Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Keweenaw National Historical Park bill be printed in the Record. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Akaka, Grassley, Leahy, and Durbin today in introducing the Federal…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Keweenaw National Historical Park bill be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Akaka, Grassley, Leahy, and Durbin today in introducing the Federal Employees Protection of Disclosures Act. Our bill strengthens the law protecting employees who blow the whistle on fraud, waste, and abuse in federal programs.
Whistleblowers play a crucial role in ensuring that Congress and the public are aware of serious cases of waste, fraud, and mismanagement in government. Whistleblowing is never more important than when our national security is at stake. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, courageous individuals have stepped forward to blow the whistle on significant lapses in our efforts to protect the United States against potential future attacks. Most notably, FBI Agent Coleen Rowley alerted Congress to serious institutional problems at the FBI and their impact on the agency's ability to effectively investigate and prevent terrorism.
In another example, two Border Patrol agents from my State of Michigan, Mark Hall and Bob Lindemann, risked their careers when they blew the whistle on Border Patrol and INS policies that were compromising security on
the Northern Border. Their disclosure led to my holding a hearing at the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in November 2001, that exposed serious deficiencies in the way Border Patrol and INS were dealing with aliens who were arrested while trying to enter the country illegally. Since the hearing, some of the most troublesome policies have been changed, improving the security situation and validating the two agents' concerns. Despite the fact that their concerns proved to be dead on, shortly after they blew the whistle, disciplinary action was proposed against the two agents. Fortunately in this case, whistleblower protections worked. The Office of Special Counsel conducted an investigation and the decision to discipline the agents was reversed. However, that disciplinary an action was proposed in the first place is a troubling reminder of how important it is for us to both strengthen protections for whistleblowers and empower the Office of Special Counsel to discipline managers who seek to muzzle employees.
Agent Rowley, Mark Hall and Bob Lindermann are simply the latest in a long line of Federal employees who have taken great personal risks in blowing the whistle on government waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Congress has long recognized the obligation we have to protect a Federal employee when he or she discloses evidence of wrongdoing in a Federal program. If an employee reasonably believes that a fraud or mismanagement is occurring, and that employee has the courage and the sense of responsibility to make that fraud or mismanagement known, it is our duty to protect the employee from any reprisal. We want Federal employees to identify problems so we can fix them, and if they fear reprisal for doing so, then we are not only failing to protect the whistleblower, but we are also failing to protect the taxpayer.
I sponsored the Whistleblower Protection Act in 1989 which strengthened and clarified whistleblower rights, as well as the bill passed by Congress to strengthen the law further in 1994. Unfortunately, however, repeated holdings by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have corrupted the intent of Congress, with the result that additional clarifying language is sorely needed. The case of LaChance versus White represents perhaps the most notable example of the Federal Circuit's misinterpretation of the whistleblower law.
In LaChance, decided on May 14, 1999, the court imposed an unfounded and virtually unattainable standard on Federal employee whistleblowers in proving their cases. In that case, John E. White was an education specialist for the Air Force who spoke out against a new educational system that purported to mandate quality standards for schools contracting with the Air Force bases. White criticized the new system as counterproductive because it was too burdensome and seriously reduced the education opportunities available on base. After making these criticisms, local agency officials reassigned White, relieving him of his duties and allegedly isolating him. However, after an independent management review supported White's concerns, the Air Force canceled the program White had criticized. White appealed the reassignment in 1992 and the case has been in litigation ever since.
The administrative judge initially dismissed White's case, finding that his disclosures were not protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act. The MSPB, however, reversed the administrative judge's decision and remanded the case back to the administrative judge, holding that since White disclosed information he reasonably believed evidenced gross mismanagement, this disclosure was protected under the Act. On remand, the administrative judge found that the Air Force had violated the Whistleblower Protection Act and ordered the Air Force to return White to his prior status; the MSPB affirmed the decision of the administrative judge. OPM petitioned the Federal Circuit for a review of the board's decision. The Federal Circuit subsequently reversed the MSPB's decision, holding that there was not adequate evidence to support a violation under the Whistleblower Protection Act. The Federal Circuit held that the evidence that White was a specialist on the subject at issue and aware of the alleged improper activities and that his belief was shared by other employees was not sufficient to meet the ``reasonable belief'' test in the law. The court held that ``the board must look for evidence that it was reasonable to believe that the disclosures revealed misbehavior'' by the Air Force. The court went on to say: ``In this case, review of the Air Force's policy and implementation via the QES standards might well show them to be entirely appropriate, even if not the best option. Indeed, this review would start out with a presumption that public officers perform their duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in accordance with the law and governing regulations. * * * And this presumption stands unless there is `irrefragable proof to the contrary'.''
It was appropriate for the Federal Circuit to remand the case to the MSPB to have it reconsider whether it was reasonable for White to believe that what the Air Force did in this case involved gross mismanagement. However, the Federal Circuit went on to impose a clearly erroneous and excessive standard for him to demonstrate his ``reasonable belief''--requiring him to provide ``irrefragable'' proof that the Air Force had engaged in gross mismanagement.
Irrefragable means ``undeniable, incontestable, incontrovertible, incapable of being overthrown.'' How can a Federal employee meet a standard of ``irrefragable'' in proving gross mismanagement? It is virtually impossible standard of proof to meet. Moreover, there is nothing in the law or legislative history that even suggests such a standard applies to the Whistleblower Protection Act. The intent of the law is not for a federal employee to act as an investigator and compile ``irrefragable'' proof that the Federal Government, in fact, committed fraud, waste or abuse. Rather, under the clear language of the statute, the employee needs only to have ``a reasonable belief'' that there is fraud, waste or abuse occurring in order to make a protected disclosure.
LaChance is only one example of the Federal Circuit misinterpreting the law. Our bill corrects LaChance and as well as several other Federal Circuit holdings. In addition, the bill strengthens the Office of Special Counsel and creates additional protections for federal employees who are retaliated against for blowing the whistle.
One of the most important issues addressed in the bill is to clarify again that the law is intended to protect a broad range of whistleblower disclosures. The legislative history supporting the 1994 Whistleblower Protection Act amendments emphasized: ``[I]t also is not possible to further clarify the clear language in section 2302(b)(8) that protection for `any' whistleblowing disclosure truly means `any'. A protected disclosure may be made as part of an employee's job duties, may concern policy or individual misconduct, and may be oral or written and to any audience inside or outside the agency, without restriction to time, place, motive or content.''
Despite this clear Congressional intent that was clearly articulated in 1994, the Federal Circuit has acted to push a number of whistleblower disclosures outside the protections of the whistleblower law. For example, in Horton versus the Department of the Navy, the Federal Circuit ruled that a whistleblower's disclosures to co-workers, or to the wrong-doer, or to a court ruled that a whistleblower's disclosures to official in the agency chain of command or those made in the course of normal job duties were not protected. In Huffman versus Office of Personnel Management, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed Horton and Willis. And in Meuwissen versus Department of Interior, the Federal Circuit held that a whistleblower's disclosures of previously known information do not qualify as ``disclosures'' under the WPA. All of these rulings violate clear Congressional intent to afford broad protection to whistleblower disclosures.
In order to make it clear that any lawful disclosure that an employee or job applicant reasonably believes is evidence of waste, fraud, abuse, or gross mismanagement is covered by the WPA, the bill codifies previous statements of Congressional intent. Using the 1994 legislative history, it amends the whistleblower statute to
cover any disclosure of information without restriction to time, place, form, motive or context, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee's duties that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is credible evidence of any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or other misconduct specified in the whistleblower law. I want to emphasize here that, other than the explicitly listed exceptions identified in the statute, we intend for there to be no exceptions, inferred or otherwise, as to what is a protected disclosure. And the prohibition on inferred exceptions is intended to apply to all protected speech categories in section 2302(b)(8) of the law. The intent here, again, is to make it clear that when the WPA speaks of protecting disclosures by Federal employees ``any'' means ``any.''
The bill also addresses the clearly erroneous standard established by the Federal Circuit's LaChance decision I mentioned earlier. Rather than needing ``irrefragable proof'' to overcome the presumption that a public officer performed his or her duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in accordance with the law and regulations, the bill makes it clear that the whistleblower can rebut this presumption with ``substantial evidence.'' This burden of proof is a far more reasonable and appropriate standard for whistleblowing cases.
The Federal Circuit's repeated misinterpretations of the whistleblower law are unacceptable and demand Congressional action. In response to the court's inexplicable and inappropriate rulings, our bill would suspend for five years the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over whistleblower appeals. It would instead allow a whistleblower to file a petition to review a final order or final decision of the MSPB in the Federal Circuit or in any other United States appellate court of competent jurisdiction and defined under 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(2). In most cases, using another court would mean going to the federal circuit where the contested personnel action took place. This five year period would allow Congress to evaluate whether other appellate courts would issue whistleblower decisions which are consistent with the Federal Circuit's interpretation of WPA protections and guide Congressional efforts to clarify the law if necessary.
In addition to addressing jurisdictional issues and troublesome Federal Circuit precedents, our bill would also make important additions to the list of protected disclosures. First, it would subject certain disclosures of classified information to whistleblower protections. However, in order for a disclosure of classified information to be protected, the employee would have to possess a reasonable belief that the disclosure was direct and specific evidence of a violation of law, rule or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, a substantial and specified danger to public health or safety, or a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact. A whistleblower must also limit the disclosure to a member of Congress or staff of the executive or legislative branch holding the appropriate security clearance and authorized to receive the information disclosed. Federal agencies covered by the WPA would be required to establish a process to provide confidential advice to employees on how to lawfully make a protected disclosure of classified information to Congress.
Current law permits Federal employees to file a case at the MSPB when they feel that a manager has taken a personnel action against them in retaliation for blowing the whistle. The legislation would add three new personnel actions to the list of adverse actions that cannot be taken against whistleblowers for engaging in protected activity. These actions would include enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form or agreement against a whistleblower for making a protected disclosure; the suspension, revocation, or other determination relating to a whistleblower's security clearance; and an investigation of an employee or applicant for employment if taken due to their participation in whistleblowing activity.
It is important to note that, if it is demonstrated that a security clearance was suspended or revoked in retaliation for whistleblowing, the legislation limits the relief that the MSPB and reviewing court can order. The bill specifies that the MSPB or reviewing court may issue declaratory and other appropriate relief but may not direct a security clearance to be restored. Appropriate relief may include back pay, an order to reassign the employee, attorney fees, or any other relief the Board or court is authorized to provide for other prohibited personnel practices. In addition, if the Board finds an action on a security clearance to have been illegal, it may bar the agency from directly or indirectly taking any other personnel action based on that illegal security clearance action. Our legislation would also require the agency to review and provide a report to Congress detailing the circumstances of the agency's security clearance decision, and authorizes expedited MSPB review of whistleblower cases where a security clearance was revoked or suspended. The latter is important because a person whose clearance has been suspended or revoked and whose job responsibilities require clearance may be unable to work while their case is being considered.
Our bill would also add two prohibited personnel practices of the whistleblower law. First, it would codify the ``anti-gag'' provision that has been in force since 1988, by virture of its inclusion in appropriations bills. Second, it would prohibit a manager from initiating an investigation of an employee or applicant for employment because they engage in a protected activity, including whistleblowing.
Another issue addressed in the bill involves certain employees who are excluded from the WPA. Among these are employees who hold ``confidential policy-making positions.'' In 1994, Congress amended the WPA to keep agencies from designating employees confidential policymakers after the employees filed whistleblower complaints. The WPA also allows the President to exclude from WPA jurisdiction any agency whose principal function is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. Our legislation maintains this authority but makes it clear that a decision to exclude an agency from WPA protections must also be made prior to a personnel action being taken against a whistleblower from that agency. This provision is necessary to ensure that agencies cannot argue that employees are exempt from whistleblower protections after an employee files a claim that they were retaliated against.
Another key section of the bill would strengthen the Office of Special Counsel. OSC is the independent federal agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting federal employee complaints of whistleblower retaliation. Current law, however, limits OSC's ability to effectively enforce and defend whistleblower laws. For example, the law provides the OSC with no authority to request the Merit Systems Protection Board to reconsider one of its decisions or to seek appellate review of an MSPB decision. Even when another party petitions for a review of a MSPB decision, OSC is typically denied the right to participate in the proceedings.
Our bill would provide explicit authority for the Office of Special Counsel to appear in any civil action brought in connection with the whistleblower law. In addition, it would authorize OSC to obtain circuit court review of any MSPB order in a whistleblowing case if the OSC determines the Board erred and the case would have a substantial impact on the enforcement of the whisltleblower statute. In a letter to me addressing these provisions, special Counsel Elaine Kaplan said, ``I believe that these changes are necessary, not only to ensure OSC's effectiveness, but to address continuing concerns about the whittling away of the WPA's protections by narrow judicial interpretations of the law.'' I ask unanimous consent that the OSC letter be printed in the Record.
OSC currently has the authority to pursue disciplinary action against managers who retaliate against whistleblowers. However, Federal Circuit decisions, like LaChance, have undermined the agency's ability to successfully pursue such cases. The Special Counsel has said that ``change is necessary in order to ensure that the burden of proof in these cases is not so onerous as to make it virtually impossible to secure disciplinary action against retaliators.'' In addition to it being difficult to win, if the OSC loses a disciplinary case, it has to pay the legal fees of those against whom OSC initiates disciplinary action. In its letter, OSC said that ``the specter of having to pay large attorney fee awards . . . is a significant obstacle to our ability to use this important authority to hold managers accountable.'' Our bill addresses these problems by establishing a reasonable burden of proof for disciplinary actions and requiring the employing agency, not the OSC, to reimburse the prevailing party for attorney fees in a disciplinary proceeding.
Finally, the bill addresses a new issue that has arisen in connection with the recent enactment of the Homeland Security Act or HSA. To evaluate the vulnerability to terrorist attack of certain critical infrastructure such as chemical plants, computer networks and other key facilities, the HSA asks private companies that own these facilities to submit unclassified information about them to the government. In doing so, the law also created some ambiguity on the question of whether Federal employee whistleblowers would be protected by the WPA if they should disclose information that has been independently obtained by the whistleblower about such facilities but which may also have been disclosed to the government under the critical infrastructure information program.
While I believe it was Congress's intent to extend whistleblower protections to Federal employees who disclose such independently obtained information, the law's ambiguities are troublesome in the context of the tendency of the Federal Circuit to narrowly construe the scope of protections afforded by the WPA. Our bill would thus clarify that whistleblower protections do extend to Federal employees who disclose independently obtained information that may also have been disclosed to the government as part of the
critical infrastructure information program
We need to encourage Federal employees to blow the whistle on waste, fraud and abuse in Federal Government agencies and programs. These people take great risks and often face enormous obstacles in doing what they believe is right. The Congress and the country owe a particular debt of gratitude to those whistleblowers who put their careers on the line to protect national security. Since September 11, 2001, we have seen a number of examples of how crucial people like Coleen Rowley, Mark Hall and Bob Lindermann are to keeping our country safe. I request unanimous consent that a letter from Agent Rowley be printed in the Record. In the letter she says that when she blew the whistle, she was lucky enough to garner the support of many of her colleagues and members of Congress. However, her letter warns that for every Coleen Rowley, ``there are many more who do not benefit from the relative safety of public notoriety.'' It is to protect those responsible, courageous many that we offer this legislation. We need more like them.
I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record a section-by-section explanation of the bill.