Expiration Of The Protect America Act
I appreciate my colleague's comments. I think you have laid out very clearly the problems that we face, and I couldn't agree more. You know, I will always remember being on these grounds of the United States Capitol on the morning of 9/11,…
I appreciate my colleague's comments. I think you have laid out very clearly the problems that we face, and I couldn't agree more. You know, I will always remember being on these grounds of the United States Capitol on the morning of 9/11, September 11, 2001, and the attacks that occurred on our country, and I will always remember going back to the apartment I lived in at the time, three blocks from the Pentagon, and the smoke from the burning roof of the Pentagon wafted in all day because the air-conditioning was on.
I swore then, and I have kept that pledge and promise, that I would never forget what happened to this country. And like you and many of my colleagues on this floor and in this Congress, we said, How could this happen? What went wrong? What was the failure? How did we miss seeing this coming?
As my colleague from New Mexico knows all too well, because you are on the Intelligence Committee and I'm not, there are lots of investigations. And we said we will never let this happen. We brought in the outside experts, the best people in the land: tactical experts, policy experts. We did reviews, we second-guessed everybody in every position, and we changed the law. We changed the law to protect the lives of Americans and to prevent attack.
It is sad today to be here on this floor 10 days after the Protect America Act has expired and know that the only people who are gleeful about that are
probably residing in caves and camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan and who knows where else. They have to be looking at us saying, What fools, and thank you, thank you for opening the door and closing your eyes and your ears to our communications because you won't modernize a law that is anchored back in the 1970s.
Technology, as you have clearly pointed out, has changed. You think about these kids who buy these cell phones that are throw-away. Or if you are on the Internet, how do you know where somebody is or where they're downloading or wherever? Technology has changed; the law hasn't. And the people who seek to do our country and our people and our allies harm, they understand technology. That's one of the lessons we learned coming out of 9/11.
And so many people on both sides of the aisle changed a lot of Federal laws to try to leap forward so that we would be protected, so that our professionals, the intelligence community, would have every tool and asset to make sure it never happened again. How many people on this floor, how many Americans pledged after 9/11 to say we will do whatever it takes to make sure innocent American lives are never taken down by terrorists again? We all said that. I was in briefings on this floor, closed door, open door, where there was that unified feeling that we've just got to get with it. We've got to figure it out.
It's terrible tonight to be here knowing this law has expired and that there is a bipartisan fix. Senator Rockefeller, who chairs the Intelligence Committee in the Senate, wrote the bipartisan measure that passed with 68 votes. More than two-thirds of the United States Senate supported this bipartisan fix that provides Americans more protection than the existing law, or certainly the bill that the House had.
Now, I dare say on some matters Mr. Rockefeller is no friend of President Bush's, as he would probably tell you that. He certainly said it publicly. But he knows in the crafting of this bill that America has got to come first, our intelligence gathering has to come first. There are privacy protections, but we don't close the eyes and ears of our intelligence community listening overseas to see who's plotting to do us harm. That bill, I dare say, if brought to this floor, would pass in a heartbeat. Pass in a heartbeat.
And if I might just quote from a letter to the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from both the Attorney General and Admiral McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, said, among other things, this is a letter dated February 22: Our experience since Congress allowed the Protect America Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill demonstrates why the Nation is now more vulnerable to terrorist attack and other foreign threats. In our letter to Senator Reid on February 5, 2008, we explained that the expiration of the authorities in the Protect America Act would plunge critical intelligence programs into a state of uncertainty which could cause us to delay the gathering of or simply miss critical foreign intelligence information. Underlining for emphasis, they write: That is exactly what has happened since the Protect America Act expired 6 days ago without enactment of the bipartisan Senate bill. We have lost intelligence information this past week as a direct result of the uncertainty created by Congress's failure to act.
Madam Speaker, the thing that strikes me is, before we went out for the President's district work period, this Congress had time to spend a full day trying to figure out whether Roger Clemens was on steroids, used steroids, used human growth enhancement, whatever, and this Congress couldn't take up this law to protect America. And I dare say to my colleague and to my fellow colleagues, that if we were, God forbid, to get attacked again, that every committee will grab jurisdiction around here to do an oversight hearing to find out who failed. They need to pick up a mirror and look in it before it happens and ask that question. Will we fail America's security? Or will we take a bill that passed by two-thirds majority plus 2 in the Senate and put it on this floor today, tomorrow, as soon as possible? There is nothing even scheduled for Thursday of this week, I see. There are no bills scheduled. We have plenty of time. It is available. Why? For the life of me, I don't understand why we take this risk.
I appreciate that because I think you've summed it up quite well.
And once again, for our colleagues who have just joined us, this is all about a 30-year-old law that needs to be updated, because in the last 30 minutes technology has probably changed on us; but think about what's happened in 30 years: There was no Internet available to the public; there were no cell phones; there might have been a car radio phone or something somebody had somewhere. But we're dealing with highly trained, sophisticated terrorist organizations who show no allegiance to any country or rules or conventions, who have proven their will to use whatever force they can muster to attack innocent civilians in America and elsewhere. And we're now covering the eyes and ears of our intelligence professionals and reducing their ability to try to prevent another attack.
One of the issues that has come up in this debate, of course, is the participation of the private companies. And I would like to share some information from, again, a letter from the United States Attorney General and the National Intelligence Director where they take on this issue. Because you have to remember that all this stuff is networked. The government doesn't control every phone line and every Internet connection and all of that. You have to have a partnership. And I know after 9/11 the intelligence community and the President said, what do we need to do to work together to make sure we don't get attacked again? Are we going to get attacked again? You remember those days right after 9/11, we had the anthrax attack again here at the Capitol they never have solved. People lost their lives around America. We were really concerned, and rightfully so, that we had missed the big one, and it should never happen again. So they involved the telecommunications companies, because you can't do it without them.
Now, the Senate looked at this issue. The Attorney General and the head of National Intelligence wrote back to the chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and said: ``Private party assistance is necessary and critical to ensuring that the intelligence community can collect the information needed to protect our country from attack.'' Pretty strong words.
In its report on S. 2248, that's the Senate bill, the Intelligence Committee stated that, and this is from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: ``The intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance'' from electronic communication service providers.
The committee also concluded that ``without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful government requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation. The possible reduction in intelligence that might result in this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.'' That's not President Bush and his people saying that. That's the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence headed by J. Rockefeller, a Democrat from West Virginia.
The letter goes on to say: ``Senior intelligence officials also have testified regarding the importance of providing liability protection for such companies for this very reason.''
Do you want to do everything in your power in this Congress to safeguard America, not only here at home, but our allies overseas, and probably our men and women whose lives are on the line in the battlefields across the world? Because, you see, they're being threatened by terrorists, too. It is those communications we're trying to also find out where they plan the next car bomb attack. Where do they plan to take down one of our men and women in uniform whom we hold so high? What if their communication happens through the United States? Do we have to spend 72 hours before a court and a judge, and maybe some trial lawyers to boot, to figure out what we can listen in to and how we can act on it?
I will be happy to yield.
You're kidding. Is that actually the case? So they can shoot them, but they can't listen to their cell phone?
I just want to pick up in the timeline where you left off, because then Attorney General Mike Mukasey and the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, the admiral you referenced, head of our national intelligence wrote: ``Our experience in the past few days, since the expiration of the act, demonstrates that these concerns are neither speculative, nor theoretical. Allowing the act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill has had real and negative consequences for our national security. Indeed, this has led directly to a degraded intelligence capability.''
You know, if he testified to that before the 9/11 Commission or any of these commissions that occurred after 9/11, this House and the Senate would have said, my gosh, we've got to make sure we fix that problem. But for some reason, here we are in 2008 and there are some in the leadership who act like we'll just go about our merry way, everything's fine, there won't be a problem. And hopefully there won't be a problem. But, to me, when the Director of National Intelligence says our intelligence capabilities are degraded, we are losing intelligence-gathering abilities, we are at risk, et cetera, et cetera, it is time to act.
February 22, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Reyes: The President asked us to respond to
your letter of February 14, 2008, concerning the urgent need
to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA). Your assertion that there is no harm in allowing
the temporary authorities provided by the Protect America Act
to expire without enacting the Senate's FISA reform bill is
inaccurate and based on a number of misunderstandings
concerning our intelligence capabilities. We address those
misunderstandings below. We hope that you find this letter
helpful and that you will reconsider your opposition to the
bill passed last week by a strong bipartisan majority in the
Senate and, when Congress returns from its recess, support
immediately bringing the Senate bill to the floor, where it
enjoys the support of a majority of your fellow members. It
is critical to our national security that Congress acts as
soon as possible to pass the Senate bill.
intelligence collection
Our experience since Congress allowed the Protect America
Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill
demonstrates why the Nation is now more vulnerable to
terrorist attack and other foreign threats. In our letter to
Senator Reid on February 5, 2008, we explained that: ``the
expiration of the authorities in the Protect America Act
would plunge critical intelligence programs into a state of
uncertainty which could cause us to delay the gathering of,
or simply miss, critical foreign intelligence information.''
That is exactly what has happened since the Protect America
Act expired six days ago without enactment of the bipartisan
Senate bill. We have lost intelligence information this past
week as a direct result of the uncertainty created by
Congress's failure to act. Because of this uncertainty, some
partners have reduced cooperation. In particular, they have
delayed or refused compliance with our requests to initiate
new surveillances of terrorist and other foreign intelligence
targets under existing directives issued pursuant to the
Protect America Act. Although most partners intend to
cooperate for the time being, they have expressed deep
misgivings about doing so in light of the uncertainty and
have indicated that they may well cease to cooperate if the
uncertainty persists. We are working to mitigate these
problems and are hopeful that our efforts will be successful.
Nevertheless, the broader uncertainty caused by the Act's
expiration will persist unless and until the bipartisan
Senate bill is passed. This uncertainty may well continue to
cause us to miss information that we otherwise would be
collecting.
Thus, although it is correct that we can continue to
conduct certain activities authorized by the Protect America
Act for a period of one year from the time they were first
authorized, the Act's expiration has and may well continue to
adversely affect such activities. Any adverse effects will
result in a weakening of critical tools necessary to protect
the Nation. As we explained in our letter to Senator Reid,
expiration would create uncertainty concerning:
The ability to modify certifications and procedures issued
under the Protect America Act to reflect operational needs
and the implementation of procedures to ensure that agencies
are fully integrated protecting the Nation; the continuing
validity of liability protection for those who assist us
according to the procedures under the Protect America Act;
the continuing validity of the judicial mechanism for
compelling the assistance of private parties needed to
protect our national security; the ability to cover
intelligence gaps created by new communication paths or
technologies.
Our experience in the past few days since the expiration of
the Act demonstrates that these concerns are neither
speculative nor theoretical: allowing the Act to expire
without passing the bipartisan Senate bill has had real and
negative consequences for our national security. Indeed, this
has led directly to a degraded intelligence capability.
It is imperative that our intelligence agencies retain the
tools they need to collect vital intelligence information. As
we have explained before, the core authorities provided by
the Protect America Act have helped us to obtain exactly the
type of information we need to keep America safe, and it is
essential that Congress reauthorize the Act's core
authorities while also extending liability protection to
those companies who assisted our Nation following the attacks
of September 11, 2001. Using the authorities provided in the
Protect America Act, we have obtained information about
efforts of an individual to become a suicide operative,
efforts by terrorists to obtain guns and ammunition, and
terrorists transferring money. Other information obtained
using the authorities provided by the Protect America Act has
led to the disruption of planned terrorist attacks. The
bipartisan Senate bill would preserve these core authorities
and improve on the Protect America Act in certain critical
ways, including by providing liability protection to
companies that assisted in defending the country after
September 11.
In your letter, you assert that the Intelligence
Community's ability to protect the Nation has not been
weakened, because the Intelligence Community continues to
have the ability to conduct surveillance abroad in accordance
with Executive Order 12333. We respectfully disagree.
Surveillance conducted under Executive Order 12333 in a
manner that does not implicate FISA or the Protect America
Act is not always as effective, efficient, or safe for our
intelligence professionals as acquisitions conducted under
the Protect America Act. And, in any event, surveillance
under the Protect America Act served as an essential adjunct
to our other intelligence tools. This is particularly true in
light of the changes since 1978 in the manner in which
communications are transmitted. As a result of these changes,
the Government often has been required to obtain a FISA Court
order prior to surveillance of foreign terrorists and other
national security threats located outside the United States.
This hampered our intelligence collection targeting these
individuals overseas in a way that Congress never intended,
and it is what led to the dangerous intelligence gaps last
summer. Congress addressed this issue temporarily by passing
the Protect America Act but long-term FISA reform is critical
to the national security.
We have provided Congress with examples in which
difficulties with collections under the Executive Order
resulted in the Intelligence Community missing crucial
information. For instance, one of the September 11th
hijackers communicated with a known overseas terrorist
facility while he was living in the United States. Because
that collection was conducted under Executive Order 12333,
the Intelligence Community could not identify the domestic
end of the communication prior to September 11, 2001, when it
could have stopped that attack. The failure to collect such
communications was one of the central criticisms of the
Congressional Joint Inquiry that looked into intelligence
failures associated with the attacks of September 11. The
bipartisan bill passed by the Senate would address such flaws
in our capabilities that existed before the enactment of the
Protect America Act and that are now resurfacing. We have
provided Congress with additional and detailed examples of
how the Protect America Act temporarily fixed this problem
and have demonstrated the operational need to provide a long-
term legislative foundation for these authorities by passing
the bipartisan Senate bill.
In your letter, you also posit that our intelligence
capabilities have not been weakened, because the Government
can employ the outdated provisions of FISA as they existed
before the Protect America Act. We respectfully disagree. It
was that very framework that created dangerous intelligence
gaps in the past and that led Congress to pass the Protect
America Act last summer.
As we have explained in letters, briefings and hearings,
FISA's requirements, unlike those of the Protect America Act
and the bipartisan Senate bill, impair our ability to collect
information on foreign intelligence targets located overseas.
Most importantly, FISA was designed to govern foreign
intelligence surveillance of persons in the United States and
therefore requires a showing of ``probable cause'' before
such surveillance can begin. This standard makes sense in the
context of targeting persons in the United States for
surveillance, where the Fourth Amendment itself often
requires probable cause and where the civil liberties of
Americans are most implicated. But it makes no sense to
require a showing of probable cause for surveillance of
overseas foreign targets who are not entitled to the Fourth
Amendment protections guaranteed by our Constitution. Put
simply, imposing this requirement in the context of
surveillance of foreign targets located overseas results in
the loss of potentially vital intelligence by, for example,
delaying intelligence collection and thereby losing some
intelligence forever. In addition, the requirement to make
such a showing requires us to divert our linguists and
analysts covering al-Qa'ida and other foreign threats from
their core role--protecting the Nation--to the task of
providing detailed facts for FISA Court applications related
to surveillance of such foreign targets. Our intelligence
professionals need to be able to obtain foreign intelligence
from foreign targets with speed and agility. If we revert to
a legal framework in which the Intelligence Community
needs to make probable cause showings for foreign
terrorists and other national security threats located
overseas, we are certain to experience more intelligence
gaps and miss collecting information.
You imply that the emergency authorization process under
FISA is an adequate substitute for the legislative
authorities that have lapsed. This assertion reflects a basic
misunderstanding about FISA's emergency authorization
provisions. Specifically, you assert that the National
Security Agency (NSA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) ``may begin surveillance immediately'' in an emergency
situation. FISA requires far more, and it would be illegal to
proceed as you suggest. Before surveillance begins the
Attorney General must determine that there is probable cause
that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power and that FISA's other requirements
are met. As explained above, the process of compiling the
facts necessary for such a determination and preparing
applications for emergency authorizations takes time and
results in delays. Again, it makes no sense to impose this
requirement in the context of foreign intelligence
surveillance of targets located overseas. Because of the
hurdles under FISA's emergency authorization provisions and
the requirement to go to the FISA Court within 72 hours, our
resource constraints limit our use of emergency
authorizations to certain high-priority circumstances and
cannot simply be employed for every foreign intelligence
target.
It is also inaccurate to state that because Congress has
amended FISA several times, there is no need to modernize
FISA. This statement runs counter to the very basis for
Congress's passage last August of the Protect America Act. It
was not until the passage of this Act that Congress amended
those provisions of FISA that had become outdated due to the
communications revolution we have experienced since 1978. As
we explained, those outdated provisions resulted in dangerous
intelligence gaps by causing constitutional protections to be
extended to foreign terrorists overseas. It is critical that
Congress enact long-term FISA modernization to ensure that
the Intelligence Community can collect effectively the
foreign intelligence information it needs to protect the
Nation. The bill passed by the Senate would achieve this
goal, while safeguarding the privacy interests of Americans.
liability protection
Your assertion that the failure to provide liability
protection for those private-sector
firms that helped defend the Nation after the September 11
attacks does not affect our intelligence collection
capability is inaccurate and contrary to the experience of
intelligence professionals and to the conclusions the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence reached after careful study
of the matter. It also ignores that providing liability
protection to those companies sued for answering their
country's call for assistance in the aftermath of September
11 is simply the right thing to do. Through briefings and
documents, we have provided the members of your committee
with access to the information that shows that immunity is
the fair and just result.
Private party assistance is necessary and critical to
ensuring that the Intelligence Community can collect the
information needed to protect our country from attack. In its
report on S. 2248, the Intelligence Committee stated that
``the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence
it needs without assistance'' from electronic communication
service providers. The Committee also concluded that
``without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be
unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the
future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted
litigation. The possible reduction in intelligence that might
result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety
of our Nation.'' Senior intelligence officials also have
testified regarding the importance of providing liability
protection to such companies for this very reason.
Even prior to the expiration of the Protect America Act, we
experienced significant difficulties in working with the
private sector because of the continued failure to provide
liability protection for such companies. These difficulties
have only grown since expiration of the Act without passage
of the bipartisan Senate bill, which would provide fair and
just liability protection. Exposing the private sector to the
continued risk of billion-dollar class action suits for
assisting in efforts to defend the country understandably
makes the private sector much more reluctant to cooperate.
Without their cooperation, our efforts to protect the country
cannot succeed.
pending legislation
Finally, as you note, the House passed a bill in November
to amend FISA, but we immediately made clear that the bill is
unworkable and unacceptable. Over three months ago, the
Administration issued a Statement of Administration Policy
(SAP) that stated that the House bill ``falls far short of
providing the Intelligence Community with the tools it needs
to collect effectively the foreign intelligence information
vital for the security of the Nation'' and that ``the
Director of National Intelligence and the President's other
senior advisers would recommend that the President veto the
bill.'' We adhere to that view today.
The House bill has several grave deficiencies. First,
although numerous senior intelligence officials have
testified regarding the importance of affording liability
protection for companies that assisted the Government in the
aftermath of September 11, the House bill does not address
the critical issue of liability protection. Second, the House
bill contains certain provisions and serious technical flaws
that would fatally undermine our ability to collect
effectively the intelligence needed to protect the Nation. In
contrast, the Senate bill deals with the issue of liability
protection in a way that is fair and that protects the
national security. In addition, the Senate bill is carefully
drafted and has been amended to avoid technical flaws similar
to the ones in the House bill. We note that the privacy
protections for Americans in the Senate bill exceed the
protections contained in both the Protect America Act and the
House bill.
The Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community
are taking the steps we can to try to keep the country safe
during this current period of uncertainty. These measures are
remedial at best, however, and do not provide the tools our
intelligence professionals need to protect the Nation or the
certainty needed by our intelligence professionals and our
private partners. The Senate passed a strong and balanced
bill by an overwhelming and bipartisan margin. That bill
would modernize FISA, ensure the future cooperation of the
private sector, and guard the civil liberties we value. We
hope that you will support giving your fellow members the
chance to vote on this bill.
Sincerely,
J.M. McConnell,
Director of National Intelligence.
He said what?
You raised an interesting point about this sort of smoke-and-mirrors argument of how quickly the FISA Court can act on a surveillance order. The Speaker of the House, Ms. Pelosi, was quoted as saying in a statement on FISA negotiations on February 22, ``The FISA Court can approve surveillance orders quickly.'' But I think what I learned tonight from you is that while that may be the case, they don't get that request until somebody's built up the whole probable cause work; right?
I think, though, it's important for us, too, to talk about the safeguards for American citizens on American soil because I hear that when I go home: Are they listening in when I call my aunt or somebody across the street? This warrantless wire eavesdropping. Can you speak to that, about the protections that are still there and, in fact, strengthened under the Senate version?