Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to proceed for 20 minutes. I am very sorry the Senator from Kansas left. Let me first ask unanimous consent I be allowed to proceed. I ask unanimous consent that transcripts of two public…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to proceed for 20 minutes. I am very sorry the Senator from Kansas left. Let me first ask unanimous consent I be allowed to proceed.
I ask unanimous consent that transcripts of two public hearings where I asked questions of General Hayden, relative to the process of seeking identification of people who are referred to or who participate in intercepted conversations--that those unclassified, public hearing transcripts, or portions thereof, be printed in the Record.
The journalist Carl Bernstein once said, ``We have a national memory in this country of about 7 minutes.'' Once more, he has been proven right.
Here we are, 2 years after one of the worst intelligence disasters in our history, debating the nomination of a man to the U.N. ambassadorship, a man who has a track record of attempting to manipulate intelligence by seeking to punish intelligence analysts who do not support his view. We are so slow to learn from our history, and we are so quick to repeat it.
The issue here--and I am sure my friend from Connecticut would agree--is not the issue of whether or not policymakers have a right to disagree with analysts; of course, they do. We all should challenge analysts and analysis. We do not do enough of it. I happen to agree with the Senator from Kansas on that. That is not the issue.
The question is whether or not we manipulate intelligence or try to manipulate intelligence by trying to force analysts, who are supposed to be objective, to reach conclusions with which they don't agree in order to get support for our own policy positions. That is what is unacceptable. It is not unacceptable to disagree with analysts or not to follow their analysis. That is not at all unacceptable. That is what policymakers are here for, to make judgments, to pick between analyses. But what is unacceptable is what Mr. Bolton did repeatedly, which is to try to get analysts, who are supposed to be objective, fired or removed or transferred because they would not come to the conclusion to which he wanted them to come. That is the issue here with Mr. Bolton.
This administration does not hold people who politicize intelligence to account. Following the major intelligence failures before 9/11 and Iraq, the administration has failed to hold anybody accountable for either failure. In fact, the President gave one of the people most responsible for the intelligence disaster before Iraq, the CIA Director, a gold medal. Now the President wants to give John Bolton a promotion, although John Bolton has, in unconscionable--and I believe even potentially dangerous--ways attempted to get intelligence analysts to shape their views to his views and, if they wouldn't bend, to break them.
We know what happens when intelligence is politicized.
Before the Iraq war, ``a slam dunk'' was the CIA assessment,
although the underlying intelligence contained nuances,
qualifications, and caveats. Too often the CIA told the
administration what it thought the administration wanted to
hear.
The July 2004 bipartisan report of the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded the following:
Most of the major key judgments in the intelligence
community's October 2002 ``National Intelligence Estimate,
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Mass Destruction,'' either
overstated or were not supported by the underlying
intelligence reporting.
Just this month, newspapers reported on leaked notes from a July 23, 2002, meeting of the British Prime Minister and his senior national security staff. According to the note, the head of British foreign intelligence told Prime Minister Blair, 7 months before the war, that President Bush:
. . . wanted to remove Saddam through military action
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.
Those are contemporaneous notes, prior to the war against Iraq. Such reports reinforce the view of much of the world that the administration shaped intelligence to serve policy purposes and that it strayed from the critical principle that intelligence must be objective, independent, and free from political influence.
Twenty-five years ago, the Iran-Contra Committee reaffirmed the principle that, after heavy manipulation of intelligence by CIA Director Bill Casey:
. . . the gathering, analysis and reporting of intelligence
should be done in a way that there could be no question that
the conclusions are driven by the actual facts rather than by
what a policy advocate hopes those facts will be.
That was 25 years ago. That was Iran-Contra. That was a bipartisan criticism of the then-CIA Director Casey.
Intelligence must be gathered and analyzed in a way that there can be no doubt but that the conclusions are driven by the actual facts, not by what a policy advocate hopes those facts will be.
It is going to take years of hard work to regain credibility in our intelligence assessments after the massive failures in Iraq. The Senate began that work with the intelligence reform bill in 2004. In that bill, Congress explicitly stated that national intelligence should be ``objective'' and ``independent of political considerations.'' That is the law of the land. We require the process to ensure alternative analyses within the intelligence community.
The nomination of John Bolton shows a disdain for objective, independent intelligence and flies in the face of the Senate's effort to reform our intelligence system. Indeed, Mr. Bolton is the personification of what has been wrong with our system. Mr. Bolton has a deeply disturbing history of trying to punish intelligence analysts who do not agree with his views, of trying to squelch intelligence analysis and of distorting the intelligence community's view when they do not agree with his own.
He is aggressive about pursuing the answer that he wants, regardless of what the objective intelligence analysts say, and his actions have had a noticeably chilling effect on the intelligence analysts that he tries to intimidate and a harmful effect on the intelligence process itself.
Let's just look at his record. Mr. Bolton's view on intelligence on Cuba can be gained from an e-mail to him from his chief of staff that called the intelligence community's language on Cuba ``wimpy.'' As a policymaker, he is entitled, and was entitled, to his own view. I make it clear that what the Senator from Kansas said, I agree with. Mr. Bolton was entitled to his own view, but what he was not entitled to do was force intelligence analysts to change their views.
In preparation for his speech to the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought clearance for stronger language on Cuba's biological warfare effort than the intelligence community would support. He was repeatedly rebuffed by intelligence analysts at the State Department and the CIA, and he repeatedly responded by seeking those analysts' dismissal or removal, thereby crossing a vital line, a clear line, a red line, the line between ignoring intelligence analyses which, wise or not, is his right to do as a policymaker, that is on one side of the line. But the other side of the line he must not cross, trying to intimidate analysts into shaping intelligence analyses to his liking, that is totally impermissible. It is potentially dangerous, and it is clearly on the wrong side, the unacceptable side, the intolerable side of the line.
When he did not receive the analysis he wanted on Cuba, Mr. Bolton unleashed a tirade against the intelligence analyst.
Soon afterwards, he went to see Tom Fingar, the Principal Deputy Assistant for INR, to try to have the analyst removed. Mr. Fingar testified that Secretary Bolton was still visibly upset during their meeting, and he said that ``he wasn't going to be told what he could say by a midlevel INR munchkin analyst.''
Mr. Bolton had made clear to the analyst he was his boss, and in essence had asked his subordinate: How dare you disagree with your superior?
Mr. Fingar then testified that Mr. Bolton said he wanted the analyst ``taken off his accounts.'' Mr. Fingar protested and said ``he is our chemical and biological challenge weapons specialist, this is what he does''--making clear to Mr. Bolton that reassignment would really mean termination. Mr. Bolton persisted.
The record then shows that Mr. Bolton sought the analyst's removal two more times over a 6-month period. In one of those attempts, Mr. Bolton met with then-Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence, Carl Ford, who later said the following:
I left that meeting with the perception that I had been
asked for the first time to fire an intelligence analyst for
what he had said and done. In my experience no one had ever
done what Secretary Bolton did.
Months later, Mr. Bolton made yet another attempt when Neil Silver became the analyst's supervisor. In his testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Bolton even conceded he was still pursuing the analyst's transfer.
In his attempt to manipulate intelligence on Cuba, Mr. Bolton also tried to have a national intelligence officer from the CIA transferred. Mr. Bolton went personally to the CIA at Langley to argue for the analyst's dismissal. This is an analyst Mr. Bolton had never met, an analyst to whom he had never spoken. He had never read the analyst's work. He only knew one thing: The analyst disagreed with his views and, therefore, he had to be brought to heel.
This effort, too, lasted several months and involved repeated attempts by Mr. Bolton and his staff. Former Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin said of the request to dismiss the intelligence officer that it is ``the only time I had ever heard such a request.''
So we have the Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin as saying nobody has ever made a request to him, that he knew of, to dismiss an intelligence officer because of a disagreement with that officer's analysis--very similar to what Mr. Ford said at the office of the Assistant Secretary of State: ``in his experience, no one had ever done what Secretary Bolton did,'' which was to fire an intelligence analyst for what he had said and done.
In the end, both analysts were supported by their supervisors and they rightfully kept their positions. The only person who should have been fired over those incidents was Mr. Bolton.
Mr. Bolton's defenders like to claim no harm, no foul. That is, because none of his targets were fired despite his efforts; that everything is just fine. But the harm is in the attempt. Shooting at someone is still a crime even if you miss. As soon as a policymaker threatens an intelligence analyst with removal for disagreeing with that analyst's analysis, the harm is done.
As Mr. McLaughlin testified--and this is something the Senator from Kansas either overlooked or ignores. Listen to Mr. McLaughlin's testimony: It is perfectly all right for a policymaker to express disagreement with an intelligence officer or an analyst. And it is perfectly all right for them to challenge their word vigorously. But I think it is different, McLaughlin said, to then request, because of this disagreement, that the person be transferred.
That is the line. That is the line which Mr. Bolton crossed. That is the line that we ought to insist on. Every Member of this body should insist that line never be crossed. We ought to protect the right of policymakers to disagree, to question, and to ignore the analysis. We should never condone a policymaker who wants to see an analyst fired because the policymaker disagrees with that person's analysis. That is the line which is dangerous to cross because the pressure that puts on the analyst is to come up with the answer that the policymaker wants to hear. That is what is dangerous, when we hear an analyst, or you hear a CIA Administrator say it is a slam dunk, when it isn't, because he thinks that is what the policy maker wants to hear.
We cannot tolerate people being fired, discharged, transferred because the policymaker disagrees with the analysis of that analyst.
Mr. McLaughlin is right. It was different. It was dangerous. And according to Mr. Ford, Mr. Bolton's actions had an impact. Word of the incident, according to Mr. Ford, ``spread like wildfire among the other analysts.'' Mr. Ford testified:
I can only give you my impressions, but I clearly believe
that the analysts in INR were very negatively affected by
this incident. They were scared.
Mr. Bolton's actions were so damaging that Secretary of State Powell made a special personal visit to offer encouragement to the analysts. In his remarks, Secretary Powell specifically referred to the analysts that Mr. Bolton had targeted. He told them: Continue to call it like you see it. Continue to speak truth to power.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf confirmed what should be all too clear about Mr. Bolton, that these examples of his behavior are not isolated instances but a persistent pattern. Mr. Wolf testified that Mr. Bolton sought the removal of two officers from a nonproliferation bureau over policy differences, and that, in general, officers in the bureau--and now this is Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf--that officers in the bureau ``felt undue pressure to conform to the views of [Mr. Bolton] versus the views they thought they could support.''
Events of the past few years involving the completely missed intelligence on Iraq, the distorted intelligence on Iraq, have shown that we need to be encouraging independent and alternative analysis, not squelching it.
The Senate Intelligence Committee report on the intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq concluded that a lack of alternative analysis contributed to the failure of that intelligence.
The committee wrote that:
. . . the analysts' and collectors' chains of command, their
respective agencies, from immediate services to the National
Intelligence Council and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, all share responsibilities for not
encouraging analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully
consider alternative arguments, or accurately characterize
the intelligence report.
``Most importantly,'' according to the committee, they failed ``to recognize when analysts had lost their objectivity and take corrective action.''
Our Intelligence Committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, said corrective action should be taken when analysts lose their objectivity. Mr. Bolton tried to get analysts punished for insisting on their independence. Mr. Bolton did not value independent and objective analysis. He scorned it. He sought not to encourage alternative views but to impose his own. He did not challenge analysts. He bullied them. And he tried to fire those who disagreed with him.
Now, this is not ``water cooler'' gossip about an obnoxious boss. Objective, factual analysis can make the difference between success and failure, between life and death. In the near future, we may face a crisis over North Korea's nuclear program or Iran's nuclear intentions. Congress and the public must be confident that intelligence assessments represent information that has been assessed objectively, not shaped to serve policy goals. And if we need to go to the United Nations to make a case against a country based on our intelligence about that country's dangerous activity, the world must have confidence in the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
When Bush decided to make the case against Iraq to the United Nations, he sent Secretary of State Colin Powell, one of America's most credible diplomats. Today, we are being asked to confirm one of America's least credible diplomats to serve in an important diplomatic post, where we need credibility, we need the confidence to bring other countries to our side. We should not allow a situation in which the world might question whether it is hearing a credible view or whether it is hearing a Bolton view of intelligence.
Perhaps the biggest canard of the debate is that John Bolton is the best person to reform the United Nations. The U.N. needs reform, but so does the intelligence community. So does its systems. And, frankly, so does John Bolton. Any number of people would be a far more credible voice for reform at the United Nations.
This is a momentous decision for this body. It is shocking and sad-- it is shocking and sad--to me that the Senate may vote on this nomination while Senators are being denied critical, relevant information that members of the Foreign Relations Committee have sought. Members of that committee have requested information about the number of requests by Mr. Bolton for the names of U.S. persons cited in intelligence intercepts. The administration has refused to provide relevant information to members of the Foreign Relations Committee and to this body.
Now, those requests may be benign that Mr. Bolton made for the names of those persons and what they were saying in those intercepts. They could be part of an effort by this nominee to politicize and punish, since that was the pattern of his activity. We do not know that. But we have a right to know that. We have a right to ask why those requests were made. But this administration has refused to provide that information. We should insist on this information before we vote on this nomination. We should insist that at least the leaders of our committees, the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, be given access to the names of people that Mr. Bolton asked the intercepts relative to.
Denying the Congress and the Members of this body--
I thank the Chair and I ask unanimous consent for 3 additional minutes.
Denying Members of this body information is part of a woeful pattern of this administration denying information to the Congress. Even the Republicans of the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees and the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee over in the House included language in their bill which says that the Bush administration should be criticized ``for its lack of responsiveness to repeated Congressional requests for information.''
Mr. President, this Senate, as a body, should insist on legitimate requests for information from its Members. Every Member--every Member-- should add his or her voice to the demand for the production of relevant documents which Senators need to decide on confirmation or for any other legitimate reason. This body will be a lesser place if we do not stand with each other when it comes to gaining access to documents, at least in the absence of a claim of executive privilege.
Now, I happen to believe we should give deference to the President on the selection of his team, but deference does not mean abdication of our best judgment when a nominee crosses the line. If we do that, we will send the wrong message to anyone working in the intelligence community who sees Mr. Bolton's behavior rewarded rather than seeing him held accountable. If we do that, we will send the wrong message to the international community, to send a repeat abuser of intelligence and an abuser of intelligence analysts to be our representative at the United Nations.
We have the opportunity to send a different message to the intelligence community and to the world. We can cast a vote for objectivity in intelligence, for intelligence that is free of political influence, and for accountability. But before we vote--before we vote-- legitimate requests for documents and information from Members of this body should be honored and should be supported by every Senator. That is a need which, at one time or another, each one of us has, and as an institution we should, in one voice, demand that need be met.
This is a demand for relevant documents relevant to the qualifications of this nominee to be confirmed to this high office. It is a demand for documents which relate to an issue which is clearly involved in this nomination, and that has to do with a pattern, on the part of Mr. Bolton, of punishing people who analyze intelligence who do not give him an analysis that he likes and that supports his own policy.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and thank my good friend from Minnesota for yielding the time.
Mr. President, the names of the people that he sought information on are incredibly relevant to the question of why he sought information on those people, what was his motive. There is a pattern here, a pattern of punishment of people if they did not provide analysis that he agreed with, if they disagreed with his views. And when he asks for those intercepts, he may have had a perfectly benign reason for doing it. On the other hand, it may have been part of this totally unacceptable pattern.
But the Senate has the same right to know what he knew and he asked for, which was intercepts of particular people who were either involved in the conversation or referred to in the conversation.
If the Senate doesn't insist on that right for every Member of this body, we are a lesser body. We should insist upon that for Members who agree with us or not. This is an institutional issue of great magnitude.
If the Senator will yield, my good friend from Minnesota. If you agree that the Senate is entitled to this information, but not now--if not now, when? The reason for seeking this information relates to the nomination of Mr. Bolton. That is why this is so relevant and important. I think the members of the Foreign Relations Committee have been seeking this information for many weeks. So it is not as though this is a last-minute request which is holding up the vote on a nomination or would hold it up until we receive that information.
By the way, I happen to believe--and I don't know if my good friend from Connecticut agrees with me--that if the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee saw the names and concluded that none of those names had any relationship to this nomination because none of the names are people he tried to get fired, transfer, or punish, that would satisfy me. But the administration knows the names. John Bolton got the names. But the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the chairman won't be given those names and they are redacted. I believe the Senate cannot accept that standard and hold ourselves up as a body that is equal in power to the executive branch. We cannot. We cannot say to ourselves that this body will look at all relevant evidence that relates to confirmation before we give our consent to it and protect the Members' requests for information if we do not insist that at least the chairman
and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee have access to the names and see whether those names are relevant to this nomination in terms of the specific people John Bolton tried to punish or get transferred.
I find this really intolerable, incredible, that we as a body will not stand with a legitimate request for relevant information that relates to a pending nomination that was promptly and timely made.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter to Chairman Lugar and to Ranking Member Biden from Senator Rockefeller dated May 25 be printed in the Record.