Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment Senator Kennedy has addressed, which was introduced by Senator Durbin. It represents an effort to obtain information that is critically important to the American people in reaching a judgment,…
Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment Senator Kennedy has addressed, which was introduced by Senator Durbin. It represents an effort to obtain information that is critically important to the American people in reaching a judgment, critically important to the Congress in reaching a judgment, critically important, I believe, to our military leaders, first and foremost, in reaching a judgment as to how quickly we can remove forces from Iraq.
It is in everybody's interest that we succeed in Iraq. Some of us who were highly critical of the way we went into Iraq--more unilaterally than we should have, without the support of any Muslim nations, making our presence a Western occupation of a Muslim nation, with all of the problems that unleashes, and many of us who have been critical of the way in which the Iraqi army was disbanded unilaterally, without much thought, and the way in which we did not have a plan for a violent aftermath when we went in, the way in which we didn't listen to our military leaders in terms of the need to prepare for the possibility of the violent aftermath. All of us, those of us who were critics and those of us who were supporters, now have a common interest in Iraq and have had, once the decision was made to go into Iraq, and that is that we succeed in Iraq.
Success in Iraq requires that the Iraqis take over their own defense and their own security. This amendment will help give us a roadmap toward understanding how long it will take, what is necessary, what the cost will be for the Iraqis to take over their own security, the key to our exit, first reductions in our American forces, and then to our ultimate departure from Iraq, and the key to it is how quickly we can turn over to Iraq their own security.
This amendment sets forth a number of reporting requirements, which will help us to make a judgment as to how quickly that can be done, which will help the American people to understand there is a strategy here, there are markers along the road we are on which will tell us whether we are achieving that essential security and, more importantly, whether the Iraqis are achieving that essential security for themselves.
Two things are going to be necessary here for success to be achieved. One is to secure the area and the other is a political accommodation between the people in Iraq--people who have different religious beliefs, different ethnic backgrounds, people who are now going to have to put themselves together to form a nation.
In terms of the training of Iraqi troops, we have very different estimates over the months, and it is very difficult for us in Congress and for the American people to make a judgment as to how quickly we are going to be able to reduce our presence in Iraq--a presence which has fueled the insurgency against us, which is used as a propaganda tool against us, because we are characterized as Western occupiers in a Muslim nation. The longer we stay there, the more troops we have there, the more we play into the hands of those who want to destroy us and destroy the hopes of Iraqis for a nation.
I want to give a few examples of the discrepancies in the characterization of the ability of the Iraqis to protect and defend themselves. Back in September of last year, President Bush said the following:
Nearly 100,000 fully trained--
I emphasize fully trained.
--and equipped Iraqi soldiers, police officers, and other
security personnel are working today.
But then George Casey, our commander of the multinational force in Iraq, in January said the following:
When Prime Minister Allawi took office in June of 2004, he
had one deployable battalion. Today, he has 40. When you
multiply 40 battalions that are deployable with the number of
people in each battalion, it comes out to approximately
30,000 personnel.
So when General Casey spoke in January, months after President Bush told us there were 100,000 fully trained and equipped Iraqi soldiers, there were still but 30,000 personnel in Iraq who were deployable.
This is what General Myers said in February: That there are about 40,000 Iraqis in the police and military battalions, 40,000 that can ``go anywhere in the country and take on almost any threat.''
That is a very different impression than is given by the weekly status reports we get from the administration. This is the State Department's most recent weekly status report as to what they call trained-and-equipped Iraqi forces--152,000 this week.
There are not 152,000 Iraqi forces capable of taking on insurgents. If we are lucky, the number is about one-third of that. But we have to know two numbers, not just one, not just the weekly State Department number as to how many people are trained and equipped, but how many of those people are sufficiently trained and equipped so they can take on the insurgency. That is the critical number--how many are capable militarily of taking on insurgents.
I will give one other example of the discrepancy of the characterization of the capability of Iraqi forces.
When this supplemental in front of us was provided to us in February, this is what the supplemental represented to us: That 89 of the 90 battalions of Iraqi security forces that have been fielded--89 of 90-- are ``lightly equipped and armed and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities.'' That is about 95 percent plus of the Iraqi security forces today, according to the supplemental request; 95 percent are lightly equipped and armed and have limited mobility and sustainment. How different that is from the most recent weekly report we just received of 152,000 troops.
It is essential, it is critically important, no matter what one's views of the war are--the wisdom of going in, how well run it has been since we went in--no matter how pessimistic or optimistic one is, no matter how critical or positive one is, in terms of the operations and the way they were planned or not planned and the decision to go in as we did, we must have numbers, we must have estimates, which this amendment would require in regular reports, as to what the capabilities are of the Iraqi forces.
We need two numbers. We need that total number, 152,000, but we need the number of Iraqi forces that are capable of taking on the insurgents: How many are deployable? how many have real mobility and sustainment capabilities? How many are well trained and equipped so they can take on the insurgents?
That number is critical to Iraq. It is critical to Americans. Americans have the right to know the information this amendment requires be provided in regular reports.
I have one other comment before I yield the floor. In addition to the security requirements that must be met so
we can say that our involvement in Iraq has been a success, there must be a political accommodation. That political accommodation, in many ways, is more complicated than the military situation. We need people who now distrust each other, people who have attacked each other over the decades, to now come together politically and to work out a new constitution which will protect the rights of minorities in Iraq.
We have a major group in Iraq, the Shi'a, who feel, and properly so, that a small minority of Sunni Baathists, particularly in the leadership of the Baathist political movement, attacked the Shi'as with gas and with other means. These are Iraqis who were destroyed by Iraqis, by Saddam Hussein and the henchmen who were around Saddam Hussein. So the Shi'a community needs to accommodate themselves to a significant protection for a Sunni minority, and that Sunni minority must get used to the fact, the reality, the Shi'as are the majority of Iraqis, and they have elected a majority of members who are going to be present in the Iraqi Assembly. Of course, there is the yearning of the Kurds for significant autonomy. All that needs to be put together.
It is a very complicated equation for that to happen. As we hopefully achieve some success on the security side, we must keep a very wary eye open as to what is happening or not happening on the political side of the challenge in Iraq.
The constitution will be written by a commission which will be selected by an assembly which is now in place. That assembly will have its Prime Minister within the next few days and will then be able to select a constitutional commission which will write a constitution. That commission needs to reflect the Iraqi people, not the makeup of the assembly which has much too small a percentage of Sunnis, given the fact they did not vote. But the Shi'a majority needs to be wise enough, in selecting the commission that will write the constitution, to have a broadly representative commission that will write a constitution that is protective of the minorities in Iraq, that will guarantee majority rights, of course, but that in any decent nation will protect the minority as well.
That is the challenge they face. They are supposed to meet that challenge by August. They will not do that, obviously. They have a 6- month extension beyond that where they must write a constitution. Getting that constitution written is a major challenge, and anything we can do to facilitate that, it seems to me, would be very wise, indeed.
We have two challenges, one of which is addressed in the amendment before us relative to Iraqi security and the progress they are hopefully making, to give us the information that is important for a judgment to which the American people, the Congress, and our uniformed military are entitled from this administration. I hope this has broad support and the Senate adopts the Durbin amendment.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.