State of the Union Address (Executive Session)
Mr. President, I wish to commend my colleague, Senator Max Baucus from Montana, before he leaves the Floor, for a very fine statement. I appreciate his thoughts and comments. I rise today to discuss my vote on the nomination of Judge…
Mr. President, I wish to commend my colleague, Senator Max Baucus from Montana, before he leaves the Floor, for a very fine statement. I appreciate his thoughts and comments.
I rise today to discuss my vote on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the United States Supreme Court. First of all, I wish to briefly comment on the cloture vote that occurred this afternoon. I voted not to invoke cloture on the nomination. I want to explain why.
As many of my colleagues know, I went through minor surgery to have a knee replacement before the holidays and I have been home in Connecticut recuperating. I looked forward to coming back to participate in the debate on the Judge Alito nomination and I followed the confirmation process closely from home. For this reason, I was somewhat stunned to learn that Senator Frist filed a cloture motion on the nomination a day after it was voted out of the Judiciary Committee.
I have been a member of this body for a quarter of a century and I have voted to confirm the majority of the judicial nominations that have come before this Senate. I, too, like my colleague from Montana, voted with enthusiasm for the nomination of Chief Justice Roberts only a few months ago. The majority leader's action was surprising to me. It is exceedingly rare that a cloture motion is filed on debate regarding a Supreme Court nomination. In is my experience, cloture motions have gotten filed when the majority got frustrated with the minority for insisting upon extending debate--beyond a reasonable period of time. In this case, I feel strongly that there has not been a reasonable period of debate, let alone an extended debate.
But I am only one Member. Certainly, this institution cannot wait for one Member. I was allocated only 5 minutes of time this afternoon to comment on this nomination. However, my flight was canceled out of Hartford, CT, and thus, I lost that small window of 5 minutes to be heard. I consider the matter of confirmation of a Supreme Court Justice with great seriousness and solemnity. In my view, some of the most important votes that we make in the Senate are to fill vacancies in the Judicial Branch, second only to declarations of war. Constitutional amendments are not far behind. Therefore, to be notified that I would have only 5 minutes to comment on the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice who will serve for life, far beyond the tenure of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, far beyond the tenure of a President of the United States, far beyond the tenure of a Senator or Congressman, I found rather disturbing.
We have always respected one another here, at least we try to, and to recognize this is the Senate, different entirely from the body down the hall. We are a bicameral body for good reason. This is the place where we spend a little more time evaluating issues that come before the Senate. To ask for a few more days to have discussion about the nominee that has provoked serious controversy in the country, seems little to ask.
Put aside the nominee for a second, put aside your decision to vote for or against the nominee, we should respect one another's desire to be heard on these matters. Tomorrow is the State of the Union, and there will be a photo opportunity for the President. I am deeply disturbed that this Senate may have made a decision to rush this nomination through, to invoke cloture, in order to provide a photo opportunity for a swearing-in ceremony prior to this President's State of the Union Message.
I note the presence of my good friend and colleague from Texas in the chair of the Presiding Officer. He serves on the Judiciary Committee. He watched the gavel-to-gavel hearing proceedings. While I was at home rehabilitating this knee, I had a chance to watch my colleagues do their job. The circumstances around this nomination have been complicated. The nomination came up after Harriet Miers withdrew. We had the Thanksgiving holiday and the recess coming up. In fact, the Judiciary Committee met when we were out of session. Obviously, the desire was to move this along. I have no objection to that. That seems to be a reasonable request to have the committee meet when it did. Certainly, we all had an opportunity to watch those proceedings.
The majority leader stated earlier than we have consumed an excessive amount of time on this nomination.
This statement is correct if we measure it by days on the calendar. If we measure it by days we have actually been here during the last couple of months, it is incorrect. We have been out of session. There have been only a limited number of days in session and only a limited number of votes. Obviously, the number of days that have been consumed since the nominee was presented to this Senate is more than usual due to the circumstances surrounding the nomination and holiday session.
I cannot allow the moment to pass without expressing my concerns about it and the rationale regarding why I voted against cloture. I would have preferred not to have voted on a cloture motion at all. If this were an extended debate, the majority leader might have been right to invoke cloture. I am troubled that now we are setting a new precedent for invoking cloture within only a short time after a nomination comes out of the committee.
Mr. President, I rise today to explain my vote on this nomination. Tomorrow, at 11 a.m., we are going to vote on the Alito nomination.
I would be remiss, obviously, if I did not thank the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Specter, and the minority ranking member, my good friend from Vermont, Senator Leahy, for the extraordinary service they have rendered to the Senate, along with their colleagues, during this nomination process.
Over the last several months, these members have managed three separate nominations to the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Roberts, Harriet Miers, and now Samuel Alito. They are to be congratulated for their commitment to fair hearings and for the manner in which they discharged their duties.
The Constitution, as we know, vests in this great body, the Senate, the privilege and the solemn responsibility to advise and give consent to the President on Supreme Court nominations--a unique role in our governance. The Framers intended for the Senate to take an active role in the confirmation process. However, the Constitution does not delineate the factors by which each Member of this body should determine the fitness of a judicial nominee to serve his or her lifetime appointment on the Federal bench. Thus, each Member of the Senate, each Senator, must determine for him or herself the acceptable criteria in judging a Supreme Court nominee.
I have never opposed a nominee solely because he or she holds different views than my own regarding the Constitution or the Court's role in interpreting or applying it. I have supported seven of the last nine nominees to the Supreme Court, including the current President's nomination of John Roberts to be our country's Chief Justice. As I said earlier, I did it with enthusiasm, having witnessed and gone through the process and watched the process of his confirmation hearing.
I, like many of my colleagues, have supported the overwhelming majority of the current President's judicial nominees. Of the current President's 230 judicial nominees, only 5 have failed to be confirmed, a rather remarkable record.
In the course of my Senate career, I have never imposed a litmus test while reviewing Supreme Court nominees. But, due to the nature of a lifetime appointment, I feel they are entitled to a higher level of scrutiny than other judicial nominees for the Federal bench.
I have three specific criteria that a Supreme Court must satisfy: First, I require that the nominee possess the technical and legal skills which we must demand of all Federal judges. Second, the nominee, in my view, must be of the highest character and credibility. And, finally, I vigorously examine the nominee's record to see whether he or she displays a commitment to equal justice for all under the law, in order to protect the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
Now, I waited until after the committee vote had occurred last week, and then, in an interview with my local press in Connecticut, indicated how I would vote on this nominee. I have always done that. I have always reserved the first judgment to be made by the committee. It seems to me to respect the committee process is very important, and the views of my colleagues are important to me. Whether I agree with them or not, I like to hear how they have arrived at their decisions.
So on Supreme Court nominees, I have never announced a view on a nominee until after the committee has completed its review. Hence, less than a week after the committee voted, I find myself having to rush to the floor to make a hurried statement on this nominee. I am denied the opportunity to debate back and forth with other members of the Senate.
I waited to make my decision because I felt that Judge Alito deserved a hearing before the Judiciary Committee. I felt that each of us who are not on the committee should have an opportunity to review the transcripts of that hearing and then engage, as nonmembers of the committee, in a discussion of the merits and demerits of this nominee. That has been denied this Member because of the cloture motion filed by the majority leader, provoking what I deeply regret that occurred only a few hours ago, and that was actually to have to vote on a cloture motion.
I did not like casting that vote. I did not want to vote for it, but I felt I deserved the opportunity to be heard. So I do not regret at all that I am a part of a very small minority that voted against cloture. I wish more Members had. But I wish the majority leader had not filed that cloture motion, which provoked the exact scene we saw unfold here a few hours ago.
Now, there is little question in my mind as to Judge Alito's intellectual competence and legal experience, and all of that. If this were the only criteria, I would be for him.
Judge Alito received his legal education from Yale University School of Law in my home State of Connecticut. He served as a Government attorney in a number of positions including: Assistant Solicitor General, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, and U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey under President Reagan. In 1990, Judge Alito was nominated by George H.W. Bush to U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. In the course of his 15 years on the Federal bench, Judge Alito has heard more than 3,000 cases. Furthermore, the American Bar Association has twice unanimously awarded Judge Alito with their highest rating of ``well qualified.'' I have great respect and admiration for his intellect, legal experience, and service to the American people as part of the Judicial Branch.
``Next, I turn to character and creditability. The question is: Does Judge Alito possess the qualities of mind and temperament expected of a Supreme Court Justice? I do not question whether Judge Alito is personally decent or if he has integrity. I was impressed by the diverse group of former clerks and colleagues who testified before the Judiciary Committee who could not have given him higher praise.
Let me also say I know there were questions raised. I listened carefully regarding these concern including those regarding the Concerned Alumni of Princeton and the recusal issues that were raised by a number of committee members on the Judiciary Committee. These questions, while relevant, and certainly need to be explored, would not have decided my vote on this nominee. I do not minimize it. But if my decision were to be based solely on the recusal question or Judge Alito's membership in the Concerned Alumni of Princeton issue, I would be here supporting this nomination.
Those are not the most important issues to this Member. But what is important are other issues that were raised during this nomination. Indeed, I am troubled that throughout Judge Alito's hearings, Judge Alito failed to provide clear and germane responses to legitimate questions.
A few examples. For instance, when Senator Schumer, our colleague from New York, asked Judge Alito if he still believed his statement from the 1985 memo that said the ``Constitution does not protect the right to an abortion,'' rather than reply with a simple yes or no answer, Judge Alito deflected the question and instead replied, ``The answer to the question is that I would address the issue in accordance with the judicial process as I understand it and as I have practiced it.''
When Senator Feinstein of California asked Judge Alito if Roe v. Wade was the settled law of the land--not an unpredictable question, a fair one, one you might ask about Brown v. Board of
Education, Griswold v. Connecticut, and there is a long list of cases that are considered established law, settled law--when she asked the nominee whether Roe v. Wade--one in that litany of cases--is settled law, instead of answering it directly one way or the other, as Justice Roberts did, in very unequivocal terms--others might have said absolutely not; that would have been a very straightforward answer-- what did we hear? He said--this is reminiscent of some comments that were heard earlier--``I think it depends on what one means by the term `well settled.' ''
When Senator Durbin of Illinois asked the same question, Judge Alito offered the convoluted response: ``It is--if settled means that it can't be re-examined, then that's one thing. If settled means that it is a precedent then that is entitled to respect of stare decisis . . . then it is a precedent that is protected, entitled to respect under the doctrine of stare decisis in that way.''
Imagine giving that answer to Brown v. Board of Education. Imagine giving that answer to the long list of cases we now have as settled law. Now, the answer is, as Justice Roberts said: ``It is settled law''. But what you have here with Judge Alito is this dance going on here, instead of a direct yes or no. A no answer would have been a very honest answer. In fact, I suspect that is what his answer is, but he did not have the courage, in my view, to say that, which I would have respected. I might have disagreed with it, but I would have respected it. That is troublesome to me.
Finally, I think we should vigorously examine the nominee to see whether he or she is capable of and committed to upholding the Constitution of the United States and its promise of freedom and equality for all. Protecting the constitutional rights of all Americans is perhaps the most fundamental duty of a Supreme Court Justice. Therefore, I am deeply concerned in his 1985 memo Judge Alito explained that his interest in constitutional law was ``motivated in large part by disagreement with Warren Court decisions, particularly in the areas of criminal procedure, the Establishment Clause, and reapportionment.''
That is a fairly sophisticated answer in 1985. Many of these decisions, of course, compromise the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence, in enforcing the fundamental democratic principle of one person, one vote, in preventing the violation of an individual's privacy by the state--a matter that concerns everybody in this country; we see a lot of it going on today--and in ensuring procedural fairness in criminal trials. To wholeheartedly reject this legacy is also to reject the continued pursuit of the constitutional ideals of liberty and equality, in my view.
Before the Judiciary Committee, Judge Alito defended himself by saying he wrote the comments 20 years ago. Twenty years ago, he was well into his thirties. This is not some 18-year-old who is writing these thoughts. Of course, before becoming a judge, in that case, he was merely outlining the development of his thinking about constitutional law at the time and pledged to keep an ``open mind'' if confirmed to the Supreme Court. Well, that is nice to know. I am glad to hear he is going to have an open mind.
The seven current and former members of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated Judge Alito is ``not an ideologue,'' ``has no agenda,'' and ``is attentive and respectful of all views and is keenly aware that judicial decisions are not academic exercises but have far-reaching consequences on people's lives.'' I think those were certainly worthwhile comments to make, and certainly the comments of his fellow peers on the court I found to be compelling arguments on his behalf. However, I must say, having said all of that--I respect the fact they said it in our hearings--Judge Alito's long record as a Third Circuit judge, particularly in cases involving questions of individual rights, indicates a personal intent on stripping away many of these so-called Warren Court era achievements. In Reynolds v. Simms, for instance, Justice Warren wrote:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice
is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government. And the right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting
the free exercise of the franchise.
Yet, in Jenkins v. Manning, Judge Alito was part of a decision to dismiss a suit brought by African-American voters who argued that the district's voting system diluted the voting strength of minorities. In that case, the dissenters argued that the decision failed to give effect to ``the broad sweep of the Voting Rights Act.''
Judge Alito's long record of opinions and dissents in these, and other divided cases lead me to believe that he has a legal philosophy which lies outside the mainstream. Several newspapers and scholars provided support for this concern. One study conducted by University of Chicago Professor Cass Sunstein, found that when there was a conflict between institutions and individual rights, Judge Alito's dissenting opinions supported the institutional interest over individual rights 84 percent of the time. Moreover, 91 percent of Alito's dissents take positions more conservative than his colleagues--including those appointed by Presidents Bush and Reagan.
Judge Alito has set an incredibly high standard for individuals to meet when bringing a claim against the Government or a Corporation. He has repeatedly dissented in cases where the majority has ruled in favor of an individual alleging racial or gender discrimination. In Bray v. Marriott Hotels, for example, a housekeeper manager alleged that she was denied a promotion because she was black. While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had established the essential elements of a case of race discrimination and therefore was entitled to go to trial by a jury, Judge Alito dissented. He argued for a heightened evidentiary burden in order to protect employers who, in the future, would have to choose between--and I quote--``competing candidates of roughly equal qualifications and the candidate who is not hired or promoted claims discrimination.'' The majority again criticized Alito's approach stating that ``Title VII would be eviscerated if our analysis were to halt where the dissent suggests.''
I also fear that if confirmed, Judge Alito may pose a threat to the laws that protected disabled citizens from discrimination. In Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania the majority held that the plaintiff, a victim disabled by a terrible car accident, should be allowed to present, to the jury, evidence that the college had failed to make reasonable accommodation for her disability. Alito dissented, and again the majority reacted strongly to Alito's analysis: ``few if any Rehabilitation Act cases would survive summary judgment if such an analysis were applied to each handicapped individual's request for accommodations.''
But, I am especially troubled about Judge Alito's dissent in the Third Circuit Case of Chittester v. Department of Community and Economic Development. That case involved an employee who was fired while taking sick leave and who sought to enforce his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which became law in 1993. I was the original author of this law which has enabled more than 50 million workers to take leave for medical reasons or to care for a child or family member. A primary objective of the act is to ensure that both male and female workers have access to leave, and that they were not punished or discriminated against because of their family responsibilities. However, Judge Alito found that the law was not a valid exercise of Congressional power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. He said:
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which the Family
Medical Leave Act is said to enforce, the Family Medical
Leave Act does much more than require nondiscriminatory sick
leave practices; it creates a substantive entitlement to sick
leave.
The decision reflects a proscriptively narrow conception of what ``equal protection'' required. Real equality cannot be achieved, and the very real effects of discrimination cannot be remedied, without meaningful, substantive action. This is precisely why Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act. The Supreme Court recognized this in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs. In a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that contrary to what Judge Alito said in Chittester, a worker can sue a State employer who fired
him for taking family leave to care for his sick wife. This finding is critical to ensure that workers and their families can continue to take leave without fearing for their job. This right might be jeopardized if Judge Alito is confirmed, as during the hearing Judge Alito continued to reject evidence of discrimination in personal sick leave even though there is compelling evidence in the legislative history of this law.
In these cases, the very judges who talked about our nominee as being fair and not being an ideologue, in their majority opinions had very different things to say about their colleague on some very critical cases on which this Appellate Court Judge reached different opinions, such as I have cited here, as well as in several others that came before that circuit.
I am also concerned about Judge Alito's ruling regarding the Family and Medical Leave Act, which I authored. The Family Medical Leave Act has provided meaningful relief to millions of Americans. Judge Alito would have made significant changes, if not eliminated the law altogether, a great setback, in my view. The Supreme Court strongly overruled his decision.
Finally, I am troubled that the rights of privacy which are so deeply valued by Americans could be eroded by a Justice on the bench who does not appreciate the importance of these issues.
I am alarmed by Judge Alito's unwillingness to explain his previous statements on the unitary executive theory of Presidential power. In a November 2000 speech to the Federalist Society, Judge Alito expressed strong support for the unitary executive theory calling it ``Gospel according to the Office of Legal Counsel'' referring to the position he held in the Reagan Justice Department. Proponents of this theory believe that the Constitution vests in the executive complete control over the administrative and regulatory branches. Judge Alito's failure to shed any light on his professed support for a powerful, unitary executive is troubling. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the executive power must have reasonable limits, asserting that ``a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.'' Judge Alito refused to comment on O'Connor's statement, and instead remarked that ``no person is above the law, and that includes the President.'' Unlike Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearing, Judge Alito did not identify an affirmative obligation of the courts to block an executive action if the Executive acts unconstitutionally. Judge Alito' s answer fails to adequately explain in any substantial way, his views on limitations to executive power.
This failure is of particular significance given the current political landscape. President Bush and his lawyers adopted an expansive interpretation in their view of executive power, particularly in relation to the War on Terror and the conflict in Iraq. In fact, President Bush has cited the ``unitary executive'' theory in several recent instances to override congressional provisions he finds objectionable. I am disturbed that the President has claimed, for himself, the authority to overrule the will of the Congress in passing its antitorture legislation--legislation which received the overwhelming support of congressional Members. This undermines the separation of powers and democratic principles. I am further troubled that in the course of the Judiciary Committee hearing, Judge Alito did not adequately distance himself from the current administration's belief that this theory provides justification for the NSA to engage in the warrantless wirewrapping of U.S. citizens in defiance of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and for the detention of U.S. citizens accused of being enemy combatants.
Defining permissible boundaries of Presidential power is among the most pressing of today's constitutional questions, and will almost inevitably arrive before the Supreme Court in the years to come. It is for this reason that Judge Alito' s inability to shed light on his past comments and his current beliefs is so significant. These failures call into question whether Judge Alito has sufficiently demonstrated that his jurisprudential philosophy allows for the degree of respect for democratic checks and balances, and the protection of individual rights and freedoms that the Constitution--and the public--demands.
A Supreme Court Justice influences the most critical issues facing this and future generations of Americans. I believe that the Court may now be at a pivotal point in which the future direction of our law is at stake. Judge Alito, if confirmed, will take the seat of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the Supreme Court. While all Supreme Court Justices have the same unique obligation--to serve as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, the rule of law, and the rights and liberties of every individual citizen--Justice O'Connor has long provided a voice of reason and open-mindedness as she has carried out this weighty responsibility. With a moderate temperament and judicial independence, Justice O'Connor has often supplied the deciding vote to protect fundamental American rights and freedoms. We cannot underestimate how much is at stake in filling this critical seat on the Court.
When I spoke on this floor regarding the nomination of Chief Justice John Roberts, I stated that for those of us concerned about keeping America strong, free and just, his confirmation was no easy matter. However, I ultimately concluded that although he was a conservative nominee, Judge Roberts was within the mainstream of judicial thinking-- in his judicial philosophy, his respect for precedent and his belief that the Constitution cannot be read as a document frozen in time. While his responses to questions in the Judiciary Committee may not have been as open as I had hoped, I decided that there was sufficient evidence to believe that he would honor and protect the individual rights and freedoms enshrined in our Constitution as the majority of his record showed him to be a persuasive advocate for his clients rather than a radical judge out of the mainstream of judicial thought.
I regret to say that, having reviewed his judicial record and his responses to the committee, I cannot be convinced that Judge Alito falls within the judicial mainstream. His evasiveness in the face of questioning by the committee, his established record on the bench of taking a restrictive view of individual rights, and his inability to explain his past comments on executive power all lead me to harbor significant concern. Determining whether to confirm a nominee to the Supreme Court is never an easy decision. Whether a nominee is sufficiently within the mainstream of judicial thinking is often a question of degree. While Judge Alito is clearly intellectually qualified and legally experienced, I am not convinced that Judge Alito's judicial philosophy will allow for the faithfulness to the constitutional rights and freedoms, and the protection of equality before the law we have come to expect from a Supreme Court Justice.
After a review of Judge Alito's extensive record, his decisions as a judge on the Third Circuit, and his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I must oppose this nomination. I have concluded that Judge Alito's judicial temperament is out of step with our fundamental constitutional values and that his confirmation would not be in the best interests of the United States.
So, Mr. President, for the reasons I have stated, I will oppose this nomination. I say this with regret because it will only be the fourth occasion in 25 years I will have voted against a nominee for the Supreme Court. I will do so tomorrow at 11 a.m.
I deeply regret that I didn't have the opportunity to engage in a fuller discussion. It is somewhat disturbing, that I was only allocated 20 minutes. Because of the constraints on time, this is all this Senator can say about a lifetime appointment to a coequal branch of Government, a nominee that will have a huge impact on the course of America in the 21st century.
I yield the floor.