National Intelligence Reform Act Of 2004
Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to address the question of intelligence reform and the future of our national security establishment. I believe this is the single most important issue to be addressed by the Congress this year. Today,…
Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to address the question of intelligence reform and the future of our national security establishment.
I believe this is the single most important issue to be addressed by the Congress this year. Today, the Senate is considering legislation which would overturn the current structure of the intelligence community, primarily in response to the recommendations of the Commission established to review the tragedy of 9/11.
While I agree that improvements are needed, I urge all of my colleagues to approach this matter very cautiously. We live in interesting and very dangerous times. Many felt that with the collapse of the Soviet Union we had entered into a new era of world peace. I think most of us here recall that we, the President and the Congress, immediately proceeded to claim a peace dividend, and we sought to reap its benefits by cutting back on national security spending. Perhaps it was the right thing, in a world that had indeed fundamentally changed, to reduce our national security spending. Important programs in both defense and intelligence were curtailed.
In hindsight, some now question why certain areas of the budget were reduced. As the Cold War ended, it was clear we needed to review our national security programs. For 45 years, our defense and intelligence capabilities had keenly focused on the Soviet Union. We had devised weapons systems, strategies, and intelligence capabilities, all designed to counter that threat. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, our leaders have been working to adjust the focus of our national security apparatus to de-emphasize certain elements of our strategy and accentuate others. These changes have taken a long time and some have met resistance. Those of you who know the military history might recall that during World War I, with the advent of tanks and other motor vehicles, it became apparent that the horse cavalry was obsolete; it simply had no place on the 20th century battlefield. Yet while that war ended in 1917, it took until the 1930s for the Army to completely eliminate the horse cavalry from its ranks.
In his highly acclaimed account of the Cuban missile crisis, ``The Essence of Decision,'' Graham Allison explains how President Kennedy was surprised when Khrushchev wanted to negotiate the removal of our missiles from Turkey, while he removed missiles from
Cuba, but President Kennedy had already directed that the Turkish missiles be removed.
After 42 years in the Senate, I am aware of how frustrating it can be to change the massive national security bureaucracy. It has frustrated the reformers in those agencies who recognize what needs to be done. Each Secretary of Defense and CIA Director since 1990 has worked to change the emphasis of these agencies from a Cold War focus, and they are succeeding, albeit very slowly.
The Congress can legislate changes, but that is only half the battle. As President Kennedy discovered, those who have to implement these changes must do so. We should not be fooled into thinking this bill will be fully implemented, unless it does right by the agency it seeks to change and is supported by them. As written, I do not believe this bill meets that test.
It is clearly our responsibility to make constructive recommendations that can lead to improvements in our national security bureaucracy. That is what the people expect of us. We must be sure that the bill we pass is in fact constructive and will not create greater problems than it solves. If we pass legislation that fundamentally alters the current intelligence structure, we can ensure that it will lead to a period of several years during which the new intelligence community will experience growing pains.
Furthermore, if, in our attempt to strengthen the control of the head of intelligence, we disenfranchise those it is supposed to support, the impact of this bill will clearly be adverse. I understand the frustrations of my colleagues and of all Americans who suffered because of 9/11--those who lost loved ones in particular, but in reality all Americans because our lives were changed by that tragedy.
Every Member of Congress wants to improve our defenses against any further terrorist attack. I say to each of my colleagues again, what is most important, what is absolutely critical is that we make changes that are positive, that improve our national security structure, and that do not have unintended consequences that could jeopardize our security.
We all recognize that we face a new enemy, one that knows no borders and operates beyond the norms of civilized society, but we also know that we have 130,000 troops standing in harm's way, who face a threat significantly different than the one we face here at home.
The new national security system we create must allow us to meet both of these challenges, as it must be able to protect us from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and from the threats of nations that might seek to harm us, our allies, or our interests around the world.
I often remark that we have the greatest military in the world, perhaps in the history of mankind. Our young men and women who put on the uniform of this country serve us magnificently. Let me remind you that it is only 1 percent of our citizens who serve in our Armed Forces to protect the remaining 99 percent of us. We are truly in their debt.
It is for them that I strongly support a robust budget to strengthen defense every year. It is also for them that we must ensure we do nothing to weaken the support they get from the intelligence community.
I would like to note that, in addition to our military, our Nation is lucky to be served by the men and women in our intelligence community.
They represent the best in public service. There are those who have criticized our intelligence community since 9/11, but the men and women in this field are truly dedicated, patriotic Americans. In seeking to change how we manage intelligence we must be sure that we remember those who serve in both of these communities.
We are focusing on intelligence reform in this bill because there is need for further improvement. The tragedy of 9/11 and the faulty intelligence which had many believing that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction demonstrate that our system is not perfect. It was exactly these problems which led the 9/11 Commission and many others to call for reforming intelligence.
Like all Americans I commend the Commission for its work. It did a masterful job of reviewing the facts, combing through the massive data, and presenting the results in clear and concise prose. Their report provides a great reconstruction of the events of 9/11 and why it occurred. However, some not that the conclusions they draw may not be fully justified by the facts they uncovered.
Last week, the Appropriations Committee received testimony from several expert witnesses. We heard from a distinguished jurist, Judge Richard Posner, who studied the 9/11 Commission report and was disturbed by its recommendations. He concluded that the Commission went way beyond the evidence presented.
The Commission contends that we had an intelligence failure, that it was a systemic problem as opposed to several mistakes being made by our intelligence community. They blame it on a failure to connect the dots and a lack of imagination.
In their analysis, and also cited by the Committee, for example, they note that several terrorists met in Malaysia and that a few proceeded from there to the United States and took part in the attack on 9/11. They conclude with hindsight that the CIA should have recognized that these terrorists were linked to the bombing of the USS Cole and should have informed the FBI and the State Department about the meeting.
It is this type of evidence which the Commission and the Governmental Affairs Committee both cite as the justification for an overhaul of our intelligence infrastructure.
We all wish that our analysts would have been prescient enough to recognize the relationship among these terrorists, and their connection to the Cole bombing, and the importance of the Malaysian meeting.
We all wish that these same analysts would have made that information available to the FBI and State Department where there exists a possibility that it would have triggered an investigation of their movements here. But I for one believe it would have taken a lot of luck for that to have happened--more than simply connecting the dots or having better imagination.
Consider this point. It has been more than 3 years since the attack on our Nation. In that time, we have devoted billions of dollars and we have sacrificed many young lives in the war on terrorism, but as far as we know, Osama bin Laden remains hidden from view directing the farflung al-Qaida network.
Would anyone seriously claim that we have not worked hard enough to connect the dots since 9/11?
Intelligence is a tough business. Like me, many of our colleagues have been involved in intelligence oversight for the Congress. I am not telling them something new.
We have witnessed advances in communications and in command and control and other technologies which have revolutionized intelligence. But, with all the highly sophisticated tools in our arsenal, we still can not find Osama.
Earlier this year, former CIA Director Tenet testified to the Congress that it would take another 5 years before we had successfully rebuilt an inadequate human intelligence capability in the war on terror. Some immediately held up the Director's statement as an indication that we have not addressed human intelligence requirements. And that is simply not the case.
For 50 years we promoted human intelligence, but our focus was on defeating international communism in places where it was taking root, primarily in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In some cases it takes a generation to build a human intelligence network. When we took our peace dividend, we set back the efforts to refocus human intelligence on newer threats.
When the Director says it will take another 5 years, it is not because we haven't been responsive since the rise of al-Qaida. Should we have been working on this more vigilantly? Maybe. But I ask you: Who among us knew at the end of the Cold War that the greatest challenge we were likely to face in the future would come from the son of a Saudi construction magnate?
Had we known that at the time of Desert Storm, could we have convinced all of our colleagues that there should be no peace dividend because we needed to prepare for al-Qaida? We all know the answer to that.
So I ask you: How will changing the intelligence structure solve this dilemma? Will it allow us to grow our human intelligence capability overnight? Obviously not, but it could distort the working relationship among the various agencies so that intelligence support is harder for the agencies, such as the Defense Department, to get.
That could lead agencies with the financial wherewithal to provide that capability internally. That outcome would be expensive and very harmful.
The Commission looks at this issue only through the lens of terrorism, and seeks to ensure better coordination within the community.
In so doing, it fails to consider the varied responsibilities and needs of all the actors which depend on intelligence.
As you know, as ranking member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I have access to virtually all of our Nation's secrets, including those in the Defense Department and in intelligence programs as well.
Over the past 3 years our Committee has been informed of multiple threats, most of which have never been publicized. The intelligence community must treat each warning with utmost care. They must research and investigate each one to determine its veracity, and then respond appropriately to those incidents which are deemed credible.
In many cases what some call connecting the dots is really like searching for a needle in a haystack. And, just to make it more difficult, there are many hay stacks to examine and in some cases the needle looks exactly like hay. Sure the needles are there and theoretically they could be found, but should we really expect our analysts to find them every time?
Furthermore, I want everyone to realize that we are not standing still. We have come a long way in improving intelligence cooperation.
We created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to bring analysts from various parts of the community to work together.
The enactment of the PATRIOT Act brought down a wall which had previously blocked information sharing between various parts of the intelligence community and the FBI. Our defense and intelligence leaders are working to break stovepipes and to ensure that information sharing is working.
Certainly more improvements are needed in intelligence cooperation and in new technology to improve information sharing.
Our Nation has the finest national security apparatus--defense and intelligence--in the world. It is not perfect and it never will be. Some areas can be improved. But it is a critical capability.
Our warfighters--our young men and women who, as we speak, are serving in harm's way--depend on seamless intelligence. It is our solemn duty to ensure that we can continue to provide them the best. We must make sure that we do not inadvertently take actions which could sever the link between our defense capabilities and intelligence support.
We cannot take the Secretary of Defense out of the loop simply because we seek to strengthen the head of the intelligence community.
So what changes shall we make to improve the intelligence capability of this country?
First, I would suggest, as recommended by the Commission and the Governmental Affairs Committee, that we establish a national counterterrorism center.
The one real failing of the intelligence community in preparing for 9/11, be it in the FBI, the CIA, the NSA or other organizations was the inability or unwillingness to share terrorist intelligence and analysis completely and seamlessly among the disparate parts of this community.
Many improvements have already been made, but the one reform that truly can respond to the cries from the families of 9/11 victims is to address this issue, and to address it now. This is the most critical change that needs to be legislated and our Intelligence and Armed Services Committees need to follow up to make sure it is implemented and is effective in conducting it mission.
That center needs to be the clearing house for all intelligence on counter-terrorism, both foreign and domestic. It needs to work across disciplines and agencies, and it needs to have the support of all of the intelligence community. It needs to be the analytical capability for the community in the field of counterterrorism.
We need to join foreign and domestic analysis together to be sure that we get the full intelligence picture. However, because this Nation believes that foreign and domestic intelligence programs must be separated to ensure that civil liberties and the rights of all Americans are safeguarded, I would urge my colleagues not to give this organization any operational role.
It certainly should conduct analysis and strategic planning, but operational planning and operations should continue to be handled as they are today through other parts of the intelligence community working with the Defense Department overseas and the FBI working here at home in conjunction with other relevant domestic agencies.
I believe that as we establish this new organization, the national intelligence director's charter should ensure that this national counterterrorism center receives the resources it needs and that the director should focus his efforts on this one challenge in its first year of existence.
I agree with the managers of the bill that other intelligence centers may need to be created, but I believe the decision to do so should come from the President based on the recommendation of the national intelligence director with the concurrence of the National Security Council and the Congress.
Most important, we have to make sure we come up with the right solutions for the rest of the intelligence community. What may be right for counterterrorism may not be the solution that best serves our intelligence needs for weapons proliferation or for our military. For those reasons, I am not comfortable with rushing this process.
Some criticize the community for a ``group think'' outlook. They say that the analysis that indicated that in all probability Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction is an example of group think. I am one who questioned the results of that analysis.
With hindsight, I speculate that the community failed because it tried to provide policy makers the answer they wanted rather than a fair interpretation of the facts. Nonetheless, if group think was a problem, how will that be improved by greater centralization of the analytical capabilities in the community? Won't that only exacerbate that problem?
And by creating a more powerful intelligence director with a closer tie to policy making, won't that likely lead to more attempts to sway analysts to reach politically acceptable conclusions?
These are the troubling facts that were not addressed by the 9/11 Commission and are not adequately considered in this bill.
Last week, the Appropriations Committee received testimony from seven witnesses, all of whom are experts in the field of national security and counterterrorism. Included among them were Dr. Henry Kissinger, the current head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John Hamre.
I do not believe I would be overstating their views to say they were quite concerned with the legislation being proposed by the Governmental Affairs Committee.
Their counsel was to be cautious. Dr. Kissinger recommended that Congress study this issue more carefully.
He urged us to take another 6 months before we moved forward on what is the most significant Government overhaul since the National Security Act of 1947.
Last week, noted experts in national security, including former Secretary of State George Shultz, former CIA Director William Gates, former Secretaries of Defense Bill Cohen and Frank Carlucci, and former Senators Nunn, Hart, Bradley, Rudman and Boren, all recommended that the Congress proceed cautiously. They urged all of us to remember the old medical adage: First, do no harm.
This is a most important debate and a most important issue. I know some of my colleagues worry that if we do not
act now we will lose the opportunity for significant change. I recognize this concern. But enacting bad legislation in haste because there is a popular demand to act is not the proper way for this body to respond.
The Senate was created to cool the passions of the people. Our history, our culture, even our rules are all deeply instilled with the concept of proceeding cautiously.
I urge my colleagues to agree with those of us who recommend beginning the process of reform by establishing a new central authority for intelligence, a national intelligence director, any by responding to the specific challenges raised by the events of 9/11 with the creation of a national counterterrorism center.
But I believe we need to give a new administration and Congress more time to determine how the rest of the national security apparatus will be structured. Let us use the coming year to determine how we balance the additional responsibilities and share power among the various components of our national security agencies.
This matter is too important to rush through in 2 weeks in the heat of a Presidential campaign. Please let us act responsibly.
I yield the floor.