Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to support the Levin- Reed amendment. As we know, Iraq is the most important issue facing our country today. The core challenge in Iraq is the cycle of violence, despair, and retribution that is tearing…
Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to support the Levin- Reed amendment. As we know, Iraq is the most important issue facing our country today. The core challenge in Iraq is the cycle of violence, despair, and retribution that is tearing Iraq apart and threatening wider regional instability. There is no significant progress in Iraq. By any measurement, the situation in Iraq is getting worse as each week passes. Prime Minister al-Maliki's Government is essentially paralyzed and dysfunctional, in part by boycotts and sectarian rivalries and an intense sectarian war.
The Interior Ministry in Iraq, which controls Iraq's police forces, is still a disaster and does not function as a national ministry. Horrific violence in Iraq is spreading beyond Baghdad. Yesterday, car bombs and attacks in Kirkuk and Diyala Province killed more than 100 and injured almost 200 Iraqis. Kirkuk is an area of Iraq in the northern part, Kurdistan, that has been considered by this administration as one of the most secure areas of Iraq. Recent events in Kurdistan over the last few months have shown otherwise. Increasingly, regions that were previously seen as relatively stable and secure, such as the Kurdish area, are now being engulfed by violence. The southern four provinces in Iraq near Basra, which contains most of Iraq's oil and Iraq's only port and outlet to the sea, are out of control. Shiite militias control the southern four provinces of Iraq, including the most significant oil reserves in Iraq's one outlet to the sea. Shiite militias and criminal gangs control these provinces and today even demand tribute, and we pay it. The Iraqi Government pays tribute to Shia militias to use Iraq's primary port. The last remaining pipeline into Baghdad has been blown up, crippling Baghdad's access to oil, and there are no operating refineries in Baghdad. Hence, the product that comes to Baghdad today is trucked in from Kuwait. This is the nation that has the third largest oil reserves in the world. The green zone is being attacked daily.
Last week, 9 people were killed, including Americans, and over 30 wounded inside the green zone. These daily attacks on the green zone by mortar fire, rocket fire increase.
I have listened today to some of my colleagues argue that the surge strategy--the surge strategy--has only just begun; why don't we give it a chance to work; we are at a very early stage; we must give the President more time.
Let me remind our colleagues it has been more than 6 months since the President of the United States announced to the Nation on January 10 the decision to send tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops into Iraq. That was the beginning of the surge, not now. It has been more than 5 months since these additional U.S. troops began arriving in Iraq in early February. We have had months to judge the situation in Iraq. Only last week, the President reported to Congress that there has been no progress--no progress--on any of the political benchmarks in Iraq. The violence that is tearing Iraq apart has intensified and spread over the last 6 months. The current strategy is failing, and the so-called surge that some of my colleagues refuse to recognize that began almost 6 months ago has cost 532 American men and women their lives since that began. We have lost more than 3,600 Americans who have died and over 26,000 wounded over the last 4\1/2\ years.
We must change our policy in Iraq. Central to our new strategy must be diplomacy, regional engagement, and the
involvement of the international community, all of these coming together within the framework of a new policy, using all of the instruments of power to help achieve Iraqi political accommodation-- political accommodation. We are captive to a cycle of violence. We cannot break out of the cycle of violence. More troops will not do that. We have put burdens on our troops and asked them to make sacrifices and do things they cannot achieve in the course of finding an answer to break the cycle of violence. It is bigger than the military. General Petraeus has said so. As a matter of fact, General Petraeus has said there will be no military solution in Iraq. Every general I have met in my five trips to Iraq, every general I have met here in and out of uniform, has said there will not be--cannot be--a military solution.
I have cosponsored the Levin-Reed amendment because it requires that the United States move toward a comprehensive policy on Iraq--a comprehensive policy on Iraq--not just continuing to feed American troops into the middle of a civil war, which is clearly not working, but something in addition to our military security. That new policy must be centered on diplomacy and helping achieve Iraqi political accommodation to get to political reconciliation.
This amendment is responsible. It is comprehensive, forward-looking, compelling, and not all that different, incidentally, from what my other colleagues are offering on the floor of the Senate as options. Yes, it requires a phased, responsible reduction of U.S. forces from Iraq. I say again, a reduction--not a withdrawal--of our forces. No one I know is calling for any sort of precipitous withdrawal or precipitous action to take America out of Iraq now. We couldn't do that anyway. Even if we wanted to withdraw precipitously or quickly, the reality of the logistics would prevent it. The fact is, we are where we are. We have national interests in the Middle East. We have national interests in Iraq. We should not confuse the issue that we debate today. We are not advocating a cut-and-run strategy. I am not sure what cut and run means. It is catchy. It is good sloganeering. But I have yet to hear anyone come to the Senate floor and say: I am for cutting and running. Those who use that term or accuse others of employing that term should define what that means.
Of all the resolutions I am aware of that have been introduced in the Senate on this issue, none that I am aware of is a so-called cut-and- run amendment.
We are talking about a transition in the mission being carried out by U.S. forces in Iraq. A policy, a strategy. Let's make something else clear. The military does not make policy. The military implements policy. The Congress is part of making that policy. Constitutionally we have a role with the President in helping frame and make policy. The military has input into that policy, as they must and as they should, but once the policy is given to the military, they can't alter the policy. They are captive to policy. That is constitutionally the way it is and the way it should be. We are talking about a new policy, a new strategy. We have a legitimate mission to carry out in Iraq, and those various missions are critical to our security, and hopefully, at some point, the stability of Iraq. The Levin-Reed amendment focuses solely on those missions and the transitions of those missions: Counterterrorism, targeting terrorists and other global organizations; training Iraqi forces, protecting U.S. and coalition personnel and facilities, helping maintain territorial integrity of Iraq.
As I have said, nearly all of the other significant amendments I am aware of that have been introduced on the floor of the Senate on Iraq, including the Warner-Lugar amendment, the Salazar-Alexander amendment focused largely on the same limited mission, as the Levin-Reed amendment, as does the Nelson-Collins amendment, on a limited mission. There is an emerging consensus on how our military mission should transition in Iraq as well. Our amendment includes a timeline and would require that this shift in our military mission be completed by April 30 of next year.
Our amendment is not alone in establishing a timeline. Again, the other significant amendments on Iraq also have timelines. The Warner- Lugar amendment recommends beginning the military transition no later than December 31, 2007. That is a timeline. The Salazar-Alexander amendment sets as the sense of the Congress that the transition be completed by the first quarter of 2008. Now, that is a timeline. There is yet another emerging consensus on establishing a timeline to transition our military mission in Iraq. Our amendment also respects that only military professionals--the generals, those who have the responsibility of carrying out the policy; not making the policy, but carrying it out--those professionals determine how many troops will be needed to carry out our limited military mission in Iraq.
So the talk I hear more than occasionally on the Senate floor that somehow the Congress is micromanaging the war is not correct; that we are micromanaging the army is not correct.
Once again, our amendment, the Levin-Reed amendment, sets policy of the military mission in Iraq. That is policy. What is the mission? What is the strategic, diplomatic mission of employing America's power and prestige in Iraq? That is the policy. But the scope of the reduction-- the reduction, not the withdrawal but the reduction--of U.S. forces in Iraq will be determined by, and needs to be determined by, our military professionals based on a troop-to-task analysis; not the Congress, not the committees telling the generals how to do anything.
Troop to task is a very simple concept. You connect the requirements of your mission with the force structure needed. We are way out of balance. We have been out of balance since we invaded Iraq in March of 2003. We never had enough force structure. Some of the same people on the floor of the Senate who are now saying: Well, let's listen to the generals, where were they when the generals warned this administration that we didn't have enough men and women and force before we went into Iraq, I didn't hear many of them talking about how much faith we should put in our generals then.
The former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Shinseki, said it. He said it openly in the Presiding Officer's Armed Services Committee. When asked the question: What would it take in manpower to remove Saddam Hussein from power and help stabilize and secure Iraq, General Shinseki said: It would take hundreds of thousands of American troops.
This administration completely dismissed that as wildly--I believe as the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time said--wildly off the mark. Well, he wasn't off the mark, I say to my colleagues. He was exactly right. He was exactly right.
So we have never had the forces to match the mission. That is not new. Some of us may be coming to that conclusion for the first time, but it is not new. We have never had the force structure to match the mission. That is not the fault of the generals. That is not the fault of the military. That is the fault of policymakers.
Our amendment also respects that only military professionals can determine those numbers. The scope of the reduction would stay firmly in the hands of the military professionals. This approach is responsible. Not one U.S. general today will tell you that there can be, there will be, there is a military solution in Iraq.
Then the next question is--and a statement being made often on the floor of the Senate is: Well, we need to buy the Iraqis time. We need to give the Maliki government time. That is true. That is why we have benchmarks. That is why we have some sense of where this is going? Are we making progress or not making progress? Is it getting better or is it getting worse? Now, 4\1/2\ years into this, we should have some measurements of giving the government time, but time for what? What is the end game as more Americans sacrifice their lives and a half trillion dollars of America's taxpayers' money has sunk into the sands of Iraq? We are buying time for what? For a political reconciliation brought about by the Iraqis themselves to be able to functionally govern their country with some sense of stability and security. That is going the other way. That hasn't gotten better; it has gotten worse by every measure. So we continue to buy time with American blood and American treasure, for what? For
what? No one wants to answer that question, by the way. We end it with we have to buy time, but the additional part of that equation is: Buy time for what? Do we buy time for another 2, 3, or 4 years?
It is also clear that the generals have said when April comes, and there is a timeline already that is built in--whether we ever deal with it or not in the Congress--there is a timeline built in, and it is called manpower. It is called deployment rotations.
We are pushing our young men and women now to 18-month rotation, and some, by the way, are longer than that because of what is known as a stopgap measure where the Secretary of Defense can stop anyone from leaving a war zone based on the speciality of his or her MOS or job. So we are actually having people stay there longer than 18 months. But now it is 18 months, even though the Secretary of Defense testified in January before the Senate Armed Services Committee that we need to get back to 12 months.
Senator Webb and I and others, a bipartisan group of Senators / last week had two amendments on that issue. We couldn't get the required 60 votes to go back to a 12-month deployment. So now it is 15 months, and we are pushing even 18 months.
The generals have told us that when this spring comes, there is no more give in those deployment rotations. There is nothing left. So there is a timeline built in already. Whether any of us want to acknowledge that or introduce that, that is a reality.
Any change to policy in Iraq cannot be done in isolation, separate or disconnected, from the broader sense of dynamics in Iraq and the Middle East. That is why this amendment requires a phased reduction be conducted as part of a comprehensive, diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement to Iraq's neighbors and the international community.
I am very pleased to note that today the announcement came from the State Department that the United States is now prepared to hold new direct talks with Iran. That is progress, not because Iran wants to be our friend. Of course not. But Iran is a significant power in the Middle East. It is working against our interests in the Middle East. We must engage Iran. I have been calling for dialog with all Middle East nations, including Iran and Syria, or over 3 years. A constructive regional framework for Iraq can only be achieved through sustained diplomacy, not hit or miss, not ``if we have time.''
A vital element of this comprehensive diplomatic strategy must be to internationalize Iraq through an international mediator under the auspices of the U.N. to engage all of Iraq's political, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders.
I first called for an international mediator in a letter to President Bush in May. Since then, I pressed this issue with Secretary Rice last week, our National Security Adviser, Steve Hadley, 2 weeks ago, and again today with the United Nations Secretary General. It is time to take the American face off Iraq's political process.
The United States is seen as the occupier in Iraq. We must have a new strategy that will further invest the region and the rest of the world to helping stabilize Iraq, reversing Iraq's slide into chaos. And it is chaos, Mr. President. I hear on the floor of the Senate, gee, if we changed our mission, if we moved in any different direction, if we reduced our forces, if we did anything different, Iraq would end in chaos. Some of my colleagues must not understand what is going on in Iraq. We have chaos. We have real chaos in Iraq today. That means there are no good options today. The optics here should be clear, and we should base our new policies and our new strategies on those clear optics that Iraq is in chaos today.
Creating an international mediator would help build some new common interests in the region and in the world. This amendment represents the core elements of a different U.S. strategy for Iraq, a strategy that more accurately understands the grim realities we face today, that we will face at the end of this year, that we will face next spring, and we will face next year. The question is whether the President and Congress will come together to present a new policy for Iraq that can be supported by the American people and protect and advance America's interests in Iraq and the Middle East.
We are coming dangerously close to the moment when the American people will demand that we leave Iraq and pullout of the Middle East. Almost 70 percent of the American people today, by every measurement, say enough is enough. This is not in the U.S. interest nor the world's to leave Iraq that way. That is why the United States needs a new strategy for Iraq now.
Well into our fifth year in Iraq, we are beyond nonbinding language of resolutions. We are beyond calling for new plans or new reports. We are beyond sense-of-the-Senate resolutions. We have to understand where we are today. We are in a very dangerous position in Iraq. Our policy in Iraq has been a disaster. Why are we kidding ourselves otherwise? By any measurement, it is a disaster. It must change now. The time for suggestions is over. If we do not believe our current policy is worthy of the sacrifices being made by our troops, then it is wrong to simply say we will wait until this fall to change course or let's hang on for 2 or 3 more months to see what happens.
We know what is happening. We know what is happening today, we know what has been happening, and we know what is going to happen tomorrow.
I am grateful for the opportunity to express myself on this amendment. I also appreciate the opportunity to cosponsor this responsible amendment with my colleagues. I note again it is a bipartisan amendment, and I hope all my colleagues in the Senate will take a look at all the different options and amendments and spend some time on each because they are each worthy of time, but in the end, the consistency of the amendments that have been presented so far are about one thing, and you can paint it any way you want, but that is a change of mission in Iraq and a new policy in Iraq.
I yield the floor.