Mr. Speaker, on September 15, 2005, I submitted the following statement during a hearing in the Committee on Government Reform entitled, ``Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at Lessons Learned from Katrina'': Good morning. Thank you,…
Mr. Speaker, on September 15, 2005, I submitted the following statement during a hearing in the Committee on Government Reform entitled, ``Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at Lessons Learned from Katrina'':
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Davis, for agreeing last
week to hold hearings in this Committee on what went wrong
with the government response to Hurricane Katrina. This
Committee is the most important venue within the House of
Representatives for federal government oversight and I am
grateful for your leadership. Interestingly, this first
hearing will not focus on Hurricane Katrina and the disaster
in New Orleans and the surrounding area, but will focus on 3
other cities that are vulnerable to a natural disaster or
terrorist attack: Los Angeles, Miami and Washington, D.C.
Further, the hearing is intended to examine the local
response to crisis, rather than the federal response, to
determine how prepared we are to handle another disaster.
Local, state and federal government all play key roles in
handling a disaster and disaster relief, but let's face it:
the federal government has the largest resources and should
have the greatest ability to deal with a serious disaster in
our nation. The first lesson we have learned from Katrina is
that this proved not to be the case. The federal government
was slow to act and the disaster was far too great for city
and state government to handle alone.
The second lesson we have learned from Katrina is that we
have not learned the lesson from the Iraq war regarding
Halliburton. Halliburton overcharged the government at the
taxpayer's expense during the Iraq war. Days after Katrina
struck, Halliburton was one of the earliest companies awarded
no-bid contracts, to repair 3 different Navy facilities in
Mississippi. The flawed contracting procedures of the Iraq
war are rearing their ugly head in the recovery of Hurricane
Katrina. Congress has already appropriated $62 billion so far
and more is surely to come. Yet the contracts awarded have
been cost-plus and no bid contracts, lacking oversight and
transparency.
There is an infinite number of issues on the federal level
that seriously need to be explored. Why aren't more steps
being taken to hire local displaced workers to rebuild their
towns and cities? How has the merger of FEMA into the
Department of Homeland Security played a role in FEMA's
ability as an agency? Why didn't FEMA's Hurricane Pam study--
contracted out to IEA to investigate what would happen if a
hurricane hit the gulf coast--better prepare the federal
response to the Katrina disaster?
As Chairman Davis indicated, however, we'll get into more
of these federal issues at future hearings.
A very important local issue that should be considered
today is the morality of establishing a mandatory evacuation
when there are people who lack the ability to evacuate. We
saw this in New Orleans with Hurricane Katrina. Everyone was
forced to evacuate, but not everyone could. There were people
in hospitals and nursing homes and people too poor and
without cars that were simply left behind. How were these
people supposed to leave? How might there have been better
emergency plans in place to facilitate the evacuation of
these citizens? In one reported story, a dead body was left
to decay for over 2 weeks in the Algiers neighborhood of New
Orleans, despite swarms of local police, Louisiana state
troopers and the Army. Residents believed that law
enforcement officials left the body there purposely to
encourage the residents to evacuate. If their belief is true,
such a practice is truly shameful and must be addressed.
Another issue related to local government observed in New
Orleans with the enforced racism that occurred through the
application of two standards of justice by law enforcement
officials. Local law enforcement reportedly allowed white
armed vigilantes to ride throughout the city but would not
allow the same for black residents. According to Malik Rahim,
a community organizer who recently ran for city council in
New Orleans. ``If a white person was taking something, he was
taking food for his family. But if a black was taking
something, he was looting.'' Rahim further described how the
white vigilantes were shooting blacks in his neighborhood
under the guise that they were protecting his neighborhood,
and were even bragging about it. He said he never before seen
New Orleans come so close to breaking into a race riot.
If a race riot had broken out in New Orleans the crisis
situation there would have become far more disastrous. How
can local governments ensure that one standard of justice is
applied equally in times of disaster?
I hope this hearing will address the many concerns raised
and what changes are necessary in the local planning for
disasters in other large cities. Moreover, I look forward to
the series of hearings that this Committee intends to hold
that will specifically look at the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina.