Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition. I would like to place in the Record an article from the Christian Science Monitor entitled, ``Used-car salesman as Iran proxy? Why assassination plot doesn't add up for experts,'' and also…
Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition.
I would like to place in the Record an article from the Christian Science Monitor entitled, ``Used-car salesman as Iran proxy? Why assassination plot doesn't add up for experts,'' and also from Mother Jones, ``Four Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb Plot.''
[From The Christian Science Monitor--CSMonitor.com, Oct. 12, 2011]
Used-Car Salesman as Iran Proxy? Why Assassination Plot Doesn't Add Up
for Experts
(By Scott Peterson)
The U.S. has blamed the specialist Qods Force in an Iran
assassination plot. But those who track the group say the
plot doesn't reflect the careful planning, efficiency, and
strategy the Qods Force is known for.
How careful is Iran's Qods Force when it comes to covert
operations abroad?
This wing of the Revolutionary Guard was accused by U.S.
military commanders in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 of jeopardizing
the efforts of more than 150,000 American troops on the
ground, of backing militias of all stripes, and of exercising
strong influence on Baghdad's rulers.
Yet how many Iranian Qods Force operatives did that take?
One U.S. diplomat posted to Baghdad at the time had the
consensus answer: There were just eight Qods Force men in all
of Iraq.
IN PICTURES: Iran's military might
Indeed, the Qods Force has a reputation for careful,
methodical work--as well as effective use of local proxies,
and ultimately their pragmatic deployment by Tehran as covert
tools to expand Iran's influence across a region in flux.
That explains why Iran experts are raising questions about
fresh U.S. charges of an Iran-backed bomb plot, this time to
kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington and blow up the Saudi
and Israeli embassies.
A criminal complaint filed by U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday
charge Mansour Arbabsiar--a naturalized U.S. citizen with an
Iranian passport from Corpus Christi, Texas--and Gholam
Shakuri, ``an Iran-based member of Iran's Qods Force,'' with
plotting to kill the Saudi diplomat on U.S. soil in an
operation ``directed by factions of the Iranian government.''
Details of alleged plot
Those who know Iran well are skeptical, but do not rule out
any possibility. Mr. Arbabsiar may have arranged for $100,000
to be transferred from Iran as a downpayment of $1.5 million
for the hit, as U.S. charges indicate.
Arbabsiar may also have boasted to one alleged accomplice
in the plot--an associate of Mexico's Zeta drug cartel, who
also happened to be an informant of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration--that his cousin was a ``big general'' in the
Iranian military.
While also describing a series of potential attacks to the
associate, he may even have stated--apparently in secretly
taped conversations--that mass American casualties as a
result were not a problem: ``They want that guy [the
ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him f* *k
'em,'' reads the legal complaint.
Why the plot doesn't add up
But Iran specialists who have followed the Islamic Republic
for years say that many details in the alleged plot just
don't add up.
``It's a very strange case, it doesn't really fit Iran's
mode of operation,'' says Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at
the Rand Corp. in Arlington. Va., and coauthor of studies
about the Revolutionary Guard.
``When you look at Iranian use of terrorism, it has some
very specific objectives, whether it's countering the United
States in Iraq or Afghanistan, or retaliating against
perceived Israeli actions,'' says Mr. Nader.
``This [plot] doesn't seem to serve Iran's interests in any
conceivable way,'' says Nader. ``Assassinating the Saudi
ambassador would increase international pressure against
Iran, could be considered an act of war . . . by Saudi
Arabia, it could really destabilize the government in Iran;
and this is a political system that is interested in its own
survival.''
No apparent cost-benefit analysis
Iran has been trying to evade sanctions, strengthen
relations with non-Western partners, while continuing with
its nuclear program, notes Nader.
He says it is ``difficult'' to believe that either Qassim
Soleimani--the canny commander of the Qods Force--or Iran's
deliberative supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali
Khamenei, would order such an attack that ``would put all of
Iran's objectives and strategies at risk.''
That view has been echoed by many Iran watchers, who are
raising doubts about the assassination plot allegations.
``This plot, if true, departs from all known Iranian
policies and procedures,'' writes Gary Sick, an Iran expert
at Columbia University and principal White House aide during
the 1979 Iranian revolution and hostage crisis.
While Iran may have many reasons to be angry at the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia, Mr. Sick notes in a posting on the
Gulf2000/Columbia experts list that he moderates, ``it is
difficult to believe that they would rely on a non-Islamic
criminal gang to carry out this most sensitive of all
possible missions.''
Relying on ``at least one amateur and a Mexican criminal
drug gang that is known to be riddled with both Mexican and
U.S. intelligence agents'' appears to be sloppy, adds Sick.
``Whatever else may be Iran's failings, they are not noted
for utter disregard of the most basic intelligence
tradecraft.''
The odd set of details means that the usual cost-benefit
calculation that experts often attribute to Tehran's
decisionmaking does not apply here, says Muhammad Sahimi, in
an analysis for the Tehran Bureau website.
At a time when pressure is building on Iran over ``gross
human rights violations,'' sanctions are showing signs of
working, Iran is ``deeply worried about the fate of its
strategic partner in Syria . . . tensions with Turkey are
increasing . . . and a fierce power struggle is under way
within Iran,'' says Mr. Sahimi, ``it is essentially
impossible to believe that the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran]
would act in such a way as to open a major new front against
itself.''
Previous assassinations only targeted Iranians
Sahimi also notes that, even at the height of the regime's
assassinations of opponents in the past, it did not target
non-Iranians.
``It is keenly aware that it is under the American
microscope,'' says Sahimi, making even less likely Iran
embarking ``on such a useless assassination involving a low-
level, non-player individual.''
Such reservations are not the same ones given by Iranian
officials when they dismiss the charges of a murder plot. But
analysts suggest more information will need to be revealed
before judgment can be made.
``Iran does have a history of terrorism, but they also like
to go through proxies--and true and tested proxies, not
necessarily just anybody,'' says Nader of Rand, citing
Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, or Iraqi Shiite insurgents
trained in Iranian camps.
The man arrested by U.S. law enforcement at JFK airport on
Sept. 29 does not seem to fit that mold.
Not your average proxy
Arbabsiar, a former used car salesman, would appear to have
been a surprise choice of the Qods Force. Yet he apparently
traveled several times to Mexico to recruit drug-cartel hit
men, had $100,000 from Iran paid into a U.S. account and
promised much more, and discussed the plot on a normal
telephone.
``The Iranian modus operandi is only to trust sensitive
plots to their own employees, or to trusted proxies such as
Hezbollah, Saudi Hezbollah, Hamas, the Sadr faction in Iraq,
Iran-friendly extremist Muslims in Afghanistan and other pro-
Iranian Muslim groups,'' wrote Kenneth Katzman of the
Congressional Research Service on Gulf2000 on Wednesday.
``Are we to believe that this Texas car seller was a Qods
sleeper agent for many years resident in the U.S.?
Ridiculous,'' said Mr. Katzman, who authored a study of the
Revolutionary Guard in the 1990s. ``They (the Iranian command
system) never ever use such has-beens or loosely connected
people for sensitive plots such as this.''
And what kind of man is he? The Associated Press spoke to
Arbabsiar's friend and former Texas business partner David
Tomscha, who said he was ``sort of a hustler.'' The Iranian-
American, the AP reported, ``was likable, albeit a bit
lazy.''
``He's no mastermind,'' Mr. Tomscha told the AP. ``I can't
imagine him thinking up a plan like that. I mean, he didn't
seem all that political. He was more of a businessman.''
Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record an article from the Washington Post ombudsman entitled, ``Getting ahead of the facts on Iran,'' which states that the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb nor does it say it is building one.
[From The Washington Post, December 9, 2011]
Getting Ahead of the Facts on Iran
(By Patrick B. Pexton)
Headlines are tricky and difficult. They're written
quickly, with print and Web publishing deadlines always
looming, and with space limitations, yet headline writers try
to be creative, informative, and occasionally, humorous.
Few readers remember the hundreds of well-crafted headlines
that entice yet describe a story accurately. But when a
headline is bad, it sticks with you, like a burr you can't
get out of your sock.
So it was with recent headlines that appeared on one of The
Post's online photo galleries.
I was bombarded--about 1,500 e-mails--with complaints about
this headline (it was an organized campaign, but more about
that in a minute).
The photo slideshow depicted Iran's nuclear research
facilities and originally had a headline and subhead that
readers felt were misleading: ``Iran's quest to possess
nuclear weapons, the main headline said, followed by this
subhead: ``Intelligence shows that Iran received foreign
assistance to overcome key hurdles in acquiring a nuclear
weapon, according to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.''
The gallery was linked to two stories by The Post's
national intelligence reporter, Joby Warrick, one on Nov. 6
and one on Nov. 8 describing the latest IAEA report, in which
the U.N. agency said that Iran's drive for nuclear technology
has military aspects that could bring it to the threshold of
a nuclear bomb.
``But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor
does it say it is building one, only that its multiyear
effort pursuing nuclear technology is sophisticated and broad
enough that it could be consistent with building a bomb.
Iran steadfastly denies it is aiming for a nuclear bomb and
says its program is aimed at civilian nuclear energy and
research. Of course, Tehran could be lying. But no one knows
for sure.
This is what the U.S. director of national intelligence,
James R. Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in
March: ``We continue to assess [that] Iran is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing
various nuclear capabilities that better position it to
produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not
know, however, if Iran will evantually decide to build
nuclear weapons.''
So are there 1,500 Post readers so attuned to headlines
that they wrote me spontaneously to object? Well, no.
This was an effort organized by a left-leaning nonprofit
goup called Just Foreign Policy. On the group's board, among
others, are Julian Bond, longtime NAACP chairman, and Tom
Hayden, former California legislator and 1960s activist.
Founded in 2006, Just Foreign Policy is a shoestring
operation, and it has no staff in Washington.
Robert Naiman, a recent master's degree graduate from the
University of Illinois, runs the group's online campaigns
from his home in Urbana.
``We're not a super-sophisticated operation,'' Neiman
acknowledged with a chuckle. But it is savvy enough to use
the Web effectively. ``We try to inform and agitate,'' he
added. The group works mainly to end the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and to prevent new ones, such as with Iran.
``Most of what I do is read the newspaper and try to tell
people about what I read,'' Naiman said. ``I stumbled on the
headline, and was astonished, even knowing The Post's
editorial line on Iran. I'm old-fashioned. The editorial page
is one thing and the news is the other. The gallery headlines
belonged more in the former and not the latter.''
So he spotlighted the headline on the top of Just Foreign
Policy's home page, with this message: ``U.S. media helped
railroad the nation into war with Iraq by treating unproven
claims about Iraq's alleged [weapons of mass destruction]
program as facts. Now we're seeing the same behavior
concerning Iran.''
Visitors to Naiman's site could click on a link that sent a
pre-written e-mail urging yours truly to fact-check the
headline. Daily Kos and other left-leaning Web sites picked
it up, adding fuel to the fire. Pretty soon, the ombudsman's
inbox was crammed.
I think Naiman and his Web army were right. The headline
and subhead were misleading.
Photo galleries generally are built by photo editors and
then passed to copy editors for captions and headlines. I
couldn't identify exactly where in the process these
headlines went wrong, but when I raised the issue it was
quickly fixed.
In a Web-driven world, one bad headline can check the globe
in minutes and undermine The Post's credibility. It can also
play into the hands of those who are seeking further
confrontaion with Iran.
I would like to place in the Record an article, ``Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanction Strategy'' which raises questions about the Iranian stockpile and how much enriched uranium they actually have.
Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanctions Strategy
Monday, November 28, 2011
(By Ardavon Naimi)
Washington, DC.--``We have succeeded in imposing the
strongest sanctions to date on the Iranian regime,'' said Tom
Donilon, National Security Advisor, last week at the
Brookings Institution. Donilon, addressing the
administration's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program in
light of the latest IAEA report, stated that sanctions have
isolated Iran internationally, helped delay Iran's nuclear
program, and facilitated divisions inside Iran's political
establishment.
But according to some of the experts participating in a
panel discussion preceding Donilon's keynote address, the
sanctions have largely punished ordinary Iranians and have
united, not divided, political factions in Iran.
According to Kevan Harris, U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings
Randolph peace scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the Johns
Hopkins University, the sanctions are ``not as smart as we
think.''
Harris described the effects of sanctions inside of Iran.
``Sanctions are having an impact . . . in what I like to call
`trickle down' sanctions.'' Sanctions affect the ability of
certain banks and large enterprises to obtain foreign
exchange and goods, consequently affecting small and medium
sized enterprises
inside Iran--such as the construction and automobile
industry. This process has resulted in the rising cost of
business. This trickling down helps to rise ``unemployed to a
certain extent, and also decreases wages,'' affecting
everyday Iranians.
Harris challenged the assumption that sanctions facilitate
divisions inside Iran's political elite. ``If you threaten
countries . . . all of a sudden they have a real big
incentive to start working together,'' said Harris. ``At high
peaks of perceived external threat, the discourse of unity
raises and the discourse of factionalism dies down.''
We spend a lot of resources on sanctions . . . political
and economic . . . we need to ask ourselves, what's the cost
benefit of that versus spending resources on diplomatic
options.''
Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations believes that ``Iran's nuclear
program is driven by domestic political factors.'' Yet,
Takeyh takes the argument against sanctions a step further.
He believes that Iran's nuclear program is actually the
Islamic Republic's only perceived path to ``international
legitimacy.'' By withstanding sanctions and obtaining a
nuclear weapon, Iran would ``extract tributes from
international concession.'' ``This program . . . may be
beyond diplomatic mediation . . . underpinned by economic
coercion,'' said Takeyh.
Harris challenged Takeyh's assertion, stating ``if the goal
of the program is their perceived only path to international
legitimacy, then it seems like an alternative policy would be
to provide a different path to international legitimacy for
Iran that they don't perceive as open.''
Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American
Scientists, discussed the latest IAEA report on Iran's
nuclear program. ``Is there anything really new in the annex
of the IAEA report?'' asked Ferguson, ``you have to say, not
really. There's not a whole lot of new stuff in there.''
Although there are reasons for concern regarding Iran's
ongoing efforts, Ferguson says that ``most of the things that
are documented, that we know well, happened prior to 2004.''
Iran continues to build up its stockpile of 19.75 percent
enriched uranium, yet Ferguson acknowledges that ``even at 20
percent enrichment, it's still going to take a few hundred
kilos of that amount of material to have enough for one bomb
. . . and Iran so far according to the IAEA, has something
like 80 kilograms enriched to that level.'' Even when
factoring in Iran's 4900 kilograms of 3.5 percent low
enriched uranium, Ferguson concludes that it is ``still not
enough material to provide Iran with a true breakout
capability.'' Ferguson suggested that the best response to
Iran's defiance is not further isolation, but creating
openings for dialogue to facilitate increased safeguards and
limits on Iran's nuclear program.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
I realize, Mr. Speaker, that there are a number of people who want to speak on this who are in favor of this resolution. In order to make sure that everyone is provided a chance, although I may disagree with what Mr. Sherman is about to say, I'll defend his right to speak, and so I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).
Could I ask, Mr. Speaker, how much time all parties have remaining?
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to place in the Record an article from the Arms Control Association which states that the IAEA board resolution avoided direct censure of Iran, and did not declare Iran to be in noncompliance with its nonproliferation activities.
[From armscontrol.org, Nov. 8, 2011]
The IAEA's Iran Report: Assessment and Implications
The IAEA report and annex released today provides
disturbing and ``credible'' additional details regarding
Iranian nuclear warhead development efforts that have allowed
Tehran to acquire some of the expertise needed to build
nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so.
The broad outline in the IAEA' s latest report on the
military dimensions of Iran's program is not new, but rather,
provides greater detail regarding weapons-related activities
outlined in previous public reports.
The IAEA report and annex reinforce what the
nonproliferation community has recognized for some time: that
Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development
activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but
continued other.
The activities documented in the IAEA report, including
research related to nuclear warheads, underscore that
Tehran's claims that it is only seeking the peaceful use of
nuclear energy are false.
Iran's warhead work also contradicts its obligation not to
pursue nuclear weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), under which states parties commit ``not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.''
The report suggests that Iran is working to shorten the
timeframe to building the bomb once and if it makes that
decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran
is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.
The report should prompt greater international pressure on
Tehran to respond more fully to the IAEA's questions, allow
for more extensive inspections of its nuclear facilities,
engage more seriously in talks on its nuclear program, and to
agree to confidence building steps to help resolve the
crisis.
Comparison of the IAEA's Findings with Public U.S. Intelligence
Assessments
Because the IAEA report is based largely on intelligence
the United States and other IAEA member states have been
sharing with the agency for some time, in addition to the
agency's own investigations, the information in the report
likely provides greater insight into current U.S. assessments
about Iran's nuclear program.
The U.S. intelligence community appears to stand by the
judgment made in the 2007 NIE that Iran had a nuclear weapons
program that was halted in the fall of 2003.
Moreover, in his testimony before a Senate committee in March
2011, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
confirmed that the intelligence community still had a high
level of confidence that Iran has not yet made a decision to
restart its nuclear weapons program.
Because the weapons program is believed to refer to the
series of projects the IAEA report details, Clapper's
statement is not inconsistent with the notion that some
weapons-related R&D has resumed which is not part of a
determined, integrated weapons-development program of the
type that Iran maintained prior to 2003.
Consistent with the finding of the 2007 U.S. National
Intelligence Estimate, the IAEA report says that a
comprehensive weapons program (known as the AMAD Plan) ``was
stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a `halt order,' '' in
late 2003, but that some of the program's activities were
resumed later. Key personnel are still involved in those
renewed activities apparently tying up loose ends regarding
their prior research and development work.
Summary of Key IAEA Findings on Weapons-Related Activities
The IAEA deserves credit for continuing to press the issue
and to present this important information to the IAEA Board
of Governors in spite of Tehran's unwillingness to cooperate
with the investigation. This resolve helps to bolster the
integrity of the agency and show that countries cannot simply
get away with nonproliferation violations by denial and
obfuscation.
According to the report, Iran was engaged in an effort
prior to the end of 2003 which ran the full range of nuclear
weapons development, from acquiring the raw nuclear material
to working on a weapon they could eventually deliver via a
missile. Just as important as the type of work being carried
out is how that work was organized. The series of projects
that made up Iran's nuclear program appears to have been
overseen by ``senior Iranian figures'' and engaged in
``working level correspondence'' consistent with a
coordinated program.
Key components of this program include:
Fissile Material Production: As documented in previous
reports, Iran ran an undeclared effort to produce
uraniumtetrafluoride (also known as Green Salt), a precursor
for the uranium used in the enrichment process. The
affiliation between this project and other projects directly
related to warhead development suggests that Iran's nuclear
weapons program included both fissile material production and
warhead development Although the report does not detail a
uranium enrichment effort as part of the AMAD Plan, the
secret nature of the Natanz enrichment plant prior to 2002
suggests that it was originally intended to produce the
highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons.
High Explosives Testing: Iran's experiments involving
exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators and the simultaneous
firing of explosives around a hemispherical shape points to
work on nuclear warhead design. The agency says that the type
of high explosives testing matches an existing nuclear weapon
design. Iran admits to carrying out such work, but claims it
is for conventional military purposes and disputes some of
the technical details.
Warhead Design Verification: Iran carried out experiments
using high explosives to test the validity of its warhead
design and engaged in preparatory work to carry out a full-
scale underground nuclear test explosion.
Shahab-3 Re-entry Vehicle: Documentation reviewed by the
IAEA has suggested that, as late as 2003, Iran sought to
develop a nuclear warhead small enough to ft on the Shahab-3
missile. Confronted with some of the studies, Iran admitted
to the IAEA that such work would constitute nuclear weapons
development, but Tehran denies carrying out the research.
The IAEA admits that it has less information regarding
warhead-related work Iran has continued to pursue since 2003,
but the report has provided some insight into the type of
activities that Iran subsequently resumed, which seems to be
focused on warhead design verification. The act that the
agency was able to detail some of the organizational changes
that have taken place since 2003, including the current
position of the person who formerly oversaw the AMAD Plan,
suggests that intelligence agencies still have considerable
insight into Iran's nuclear program. Tehran will likely be
concerned about its inability to hide such important
information and will likely engage in further restructuring
following this report, which may delay its efforts once
again.
Considering the IAEA's reliance on intelligence information
from states, it went through considerable length to
demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. It
was not just a matter of acquiring consistent information
from over 10 countries, but it seems some of the most
incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which
Iran admits it relied upon. The information from the Khan
network includes details about nuclear warhead designs the
network gave Iran that match up to the research and
experiments detailed in the intelligence information.
The IAEA Board of Governors Needs to Respond
The report will be considered by the IAEA Board of
Governors at its next meeting Nov. 17-18, along with a draft
resolution censuring Iran for violating its nonproliferation
commitments. The Board's 35 members cannot ignore Iran's
warhead development activities or Tehran's refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into that work. It
must also insist that Iran improve its cooperation with the
agency prior to the next board meeting.
A consensus response is unlikely given existing divisions
among the 35 countries, and in particular, Cuba's current
membership on the board. Beijing and Moscow have also
unfortunately played an unhelpful role prior to the release
of the report by calling on Director-General Yukiya Amano to
limit the information detailed it contains.
However, it is important that the board's response receives
support from as many countries as possible to demonstrate to
Tehran that it cannot engage in work directly related to
nuclear weapons with impunity.
In particular, developing countries on the IAEA Board of
Governors should no longer treat the Iran nuclear issue as a
test case for preserving the right to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Rather, it is time that all states insist
that Iran stop abusing that right for the development of a
nuclear weapons capability and take meaningful steps to
cooperate with the IAEA and suspend enrichment work,
particularly enrichment of uranium at the 20% level.
Rights and Responsibilities
Iran cannot complain that Western states are trying to deny
the Islamic Republic its nuclear ``rights.'' The U.S.
position, consistent with the 2006 offer by the P5+1, has
been that Iran could resume enrichment some time in the
future after it reestablishes confidence with the
international community that it is not pursuing nuclear
weapons.
As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained it
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 1, 2011,
it is the U.S. Government's position is that ``under very
strict conditions'' and ``having responded to the
international community's concerns,'' Iran would have a
``right'' to enrich uranium under IAEA inspections.
In response to the IAEA's report, the international
community should redouble efforts to implement existing U.N.
Security Council-mandated sanctions on Iran's nuclear and
missile sectors and, if Iran remains unwilling to cooperate
with the IAEA and ignore the Security Council, further
isolate Iran diplomatically and economically.
Maintain Pressure and Engage
In response to the report, the White House has
appropriately underscored that the United States continues to
focus on using diplomatic channels to pressure Iran to
abandon its sensitive nuclear activities.
To keep open the option for an effective negotiated
resolution to the crisis, President Barack Obama should also
reiterate the willingness of the United States and its P5+1
partners to follow-through on the recent letter from the EU's
Catherine Ashton to Iran's leaders offering to engage them in
further talks to address the nuclear program.
Continuing pressure through targeted sanctions against
Iran's nuclear and missile sectors, coupled with the pursuit
of a negotiated agreement to resolve serious concerns over
Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and to limit its uranium
enrichment capacity provides the best chance of preventing a
nuclear-armed Iran.
Talk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and
military targets is unhelpful and counterproductive. Military
strikes by the United States and/or Israel would only achieve
a temporary delay in Iran's nuclear activities, convince
Iran's leadership to openly pursue nuclear weapons, rally
domestic support behind a corrupt regime, and would result in
costly long-term consequences for U.S. and regional security
and the U.S. and global economy.
Ultimately, resolving the nuclear issue will require
sufficient pressure and inducement to convince Iran that it
stands more to gain from forgoing a nuclear-weapons option
and much to lose from any decision to build them.
My friend from Oregon earlier mentioned the question of oil prices, and it's something that we ought to be concerned about.
I would like to place in the Record an article from Slate that says that this sanction could lead to an increase in the price of gasoline that could be as much as $1.25 a gallon.
[From Slate, Dec. 2, 2011]
Will Sanctions Against Iran Raise Gas Prices?
(By Brian Palmer)
The Senate unanimous passed a bill Thursday that would
impose economic sanctions on Iran, over the objection of the
White House. One of the administration's complaints was that
the move could increase oil prices. How much could
sanctioning Iran cost us at the pump?
The nightmare scenario would be an additional $1.25 per
gallon. Iran produces just over 5 percent of the world's
crude, which doesn't seem like a lot. But oil demand is
price-insensitive--people and businesses refuse to change
their fuel-buying habits until the costs go way up. That
means a reduction in supply will have a disproportionate
affect on prices. In the past, price increases have been
about 10 times greater than their precipitating drops in
production. Based on the same historical data, and given
that oil is currently hovering at around $100 per barrel, a
complete shutdown of Iranian exports could force prices as
high as $150. (That's 5 percent, times the tenfold
multiplier, times the current price of $100.) Since a one-
dollar change in the cost of a barrel of oil usually
translates to a two-and-a-half-cent surge in retail gas
prices, cutting Iran off from world oil markets could
increase the price of gasoline by a dollar and a quarter.
This theoretical scenario is extremely unlikely, however.
The Senate bill permits the president to delay the sanctions
if there isn't adequate supply on the market. In addition,
the bill would make it harder for foreign banks to deal with
the Iranian central bank, which acts as a middle man in oil
transactions. But it wouldn't make buying Iranian crude
impossible, and sanctioned countries have historically found
ways to sell their oil. (Consider, for example, the oil for
food program that undermined sanctions against Iraq. The
Senate sanctions against Iran also have a humanitarian
exemption.) There hasn't been a truly effective, worldwide
boycott of a country's oil exports since 1951-53, when Iran
nationalized its oil industry. As long as Iranian oil
continues to flow to Asia and parts of Europe, the sanctions
would have a relatively small impact on prices.
There's also the possibility that Saudi Arabia could make
up for some of the banned Iranian oil, as it did during the
first and second Persian Gulf wars. The Saudis wouldn't be
able to plug the gap entirely, because they don't have as
much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the
blow, though.
There is one long-shot scenario that should be mentioned,
in which oil prices go even higher than $150 per barrel. When
pressured in the past, Iran has threatened to block oil
deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz. Around 17 percent of
oil traded globally passes through that waterway.
While such an occurrence could theoretically lead to $8-
per-gallon gasoline, based on the historic relationship
between supply and price, it's a practical impossibility.
Demand would drop significantly at those dizzying prices,
causing the cost of a barrel of oil to increase more in
proportion with changes to supply. More importantly, the
economic shock of such a scenario would likely trigger a
naval response from the U.S. and its allies.
Mr. Speaker, an article in the Wall Street Journal raises this question as well. It says that crude flirts with $100 a barrel on geopolitical unrest. And it also quotes a commodity strategist at the Standard Bank in London as saying the timing of an Iranian embargo could hardly be worse. Relatively small disruptions could cause spikes in oil prices.
A director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, Mr. Adam Szubin, stated that there are real scenarios in which an oil spike might hit. This is from an article: U.S. officials warn that new sanctions could be a boon to Iran. There's another article that cites that, and an article from The New York Times which states that U.S. officials have declared they'd hold Iran accountable for a purported plot, but they've now decided that a proposed move against Iran's central bank would disrupt international oil markets and further damage the reeling American and world economies. I think that's something that we ought to be concerned about; that if, in fact, we are moving forward with sanctions, sanctions which will have an effect on the price of oil, is this the timing to do that kind of thing, and are we prepared in this Congress to accept the responsibility for a sharp increase in the price of oil?
Here's a quote from a blog called San Francisco Gate quoting the Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``There's absolutely a risk the price of oil would go up, which would mean that Iran, would, in fact, have more money to fuel its nuclear ambitions, not less.''
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
I would respectfully respond to my friend from New York that the price of oil is, in fact, a moral question.
I want to raise the question of the constitutionality of this particular proposal. I believe that it's unconstitutional because it is an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and freedom of association. It is an unconstitutional abridgement of the right of free expression by Federal employees. It is a violation of whistleblower protections which have been granted a constitutional basis; that, in fact, it violates our own speech and debate clause of the Constitution of the United States because we have an obligation to inquire and to ask questions; that it violates the Constitution's separation of powers and challenges the President's power to engage in foreign diplomacy; that it is operationally impossible; that you can have even Admiral Mullen, former Chair of the Joint Chiefs, point out that with the miscommunications that can occur from a lack of diplomacy, we could be putting our own people at risk.
In fact, there was an article that was published that deals with a scenario that would happen in the Gulf where there are run-ins between American and Iranian vessels. The no contact provision, if enacted, could outlaw the U.S. Navy's bridge-to-bridge communications with Iranian vessels.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to place in the Record an article by Seymour Hersh which cites the IAE's report suggesting, according to the Arms Control Association, that Iran is working to shorten a time frame to build a bomb once and if it makes the decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable.
[The New Yorker Online Only Daily Comment, November 18, 2011]
Iran and The I.A.E.A.
(Posted by Seymour M. Hersh)
The first question in last Saturday night's Republican
debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly
published report by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The report, which raised renewed concern about the ``possible
existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in
Iran,'' struck a darker tone than previous assessments. But
it was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any
ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the
I.A.E.A. report had provided ``additional credible evidence
that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon'' and asked what
various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to
stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would assist those who are
trying to overthrow the government. Newt Gingrich said he
would coordinate with the Israeli government and maximize
covert operations to block the Iranian weapons program. Mitt
Romney called the state of Iran's nuclear program Obama's
``greatest failing, from a foreign-policy standpoint'' and
added, ``Look, one thing you can know . . . and that is if we
reelect Barack Obama Iran will have a nuclear weapon.'' The
Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night.
I've been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker
for the past decade, with a focus on the repeatedly inability
of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations
Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons
production program in Iran. The goal of the high-risk
American covert operations was to find something physical--a
``smoking calutron,'' as a knowledgeable official once told
me--to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an
undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to
attack and destroy the site.
The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the
report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators ``have amassed a
trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a `credible'
case'' that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons
activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as
declaring that ``the level of detail is unbelievable. . . .
The report describes virtually all the steps to make a
nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of
those steps. It reads like a menu.'' The Times set the tone
for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on
the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that ``it is true
that the basic allegations in the report are not
substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for
years.'')
But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings?
The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years ``to
receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to
possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program'' and,
as a result, it has been able ``to refine its analysis.'' The
net effect has been to create ``more concern.'' But Robert
Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who
previously spent more than thirty years with the Department
of Energy's nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could
find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He
noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from
a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the
I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance
could not be established. Those materials, and others, ``were
old news,'' Kelley said, and known to many journalists. ``I
wonder why this same stuff is now considered `new
information' by the same reporters.''
A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published
by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose
mission is to encourage public support for effective arms
control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did ``reinforce
what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some
times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons
development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them,
but continued others.'' (The American intelligence community
reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007
estimate.) The I.A.E.A.'s report ``suggests,'' the A.C.A.
paper said, that Iran ``is working to shorten the timeframe
to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it
remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not
imminent nor is it inevitable.'' Greg Thielmann, a former
State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst
who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me,
``There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are
still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran
is really building a bomb.'' He added, ``Those who want to
drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of
aggressively misrepresented the report.''
Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a
disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton's
International Security Advisory Board, said, ``I was briefed
on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A.
headquarters in Vienna. There's little new in the report.
Most of this information is well known to experts who follow
the issue.'' Cirincione noted that ``post-2003, the report
only cites computer modelling and a few other experiments.''
(A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, ``I was
underwhelmed by the information.'')
The report did note that its on-site camera inspection
process of Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment facilities--
mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which
Iran is a signatory--``continues to verify the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material.'' In other words, all of the
low enriched uranium now known to be produced inside Iran is
accounted for; if highly enriched uranium is being used for
the manufacture of a bomb, it would have to have another,
unknown source.
The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change
at the top. The I.A.E.A.'s report had extra weight because
the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable
arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the
I.A.E.A.'s Director General two years ago, was viewed
internationally, although not always in Washington, as an
honest broker--a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel
Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei's replacement is Yukiya Amano
of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable
from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described
Amano as being ``ready for prime time.'' According to the
cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in
September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent
representative to the I.A.E.A., said, ``Amano reminded
Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make
concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries],
which correctly required him to be fair-minded and
independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on
every strategic decision, from high-level personnel
appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear
weapons program.'' The cable added that Amano's ``willingness
to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy . .
. bodes well for our future relationship.''
It is possible, of course, that Iran has simply
circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the
I.A.E.A., perhaps even building Dick Cheney's nightmare: a
hidden underground nuclear-weapons fabrication facility.
Iran's track record with the I.A.E.A. has been far from good:
its leadership began construction of its initial uranium
facilities in the nineteen-eighties without informing the
Agency, in violation of the nonproliferation treaty. Over the
next decade and a half, under prodding from ElBaradei and the
West, the Iranians began acknowledging their deceit and
opened their enrichment facilities, and their records, to
I.A.E.A. inspectors.
The new report, therefore, leaves us where we've been since
2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the
Axis of Evil--with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive
evidence of a nuclear-weapons program.
I would ask how much time is left on all sides.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to place in the Record a letter from 26 organizations that urge Congress to oppose the provision restricting contact with Iranian officials.
December 8, 2011.
Dear Representative: We urge you to oppose the provision
restricting contact with Iranian officials in the Iran
sanctions bill H.R. 1905 and to work with your colleagues to
remove it from the bill when it comes to the House floor. We
are concerned that Section 601c of this legislation would
undermine prospects for a diplomatic resolution of Iran's
disputed nuclear program, increasing the threat of war.
This provision was inserted into the bill during committee
markup, after most of the cosponsors had already signed onto
H.R. 1905. Section 601c of H.R. 1905 would expressly prohibit
contact between U.S. government officials and certain Iranian
officials, as noted below:
(c) Restriction on contact.--No person employed with the
United States Government may contact in an official or
unofficial capacity any person that--(1) is an agent,
instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is
serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and
(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated
with terrorist organizations. (d) Waiver.--The President may
waive the requirements of subsection (c) if the President
determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional
committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority
that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national
security interests of the United States.
If this provision were to be enacted into law, it could
have a chilling effect on any diplomatic engagement that this
or any future administration might wish to pursue to address
Iran's nuclear program, its role in exacerbating or de-
escalating regional conflicts, and its failure to respect the
human rights of its citizens. It would also place
restrictions on members of Congress, likely precluding the
potential for inter-parliamentary dialogue with Iranian
parliamentarians.
As Ambassadors Thomas Pickering and William Luers have
pointed out, this provision also raises ``serious
constitutional issues over the separation of powers''. For
the administration to exercise its waiver authority, the
President would have to certify 15 days in advance that the
failure to do so would ``pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the vital national security interests of the United
States''.
At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran,
sustained and flexible diplomacy is an essential tool to
prevent war. Just before he retired from the position of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen called
for an established channel of communications with Iran,
noting that: ``We haven't had a connection with Iran since
1979. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we had links
of the Soviet Union . . . If something happens it's virtually
assured that we won't get it right, that there will be
miscalculations which would be extremely dangerous in that
part of world . . . I think any channel would be terrific.''
We urge every member of Congress to oppose Section 601c of
H.R. 1905 speak out on the House floor against efforts
designed to constrain diplomatic engagement with Iran.
Sincerely,
Friends Committee on National Legislation; Americans for
Peace Now; Arms Control Association; Center for
Interfaith Engagement, Eastern Mennonite University;
Church of the Brethren; Council for a Livable World;
Fellowship of Reconciliation; Just Foreign Policy;
Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness; Mainstream Media
Project; Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns;
Mennonite Central Committee; Minnesota Peace Project.
Middle East Peace Now; National Iranian American Council;
New Internationalism Project, Institute for Policy
Studies; Peace Action; Peace Action West; Peace
Catalyst International; Progressive Democrats for
America; Project on Middle East Democracy; Student
Peace Alliance; United Church of Christ, Justice and
Witness Ministries; United Methodist Church, General
Board of Church and Society; Women's Action for New
Directions; 3P Human Security: Partners for
Peacebuilding Policy.
It's interesting that what we're actually suggesting here is taking diplomacy off the table. I was here for the debate in Iraq. I led the effort in this Congress in challenging the then-Bush administration's assertions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which they intended to use against the United States. I was here. I don't know how many of you were here. But I saw a case being made for war, and that case was based on exaggerations and unfortunately in some cases distortions and lies.
We have to be very careful that we're not setting the stage for still another war. We must be very careful that when we assert a certain level of preparedness on the part of Iran with respect to their nuclear capability that we aren't actually shutting the door that needs to be open in order to try to resolve any difficulty between our nations. We can say, well, we want to get them back to the table, but then don't talk to them.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to say I have respect for all of my colleagues who are concerned about nuclear proliferation. We all ought to be concerned about nuclear proliferation. We can start with our own country. Right now we've set the stage for continuing to develop nuclear weapons. It's very difficult to be able to have a strong position of standing on this issue if we have one set of rules for ourselves and another set of rules for the rest of the world.
I don't want to see a nuclear proliferation in Iran, but I think that if we want to have a standing where people want to take what we say, we have to be consistent. We have to make sure that what we do is consistent with what we say.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I would ask how much time is remaining.
I would respectfully suggest to my friend from New Jersey that the certainty that Congress had in the debate in October of 2002 with respect to Iraq is very much paralleled with the certainty that some of my friends here have about not only Iran's intention to have a bomb but an intention to use it. That's why we need diplomacy. That's why the provisions of this bill in section 603(c), which say U.S. Government employees can't have any contact with Iranians, is really upside down.
I yield to the gentleman from California.
In reclaiming my time, section 603(c) was added in committee. I would inquire of the gentleman, was it stripped from the bill?
I reclaim my time.
Perhaps the President is not restricted, which is good for the gentleman to say; but the very clear and plain reading of that is that it says no U.S. Government employee.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Correct.
I yield myself 1 minute.
I am quoting from an article in The Hill, which I cited earlier:
Section 601 would prohibit U.S. Government employees in any official or unofficial capacity from contacting anyone who is affiliated with the Iranian Government who presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with a terrorist organization.
Look, if you want to stop war, you have to have communication with people. I mean, if you look back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is one of the gravest crises of the 20th century, it was the fact that the United States and Russia were able to engage in a communication.
So we have to be very careful that we don't pass any kind of a law that would restrict, not just First Amendment rights and not just freedom of association, but would restrict the basic kind of diplomacy that's used, because everyone here knows that diplomacy is not just leaders talking to leaders. All kinds of backdoor diplomacy goes on, and I think that that needs to be taken into consideration.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I thank my colleagues very much, for whom I have the greatest respect, for the opportunity to discuss this; although I painfully must disagree with you here.
Broad sanctions against Iran can only further isolate Iran from the international community and cause the regime to be increasingly secretive. The sanctions actually play directly into the hands of the Iranian Government. They directly undermine the efforts of the Iranian people, who have courageously challenged their government often at the cost of their lives. The sanctions could be seen as a gift to the regime, not just a political gift for polarization within their country to cross opposition, but also an economic gift because the price of oil will go up, and Iran will cash in on that.
Section 302 of this bill revokes the President's authority to license the export of civilian aircraft parts and repairs for Iranian civil aircraft, authority which would ensure the safety of flight for humanitarian purposes. This provision recklessly places the lives of Iranian Americans in danger. We ought to defeat this bill and stand for diplomacy.
I yield back the balance of my time.