Madam Speaker, I would like to share with our colleagues testimony that John Prendergast, co-founder of the Enough Project, gave yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health on the critical issue of…
Madam Speaker, I would like to share with our colleagues testimony that John Prendergast, co-founder of the Enough Project, gave yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health on the critical issue of U.S.-Sudan policy, specifically as it relates to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). During the Clinton administration John was director of African Affairs at the National Security Council and special advisor at the Department of State. I respect his views given his long-time involvement in Africa and Sudan.
Sudan U.S. Policy and Implementation of the CPA
Thank you Congressman Payne and members of this
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on a topic that
will help determine the future of millions of people from
Sudan and the surrounding region.
At this subcommittee hearing, members will hear a very
different message than that which will be communicated at
tomorrow's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Today,
this subcommittee's members will hear a bipartisan critique
of the current direction of U.S. policy towards Sudan. Rich
Williamson, Roger Winter and I all have negotiated
extensively with the regime in Sudan, have roughly a combined
six decades in working on or in Sudan, and have a very clear
idea of what is required for lasting peace to have a chance
in that embattled country.
This hearing comes at a moment in Sudan's history fraught
with danger and potential. There is no effective peace
process for Darfur, but one could be built with U.S.
leadership. The CPA is on the brink, but could be salvaged if
U.S. engagement deepens. Next year's elections are at risk,
but could become an important opportunity to strengthen
opposition parties and democratic structures crucial for the
referendum and for Sudan's political future. The referendum
itself is doubtful, but its prospects could be enhanced with
a credible international roadmap.
The major unknown variable that will help determine whether
the dangers or the opportunities get maximized is the
unresolved internal debate over the direction of U.S. policy
towards Sudan. In the absence of any agreement on the policy,
U.S. diplomatic engagement has been energetic, for which
Special Envoy Gration should be credited. But the substance
of this robust engagement has been fraught with missteps,
lack of internal coordination, and an overall aversion to
pressuring the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).
Sustained pressure leveraged by meaningful and focused sticks
is the principal tool that has moved the NCP to change its
behavior during the 20 years of its authoritarian rule. This
substantial track record of empirical evidence of the value
of pressure makes the direction of U.S. diplomacy all the
more questionable.
There is also a broader inconsistency in U.S. foreign
policy when it comes to Sudan. The Obama administration has
resolutely worked to craft more formidable international
coalitions to isolate North Korea and Iran for important U.S.
policy objectives. However, the U.S. is not doing the same
for Sudan, despite the existence of a regime there that is
responsible directly or indirectly for the loss of two and a
half million lives in the South and Darfur.
U.S. Goals in Sudan and How to Achieve Them
In the context of its policy review, the U.S. should spell
out clear goals:
(1) U.S. leadership in constructing a more effective Darfur
peace process, using as a model the process that led to the
CPA involving a lead role for the U.S. and a multilateral
support structure that provided international leverage,
expertise, and support;
(2) U.S. leadership in supporting the implementation of the
CPA, continuing the trend of deeper engagement over the last
few months but structuring clear penalties for non-
implementation of any of the key provisions;
(3) U.S. leadership in supporting the democratic
transformation of Sudan by supporting the electoral process,
providing institutional support to opposition parties and
civil society organizations, and building the capacity of the
Government of Southern Sudan;
(4) U.S. leadership in preparations for the South's
referendum in 2011, which will be a make-or-break process for
the future of both North and South.
The essential word that repeats throughout all these goals
is ``leadership.'' U.S. leadership--multilaterally and when
necessary unilaterally--will be an enormously influential
ingredient in a successful transition to peace and democracy
in Sudan.
But success will require greater leverage than that which
presently exists. The debate internally within the U.S.
Government in part rests on the degree to which incentives or
pressures ought to be favored instruments for changing the
behavior of the Sudanese regime, the Darfur rebels, and the
GOSS. It is the view of this panel and the activist
organizations that comprise the Darfur movement that the way
forward should involve deeper diplomatic engagement that is
rooted in multilateral pressures and the credible threat of
significant consequences for policies or actions by Sudanese
parties that undermine peace efforts and lead to worsening
humanitarian conditions. In the absence of these pressures,
and if incentives are all that are put forward, then failure
is guaranteed.
Success will also require the construction of credible and
effective processes that allow for the achievement of U.S.
policy goals. First and foremost, the glaring lack of an
effective peace process for Darfur calls out for greater U.S.
leadership in constructing from the existing elements a
revitalized process that has the chance of ending Darfur's
war. Secondly, the U.S. should intensify its early efforts to
revive the CPA and back these efforts with the construction
of clear multilateral consequences for violations or non-
implementation of key elements of the deal.
U.S. policy must be shaped by the fact that these complex
conflicts have a common core: Flawed governance by a center
that exploits and marginalizes an underdeveloped periphery.
Not only does the CPA provide a roadmap for resolving the
longest and bloodiest of these conflicts, but it also offers
a framework for the kind of democratic, structural
transformation necessary to alter the root cause of Sudan's
many recurring conflicts. The successful model of the CPA
could and should be replicated in a revitalized Darfur peace
process. The U.S. cannot afford to allow the CPA to fail, nor
can it allow the continuation of an ineffective Darfur
process that obstructs any real possibility of peace.
Priorities for CPA Implementation
The troubling reality is that Sudan's North-South peace
remains precarious at best. Given the mounting tensions
between the North and South and the spate of violence in the
South in recent months, deeper international engagement is
required. Renewed Sudanese civil war could bring wholesale
violence on a terrible scale while further destabilizing the
entire region. I will focus the remainder of my testimony on
the key priorities for the U.S. Government in CPA
implementation.
I am encouraged by recent positive steps by the Obama
administration to prioritize CPA implementation and to
revitalize international efforts to urge the Sudanese parties
to work on an array of outstanding provisions in the
agreement in the remaining year and a half. These new
efforts should be followed up with an approach that
penalizes failure of one of both of the Sudanese parties
to implement key provisions of the agreement. The hard
work begins now. It is time
for the administration to pursue specific priorities in
order to meet the key benchmarks in the crucial final
stages of CPA implementation.
The U.S. must direct renewed energy and commitment toward
the following strategic priorities:
1. Protect the People: Due to a worrisome upsurge in
intercommunal violence, the death toll in the South this year
now exceeds the number of violent deaths in Darfur in the
same period, and as elections draw closer, instability may
well increase. Tribal clashes are occurring among a heavily
armed civilian population that the poorly disciplined
southern army has proved incapable of securing. Some of the
latest clashes highlight the flaws and dangers of the so-
called the Joint Integrated Units, or JIUs, whose presence
has often led greater violence, instability, and civilian
casualties. The U.S. should take two specific measures to
help improve security and decrease the risk of further
violence in communities throughout the South:
Work with the U.N. Security Council to ensure that the
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has the necessary
capacity to fulfill its mandate and protect civilians. The
United States should lead efforts within the U.N. Security
Council to strengthen UNMIS' ability to support the CPA, but
this support must be matched with clearer strategic vision by
UNMIS on how it can best allocate its resources to
operationalize its mandate amidst ongoing security threats
throughout the South. Other guarantors of the CPA can support
UNMIS' efforts by contributing to coordinated programs such
as security sector reform within the SPLA.
Encourage the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to take
leadership in promoting local peace-building initiatives to
defuse tensions between communities that have taken up arms
against each other.
2. Build the ``peace dividend'': Since the signing of the
CPA, progress has been slow in providing basic infrastructure
and services to the peripheral areas of Sudan. Insecurity and
underdevelopment remain a fact of life for most Sudanese. As
long as that is the case, the southern government will have
difficulty consolidating the peace and holding together an
ethnically divided South with competing political visions.
The GoSS has also been hit hard by the financial crisis, and
is in need of significant economic support, but this support
should be aimed specifically at capacity building efforts
that can strengthen the fledgling government. Additional
investments in agriculture and microcredit would make a
difference on the ground for the people of southern Sudan,
more than two million of whom have returned home to very
little after decades of war.
3. Defuse North-South tensions: A number of contentious
issues between the North and South must be resolved in next
year and a half, all of which necessitate robust support from
the international community in order to keep the negotiations
and processes on track. The U.S. should direct renewed energy
and commitment toward the following strategic priorities:
Urge meaningful reforms from the Sudanese parties before
the 2010 elections. The United States and other key actors,
operating on a tight timeline, need to lower their
expectations for the election and develop a multilateral
strategy to press the Government of National Unity--the
ruling National Congress Party in particular--to enact
meaningful reforms regardless of who wins in 2010, revitalize
CPA implementation, and establish a framework for talks in
Darfur that are consistent with the power-sharing provisions
of the CPA. There also has to be a clear and unified
international posture with regard to addressing the issue of
Darfur, given the near-impossibility of holding a free and
fair ballot there.
Keep the parties on track in the dual processes of
implementing the legal ruling on the boundaries of the Abyei
region and demarcating the North-South border. Two crucial
issues regarding contested borders between Sudan's North and
South need sustained attention from the international
community. The failure to establish clear international
penalties for a failure to implement these key CPA provisions
such as the demarcation of the disputed North-South border
has been a clear drag on the CPA. However, last week's legal
decision on the boundaries of Abyei--an oil-rich, contested
region along the disputed North-South border within Sudan--is
a crucial litmus test of the parties' will to implement the
CPA moving forward. Now that the ruling on Abyei has been
accepted by both parties, the U.S., the U.N., and the rest of
international community must follow through on its
commitments to help implement the ruling and monitor the
status of the demarcation of the Abyei boundaries.
Encourage negotiations between the NCP and SPLM on long-
term wealth-sharing arrangements before the 2011 referendum.
Track-two diplomatic efforts can get both parties to consider
various scenarios for wealth sharing after the referendum and
mitigate the likelihood that these discussions will short
circuit into a zero-sum game leading directly to conflict
after the referendum. Discussions of access to land for
populations with diverse needs and livelihoods and planning
for mutually beneficial development of oilfields in the
contested border region could ease current tensions over
border demarcation and generate momentum for further
cooperation.
Urge passage of the referendum law before the elections.
Applying pressure on Sudan's Government of National Unity to
urge the National Assembly to review and pass the law on the
southern referendum before the elections could reduce
tensions between the parties after the elections and enable
preparations for the referendum to begin now. Once the law is
passed and the Referendum Commission is created, potential
disputes, such as questions over whether or not certain
populations--such as southerners in Khartoum--are eligible to
vote, can be addressed before tensions escalate in the
immediate run-up to the referendum.
4. Prevent a return to war: The likelihood of a return to
war between the North and South, or of conflict breaking out
within the South, is real. An arms race between the Northern
and Southern government is just one warning sign of a tenuous
situation that could explode into outright conflict. Several
preventive measures can mitigate the risks of violence in the
run-up to the 2010 general elections and the 2011 referendum:
Enhance efforts to professionalize and modernize the SPLA.
The SPLA has struggled to transition from a guerilla movement
to a formal army, a process complicated by attempts to
integrate southern militias that opposed the SPLA during the
war. To ensure that the south is stabile and the GoSS can
deliver a peace dividend, the SPLA must continue to modernize
through a well-supported process of security sector
transformation that improves discipline, command and control,
capacity, and competency. Toward this end, the Obama
administration should explore the sale of an air defense
system to the GoSS. Although introducing new weapons systems
into a volatile military environment could be interpreted as
contrary to donors' responsibility to make unity attractive,
it is in the interests of lasting stability that the GoSS
spend money on defense wisely. Unlike the aforementioned
refurbished tanks, an air defense is non-offensive and helps
level the playing field by neutralizing the north's major
tactical advantage in the event of renewed hostilities.
Comprehensive Peace: the Only Option in Sudan
Ending genocide in Darfur and fulfilling the promise of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires a comprehensive
approach to Sudan rather than reactive crisis management. The
U.S. must lead the international community in working now to
ensure that the CPA does not collapse and spark a devastating
new round of conflict in Sudan. With a significant diplomatic
reinvestment in the CPA that prioritizes protecting
civilians, building peace in the South, and defusing tensions
between the North and South, the U.S. can help prevent the
catastrophic consequences of a potential collapse of the CPA.