Mr. President, I commend my friend from Rhode Island for his leadership in this area. It is critically important that we show some constraint--at least in funding of new nuclear weapons and modifications of existing nuclear weapons in…
Mr. President, I commend my friend from Rhode Island for his leadership in this area. It is critically important that we show some constraint--at least in funding of new nuclear weapons and modifications of existing nuclear weapons in order to make them more usable.
Appropriating funds, as this bill does, for research on a new nuclear weapon and research on a modification of existing weapons in order to make them more useful moves us in a dangerous new direction which marks a major shift in American policy. It is inconsistent with our longstanding commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to end the nuclear arms race. It undermines our argument to other countries around the world that they should not develop or test nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the bill before us supports this dangerous new direction by putting funds into research of both the new weapon and modification of existing weapons to make them more usable.
At least the pending amendment of the Senator from Rhode Island puts an explicit constraint on the expenditure of that money. Why it is so important this language be included is that it makes explicit, before we can move to the developmental stage of these new weapons, there must be an explicit congressional vote. It cannot happen--this next stage, which we hope will never come--if the Reed language is adopted and maintained in conference, and if we were able to maintain similar language in conference in the authorization bill that development of these new weapons and modified weapons, to make them more usable, could not happen without an explicit action on the part of Congress.
That is not the current policy that there be an explicit authorization. It is not inconsistent with current policy that there be an explicit authorization before we approve development, but it is not the existing policy.
It is critically important that at least if we cannot stop this country from moving in a direction which is so totally inconsistent with what we are urging the rest of the world to do, at a minimum, we go as far as we can in expressing the determination of at least many of us that we move not at all, if possible, before we move that there be a formal vote on the part of Congress.
I do not understand how we can argue to other countries, with our heads high, that they should not move in a nuclear direction at the same time we are doing research on new nuclear weapons. We are telling others, do not go down that road. But instead of being a leader in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are going to move recklessly down that
same road. We are following a policy that we do not tolerate in others.
The adoption of the Reed amendment would at least put some brake on the speed at which we are going down that road, and hopefully, before development is reached, before taking the next milestone on that road.
Appropriating funds for research in new nuclear weapons begins to take the United States in a dangerous new direction that marks a major shift in American policy, is inconsistent with our longstanding commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to end the nuclear arms race, and undermines our argument to other countries around the world that they should not develop or test nuclear weapons. Unfortunately the bill now on the Senate floor would also support this dangerous new direction. But the pending amendment puts an explicit constraint on it.
Current U.S. law bans research and development of new nuclear weapons that could lead to their production. The specific weapons covered by the ban are so called low-yield nuclear weapons which have a nuclear explosive yield of 5 kilotons or less. Five kilotons is roughly a third the size of the nuclear bomb that was used at Hiroshima, which immediately killed an estimated 140,000 people and left many more injured.
The Bush administration asked that this ban be repealed. If the ban is repealed, the purpose is to make nuclear weapons more usable. As stated by Linton Brooks, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration in testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2003, ``I have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield because I have the bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction . . . I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable.''
The language approved by a majority of the Armed Services Committee and included in the Senate passed version of the Defense authorization bill would repeal this ban. Without this ban there is no impediment in law to research, development, testing, production, or deployment of new, low yield nuclear weapons. The bill before us would also support the repeal of this ban by appropriating $6 million to begin the research on new low-yield nuclear weapons, or for any other advanced new nuclear weapons concept.
The Defense authorization bill authorizes the National Nuclear Security Administration to continue work on a robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP). The Energy and Water bill would appropriate these funds.
This effort would modify one of two existing high-yield nuclear weapons to create a nuclear weapon that will penetrate rock. Both weapons being looked at for possible modification are high yield nuclear weapons with yields that are approximately 30 and 70 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. Without a requirement that the earth penetrator weapon be authorized by Congress, there is no legal impediment to its development, testing, production, or deployment.
At a time when the United States is trying to dissuade other countries from going forward with nuclear weapons development, when we strongly oppose North Korea's pulling out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, when we are trying to prevent Iran from establishing a nuclear weapons program and when we are spending over a billion dollars to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons material and technology, these actions would send a terrible message. We are telling others not to go down the road to nuclear weapons. But instead of being a leader in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are recklessly driving down that same road. In short, the United States is following a policy that we do not tolerate in others.
President Bush on June 18 stated that the United States will not tolerate a nuclear Iran. Similarly in May President Bush, in a joint statement with the President of South Korea, said he would not tolerate a North Korean nuclear weapon.
The leaked version of the Nuclear Posture Review identifies both North Korea and Iran as countries against which the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons. Clearly North Korea is the focus of the concern about hard and deeply buried targets and the desire to pursue the development of an RNEP.
At the same time that the United States is actively engaging in talks with North Korea to persuade them to give up their nuclear weapons program and urging the IAEA to ensure that Iran does not pursue a nuclear weapons program, we are beginning the process to develop new nuclear weapons. The Bush administration is taking action to ensure that there is a robust complex to build new nuclear weapons and an accelerated test readiness program to test them.
Where is the consistency in our actions? Having undertaken a preemptive war against an alleged imminent threat in the name of counter proliferation, can the United States effectively unite the world against Iran and North Korea's pursuance of nuclear weapons programs when the Bush administration appears to be on the verge of reversing a decades old nuclear policy and pursuing new tactical nuclear weapons? Weapons that, in the words of Linton Brooks, the Administrator of the National Security Administration, ``might be usable.''
The inconsistency of U.S. action was noted in a May 17 editorial in the Economist Magazine:
. . . America would dangerously blur the line against nuclear
use by anyone. That would make it more likely, not less, that
America's own forces would eventually have nuclear weapons
used against them too. Mr. Bush has said repeatedly, with
reason, that he wants America to rely less on nuclear weapons
for its future security, not more. In their determination to
leave no weapons avenue unexplored, his advisors are
proposing to lead America along a dangerous path. Time the
president called a halt.
On July 17 of this year the New York Times also commented on the inconsistency between urging others to forego nuclear weapons development at a time when the United States is beginning to put in place all the elements of a new nuclear weapons program. Particularly a program whose goal appears to be to produce nuclear weapons that ``might be usable.''
The July 17 editorial cautioned:
Nuclear bombs should not be casually re-engineered for
ordinary battlefield use at a time when countries like North
Korea, Pakistan and India have added nuclear weapons to their
arsenals and a chief objective of U.S. policy is to make sure
these weapons are never used.
I urge the Bush administration to continue to work to persuade both North Korea and Iran to disavow nuclear weapons programs. Arms control still has a vital role to play. As Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said, in defense of the Nonproliferation Treaty, ``Agreements such as the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, organizations such as the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group--these constitute a global security architecture that has served us satisfactorily and kept us sage.''
As Rose Gottemoeller, a former Assistant Secretary of Energy said:
Other countries watch us like a hawk. They are very
attentive to what we do in the nuclear arena. This is going
to be considered another step in the tectonic shift. I think
people abroad will interpret this as part of a really
enthusiastic effort by the Bush administration to
renuclearize. And I think definitely there's going to be an
impetus to the development of nuclear weapons around the
world.
Let us slow down and think about the road on which we are about to travel.
Senator Reed, Senator Kennedy, and I offer an amendment today to once again preserve Congress's role in any decision to move toward the design, engineering, testing, or deploying of any new nuclear weapon. And equally important, this amendment will require us to stop and think seriously before going down the road toward new nuclear weapons.
The amendment would require the Department of Energy to obtain a specific authorization from Congress before the Department could move to phase 3 or beyond in the nuclear weapons development process. Phase 3 is the engineering development phase, the point at which a concept would begin to be a new weapon.
The amendment would also apply to this same phase, the engineering development phase, in the process of modifying an existing weapon for a new military requirement. When the Department modifies an existing weapon the engineering development phase is the 6.3 phase. This amendment would apply to the 6.3 phase as well.
Language similar to this amendment passed the Senate 95-0 during the consideration of the Defense Authorization Act. There was no disagreement then, and should not be now, that Congress retain a central role in any decision to seek new nuclear weapons.
In 1994, Congress determined that the United States did not need to embark on a new nuclear weapons program, which would require nuclear weapons testing prior to being deployed, and banned research that could lead to production of new, low-yield, nuclear weapons. The current law is found at section 3136 of the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. It is commonly known as the Spratt-Furse provision.
The Senate passed version of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act repeals the current Spratt-Furse law, while the House-passed version of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, modifies the current law. The House modification would allow the Department of Energy to conduct research on low yield nuclear weapons but not to begin the engineering design phase of the nuclear weapons process.
The conferees have been working for several months to resolve the many differences in the two versions of the Defense Authorization Act. One of the issues that the conferees have yet to resolve is the issue of the Spratt-Furse provision.
The conferees are discussing whether Spratt-Furse should be modified, as in the House-passed bill, or repealed, as in the Senate-passed bill, or whether both provisions could be dropped and the current law preserved. It is important to note that the Reed amendment is consistent with any of the possible outcomes in the defense authorization conference.
Whatever the outcome, the Reed amendment will ensure that Congress plays a role in future nuclear weapons decisions.
In May of this year, unusually heavy rainfall occurred in four counties of the Upper Peninsula of my home State of Michigan-- Baraga, Gogebic, Marquette and Ontonagon Counties--causing rivers and streams throughout the area to swell out of their banks, inflicting severe and widespread damages. These four counties are not able to absorb this disaster as they have overall unemployment and poverty rates higher than the state average.
The greatest damages occurred in Marquette County where an earthen dike at Silver Lake Basin failed, sending an estimated 8 billion gallons of water cascading downstream through central Marquette County and the city of Marquette toward Lake Superior. Rapidly moving water and massive amounts of trees, logs and other debris has severely undercut many sections of the riverbank, making them unstable and creating serious public safety and environmental concerns.
Damages to one of the power generation facilities, the Presque Isle plant in the city of Marquette, resulted in shutdown for more than 30 days. Without power, two iron ore mines, which produce about 20 percent of our Nation's annual iron ore output, were shut down, idling 1,200 workers. These mines contribute nearly $115 million in personal income annually and are two of the largest employers in Marquette County. Even this temporary shutdown has had a significant negative impact on the local, regional, State and national economies. Dozens of other area businesses, institutions and private homeowners were also seriously impacted.
Current estimates of economic damages alone to these counties, mostly to Marquette County, are calculated at over $100 million. There have been severe impacts to roads, bridges, culverts, water control structures, utility infrastructure and environmental and ecological damage to the waterways resulting from this flooding. When the public damage figures, currently estimated at $18-20 million, are combined with those high economic impacts caused by the loss of electrical power generation capabilities and the environmental degradation to the area, it paints a devastating picture for this area in Michigan. Further, this area is still recovering from the flooding that occurred last year. The fact that these counties have suffered two major disasters in two years is extremely significant.
Without our assistance, Marquette and the other three counties will have a difficult, if not impossible, task of recovering from this disaster. And the health, safety, economic vitality, and quality of life of the communities and their citizens will certainly suffer for years to come.
I urge my colleagues to support this request for $125 million in emergency funding for flood damage remediation assistance.