Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from California, I came over to hear my colleague's remarks. I appreciate her courtesy. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the nomination of John Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the…
Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from California, I came over to hear my colleague's remarks. I appreciate her courtesy.
Mr. President, I rise to speak on the nomination of John Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
Let me begin, briefly, by stating what this nomination and debate is not about. It is not about reform at the United Nations. There is not a single Member of this body who I know of who does not agree with the notion that we ought to be doing everything we can to make the United Nations a stronger institution, a more meaningful one, in today's world, where more direct actions can be taken where problems exist around the world to make it more efficient, to function better. All of us agree with that, and all of us agree that whoever assumes this position as ambassador from the United States to the U.N. ought to play a critical role in that effort. That is not in question here. That is not a matter of debate.
What is also not a matter of debate is the style of the particular nominee in question. I think all of us in this city certainly respect the fact that some people's style is a little more brusque than others, can be a little more blunt
than others. I do not know of anyone, certainly on this side of the aisle--or that side, for that matter--who disagrees with a nominee because they do not particularly like their style, although they may have been particularly rough on some employees. We may not applaud it. We may not like it. We may think it is unwise and bad management style. But almost nobody in this Chamber on either side has objections to this nominee solely because of the question of reform at the United Nations or whether Mr. Bolton's style is objectionable or not.
My objection to this nomination focuses on one single issue. Members will have to decide for themselves whether they think this issue is of such importance that it would disqualify Mr. Bolton from the position he has now been nominated to or allow him to go forward.
The facts are no longer in debate. It is often said in this Chamber, you are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts. The facts are overwhelming in terms of the allegation that Mr. Bolton, whatever his motivations may have been--and I suspect I know what they were--decided that because he disagreed with some intelligence analysts, he wanted them removed from their jobs.
I have never objected, nor would I--in fact, I agree with my colleague from Michigan who spoke so eloquently, that, in fact, there ought to be more debate between policy centers and intelligence analysts. What was missing during the debate on Iraq, as to the issue of weapons of mass destruction, was the absence of debate between policymakers and intelligence analysts. None of us, that I know of, disagree with the notion that there ought to be more debate. Where policy setters disagree with intelligence analysis, they ought to express that objection and tell people they think it is wrong. But if you go beyond just disagreeing, if you go beyond forceful debate, if you reach down and decide you are going to remove or try to remove an intelligence analyst from their position because you don't like what they are saying to you, that then crosses a line.
I don't care whether it is a Democratic administration or a Republican one. If this body, by a vote of confirmation says to a person who seeks the position of ambassador to the United Nations, that even though you have tried to fire intelligence analysts because you disagreed with their analysis, then I think we send a dreadful signal at the very time in the world that our credibility on intelligence is in question.
We all know that to be the case, regrettably. We have been through a dreadful period where intelligence was very wrong in assuming there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. So the issue for this Senator is, did Mr. Bolton do this or not? And if he did, why are we even considering this nomination? Because anyone, regardless of the administration, their political persuasion or ideology, who tries to fire people, not debate, not disagree with them, not reprimand some higher official because he disagrees with what they are saying, but to reach down and fire an analyst at the CIA or the Department of State because you don't like what they were telling you, in my view, crosses a line.
This body has an obligation to the American public to stand up and say: We will not tolerate that.
This is far more important than Mr. Bolton. It is far more important even than this President or this Congress.
The issue goes far beyond any individuals. It goes to the heart of whether we are going to have credible intelligence which we, as Members of Congress, can believe, and our allies around the world, and from those we seek to find support on various foreign policies who will understand the purposes for which we are seeking their support. That is what I worry about more than anything else.
Yesterday I spoke on the floor about the availability of information. The reason I had requested, and that we have an expedited version of a cloture motion, doesn't have to do with whether or not Mr. Bolton should have an up or down vote. I want to have an up or down vote on Mr. Bolton. But I also believe this body has a right to information.
When the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee are deprived the opportunity to read the names on the intelligence intercepts, the names Mr. Bolton could see, that his staff could see, but that the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the ranking member, the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee are deprived the opportunity to see, then we are not getting the information we ought to have in order to make an intelligent decision.
The only vehicle I have available to me is to say, I am going to insist upon a 60-vote criteria unless you give us the information. It is 11:20. I am still waiting. There is no reason for us to have to have a cloture vote this afternoon. Instead, we can have a simple up-or-down vote on Mr. Bolton at 6 o'clock tonight, if in the next hour or two the administration would release those names to the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, and the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the information Senator Biden is seeking regarding the matter of the supposed weapons of mass destruction in Syria. There are not a lot of documents. It wouldn't take much time. But if we can't get those documents, if we are not being allowed to see the very things the nominee had a right to see, then I don't think we are being treated as a coequal branch of Government that has a right, through the appropriate means, with the appropriate members. I am not suggesting every member of the committees should see these names, but that the appropriate people we have designated historically have access to that kind of information for a nomination such as the one before us.
I am still hopeful that will happen. I am not so naive as to be unaware of what we have just been through in the debate about filibusters on Federal judges. I would not have brought up this nomination right now in the wake of that. I thought we were going to deal with Federal judges, not the nominee to the United Nations. But the majority, as is its right, sets the agenda. They have asked this Congress, this Senate to debate the issue of Mr. Bolton.
I am put in the position of saying: I guess after all of this you can do what you want and deny us that information. I would hope some of my Republican friends, despite the fact they are going to vote for Mr. Bolton, would vote with us on the cloture motion. I took some interest in the fact that even on the House Republican side, the difficulty that major committees of the Congress, both the House and the Senate, are having in getting information from this administration is growing. If we don't at some point stand up for our rights as a constitutionally designated coequal branch of Government, then this administration will receive the message that we don't care about this and that we can deny this Congress anything we want and they will do nothing about it.
So aside from how you feel about Mr. Bolton, yes or no, it is important for this institution to stand up for its rights and to demand this information as we have a right to.
I am hopeful we can still get the information and not have to go through a cloture vote at 6 o'clock this evening.
Let me get back to the subject matter of Mr. Bolton himself. The reasons for my concern are primarily focused on one issue. That is, of course, whether Mr. Bolton tried to fire people within the CIA and the State Department because he did not like the analysis they were giving him.
What is extraordinary about this nomination, first and foremost, is the number of people on whom we have relied, considering their status, who oppose this nomination. I would like to read the names. I am not suggesting all of these people are opposed to Mr. Bolton, but the basis upon which we have determined that Mr. Bolton tried to fire two intelligence analysts relied primarily on the names on this particular chart. I want to read the names and the positions they hold. It was these individuals, more than anything else, who made a significant difference in our conclusions that Mr. Bolton had, in fact, tried to fire these individuals.
John McLaughlin was the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
These individuals are either presently members of the Bush administration, this President, or were formerly members of the Bush administration.
Larry Wilkerson was chief of staff to Secretary Colin Powell; Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. The dates of their service are here. They are all dates that run roughly 2002, 2003, up to the present time, or just a month or so ago.
Stuart Cohen, Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; Alan Foley, head of the CIA's Office of Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control; Jamie Miscik, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA; Thomas Hubbard, United States Ambassador to South Korea, a Bush appointee; John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Tom Fingar, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Christian Westermann, analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Neil Silver, Office Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; INR supervisor, we don't use his name here, the immediate supervisor of Mr. Westermann; Fred Fleitz, acting chief of staff of John Bolton; Wil Taft, Department of State legal advisor; and a Department of State attorney whose name we are not using as well in the office of legal advisor.
These are 15 individuals either presently serving in the Bush administration or having previously served. It is on them that we relied. It is their damning statements that confirm without any question that Mr. Bolton essentially tried to have these intelligence analysts fired. They also provided other damaging information.
I have been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 24 years. Those who have served with me know it is rare, indeed, for this member to get up and object to a Presidential nomination, particularly one that is not a lifetime appointment. In fact, as my colleagues who have served with me for some time know, I have been one of only a handful who have supported nominees of Republican administrations. I was one of two Democrats who supported John Tower when he was nominated to be Secretary of Defense under President Bush's father. I supported John Ashcroft in the first administration of the current President Bush, one of only a handful of Democrats who did that.
I tried to recall an instance when I have taken such a strong objection to another nominee in 24 years. I can't recall one that has gone this far. I have had my objections to others, but they usually didn't reach this particular point. So it is uncomfortable for me to come to the floor to engage, over almost the last 2 months, in this nomination. But when you add the names of 102 former ambassadors, 15 present or former members of the Bush administration, these are not Democrats, these are not some left-wing organizations that are out there objecting to John Bolton. These are serious people who do a serious job, many of them career officials who have served our country with great distinction over the years. These individuals are the ones on whom we relied to draw their conclusion.
I am going to share with my colleagues their statements, not mine, not the names of some Democrats who might have some political motivation but, rather, people who care about our country, care about the United Nations, believe it needs reform, believe we need a strong person there to engage in that kind of reform, but believe John Bolton is not the person who ought to be receiving the nomination.
The committee did an extensive review of all the allegations related to this nominee. Committee staff, on a bipartisan basis, conducted more than 30 interviews of individuals with knowledge of the nominee. There was excellent cooperation on the part of most of those staff we sought to interview. I believe the work of this Senate has been assisted by these individuals who courageously came forward to answer questions and provide information that in many cases they would rather not have done. These individuals did not want to speak ill of another Republican or a former colleague. But they acted as dutiful citizens, patriots, and cooperated with the committee's efforts to fully explore matters related to the nomination of John Bolton. Regardless of how this Senate disposes of this nomination, these individuals have done a service to our country. We should honor them for doing so, for having the courage to come forward and to be honest when asked questions about this nominee.
Mr. Bolton's behavior clearly troubled a number of people who have worked directly with him over the last number of years.
Former Assistant Secretary of State Carl Ford, a self-proclaimed conservative Republican, described Mr. Bolton as ``the quintessential kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy.'' He also labeled Mr. Bolton a ``serial abuser.''
We did not hear from any people disabusing the committee of that view. That he has an abusive management style is problematic, but as I said at the outset, that would not be justification for voting against Mr. Bolton to be the ambassador to the United Nations. This is not about style. It is not about reform of the U.N. It is about whether this individual tried to fire intelligence analysts in his position as Under Secretary of State.
However, when Mr. Bolton harnesses that management style of his, as he has over the last 4 years, to affect intelligence judgments or to stifle the consideration of alternative policy opinions, then I think he has crossed the line over what is acceptable behavior. Why? Because those actions go directly to the heart of the integrity of U.S. intelligence and the firewall that must exist between policy and intelligence to ensure the integrity of that intelligence. Again, I emphasize, this is not about a disagreement. It is not about a policymaker disagreeing with an intelligence analyst.
Intelligence analysts do not speak ex cathedra. They are not sitting there coming to conclusions that we ought not to question. That is legitimate. In fact, we need more questioning. The issue is whether one ought to go beyond questioning and decide to remove someone because you disagree with their conclusions.
When this committee convened last month to consider the matter, we had irrefutable evidence--this is not conjecture--and this body has to decide whether you are going to send this man forward in the face of irrefutable evidence that on 5 different occasions over the past 48 months, Mr. Bolton tried to have 2 intelligence analysts removed from their jobs--one at the State Department and one at the CIA--because these individuals would not clear the language Mr. Bolton wanted to use, which was not supported by available intelligence.
I emphasize another point that needs to be made. When Mr. Bolton speaks as John Bolton, he can say whatever he wants. But when he gets up and says, ``I am speaking on behalf of the United States,'' then there is a different standard. When you speak on behalf of our country, you cannot just say anything you want. You have to rely on the best intelligence we have. You may disagree with that and you can fight over it, but in the final analysis you cannot offer your own opinions when you are expressing them as the U.S. views. You can say John Bolton believes this. If Mr. Bolton wants to speak to the Heritage Foundation and say, ``I believe the following,'' I may think he is profoundly wrong, but I would fight with my life for John Bolton to be able to say it. That is first amendment rights.
It is when Mr. Bolton gets up and says, ``I am speaking on behalf of the United States of America and I want to say the following,'' and then he absolutely contradicts what is being concluded by the intelligence analysts here, at that point, it seems to me he has a higher responsibility than he has shown.
Carl Ford's testimony was a watershed for me. Never in my 24 years as a Senator have I ever witnessed one high-ranking, former administration official testify as vociferously and as strongly as Mr. Ford did against a colleague. That is exactly what he did last month. Carl Ford made it clear why he did so. He believed Mr. Bolton's actions caused a chill among his intelligence analysts--so much so that the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had to buck up the employees to assure them that they should not succumb to political pressure.
Because we have talked a lot about this, I used this chart in the Foreign
Relations Committee. I realize from a distance it looks like a lot of spaghetti. What it amounts to is the chart of the positions of the State Department, beginning with the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State, Chief of State, Executive Secretary, and the various Under Secretary positions here. The third one is Mr. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. That is his responsibility, this group right here. He was in charge of the people who worked in this particular column.
Where did that intelligence analyst work? He worked down here. You have to go way down to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford, who was head of the INR. This intelligence analyst was down here; that is where Mr. Westermann worked. He was not directly in Mr. Bolton's line of command, but in a separate division. He is a GS-14 at this level.
You need to understand what happened here. This was a case where Mr. Bolton doesn't get ahold of Mr. Ford and say: I have a problem with your intelligence analyst because I disagree with what he said. I think he is wrong and I want to argue about it.
Mr. Bolton reaches down out of his line and drags this guy up to his office and begins to berate him for the job he has done. That is objectionable to me, and outrageous. If it ended there, that is dreadful behavior and nobody ought to do that without clearing what you want to say with the people who are responsible for that individual's work. If it ended there, maybe I would just vote against the nominee and I would not make the case on that basis alone. It is what happens afterward. It is not just berating. There is no doubt that there would be chill in the Department if an Under Secretary of State dragged an intelligence analyst to his office and word goes out. As we all know, in institutions the word flies around immediately. One of our fellow workers has been dragged up to the Under Secretary's office and screamed at because he didn't like his conclusions. That is why Colin Powell, the guy at the top, had to go down to these offices--down here on the chart--and explain to them that they did the right thing. You, Mr. Westermann, did the right thing. You are not supposed to succumb to political pressure. You tell people what they think they need to hear, and if they don't like it and disagree with you, that is one thing. But you did the right thing. It was wrong by implication, because why would the Secretary of State go down here and bring these analysts together and remind them that they had done their job if he felt Mr. Westermann being dragged up to Mr. Bolton's office was not wrong? That is why the Secretary of State did that. He went down there to tell those people not to worry about this, do your jobs. I think the Secretary was worried that the word would go out to these analysts that if you don't want to get in trouble, start to agree with Mr. Bolton when he disagrees with you; that is the easy thing to do. If he tells the analyst you ought to say the following, you better say that. If you do, you won't be brought up to his office and bellowed at. That is dangerous and that is one of the reasons we have such concern about this nomination.
As I said, this was the conclusion of Secretary Powell, according to Mr. Wilkerson, his chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson, who was the chief of staff of Secretary Powell, testified before the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee the following: Secretary Powell ``went down into the bowels of the building and talked to people about not being inhibited by, or in any way fearful of, people on the seventh floor, or leadership in general, questioning their analyses or their statements or whatever.''
Mr. Bolton had a very selective recollection about his interactions and intentions with respect to intelligence analysts at the State Department and the CIA during his appearance before the committee.
Mr. Bolton told the committee:
I didn't seek to have these people fired. I didn't seek to
have discipline imposed on them. I said, ``I've lost trust in
them.'' And are there other portfolios they could follow. It
wasn't anything to me that I followed at great length. I made
my point and moved on.
Committee staff interviews and review of State and CIA documents paint a very different picture indeed. What is that picture?
First, with respect to Mr. Westermann. Six months after this event I have described on the chart with--this run-in occurred, Mr. Bolton was still seeking to have Mr. Westermann removed from his job as the biological weapons expert analyst at the Intelligence and Research Division of the State Department.
Mr. Bolton's recollection about what he did with respect to the CIA analyst was likewise clouded on April 11. As to the so-called ``Mr. Smith,'' as we called him to protect identity, Mr. Bolton said:
I had one part of one conversation with one person one time
on ``Mr. Smith,'' and that was it. I let it go.
We now know that much more than that occurred. Let me lay it out for you.
In addition to a meeting with the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, we now know from e-mails that Mr. Bolton considered raising the matter directly with the Director of the CIA, George Tenet. We know as well that he continued to conspire with former Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich and his office for a period of 4 months after he first ``lost confidence'' in ``Mr. Smith'' to have him removed from his job.
Also under consideration by Mr. Reich and Bolton were other punitive measures--we know this now--such as denial of country clearance for Mr. Smith's official travel throughout Latin America, banning him from all meetings held in their bureaus. And the ultimate act of pettiness-- consider revoking his State Department building pass.
I am not making this stuff up. He said he had ``one part of one conversation with one person one time, and I let it go.''
Hardly. The facts are overwhelming here regarding what he tried to do both at the State Department and the CIA.
We have also learned that other intelligence analysts were having difficulties with Mr. Bolton's office.
Jami Miscik, Deputy Director for Intelligence, 2002 to 2005, in the Bush administration, told the committee staff that Mr. Bolton had a reputation for being difficult to deal with. She noted that ``interaction between policymakers and the intelligence community usually goes more smoothly than it often did . . . in the cases with Mr. Bolton . . . It is rare that . . . a single policymaker is known for having . . . pretty regularly contentious kinds of issues in this regard.''
We know as well that expert intelligence officials disapproved of and resisted Mr. Bolton's efforts to ``cherry-pick'' intelligence for ideological purposes.
Dean Hutchings, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 2003 to 2005, described the ``cherry-picking'' problem in the context of what Mr. Bolton wanted the Intelligence Committee to bless with respect to Syria's weapons of mass destruction capabilities:
Mr. Bolton took isolated facts and made much more of them
to build a case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It
was a sort of cherry picking of little factoids and little
isolated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest
possible case.
We also know that Deputy Secretary Armitage didn't trust Mr. Bolton's judgments when it came to making public speeches. We have heard this from others, such as George Voinovich, as well as Carl Levin, as well as Barbara Boxer and others, who have spoken on this matter.
Mr. Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff, told the committee:
There were problems on a number of occasions with Under
Secretary Bolton's proposed remarks. . . . The Deputy, Mr.
Armitage, made a decision and communicated that decision to
me, that John Bolton would not give any testimony, nor would
he give any speech, that wasn't cleared first by Rich
Armitage.
With all of the other duties Deputy Secretary Armitage had in managing the Department in Secretary Powell's absence, he also felt he had to babysit Mr. Bolton because the normal clearance procedures established by the Department didn't work with Mr. Bolton. Yet, this body is now being asked to vote to send Mr. Bolton to New York, where he will be unsupervised on a daily basis. Lord only knows the kind of problems that can ensue with Mr. Bolton, given his past performance.
Individuals under Bolton's direct line of authority also took issue with the
rigidity of his views. John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation and a career diplomat, told committee staff that Mr. Bolton ``tended to hold onto his own views strongly and . . . he tended not to be enthusiastic about alternative views. And he did not encourage us to provide our views to the Secretary.''
Again, I am not arguing about someone's style here. But when you have 125 employees at the U.N. and the only things you want to hear are the things you agree with, that is a management style that is dangerous for a person who is going to work with all of the nations we have to build relationships with in the U.N. We all do this as Senators. We know when a staff member gets up and wants to tell us an alternative view, it is uncomfortable. We would like them to agree with us. We also know how vitally important it is as Senators that people in our offices who have the willingness to stand up and know when they do, they are not going to be threatened with their jobs, or considered for removal because they are telling us something we don't want to hear. We understand the value of that. Mr. Bolton doesn't. That is dangerous.
Mr. Wolf said:
Some of the officers within the nonproliferation bureau
complained that they felt undue pressure to conform to the
views of the Under Secretary, versus the views that they
thought they could support.
That is a dangerous statement, that we have somebody who is about to take on a position who would make others feel they were unfit or are being pressured to conform their views.
All of these matters I have just mentioned cause me grave concern about this nomination. But what troubled me the most were the devastating comments made by Secretary Powell's chief of staff, Mr. Wilkerson, an individual who on a day-to-day basis was in a position to know what was going on in the Department and what foreign policy challenges the Secretary of State was attempting to manage.
This is what he has to say about Mr. Bolton's single-minded preoccupation with sanctioning every Chinese entity he could find which might have violated nonproliferation standards:
Are we actually stopping China's proliferation through
sanctions that was dangerous to our interests? Or are we
doing it, and ignoring problems that cry out for cures,
diplomatic? The one time I had a conversation with John about
this, I asked him, ``How do you go beyond sanctions, John?
War?'' Mr. Bolton replied, ``It is not my business.''
Mr. Wilkerson also explained to our committee staff why he believes Mr. Bolton is ill suited for the U.N. position. I am quoting Mr. Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's chief of staff. This is not some liberal left-leaning Senator or Congressman or columnist talking about Mr. Bolton. This is the former chief of staff of a Republican Secretary of State under George Bush--this President's administration:
One, I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150
people up there at the United Nations that have to be led;
they have to be led well, and they have to be led properly.
And I think, in that capacity, if he goes up there--
Speaking about Mr. Bolton--
you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year.
Second, I differ with a lot of people in Washington, as to
his brilliance. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted
beans . . . had no willingness--and in many cases no capacity
to understand other things that were happening around those
beans. And that is just a recipe for problems at the United
Nations.
These are very serious conclusions from an individual who was a loyal and trusted member of Secretary Powell's team, and they go to the heart of whether Mr. Bolton has the capacity to carry out his duties at the United Nations. This is not about whether we like the nominee's views on the United Nations, arms control, or Cuba. He is entitled to his personal views about any of those matters, and he should not be disqualified from any office because he has them. But for the interests of the United States to be served at the United Nations, there has to be a balance between ideology and pragmatism.
The individual on the spot in New York will be called upon, from time to time, to strike that balance. He also must have the credibility to make the best case for the United States before that international body. These things are at the heart of effective diplomacy.
Ambassador Negroponte was able to strike that balance between ideology and pragmatism and have the credibility to make the case of the United States before the U. N. Security Council. Senator John Danforth, a former colleague, was able to do so as well.
Based on what we have learned about Mr. Bolton in recent days, I seriously doubt he is willing or able to strike that balance, and I now know, given his penchant for stretching intelligence and pressuring analysts, that his credibility will be challenged by other U.N. members.
Our colleagues brush aside this problem by saying Mr. Bolton will be getting his instructions from Secretary Rice. Mr. President, that is just not realistic at all. Much of the guidance that is developed for our U.N. ambassadors is developed cooperatively between Washington and New York. What gets said at the United Nations by a representative is, in large measure, shaped by our reporting from our mission in New York. I feel Mr. Bolton will be incapable of making the kind of judgments that move the diplomatic process forward.
We all know these are difficult times. Our responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan are significant and costly. Other challenges to international peace and stability loom large on the horizon--Iran, North Korea, the Middle East. The humanitarian crises in Africa and Asia cry out for attention. The United States cannot solve these problems all by ourselves. We know that. We need tremendous international assistance and cooperation to address them, and the logical focal point for addressing that international support is the United Nations. It makes sense.
But international support will not be automatically forthcoming and will require, as we all know, U.S. leadership at the U.N. to build the case for such cooperation. That U.S. leadership must necessarily be embodied in the individual who serves as our ambassador to the United Nations is obvious.
Based on what I know today about Mr. Bolton, I believe he is incapable of demonstrating that kind of leadership. The ambassador to the United Nations is a very important position. The individual who assumes that position is necessarily the face of our country before the world.
For all the reasons I have cited--Mr. Bolton's management style, his attack on the intelligence community, his tunnel vision, his lack of diplomatic temperament--I do not believe he is our man to be the face at the United Nations.
But of all those reasons, I come back to the one I made at the outset. It is not about style, it is not about reform at the United Nations, it is not about Mr. Bolton's views on a variety of subject matters. Our colleagues have to make a decision. We now know, categorically, without any question whatsoever, that this nominee tried to fire intelligence analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. That evidence comes from his own colleagues, from people with whom he has served, not from outside groups or members of this body.
The decision for our colleagues today is whether or not we promote someone who has done that and what message it sends to the analyst community, what message it sends to our allies, and what message it sends to our adversaries, for that matter, around the globe. That this individual who engaged in such reprehensible behavior, in my view, should be given the position of U.N. ambassador to represent the United States at this critical hour, I think is a massive mistake.
Again, I am still hopeful that in the remaining hours of this debate, the administration will see fit to provide the additional information for which we have asked for almost 2 months. I regret deeply having to ask my colleagues to vote on a cloture motion. I have said, if cloture is invoked, we will vote immediately on Mr. Bolton. If it is not invoked, it will layover, and we will continue to try to get the information.
I have no desire to filibuster this nomination. I do have a desire to see the Senate stand up for its rights when it seeks information-- information the nominee had access to but the chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committee and Foreign Relations Committee were denied. That is a precedent we need not make with this decision.
My hope is our colleagues will support the opposition on the cloture motion and, if we get a vote on Mr. Bolton today, we reject this nominee. There are many qualified, blunt, forceful people who can assume this job who embrace the President's view on foreign policy and who will do a very good job at the United Nations. John Bolton is not that individual.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
I will be happy to yield.
Mr. President, in response to my friend and colleague from Maryland, that is exactly the point.
Mr. President, if I may respond to my colleague from Maryland, I was going to recite to him--because I think some of my colleagues may think this Senator from Connecticut has raised this issue in the last 24 hours as a delaying tactic--I want to point out to my colleagues the chronology which begins actually on April 11-- approaching 2 months ago. Then there were subsequent requests on April 14, April 22, April 29, May 4, May 18, as well as even as late, as of course, we all know, yesterday.
I want to make it clear that from very early on, we tried to get this information. I emphasize, again, these are names Mr. Bolton has seen, his staff has seen, and we are not asking every Member see, only the ranking members and the chairmen of the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, to let them know whether or not the names coincide with the names of people we have run across in our examination of Mr. Bolton to be a nominee to the U.N.
The chairman of the Intelligence Committee will tell you they had an interview with General Hayden and he showed them some documents. But in his letter to our colleagues last evening, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee very honestly pointed out that the names of the 19 individuals in the 10 intercepts he sought are redacted. The only pertinent information is those names and the motivation Mr. Bolton had in seeking that information.
The heart of the request--even the Intelligence Committee chairman cannot see it. Yet Mr. Bolton could see it, his staff could see it. But the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee is not allowed to see it. Every Senator ought to be outraged about that. If we let them get away with it here, they will get away with it every single day hereafter. Either we stand up for our rights as a Senate, as a coequal branch of Government, or we do not.
Yes, I yield.
Again, the Senator from Maryland is absolutely correct. These issues come back and come around and the word spreads: You can get away with this. It is not just this administration. The Senator is correct. Future administrations will use this as an example of why they do not have to comply with the request because previous Congresses allowed this information to be kept secret when Senate committees were seeking it.
Mr. President, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?
I ask unanimous consent that the remaining time I have be divided between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Massachusetts. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed, also asked for time. I had 60 minutes, and want to give up some time.
I have a little less than 20 minutes remaining. What I want to do is give the 20 minutes I have left to my colleagues to use. Mr. President, I make that request, that the time remaining be divided between the Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Massachusetts.
And Senator Reed from Rhode Island also seeks some of that time. Just Senator Reed and Senator Kennedy. The Senator Maryland has time.