Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. Mr. Speaker, it is important to go back a little bit in history here. The Iraq Accountability Act of 1998 was about funding a media propaganda machine which was, unfortunately, used to lay the groundwork…
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, it is important to go back a little bit in history here. The Iraq Accountability Act of 1998 was about funding a media propaganda machine which was, unfortunately, used to lay the groundwork for a war against Iraq. That act was about encouraging and funding opposition inside Iraq, unfortunately, to destabilize Iraq prior to a war.
You could call this bill the ``Iran Accountability Act.'' This act funds media propaganda machines to lay the groundwork for a war against Iran. It encourages and funds opposition inside Iran for that same purpose.
Notwithstanding what the words are in this bill, we have been here before. This administration is trying to create an international crisis by inflating Iran's nuclear development into an Iraq-type WMD hoax. ``Iran is not an imminent threat,'' this from Dr. Hans Blitz, former Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector, speaking to our congressional oversight subcommittee the other day.
The International Atomic Energy Agency points out that Iran has an enrichment level of about 3.6 percent. You have to go to 90 percent to have weapons quality enrichment. Iran is not an imminent threat. Iran does not have nuclear weapons.
This is a time for us to engage Iran with direct talks, our President to their President. This is the time to give assurance to Iran that we are not going to attack them.
Unfortunately, this administration has chosen to conduct covert ops in Iran. This administration has chosen to select 1,500 bombing targets with the Strategic Air Command. This administration has chosen plans for a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This administration looked the other way when a congressional staff report basically claimed that Iran was trying to engage in nuclear escalation.
We don't need war, we need to talk, and that is what we ought to stand for here. No more Iraqs.
The End of the ``Summer of Diplomacy'': Assessing U.S. Military Options
on Iran
A CENTURY FOUNDATION REpORT
(By Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Ret.))
This report is part of a series commissioned by The Century
Foundation to inform the policy debate about Iran-related
issues.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
Nothing written here is to be
construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Century
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of
any bill before Congress.
``The doctrine of preemption remains sound and must remain
an integral part of our national security strategy. We do not
rule out the use of force before the enemy strikes.''--
Stephen Hadley, March 16, 2006.
Introduction
The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement:
on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared
that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran's
nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk
directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement
working alone at home. She called President Bush and received
his approval. The Bush administration announced it as a
significant initiative; it appeared to reflect a major change
in policy.
This shift was not uncontroversial within the
administration; Vice President Dick Cheney had opposed the
announcement. But the rationale that prevailed seems to have
been that if the United States were going to confront Iran,
the diplomacy box had to be checked. The secretary of state
was given the summer to try it.
Well, the summer is over. Diplomacy was given a chance, and
it now seems that the diplomatic activity of the past several
months was just a pretext for the military option.
Unfortunately, the military option does not make sense.
When I discuss the possibility of an American military strike
on Iran with my European friends, they invariably point out
that an armed confrontation does not make sense--that it
would be unlikely to yield any of the results that American
policymakers do want, and that it would be highly likely to
yield results that they do not. I tell them they cannot
understand U.S. policy if they insist on passing options
through that filter. The ``making sense'' filter was not
applied over the past four years for Iraq, and it is unlikely
to be applied in evaluating whether to attack Iran.
In order to understand the position of those within the
U.S. government who will make the final decision to execute a
military option against Iran, you must first consider the
seven key truths that they believe: Iran is developing
weapons of mass destruction--that is most likely true. Iran
is ignoring the international community--true. Iran supports
Hezbollah and terrorism--true. Iran is increasingly inserting
itself in Iraq and beginning to be involved in Afghanistan--
true. The people of Iran want a regime change--most likely an
exaggeration. Sanctions are not going to work--most likely
true. You cannot negotiate with these people--not proven.
If you understand these seven points as truth, you can see
why the administration is very close to being left with only
the military option. Administration officials say that they
want to give diplomacy a chance. But when they say that, we
need to remind ourselves that they do not mean a negotiated
settlement. They mean that Iran must do what we want as a
result of our nonmilitary leverage: suspend enrichment, and
we will talk. But enrichment appears to continue, and there
are no direct discussions between the two main parties.
Satisfied that nonmilitary leverage is not going to work,
those who believe the seven ``truths'' argue that the only
viable option remaining is a military one. The story,
however, is more complicated.
This report draws on my long experience of running military
war games to examine some of the complications of the current
situation: the various pressures and rationales for an attack
on Iran; the probable direct and indirect consequences of air
strikes; the significant gap between what proponents of the
military option want to achieve and what in fact such attacks
will achieve; and the likelihood that policymakers will
ignore those gaps and proceed to war despite them.
Timing and Uncertainty
Waiting makes it harder. The history of warfare is
dominated by attackers who concluded that it was better to
attack early than to wait. One source of the momentum in
Washington for a strike on Iran's nuclear program is the
strategic observation that if such an attack is in fact
inevitable, then it is better done sooner than later.
I conducted a war game for the Atlantic Monthly magazine
two years ago. On a chart prepared for a mock meeting of the
National Security Council, I identified thirteen nuclear-
related targets in Iran. I still do this kind of gaming. My
most recent chart reflects twenty-four potential nuclear-
related facilities. In the past few years we have seen Iran's
Natanz uranium enrichment facility buried under more than
fifteen meters of reinforced concrete and soil. There is
evidence that similar hardening is taking place at other
facilities, and there is some evidence of facilities being
placed inside populated areas. The longer the United States
waits, the harder the targets--and the harder the targeting.
Another major issue that affects timing is the conspicuous
absence of reliable intelligence about Iran. A report by the
House Intelligence Committee found that we have serious gaps
in our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program.
Paradoxically, those gaps in intelligence produce not
caution, but further pressure to attack. U.S. intelligence
agencies do not know the locations of all of Iran's
facilities; they are not certain how far Iran has gone with
enrichment. They know that Iran's nuclear program bears a
striking resemblance to the Pakistani program, but they do
not know whether Iran has acquired technology that might put
it ahead of current estimates.
Some U.S. officials say that Iran is ten years from a
weapon. The Pentagon, we are told, is operating under the
assumption that Iran could have a weapon in five years. Some
Israeli estimates say that Iran could have a weapon in three
years. John Negroponte, the U.S. director of national
intelligence, recently said that Iran could not develop a
nuclear weapon until some time in the next decade. But the
next day, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did
not trust estimates of the Iranian program.
The very ambiguity of the intelligence picture has become
another argument for military options, because even if U.S.
policymakers could agree on a firm policy red line, there
would be no way of determining if and when Iran crossed that
line. Vice President Cheney's espoused calculation for
dealing with global threats is that if there is even a 1
percent chance of a country passing WMD to a terrorist, the
United States must act. Because there is a 1 percent chance
Iran could pass WMD to a terrorist, the Bush administration
finds itself obliged to reject nonmilitary options.
Regional Pressures
Adding to the political momentum toward war with Iran is
significant pressure from the Israeli security establishment.
Israel says that it has a plan for attacking Iranian nuclear
facilities. Israel recently appointed an airman to be in
charge of the Iranian theater of operations. It was announced
that this major general would coordinate Israeli planning for
Iran. Israeli military planners have U.S. penetrating weapons
and a replica of the Natanz facility. They say that the
attack would resemble the kind of operation they used against
Egypt in 1967. They say that the plan involves more than just
air strikes from the ``Hammers'' of the Israeli Air Force's
69 Squadron. It would include Shaldag commando teams,
possibly some version of sea-launched missiles, and even
explosive-carrying dogs that would penetrate the underground
facilities.
Israel probably could hit most of the known nuclear
targets. But such an attack would leave Iran with significant
retaliatory options. That is a serious problem. U.S. forces
and interests in the region would be likely targets of
Iranian retaliation, so even an independent Israeli military
operation would have critical consequences for the United
States.
Part of the problem is that the two countries' red lines
for Iran are not the same. Israel's red line is enrichment.
The U.S. red line used to be the development of an Iranian
nuclear weapon. But over the past six months, America's red
line has drifted closer to Israel's. On March 21, the
president said that the United States could not allow Iran to
have the knowledge to make a weapon. He repeated the phrase
in August.
By redrawing the red line in this manner, U.S. policymakers
are creating pressure to go to war with Iran. In saying that
Iran could not be permitted to have the knowledge to develop
nuclear weapons, the president used almost the exact words
the Israeli Foreign Minister had used a year earlier. More
recently, a senior State Department official said that Iran
was near ``the point of no return'' on its nuclear program.
Again, this was an exact echo of the words of Israeli
officials. The Israeli pressure has worked.
Marketing the Military Option
I often hear from those who were strongly supportive of the
Iraq invasion that the targeting of the Iranian facilities
would be simple. If you understand the elements of the
nuclear process, all you have to do is go after a small
number of targets. The argument continues that Iran's nuclear
facilities could be devastated on a single night, in a single
strike, by a small number of U.S. B-2 bombers. The apparent
ease of the operation is another element of this pressure to
go now: If the Iranian nuclear program can be stopped in one
night by a simple strike, why should the United States wait?
But the elimination of Iran's nuclear capability, while it
might be the stated aim for the United States, is only part
of the objective. While the Iranian regime's weapons program
is a genuine source of concern, American policymakers are
also troubled by Iran's interference in Iraq. Despite U.S.
warnings, the Revolutionary Guard continues to supply
weapons, money, and training to insurgents inside Iraq. Some
proponents of attacking Iran feel that Tehran should be
punished for supporting militias and extremists in Iraq.
In addition to Iran's role as an aspiring nuclear rogue and
a supporter of the insurgency in Iraq, the country has been
repeatedly portrayed as a key adversary in the war on
terrorism. The United States has put Iran into a separate and
new terrorism category, dubbing it the ``Central Banker of
Terrorism.'' The new National Security Strategy says, ``Any
government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as
Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice,
and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.''
``Unnamed intelligence officials,'' citing evidence from
satellite coverage and electronic eavesdropping, have told
the press that Iran is hosting al Qaeda, granting senior
operatives freedom to communicate and plan terrorist
operations.
Indeed, the case against the regime is so forceful, and so
multifaceted, that it becomes clear that the goal is not
simply to do away with the regime's enrichment program. The
goal is to do away with the regime itself.
And on top of all of those pressures--pressure from Israel,
pressure from those worried about a nuclear Iran, Iran in
Iraq, and Iran in the war on terrorism--is another, decisive
piece of the puzzle: President George W. Bush. The argument
takes several forms: the president is said to see himself as
being like Winston Churchill, and to believe that the world
will only appreciate him after he leaves office; he talks
about the Middle East in messianic terms; he is said to have
told those close to him that he has got to attack Iran
because even if a Republican succeeds him in the White House,
he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys.
Most recently, someone high in the administration told a
reporter that the president believes that he is the only one
who can ``do the right thing'' with respect to Iran. One
thing is clear: a major source of the pressure for a military
strike emanates from the very man who will ultimately make
the decision over whether to authorize such a strike-the
president. And these various accounts of his motivations and
rationales have in common that the president will not allow
does-not-make-sense arguments to stand in the way of a good
idea.
Below the CNN Line
Stay below the ``CNN line.'' That was the guidance given to
the Air Component Commander, General Mike Mosley, as the
secret air strikes began against Iraq in operation SOUTHERN
FOCUS. It was July 2002. This classified bombing campaign
would involve strikes on almost 400 targets. It was initiated
just after the president visited Europe where he announced
numerous times, ``I have no war plans on my desk.''
There was no UN resolution. The congressional authorization
was not to come for four months. But the United States was
starting the war.
All of the pressures described above are pushing for war
with Iran, and increasingly, a public case for such a war is
being made. But behind the scenes, military operations are
already under way. (See Figure 1.) Most likely, the same
guidance has been given to military commanders. The pattern
is repeating.
When U.S. commandos began entering Iran--probably in the
summer of 2004--their mission appears to have been limited.
The objective was to find and characterize the Iranian
nuclear program. From press reports, we know that the task
force doing these operations was implanting sensors to detect
radioactivity. Intelligence for these early operations inside
Iran was coming from information provided by A.Q. Khan, the
Pakistani dealer in black market nuclear material. The
incursions were focused in the northeast, where the Iranian
nuclear facilities are concentrated. The base of these
incursions was most likely Camp War Horse in Iraq.
Israel also was conducting operations inside Iran in late
2003 or early 2004. The Israeli commandos reportedly were
operating from a base in Iraq. These commandos also were
implanting sensors. I would expect the U.S. and Israeli
operations to have been coordinated. At about this time the
United States began operating remotely piloted vehicles
inside Iran over nuclear facilities. (Although this was
certainly an embarrassment to the Iranians, they mentioned
the flights numerous times in their press.)
In 2005, the balance within the U.S. government shifted in
favor of those who were pushing for regime change in Iran.
This was to result in the eventual creation of the Iran/Syria
Operations Group inside the State Department, a request to
Congress for $75 million, and the creation of a robust
``democracy promotion'' program. Meanwhile the United States
moved from intelligence collection inside Iran, to
establishing contact with ethnic minorities, to being
involved in--and most likely conducting---direct action
missions. Reports suggest that the United States is
supporting militant groups in the Baluchistan region of Iran.
There have been killings and kidnappings in this region. Iran
Revolutionary Guard convoys have been attacked. In a New
Yorker article, Seymour Hersh confirmed that this region was
one of the areas where U.S. forces were operating. The
Iranian press also has accused the United States of operating
there. In addition, press reports suggest that the United
States may be sponsoring former members of the Iraq-based MEK
(Mojahedin-e Khalq) in Baluchistan.
I recently attended a Middle East security conference in
Berlin. At dinner one night, I sat next to the Iranian
ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali-
Asghar Soltanieh. I told him I had read that the Iranians
were accusing the United States of supporting elements in
Baluchistan. I asked him how they knew that. Without any
hesitation, Soltanieh told me that they have captured
militants who confessed that they were working with the
Americans.
The United States is also directly involved in supporting
groups inside the Kurdish area of Iran. According to both
western and Iranian press reports, the Iranian Party of Free
Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) has been allowed to operate from
Iraq into Iran and has killed Revolutionary Guard soldiers.
The Iranians have also accused the United States of being
involved in shooting down two of their aircraft, an old C-130
and a Fa1con jet, carrying Revolutionary Guard leaders.
NEXT STEPS: Above the CNN Line
How do we get from being below the CNN line to the next
step? The path is fairly clear. The United Nations Security
Council will fall short of imposing serious sanctions on
Iran. The United States, then, will look for a coalition of
the willing to implement smart sanctions, focused on the
Iranian leadership.
But the sanctions will be designed less to ensure
compliance from the Iranians than to generate domestic and
international support for the American position. I do not
know an Iranian specialist I trust who believes that the
sanctions would cause the Iranians to abandon their nuclear
program, any more than did the sanctions on India and
Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998. The sanctions
will be used to raise the collective conscience that Iran is
a threat, and to convince the world that the United States
has tried diplomatic solutions.
If the experience of 1979 and other sanctions scenarios is
a guide, sanctions will actually empower the conservative
leadership in Iran. There is an irony here. It is a pattern
that seems to be playing out in the selection of the military
option. From diplomacy to sanctions, the administration is
not making good-faith efforts to avert a war so much as going
through the motions, eliminating other possible strategies of
engagement, until the only option left on the table is the
military one.
When imposing the sanctions fails to alter Tehran's
position, policymakers will revert to a strike on Iran's
nuclear facilities. One can imagine the words of a planner in
the meeting: ``If we are going to do this, let's make certain
we get everything they have.'' I have done some rough
``targeting'' of nuclear facilities for which I can find
satellite photos on the Web. By my calculation, an attack of
relatively high certainty on nuclear targets would require
400 aim points. (An aim point is the specific location where
an individual weapon is directed. Most targets would have
multiple aim points.) I estimate seventy-five of these aim
points would require penetrating weapons. (See Table 1, page
12.)
But it is unlikely that a U.S. military planner would want
to stop there. Iran probably has two chemical weapons
production plants. He would want to hit those. He would want
to hit Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles that have just
recently been moved closer to Iraq. There are fourteen
airfields with sheltered aircraft. Although the Iranian Air
Force is not much of a threat, some of these airfields are
less than fifteen minutes flying time from Baghdad. Military
planners would want to eliminate that potential threat. The
Pentagon would want to hit the assets that could be used to
threaten Gulf shipping. That would mean targeting cruise
missile sites, Iranian diesel submarines, and Iranian naval
assets.