Mr. President, day after day record-high oil and gasoline prices are hurting millions of American consumers and businesses. Unless we act, the record-high prices will continue to reverberate throughout our economy, increasing the prices of…
Mr. President, day after day record-high oil and gasoline prices are hurting millions of American consumers and businesses. Unless we act, the record-high prices will continue to reverberate throughout our economy, increasing the prices of transportation, food, manufacturing and everything in between, endangering the economic security of our people and our Nation.
The price of crude oil recently reached a record high price of about $147 per barrel. Sky-high crude oil prices have led to record highs in the price of other fuels produced from crude oil, including gasoline, heating oil, diesel fuel, and jet fuel. The national average price of gasoline is at a record high of about $4.11 per gallon. Jet fuel costs nearly $4.30 per gallon. The price of diesel fuel, which is normally less expensive than gasoline, has soared to a record high of nearly $4.85 per gallon.
Rising energy prices greatly increase the cost of getting to work and taking our children to school, traveling by car, truck, air and rail, and growing the food we eat and transporting it to market. Rising energy prices greatly increase the cost of producing the
medicines we need for our health, heating our homes and offices, generating electricity, and manufacturing industrial and consumer products. The relentless increase in jet fuel prices has caused airline layoffs, fare increases, and service cuts. ``If fuel continues to go up, this industry cannot survive in current form,'' the president of the Air Transport Association said recently. Rising diesel prices have placed a crushing burden upon our Nation's truckers, farmers, manufacturers, and other industries.
My Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has conducted four separate investigations into how our energy markets operate. Last December, we had a joint hearing with Senator Dorgan's Senate Energy Subcommittee on the role of speculation in rising energy prices. As a result of these investigations and hearings, I have proposed several measures to address the rampant speculation and lack of regulation of energy markets which have contributed to sky high energy prices.
These investigations have shown that one key factor in price spikes of energy is increased speculation in the energy markets. Traders are trading contracts for future delivery of oil in record amounts, creating a demand for paper contracts that gets translated into increases in prices and increasing price volatility.
Much of this increase in trading of futures has been due to speculation. Speculators in the oil market do not intend to use oil; instead they buy and sell contracts for crude oil in the hope of making a profit from changing prices. The number of futures and options contracts held by speculators has gone from around 100,000 contracts in 2001, which was 20 percent of the total number of outstanding contracts, to almost 1.2 million contracts, which represents almost 40 percent of the outstanding futures and options contracts in oil on NYMEX. Even this understates the increase in speculation, since the CFTC data classifies futures trading involving index funds as commercial trading rather than speculation.
There are now, as a result, 12 times as many speculative holdings as there were in 2001, while holdings of non-speculative or commercial futures and options are up but 3 times. According to the basic law of supply and demand, the more demand there is to buy futures contracts for the delivery of a commodity, the higher the price will be for those futures contracts.
Not surprisingly, therefore, this massive speculation that the price of oil will increase, together with the increase in the amount of purchases of futures contracts, has, in fact, helped increase the price of oil to a level far above the price that is justified by the traditional forces of supply and demand.
The president and CEO of Marathon Oil recently said, ``$100 oil isn't justified by the physical demand in the market. It has to be speculation on the futures market that is fueling this.'' Mr. Fadel Gheit, oil analyst for Oppenheimer and Company describes the oil market as ``a farce.'' ``The speculators have seized control and it's basically a free-for-all, a global gambling hall, and it won't shut down unless and until responsible governments step in.'' In January of this year, as oil hit $100 a barrel, Mr. Tim Evans, oil analyst for Citigroup, wrote ``the larger supply and demand fundamentals do not support a further rise and are, in fact, more consistent with lower price levels.'' At the joint hearing on the effects of speculation we held last December, Dr. Edward Krapels, a financial market analyst, testified, ``Of course financial trading, speculation affects the price of oil because it affects the price of everything we trade . . . It would be amazing if oil somehow escaped this effect.'' Dr. Krapels added that as a result of this speculation, ``There is a bubble in oil prices.''
The need to control speculation is urgent. The presidents and CEOs of major U.S. airlines recently warned about the disastrous effects of rampant speculation on the airline industry. The CEOs stated ``normal market forces are being dangerously amplified by poorly regulated market speculation.'' The CEOs wrote, ``For airlines, ultra-expensive fuel means thousands of lost jobs and severe reductions in air service to both large and small communities.''
As to reining in speculation, the first step to take is to put a cop back on the beat in all our energy markets to prevent excessive speculation, price manipulation, and trading abuses. In the spring of 2001, when my Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations began investigating our energy markets, the price of a gallon of gasoline had spiked upwards by about 25 cents over the course of the Memorial Day holiday. We subpoenaed records from major oil companies and interviewed oil industry experts, gas station dealers, antitrust experts, gasoline wholesalers and distributors, and oil company executives. We examined thousands of prices at gas stations in Michigan, Ohio, California, and other States. In the spring of 2002, I released a 400-page report and held 2 days of hearings on the results of the investigation.
The investigation found that increasing concentration in the gasoline refining industry, due to a large number of recent mergers and acquisitions, was one of the causes of the increasing number of gasoline price spikes. Another factor causing price spikes was the increasing tendency of refiners to keep lower inventories of gasoline. We also found a number of instances in which the increasing concentration in the refining industry was also leading to higher prices in general. Limitations on the pipeline that brings gasoline into my home State of Michigan were another cause of price increases and spikes in Michigan. The report recommended that the Federal Trade Commission carefully investigate proposed mergers, particularly with respect to the effect of mergers on inventories of gasoline.
The investigation discovered one instance in which a major oil company was considering ways to prevent other refiners from supplying gasoline to the Midwest so that prices would increase.
In March 2003, my subcommittee released a second report detailing how the operation of crude oil markets affects the price of not only gasoline, but also key commodities like home heating oil, jet fuel, and diesel fuel. The report warned that U.S. energy markets were vulnerable to price manipulation due to a lack of comprehensive regulation and market oversight.
For years I have been working with Senators Feinstein, Dorgan, Snowe, Bingaman, Cantwell, and others on legislation to restore some regulatory authority in the energy markets that had been exempted from regulation because of an ``Enron loophole'' that was inserted at the last minute into an omnibus appropriation bill in December 2000. For 2 years we attempted to close the Enron loophole, but efforts to put the cop back on the beat in these markets were unsuccessful, due to opposition from the Bush administration, large energy companies, and large financial institutions that trade energy commodities.
In June 2006, I released another subcommittee report, ``The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put a Cop on the Beat.'' This report found that the traditional forces of supply and demand didn't account for sustained price increases and price volatility in the oil and gasoline markets. The report concluded that, in 2006, a growing number of trades of contracts for future delivery of oil occurred without regulatory oversight and that market speculation had contributed to rising oil and gasoline prices, perhaps accounting for $20 out of a then-priced $70 barrel of oil.
That subcommittee report, again, recommended new laws to provide market oversight and stop excessive speculation and market manipulation. I coauthored legislation with Senators Feinstein, Snowe, Cantwell, Bingaman, and others to improve oversight of the unregulated energy markets. Once again, opposition from the Bush administration, large energy traders, and the financial industry prevented the full Senate from considering this legislation.
In 2007, my subcommittee addressed the sharp rise in natural gas prices and released a fourth report, entitled ``Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market.'' Our investigation showed that speculation by a single hedge fund named Amaranth had distorted natural gas prices during the summer of 2006, and drove up prices for average consumers. The report also demonstrated how Amaranth had shifted its speculative activity to unregulated markets to
avoid the restrictions and oversight in the regulated markets, and how Amaranth's trading in the unregulated markets contributed to price increases.
Following this investigation, I introduced a new bill, S. 2058, to close the Enron loophole and regulate the unregulated electronic energy markets. Working again with Senators Feinstein and Snowe, and with the members of the Agriculture Committee in a bipartisan effort, we finally managed to include an amendment to close the Enron loophole in the farm bill that was then being considered by the Senate. Although the CFTC's new enforcement authority over these electronic markets was effective upon passage of this legislation, much of the CFTC's new oversight authority will have to be implemented through CFTC rulemaking.
Although the legislation to close the Enron loophole is important to reduce speculation in energy markets, it is not sufficient because a significant amount of U.S. crude oil and gasoline trading now takes place in the United Kingdom, beyond the direct reach of U.S. regulators. So we have to address that second loophole too.
One of the key energy commodity markets for U.S. crude oil and gasoline trading is now located in London, regulated by the British agency called the Financial Services Authority, FSA. However, the British regulators traditionally have not imposed any limits on speculation like we do here in the United States, and the British do not make public the same type of trading data that we do, i.e. it is less transparent. This means that traders can avoid the limits on speculation in crude oil imposed on the New York exchanges by trading on the London exchange. This is what is referred to as ``the London loophole.''
The Stop Excessive Energy Speculation Act--Energy Speculation Act-- which the majority leader and others recently introduced to address high prices and reduce speculation, includes a number of provisions that will help stop rampant speculation and increase our access to timely and important trading information and ensure that there is adequate market oversight of the trading of U.S. energy commodities no matter where the trading occurs. One of the key provisions in the Energy Speculation Act would close the London loophole.
The Energy Speculation Act would close the London loophole by requiring the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC, to determine whether a foreign exchange imposes comparable speculative limits and comparable reporting requirements on speculators that the CFTC imposes on U.S. exchanges prior to allowing traders in the U.S. trading U.S. energy commodities to access that exchange through a terminal located in this country. It would also give the CFTC authority to take action, such as by requiring traders to reduce their holdings, in the event that traders exceed these limits.
The legislation in the Energy Speculation Act to close the London loophole is very similar to legislation I previously introduced with Senators Feinstein, Durbin, Dorgan and Bingaman, S. 3129, to close this loophole. The legislation we introduced was also incorporated into legislation introduced by Senator Durbin, S. 3130, which, like the provisions of the Energy Speculation Act, would give the CFTC more resources and to obtain better information about index trading and the swaps market.
After these two bills were introduced, the CFTC imposed more stringent conditions upon the ICE Futures Exchange's ability to operate in the United States--for the first time insisting that the London exchange impose and enforce comparable position limits in order to be allowed to keep its trading terminals in the United States. This is the very action our legislation called for.
Although the CFTC has taken these important steps that will go a long way towards closing the London loophole, Congress should still pass the legislation to make sure the London loophole is closed. The Energy Speculation Act would put into statute the conditions the CFTC has stated the London exchange must meet before it will allow it to operate its terminals in the United States, and it would ensure that the CFTC has clear authority to take action against any U.S. trader who is excessively speculating through the London exchange or manipulating the price of a commodity, including requiring that trader to reduce holdings.
There is also concern that some large traders may be avoiding the limits on holdings and accountability levels that apply to trading on the regulated futures exchanges by trading in the unregulated OTC market. In the absence of data or reporting on the activity in the OTC market, however, it is difficult to estimate the impact of this large amount of unregulated trading on commodity prices. Moreover, even if we were to get better information about unregulated over-the-counter trades, the CFTC has no authority to take action to prevent excessive speculation or price manipulation resulting from this unregulated trading.
The legislation to close the Enron loophole placed OTC electronic exchanges under CFTC regulation. However, this legislation did not address the separate issue of trading in the rest of the unregulated OTC market, which includes bilateral trades of swaps through voice brokers, swap dealers, and direct party-to-party negotiations.
I recently introduced, along with Senator Feinstein, the Over-the- Counter Speculation Act, legislation that addresses the rest of the OTC market, a large portion of which consists of the trading of swaps relating to the price of a commodity. Generally, commodity swaps are contracts between two parties where one party pays a fixed price to another party in return for some type of payment at a future time depending on the price of a commodity. Because some of these swap instruments look very much like futures contracts--except that they do not call for the actual delivery of the commodity--there is concern that the price of these swaps that are traded in the unregulated OTC market could affect the price of the very similar futures contracts that are traded on the regulated futures markets. We don't yet know for sure that this is the case, or that it is not, because we don't have any data or reporting on the trading of these swaps in the OTC market.
The Energy Speculation Act introduced by the Majority Leader and others includes this legislation to give the CFTC oversight authority to stop excessive speculation in the over-the-counter market. These provisions in the Energy Speculation Act and in our Over-the-Counter Speculation Act represent a practical, workable approach that will enable the CFTC to obtain key information about the OTC market to enable it to prevent excessive speculation and price manipulation.
This legislation will ensure that large traders cannot avoid the CFTC reporting requirements by trading swaps in the unregulated OTC market instead of regulated exchanges. It will ensure that the CFTC can take appropriate action, such as by requiring reductions in holdings of futures contracts or swaps, against traders with large positions in order to prevent excessive speculation or price manipulation regardless of whether the trader's position is on an exchange or in the OTC market. The approach in this bill is both practical and workable.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote to proceed to the Stop Excessive Energy Speculation Act. This legislation contains several important provisions that will address the problem of excessive speculation that has been contributing to high commodity prices.