Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized to proceed as though in morning business for 15 minutes, but prior to that I be able to yield to Senator Reed of Rhode Island for 5 minutes and that not be counted against my…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized to proceed as though in morning business for 15 minutes, but prior to that I be able to yield to Senator Reed of Rhode Island for 5 minutes and that not be counted against my time; and that I then be recognized after he is done.
Mr. President, the current situation in Iraq is deeply disturbing. The violence there is a human tragedy, and the resurgence of Al Qaeda-affiliated forces in Fallujah and elsewhere represents a threat not just to the people of Iraq but to our own security and that of our friends and allies in the region. So I very much share in concerns many of us have expressed about recent developments in Iraq.
The United States has announced it will expedite military assistance, including delivery of unmanned aerial vehicles and HELLFIRE missiles. That is appropriate. The administration has stepped up intelligence sharing to help Iraq security forces in their fight. That is appropriate. The administration is holding ongoing conversations with Iraq about other ways in which the United States might assist, and that is appropriate.
One form that assistance might take is in the sale of weapons such as attack helicopters to Iraq. The issue is not whether such aircraft would help Iraq fight violent extremists; they would. The question is whether the Maliki government would use those aircraft, for instance, only against violent extremists, and whether we receive credible assurances that such weapons will be used to target Iraq's real enemies and not to further sectarian political objectives. With credible assurances, it would be appropriate to provide Iraq such assistance.
What it is wrong to do is to blame the Obama administration for the political failures of Iraqi leaders. Blaming the administration for failures and decisions by the Iraqi Government ignores not only history, it also leads to policy approaches that would not be in our interest or in the interests of the Iraqi people.
For example, here is what Senator McCain and Senator Graham said recently:
When President Obama withdrew all U.S. forces from Iraq in
2011, over the objections of our military leaders and
commanders on the ground, many of us predicted that the
vacuum would be filled by America's enemies and would emerge
as a threat to U.S. national security interests. Sadly, that
reality is now clearer than ever.
That argument ignores some important history. First, it ignores the fact that the 2011 withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraq was not set by President Obama but by President Bush. In December of 2008, just before he left office, President Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi Government that called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in 2009, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. President Bush himself, standing next to Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad as they announced their agreement, said, ``The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.'' So the 2011 withdrawal date was set by President Bush, not by President Obama.
As to whether our military commanders objected to our withdrawal from Iraq, here is what happened: While there was no mention from President Bush or Prime Minister Maliki when they announced their agreement of a U.S. troop presence after 2011, Secretary Gates and others discussed the possibility of some U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after 2011. Then, during 2011, the Obama administration entered into negotiations with the Iraqi Government with the goal of keeping some U.S. troops, in limited roles, in Iraq to assist Iraqi security forces after the 2011 withdrawal date set by President Bush. I and many other Members of Congress supported the idea of continuing a smaller, specialized U.S. military assistance force. While there was disagreement in the administration over the size of a residual force, what decided the issue wasn't how many troops would remain; rather, it was the Iraqi Government's refusal to agree to legal protections for U.S. troops, whatever their number. In the absence of such protections, it was the opinion of the military leaders that no U.S. forces should remain in Iraq, regardless of whether the number was 3,500 or 20,000.
At a November 2011 Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked General Dempsey, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the importance of legal protections for our troops as part of any agreement to keep troops in Iraq after 2011. This is what the questions and answers were:
Sen. Levin: Are you willing to have those forces remain
without an agreement relative to immunity for those troops?
Gen. Dempsey: No, sir, I am not. . . . It was the
recommendation, advice and strong belief of the Joint Chiefs
that we should not leave service men and women there without
protections.
Sen. Levin: And why is that?
Gen. Dempsey: Because the--of the many institutions in Iraq
that are still evolving and immature. The Iraqi judicial
system is certainly among those. And we did not believe it
was--it was appropriate, prudent to leave service men and
women without judicial protections in a country that still
had the challenge, as we know it has, and a very immature
judicial system.
Later in that same hearing, I asked General Dempsey if our commanders on the ground in Iraq shared that opinion. He responded:
It was the topic of many secure video teleconferences and
engagements person to person. . . . I can state that they
also believed we needed the protections, both General Austin
and General Mattis, in order to leave our troops there.
Before our committee in February of 2013, General Austin, our commander on the ground in Iraq during the 2011 negotiations, testified that there were extensive discussions with Iraq about a continuing U.S. troop presence. He testified:
We worked with the Iraqi leadership all the way up until
the point in time when they decided they weren't going to be
able to give us the protections that we needed to keep our
troops there.
As Secretary Panetta put it before our committee, the key moment in the negotiations was ``once [the Iraqis] made the decision that they were not going to provide any immunities for any level of force that we would have there.''
So our military leaders were very much unwilling to leave any U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq if they could be subjected to the vicissitudes of the Iraqi judicial system. It is therefore wrong to say that the withdrawal took place ``over the objections of our military leaders.'' It was Iraq's refusal to grant important legal protections to our troops that decided the matter.
This criticism of the administration's Iraq policy also understates the importance of factors that have come to the forefront since the 2011 withdrawal. Foremost among these has been an Iraqi Government that has repeatedly pursued a sectarian agenda, disenfranchised Sunni Iraqis, failed to address Kurdish concerns over the status of Kirkuk and the hydrocarbons law, and alienated moderate Shia Iraqis who seek a more democratic and inclusive government. Prime Minister Maliki's governance shortfalls has stoked the sectarian tensions on which Al Qaeda and other extremist groups try to capitalize.
Many Members of Congress have made clear that it is extremely difficult to support more robust assistance to the Iraqi Government unless the Iraqi leadership places the good of their country ahead of sectarian politics and unless it produces a practical strategy for governing Iraq on a more inclusive and less sectarian basis.
For example, last October, I joined five colleagues--Senators McCain, Menendez, Corker, Inhofe, and Graham--in writing to President Obama, expressing our concern about deteriorating conditions in Iraq.
I ask unanimous consent that our October 29, 2013, letter be printed in the Record.
In our letter, written as Prime Minister Malaki was visiting Washington, we supported an increase in support for Iraq's counterterrorism efforts. But we made clear that the Iraqi Government must provide a practical plan for using such aid and provide assurances relative to whom advanced weapons would be used against. We wrote President Obama as follows:
It is in our national security interest to enhance the
effectiveness of Iraq's security forces, especially through
greater intelligence sharing. However . . . we must see more
evidence from Prime Minister Maliki that U.S. security
assistance and arms sales are part of a comprehensive Iraqi
strategy that addresses the political sources of the current
violence and seeks to bring lasting peace to the country.
We further wrote:
This leads us to the final and most important point that we
urge you to stress with Prime Minister Maliki: If he devises
and implements a real governance strategy for Iraq, the
United States is ready to provide the appropriate support to
help that strategy succeed.
And:
If Prime Minister Maliki continues to marginalize the
Kurds, alienate many Shia, and treat large numbers of Sunnis
as terrorists, no amount of security assistance will be able
to bring stability and security to Iraq.
It is a tragedy for the Iraqi people and a real security concern for the United States that Prime Minister Maliki has yet to produce a strategy for broadly based governance in Iraq. We should not forget the 2011 withdrawal date for American troops from Iraq was negotiated by President Bush. We should not forget the decision to reject an ongoing U.S. troop presence after 2011 was Iraq's, because of Iraq's refusal to assure us that our troops would have protections from Iraqi courts and prosecution. We should not forget that our military leaders supported the decision not to leave our troops in Iraq without legal protections from Iraqi prosecution. We should not forget that while an ongoing relationship is in our interests, no amount of military equipment from us will protect the Iraqi people if their government continues to place sectarian goals ahead of sound governance.
So we should use opportunities to assist Iraq in its struggle against violent extremism and for stability and security, but Iraq's fate ultimately rests with its people and their leaders.
I yield the floor.