is a lot of thought that has been given to this matter.
The amendment approved last Thursday had some real problems with it, in my judgment, and I voted against it, as did 41 Senators. The amendment which was approved last Thursday, which is the one now awaiting this amendment, would have provided for review only for status determinations and not of convictions by military commissions.
As my friend from South Carolina pointed out, that is an omission which he and others acknowledge. It is a real indication of his commitment to try to figure out what the right course of action is, that he does acknowledge that omission. One of the reasons I voted against the amendment last Thursday is that it did not provide for that direct judicial review of convictions by military commissions. That is the major change in the amendment before the Senate, the so-called Graham-Levin-Kyl amendment which is before the Senate.
There are a number of other changes as well, but of all the changes, what this amendment does is add to the Graham amendment, which was agreed to last Thursday, adds a direct appeal for convictions by military commissions--not just for status determinations--and that direct appeal would, of course, go to a Federal court.
The amendment which we are going to consider tomorrow morning, after we consider the Bingaman amendment, will also provide for review of whether the standards and procedures which are referred to in the amendment are consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Those are important words because all Members believe we must operate according to our Constitution. Our laws and the review which is provided for now, if we agree to this amendment to the adopted Graham amendment, would explicitly make it clear that the review of a court would look at whether standards and procedures that have been agreed to are consistent with our Constitution and our laws.
The other problem which I focused on last Thursday with the first Graham amendment was that it would have stripped all the courts, including the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over pending cases. What we have done in this amendment, we have said that the standards in the amendment will be applied in pending cases, but the amendment will not strip the courts of jurisdiction over those cases. For instance, the Supreme Court jurisdiction in Hamdan is not affected.
However, what our amendment does, as soon as it is enacted and the enactment is effective, it provides that the standards we set forth in our amendment will be the substantive standards which we would expect would be applied in all cases, including cases which are pending as of the effective date of this amendment.
We will first vote on the Bingaman amendment tomorrow. I will vote for that amendment. It does preserve some habeas corpus review of constitutional issues relative to the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. It avoids habeas corpus review of less consequential issues, while enumerating the important issues which it would provide or permit habeas review of.
However, I cosponsored the Graham amendment with Senator Graham because I believe it is a significant improvement over the provision which the Senate approved last Thursday, specifically for the two main reasons I identified. The direct review will provide for convictions by the military commissions, and because it would not strip courts of jurisdiction over these matters where they have taken jurisdiction, it does, again, apply the substantive law and assume that the courts would apply the substantive law if this amendment is agreed to. However, it does not strip the courts of jurisdiction.
My friend from South Carolina has pointed out what the scope of the review would be if this amendment was agreed to. I will read something which he made reference to that is important it be very clear as to what this grant of review is on page 6, paragraph B:
(i) with respect to a capital case in which the alien was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years or more,
shall be as of right; or
(ii) with respect to any other case, shall be at the
discretion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.
The scope of review is set forth. It gets the Congress back into the business of laying out the ground rules for these reviews, which has been the main goal of the Senator from South Carolina. It is a goal which I hope all share. We may disagree as to what the ground rules are, but I hope all Members share in that goal that Congress become reinvolved in setting the ground rules for both the commissions and for the tribunals which make the status determinations.
Again, it has been a very constructive effort on the part of Senator Graham, myself, Senator Kyl, and others who cosponsored and will vote for this. It makes a significant improvement over what the Senate did last Thursday. Again, I as one Senator will first support the Bingaman amendment, but if it is not agreed to, I will strongly urge our colleagues to vote for the Graham-Kyl amendment.
I support my friend from South Carolina.
Mr. President, I thank my dear friend from Virginia for his positive comments. As always, he seeks to build bridges and to overcome differences and to reach across the aisle. It is typical of him, and it has been that way since the first day I met him many years ago.
The Levin-Reid amendment--there are two amendments pending--is an effort to, indeed, try to improve the situation in Iraq, to try to change the course for the better. There is no date for withdrawal in our amendment. It is not saying that we will withdraw troops at any particular specific date. We have done that because we think it would be a mistake to set a specific date, at least most of us do. On the other hand, we believe it is essential that we change course in a number of directions in order to improve the chances of Iraq becoming a success.
America is going to be less secure if Iraq is a failed state. Everybody agrees on that. The question is, How can we improve the chances of Iraq not becoming a failed state? What could we do here, carrying out our responsibility, what contribution can we make here to success in Iraq? Things are not working very well in Iraq in many ways. I know there are people who will point to progress in Iraq and, obviously, there are things to which one could point. But on the other hand, there are things that are not working well, and this amendment intends to address those in a constructive and positive way.
Staying the course is not a strategy; that is a slogan. How do we improve the chances for success? How do we modify our course so that we can achieve or help the Iraqis achieve--more accurately--a nation? And how can we also look forward to the day when our troops come out sooner rather than later?
This amendment looks at the year 2006 as a transition year, with Iraqi forces taking over security functions to a far greater extent. For that to happen, this amendment points out that a number of things need to happen. First, we have to advise the Iraqis that we are not there for an indefinite period of time, that they must take the steps necessary to achieve a broad-based political settlement which is so essential to defeating the insurgency. Our military advisers are unanimous on this point. There is no purely military solution unless the Iraqis come together politically. Unless they unify politically, they will not be able to defeat the insurgents. It is a point which must be made to the Iraqis. They cannot simply continue to squabble over the content of a constitution. They have to come together or else they are not going to succeed, and we are not going to succeed in helping them to achieve the security they want.
We need to advise the Iraqis we are not there indefinitely. They have to take the steps necessary to achieve a broad-based political settlement which is critically important to defeating the insurgency. We need a plan for success. We don't have a plan for success. I will speak more about that in a moment.
I want to go through the amendment. I want to point out where there is apparently agreement and where there is disagreement and what the significance is of both. The sense of the Senate starts by saying something that I think every Member of this body would agree with:
. . . members of the United States Armed Forces who are
serving or have served in Iraq and their families deserve the
utmost respect and the heartfelt gratitude of the American
people for their unwavering devotion to duty, service to the
Nation, and selfless sacrifice under the most difficult
circumstances.
We start with that. Our troops and their families deserve the very best in equipment, training, and support, but also in our thinking. That doesn't mean there is going to be unanimity around. People who disagree on what the next step should be should not be pilloried in any way or criticized as being less American than those who support the administration's policy lock, stock, and barrel. There is a place for constructive criticism, for different points of view in a democracy. That is what our troops have always fought for. That is what men and women have died for, so that we would have an opportunity to have the kind of debate on policy which is going on now.
First, our heartfelt gratitude to our troops. Second, the sense of the Senate recognizes that the Iraqi people have made enormous sacrifices and that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to live in peace and security. There is no disagreement on that. The alternative amendment that we will be voting on does not differ with that.
The next paragraph there is no difference on either. Both amendments have the same language. There is no change in our version from the Frist-Warner version. That is:
. . . calendar 2006 should be a period of significant
transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security
forces taking the lead for the security of a free and
sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the
phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.
That is in paragraph 3 of the sense of the Senate. There is no change in that language to the Frist-Warner language. That is paragraph (b)(3). Creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq surely ought to be a goal.
(4) United States military forces should not stay in Iraq
indefinitely and the Iraqi people should be so advised.
That is an important statement to the Iraqi people, and it is an important statement to our people. We should not be staying in Iraq indefinitely. That is the wrong message to send for a number of reasons to the Iraqi people.
What the Warner version does is, it strikes the word ``indefinitely'' and says:
United States military forces should not stay in Iraq any
longer than required and the people of Iraq should be so
advised.
The problem with that is, they could be required forever. That is open-ended. It is unlimited. It is the wrong message. That is a difference, and it is the first difference.
The next paragraph, there is no difference on:
. . . the Administration should tell the leaders of all
groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make
the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based
political settlement that is essential for defeating the
insurgency . . . within the schedule that they have set for
themselves.
By the way, the schedule that they have set for themselves is to appoint a commission when the new assembly takes office in January, to appoint a constitutional commission to review the constitution and make recommendations for changes within 4
months. That is their schedule. They ought to keep that.
Next--there is no disagreement on this language--
. . . the Administration needs to explain to Congress and the
American people its strategy for successful completion of the
mission in Iraq.
No difference on that language.
Now to paragraph C on the reports.
That is correct.
The Senator is correct.
On the report section, there is a change from 30 days to 90 days, which I will not spend time on. I think it is a fairly technical change, that there is not a particular difference or problem.
After that first report, whether it is 30 days or 90 days--30 days in our version, 90 days in Senator Warner's version--every 3 months thereafter, until all U.S. combat brigades have been redeployed from Iraq, the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified report on U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq. In our version we say:
Each report shall include the following:
What the Warner version adds is ``to the extent practicable, unclassified information.'' And by the way, it is clear that there is classified information that cannot be in a report, and we don't suggest to the contrary. We just want an unclassified report to the extent you can have an unclassified report on each of the following items:
. . . The current military mission and the diplomatic,
political, economic, and military measures, if any, that are
being or have been undertaken to successfully complete that
mission.
So far, no difference on that one.
Efforts to convince Iraq's main communities to make the
compromises necessary for a broad-based and sustainable
political settlement.
That is what I referred to before. It is so critically important that we must convince the communities in Iraq that they must make the compromises necessary for a broad-based, politically acceptable settlement. No difference on that language; no proposed change in that.
Next, in our amendment, we need to engage
the international community and the region in the effort to
stabilize Iraq and to forge a broad-based and sustainable
political settlement.
No difference on that.
We need a report to us every 30 days on what is being done to strengthen the capacity of Iraq's Government ministries; to accelerate the delivery of basic services; to secure the delivery of pledged economic assistance from the international community, and additional pledges of assistance; to train Iraqi security forces and transfer security responsibilities to those forces and the Government of Iraq.
No difference on that in terms of what must be in this report.
Next, we need in this report to know
whether the Iraqis have made the compromises necessary to
achieve the broad-based and sustainable political
settlement--
We need to keep the pressure on the Iraqis. We need the administration to tell us the Iraqis have made the compromises necessary. Without that kind of keeping the Iraqis' feet to the fire, it is less likely the Iraqis are going to make the kind of broad-based compromises that are necessary--the compromises that are necessary to achieve that broad-based political settlement that is essential, in our words, to defeat the insurgency in Iraq.
And now we get down to the heart of the matter where there seems to be a difference, and I want to spend another couple minutes on this. This report, according to our amendment--not disagreed to with the Warner amendment--must include specific conditions that were included in an April 2005 campaign action plan and any subsequent update to that campaign plan that must be met in order to provide for the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi security forces.
There seems to be no objection to that. There is no change in that. So we want that document, that report from the administration to set forth any specific conditions that were in the April 2005 campaign action plan and any updates to that campaign plan that need to be met in order to provide for transition of security responsibility.
There is an acknowledgement by no change in our language that there is a report containing conditions, that there is a need for updates to that campaign plan that need to be met in order to provide for the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi forces.
Now we then have language which on this whole next page is not objected to, which is accepted, which is that to the extent these conditions are not covered, as I have just outlined, the following needs to be addressed. We lay out here one, two, three, four conditions: number of battalions of Iraqi Armed Forces that have to operate independently or take the lead in counterinsurgency operations; number of Iraqi police units that have to operate independently or take the lead in maintaining law and order in fighting the insurgency, the number of regular police that must be trained and equipped to maintain law and order; the ability of Iraq's ministries and provincial and local governments to independently sustain, direct, and coordinate Iraq's security forces.
Now, so far there is apparently no problem. We have laid out all of those conditions that need to be set forth in the report that has to come every 30 days after that first report.
Then in subsection (6) we have a requirement in the report that is also not objected to, which is a schedule for meeting such conditions. There is no objection to that in the Warner amendment. There is no language change in his version.
So we require a schedule for meeting those conditions which I have outlined and an assessment of the extent to which such conditions have been met, information regarding variables that could alter that schedule, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that schedule.
So far, so good. No change in the language.
Not quite, because there was that one change which the Senator from Virginia made in the sense-of-the-Senate language.
I know you said there has been no change other than this. I said there was a prior one which we agreed was a change.
I would agree. Now to the last paragraph, which for reasons beyond me has been stricken.
We referred to the campaign plan--without objection. There was a campaign plan we referred to which said, what are the conditions in that plan that must be met in order to provide for the transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces? There is the campaign plan. There are the conditions which have been laid out, which of those conditions must be met in order to achieve the goal which we have agreed on in this document--transition of security responsibility to security forces.
Then we have agreed that the report has to contain a schedule for meeting those conditions. What are the conditions? What is the schedule for meeting
them? Three times we refer to that schedule in that same paragraph. No objection so far.
But now we say that campaign plan should also contain estimated dates for the phased redeployment of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq as each condition is met. The conditions are already laid out. What is the campaign plan with estimated dates for the phased redeployment as those conditions are met?
Then we explicitly acknowledge that, with the understanding that unexpected contingencies may arise.
We have already made reference to the phased redeployment. That is the first time we have made a reference to phased redeployment.
In the sense of the Senate, paragraph (b)(3), we have said:
Calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant
transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security
forces taking the lead for the security of a free and
sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the
phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.
So in subparagraph (7), the last paragraph, which makes reference to the campaign plan--we have already described what that is, with no objection to it--are the estimated dates for the phased redeployment of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq--we have already made reference to the goal of phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces--as each condition is met. We already have agreement on everything up to now, talking about all those conditions and the need that they be met, with the understanding that unexpected contingencies may arise, which I can't imagine anybody would object to because there are unexpected contingencies that always arise. We have acknowledged this.
But why it is there is objection to acknowledging what is obvious, that a campaign plan needs to have dates, estimated dates for the phased redeployment we have already agreed is desirable, as conditions allow and as each condition is met? Why that would be objectionable is frankly a mystery to me unless there is a reluctance to do what we do in an earlier paragraph, which is to say, folks, we can't stay there forever, we have a plan for success, where there is a takeover of the major security operations by the Iraqis so we can in a phased way redeploy our forces. Eliminating that part of the plan, it seems to me, is eliminating what is essential, what clearly follows from everything that precedes it, which has been agreed to, and I think it would send exactly the wrong message, to agree to all of the pieces that come up to that conclusion, including the conditions which need to be met, the desirability of phased redeployment, the fact that there is a campaign plan, the fact that that campaign plan has conditions in it that need to be met in order to provide for the transition of security responsibility.
It is all there. It is all there in the pieces leading right up to paragraph (7). Suddenly in the Warner version, paragraph (7) is stricken.
Again, I close with this emphasis. We have not said in this document that there should be a date for withdrawal. We said there should be a plan. What are the conditions for phased redeployment? What would it take for this to happen? What number of battalions need to be brought up to capability on the part of the Iraqis in order for there to be a number of our forces that are reduced and under what conditions? What are those circumstances and conditions which will allow us to reduce our forces?
For the administration to resist stating to the American people what are the conditions that need to exist for us to reduce our forces in Iraq it seems to me is wrong. It means there is no plan, there is no strategy that they are willing to lay out for the American people and for the Iraqi people as well so that there is no misunderstanding as to where this responsibility must fall ultimately, which is on the people of Iraq to come together politically and to take over their own military security.
I yield the floor.
Will the Senator yield for a correction? I inadvertently said the report would be every 30 days after the first report. I misspoke. It would be every 90 days, as the Senator from Virginia correctly has stated. It would be every 90 days after the first report.
Would the Senator yield on that point?
My amendment is exactly the same as Senator Warner's amendment in that regard. Senator Warner has adopted my amendment with two minor changes. He has not made any change in terms of the progress that has been made or the reference to the great work of our troops. I thought I heard the Senator from Connecticut--and I have no dearer friend in the Senate--suggest that he had wished that my amendment would be more fulsome relative to progress. I
just wanted to assure the Senator that there is no change in that language in the version which was subsequently filed by the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend from Connecticut, particularly for his repeated reference to a Senator from Michigan whom we all hold in such huge esteem--particularly Michigan, but it is not limited, obviously. We just put his portrait out in the reception room, one of the two Senators we have added in that reception room. I believe there are only seven Senators whose portraits are there. One of them is now Senator Vandenberg. I quote him often for many purposes, including the bipartisan foreign policy that he espoused.
As the Senator from Connecticut pointed out, he also urged us to give our very best thinking and not to worry about being mischaracterized or being challenged in terms of patriotism because all of us, I believe, agree that when we give our best assessment of the path forward, the success in Iraq, that we are all acting in the best of faith.
I know every colleague I either know of or do not know of is operating in the best of faith, total support for our troops, total support for their families, and how we can best succeed in Iraq. I believe we have to make some changes in our course. This amendment explicitly suggests some of those changes in course. It will hopefully make it more likely that we will succeed in Iraq.
One thing I know for sure, and that is that unless the Iraqis take hold, unless they put their political house in order, unless they do what this amendment says in both versions, that they make the political compromises and the tough political decisions that are necessary for them to be unified against the insurgency, unless they do that, there is no chance that they are going to succeed against this insurgency. They must come together politically. That is what this amendment says.
This amendment provides that they also must understand that we are not there for an unlimited period of time, because if they do believe that we are there for an unlimited period of time, they are less likely to make the political compromises which must be made for them to unite against the insurgency. That is the reason the message is so important. Are we there for an unlimited period of time, as long as you need us? Is that the right message? Or is the right message that we are not there for an unlimited period of time, we are not setting a date for departure, but we are putting you on notice, folks, you need to get your political house in order so that you can defeat, with our assistance, that insurgency. And without that kind of coming together, that military success is either unachievable or far more difficult.
That is the purpose of this amendment, and that is why the few words that were in this version, which the Senator from Virginia would change, are important words, to let the Iraqis know that the American military forces are not going to be there indefinitely, because, again, if they think we are there as long as they need us, which is the way the administration has phrased it, it is less likely that they are going to make the very difficult compromises that need to be made in order to put together a modified constitution around which all Iraqi factions can rally.
That is one of the purposes of this amendment. The other purpose is on the reports, which already, in this amendment which has been agreed to by my friend from Virginia, this amendment as written and as agreed to--there is no change to this--requires a schedule for meeting conditions. It requires a listing of variables that could alter a schedule. It requires that reasons be provided for any subsequent changes to that schedule.
What is one of the conditions? One of the conditions is that there be a campaign plan that must be met to provide for the transition of security responsibility to Iraqi security forces. So that is one of the stated conditions, that there be this campaign plan provided to the Congress, and that plan provide for the transition of security responsibility to Iraqi security forces.
Three times we make reference to a schedule and we make very clear the conditions which must be laid out as to which conditions need to be met when, including what are the number of the battalions in the Iraqi Armed Forces that can operate independently or take the lead in counterinsurgency operations--all that seems to be agreed to. We have a schedule. We have to lay out the conditions. One of the conditions is how many battalions of Iraqi Armed Forces need to be able to operate independently. We lay all of that out.
But then in the last paragraph, when we use the words ``estimated dates'' rather than ``schedule,'' for some reason the use of the words ``estimated dates'' creates a problem. Maybe it is not the words ``estimated dates,'' maybe it is the words ``phased redeployment,'' but I would again remind my colleagues that, in our sense of the Senate, we set forth a goal that, in order to succeed in Iraq, we have to have significant transition in the year 2006, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of the United States forces. That is a goal stated and apparently agreed to by my good friend from Virginia.
There is much in common here. I think the Senator from Connecticut is right. There is clearly a sense we have to do some things here to make it more likely that we are going to succeed in Iraq. That has to be everybody's goal, regardless of what our positions were going in or how critical we are of the way this war is run. Our goal is to maximize the chances for success in Iraq.
But our amendment does have some differences. We should not paper over those differences. There are two differences, which the Senator from Virginia has pointed out and I have pointed out. I guess that is where it is going to rest when the Senate votes tomorrow.
Mr. President, I hope we have performed that service. I know we all tried in good faith to do it. I am perfectly content, as the Senator from Virginia is, that our colleagues read that last paragraph, read the paragraph before that making reference three times to schedules, read the entire resolution we have written, and then determine as to which is the better message to send to the Iraqis.
I am perfectly content to leave it rest there.