Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution just considered by the House.

Madam Speaker, I would like to make clear that no provision of H.R. 7084 should be construed to opine on what entity or entities can be considered a ``receiving agent'' under 17 U.S.C. Section 114(g)(4). I understand that there is ongoing litigation pertaining to the qualifications of a receiving agent and I would not want H.R. 7084 to influence a court's ultimate decision on this matter.

Madam Speaker, my colleagues, Representative Jane Harman, Representative Henry Waxman. Representative Adam Schiff, Representative Diane Watson, Representative Maxine Waters, Representative Xavier Becerra, Representative Linda Sanchez, Representative Hilda Solis and I are greatly pleased to join Ramona Ripston's army of fans in recognizing her decades of service to the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, ACLU/SC, and also in celebrating the dedication of the Ramona Ripston Center for Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in Los Angeles. Over many years of friendship, we have admired Ramona's work and sought her advice, as she guided the ACLU/SC as its executive director. She is one of the Nation's premier and most distinguished advocates for civil rights and against violence and hatred.

Many of us have known Ramona for 30 or more years and have been fortunate to work with her on a whole host of issues ranging from immigration reform to the Voting Rights Act, the Constitution and the first amendment. It's been a great pleasure to watch the grace and dedication she brings to everything she does. Whether working with corporate leaders in the boardroom, policymakers on Capitol Hill, and movie stars, or walking Skid Row, she has always brought something extra and very special to the table.

Ramona's view of civil liberties embodies action more than words. She is a frequent visitor in the poorest parts of our communities where she meets with the homeless and destitute of Los Angeles, serving them by making them aware of what a civil liberties organization is and how it can help them know and exercise their basic rights. She does this not only from compassion and empathy, but because she is more comfortable there than sitting in her office. Because of this propensity, the ACLU/ SC is the only affiliate to advocate an economic Bill of Rights. She simply succeeded in making economic rights a civil liberties issue.

When civil wars in Central America brought thousands of refugees to America, Ramona could be found where immigrants gathered. She was seeking information about how the INS and our social service and educational entities dealt with them, carrying on the decades of work done by the ACLU/SU in advocating for the rights of all people, including racial and ethnic minorities and the newly-arrived.

In the same way, Ramona made equality of educational opportunity a priority--not just by reading scores and statistics, but by going out to schools in poor areas and meeting with students. She made her office a part of those communities.

Even a quick and cursory review of Ramona's accomplishments and the legion of honors awarded her by prominent community and national leaders and by numerous organizations dedicated to human rights demonstrates the extent of her work: her assertive and articulate voice constantly advancing the causes dear to her and vital to the protection of our liberties--from the right to free speech to the ability to organize as workers, the protection of antiwar demonstrators, the fights against censorship and the defense of civil rights. The ACLU/SC and Ramona have often held controversial positions and done so in the face of vociferous attacks. It is with profound appreciation for their courage, foresight, and tenacity that we salute both her and the organization she has guided.

The ACLU holds that the Constitution is its client, but for Ramona Ripston, it has also been all about the clients themselves. It is a joy to honor her and to congratulate her for the high esteem in which she is held and for the width and breadth of her humanitarian and democratic ideals.

As the new headquarters building--the Ramona Ripston Center for Civil Liberties and Civil Rights--is dedicated, we ask our colleagues to join us in paying tribute to Ramona, and to the ACLU of Southern California for decades of work in defense of liberty and justice for all. The fight is never over and we are grateful for the bulwark you will continue to be.

Madam Speaker, I rise in order to celebrate with the Taiwanese on their National Day.

This year, the Taiwanese people demonstrated to the world during their most recent Presidential election with a clear, ringing voice of freedom that they are a democratic people and a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world.

The peaceful transfer of power between Presidents stood as a reminder that Taiwan is an important ally to the United States as they exemplify to that region democracy and rule of the people. Today, as the newly elected President Ma prepares to celebrate with his people, Taiwan's National Day serves as a reminder that all who share the ideals of liberty enjoy the bonds of friendship and peace.

Please join with me in congratulating Taiwan, both our friend and ally, and on their National Day.

Madam Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to the life and career of Derrick Moyo, who served lately as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of South Africa here in Washington, DC.

Born Diederrick Moyo in Soweto on September 13, 1962, Derrick passed away just 3 days shy of his 46th birthday on September 10th of this year. His early passing has deprived not only the Republic of South Africa, but the United States and the rest of the world, as well, of his passion for democracy and peace.

He is survived by his parents Josiah and Doreen Moyo, his siblings Mary and Ernest and, his two children, Itumeleng and Tshiamo. His family has already had to endure another early loss to their family, with the tragic passing of his wife Mingy several years ago.

An avid scholar with a thirst for knowledge, Derrick was awarded a bachelor of social science degree by the University of Cape Town with majors in social anthropology, industrial sociology and international politics. Additionally he undertook specialized courses in diplomacy, Foreign Service and management, studying at renowned institutions including the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Howard University, the Foreign Service Institute in New Delhi and the Irish Institute of Public Management.

While studying, Derrick embraced the democratic cause and led the Student Representative Council of the University of Cape Town as their vice president. Later he broadened his fight to the national level and guided South Africans as the Vice Chairman of the African National Congress's Claremont branch. Ultimately, Derrick's unfailing commitment to achieving freedom and justice in his native South Africa forced him into exile during the height of the Apartheid era.

Even in exile Derrick's faith and determination never strayed, and when he was free to return to his homeland he began his diplomatic career in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Initially assigned to the Regional Economic Organisations Desk, he was quickly promoted to work on the United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council Desks.

While working at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Derrick's interest and devotion to the cause for peace culminated in the seminal discussion paper, ``South Africa's Participation in Peace Support Operations.''

Always faithful to South Africa, Derrick began his Foreign Service career in 1997 as the Counselor and Deputy High Commissioner at the South African High Commission in Canada. Later he was asked to serve as the Consul-General of South Africa in Brazil.

In 2005, Derrick assumed his final post as the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa in Washington,

Mr. Speaker, I very much thank the chairman for yielding and for all the work that he has done to bring this bill to this point.

I rise in support of S. 3325, which is the Senate's companion bill to the chairman's and a number of us, our bill, H.R. 4279, which passed the House overwhelmingly by a 410-11 vote on May 6, 2008. S. 3325, like H.R. 4279, makes necessary changes to our intellectual property laws, improves coordination of our intellectual property enforcement efforts, and devotes more resources to tackling the scourge of intellectual property crime.

The proliferation of intellectual property crime has had a disastrous impact on our economy and on public health and safety. Counterfeit and pirated products may account for up to 10 percent of the world's trade, and a significant portion of these are American products. Conservative estimates indicate that U.S. business loses up to $250 billion a year-- I know these days $250 billion isn't that much, but it's a serious amount--due to intellectual property theft.

This level of counterfeiting and piracy translates to job losses, lower tax receipts, and greater trade deficits. Public health and safety is threatened by inferior and dangerous knockoffs, such as exploding batteries, toxic pharmaceuticals, and sawdust brake pads.

In response to the grave threat of intellectual property theft and the threat that poses to the U.S. economy and the health and safety of our citizens, the House passed the PRO-IP bill.

The bill strengthened our civil and criminal laws in ways that attack the organizational structures intellectual property thieves use and that reduce the economic incentives thieves have to engage in commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy. It devoted more resources to investigating and prosecuting intellectual property crimes and to working with other governments to improve intellectual property enforcement aboard.

Following our lead, the Senate passed S. 3325, which provides many of the same reforms called for in H.R. 4279.

I just want to close by thanking very much Chairman Conyers, his staff, the subcommittee staff for all the work they put into it, the minority staff, Mr. Coble, Mr. Smith, who is a great partnership, and for working to develop and pass this bill, and to thank Senator Leahy and his staff for their efforts and urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7177) to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign recipients, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this bill reflects the bipartisan text agreed by the other body that incorporates several provisions from H.R. 5916, the Berman/Ros-

Lehtinen/Sherman/Manzullo Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008 that the House passed in May.

It authorizes the Department of the Navy to transfer surplus U.S. Navy vessels to friendly countries which Congress does on an annual basis. It strengthens the vital security relationship with our close friends and allies, South Korea and Israel. Building on the work of Representative Royce, U.S. law will now add South Korea to the list of countries in the Arms Export Control in the same way as NATO, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. This is a significant symbolic recognition of the critical importance of South Korea to U.S. national security and to peace and stability throughout East Asia.

It also requires the administration to empirically assess on an ongoing basis the State of Israel's ``Qualitative Military Edge,'' we call it QME, against conventional or nonconventional security threats, to report that assessment to Congress every 4 years, and to use that assessment when reviewing arms exports to other countries in the Middle East.

Every President since Lyndon Johnson has affirmed the U.S. commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge against potential enemies. But unfortunately it has become clear the administration uses subjective judgment when evaluating Israel's QME. The State and Defense officials have admitted there is no objective empirical method for evaluating this critical measure of whether or not Israel maintains a qualitative superiority over potential threats to its security.

It is also clear that by such subjective evaluations are performed sale by sale and country by country without clear, overall consideration of the balance of capabilities possessed throughout the region that conceivably affect Israel's security.

This provision would remedy this glaring lack of a robust mechanism to make security and export decisions that could undermine the security of one of the most important friends and allies that we have in the Middle East. The bill also authorizes security assistance to Israel, including implementing the recent U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Security Assistance.

It is fitting that on the 60th anniversary of Israel, the U.S. renews and strengthens its relationship with a most important friend in the region. It deserves all the support we can muster.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time. I simply want to express my deep appreciation to my ranking member. We have been working together now for 7 or so months. We are not always perfect in our dealings, but it is a lot more good than bad, and getting better. I am grateful for her support and understanding of all the different shifts in these kinds of things, and I am glad to have her support for this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7084) to amend section 114 of title 17, United States Code, to provide for agreements for the reproduction and performance of sound recordings by webcasters, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7084, the Webcasters Settlement Act of 2008, which grants authority to relevant parties to negotiate an alternative royalty rate for the use of music on Internet radio stations under the existing government compulsory license.

This license gives webcasters the privilege of using copyrighted recorded music at a government-mandated rate determined by the Copyright Royalty Judges.

The recent government rate was determined on March 2, 2007. After considering voluminous written submissions and 48 days of trial testimony that filled 13,288 pages of transcript, the Copyright Royalty Judges determined fair, marketplace-based rates, averaged over a 5-year rate period. The judges followed their authorizing statute and carried out their duties in a fair and impartial manner. Both sides were able to present thorough cases and the judges came to a fair result based on the evidence presented.

Since that determination, certain webcasters have requested that copyright owners enter into negotiation to offer an alternative rate for webcasters who meet unique conditions, and requested that the Committee on the Judiciary facilitate such negotiations. These negotiations have been proceeding in earnest over the past 2 months, and the parties are making considerable progress.

Because the parties will not be able to finish their negotiations before Congress recesses, however, and because authority by Congress is required for a settlement to take effect under the government compulsory license, we are pushing this legislation that will grant such authority and hope the negotiations will continue in a positive direction for both sides.

I might add that the issue of broadcasters who are doing or want to do webcasting negotiations in that area also will be starting in the immediate future.

I yield myself 1 additional minute.

It is an important principle that negotiations are more appropriate before the copyright royalty proceeding. However, these conversations that have taken place under the committee's auspices are occurring in unique and extraordinary political and business circumstances and are unlike typical marketplace negotiations.

This bill provides that any alternative private deal-making or any private deal regarding an alternative rate would not be precedential, unless, of course, the parties agreed that it should be. Some of the rates that are being discussed represent a large discount, a huge discount from what independent decisionmaking bodies have found to be marketplace rates, and less than what I understand many webcasters have been paying since the judges reached their decision.

Neither this deal nor this bill should be understood as a criticism of the judges' decision, and I would expect marketplace rates to be higher and at least a reflection of what the judges decided absent the distinct circumstances that apply here.

I hope this legislation will make it easier for more music to be performed online by paying services, and also that there will be an increase in compensation to creators.

I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee), the author of this legislation. The gentleman has been very focused on this issue since the time the Copyright Royalty Board came down with what I view as a just decision, but which others may have a different opinion of.

I have great admiration and respect for the previous speaker, Mr. Cannon, who will be moving on from this body soon.

Mr. Speaker, I want to recognize a key person in all of this process on webcasting rates, a member of our subcommittee, a very active member of our subcommittee, the gentlelady from California, for as much time as she may consume.

I am pleased to yield again to the sponsor of this bill an additional minute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I just want to take a moment, the irony of both Mr. Smith and Mr. Cannon being on the floor at the same time. For so many years, I was on Ethics Committee with Mr. Smith as chairman during a big part of that time, on the Immigration Committee with Mr. Smith being chairman for a part of that time, and on Intellectual Property, when Mr. Smith was chairman for a serious part of that time.

I hate to say this in front of the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, but with the gentleman from Utah, with whom I worked so closely on so many different aspects of the immigration issue, I will sorely miss you.

We didn't agree as much on all the intellectual property issues as we did on the immigration issues. But the other side of the coin is, I didn't agree with the ranking member of Judiciary on the immigration issues as much as I did on the intellectual property issues.

But in both cases it has really been a delight to work with both of you, and particularly you, Mr. Cannon, because at least for now you won't be back here next year. I will miss both your person and your work on these issues, and we shall prevail.

I do.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I just want to say that we have before us legislation that is supported by the DMA association, the Digital Media Association and the Sound Exchange, the collection agency, as well as their component memberships, including the labels, the performers, the musicians, the backup singers, National Public Radio, the small webcasters. I should report, based on the conversations and an amendment that extends till February 15 the deadline, this bill does not have the opposition of the National Association of Broadcasters.

I urge the passage of H.R. 7084 and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7081) to approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, be given 10 minutes, one-half of my time, to be put under her control.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself no more than 5 minutes.

I am a strong advocate of closer U.S.-India ties, including peaceful nuclear cooperation. I voted for the Hyde Act, which established a framework for such cooperation today. The bill before us today will approve the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.

Under the Hyde Act of 2 years ago, Congress was to have 30 days to review the agreement before beginning the consideration of a privileged resolution of approval. Instead, the agreement is now before us in the waning days before adjournment. We can approve the agreement now with the oversight safeguards built into this bill or we can wait until the next Congress and start over, but if we wait, however, we will likely only vote on a simple resolution of approval without any of these oversight improvements.

On balance, integrating India into a global nonproliferation regime is a positive step. Before anyone gets too sanctimonious about India's nuclear weapons program, we should acknowledge that the five recognized nuclear weapons states have not done nearly enough to fulfill their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including making serious reductions in their own arsenals, nor in the case of the United States in ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Having said that, I continue to have concerns about ambiguities in the agreement, and I, therefore, will insert several documents in the Record to clarify the meaning of these and other important issues. It is my view that these documents constitute key and dispositive parts of the authoritative representations described in section 102 of this bill.

Department of State,

Washington, DC, Jan 16, 2008.

Hon. Tom Lantos,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of

Representatives.

Dear Chairman Lantos: I am writing in response to your

letter of October 5, 2007, concerning Congressional review of

the recently-initialed U.S.-India Agreement for peaceful

nuclear cooperation (the ``123'' agreement).

The Department welcomes the opportunity to answer any

questions that members of the Foreign Affairs Committee may

have concerning the agreement. To that end, please find

enclosed the Department's responses to the 45 Questions for

the Record that you submitted with your letter.

Thank you for raising your concerns, as well as those of

the other members of your committee, on this important issue.

Thank you also for your personal interest in, and support of,

the overall Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. We look

forward to working with you to secure passage of the

123 Agreement when it is submitted to Congress.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey T. Bergner,

Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure. As stated.

Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary Bergner

Question 1: What is the Administration's expectation

regarding the likely economic benefits of this partnership,

including India's purchase of U.S. nuclear fuel, reactors,

and technology?

Answer. We are confident that this initiative will yield

important economic benefits to the private sector in the

United States. India currently has 15 operating thermal power

reactors with seven under construction, but it intends to

increase this number significantly. Meeting this ramp-up in

demand for civil nuclear reactors, technology, fuel, and

support services holds the promise of opening new markets for

the United States. Indian officials indicate they plan to

import at least eight 1000-megawatt power reactors by 2012,

as well as additional reactors in the years ahead. Studies

suggest that if American vendors win just two of these

reactor contracts, it could add 3,000-5,000 new direct jobs

and 10,000-15,000 indirect jobs in the United States. The

Indian government has conveyed to us its commitment to enable

full U.S. participation in India's civil nuclear growth and

modernization. At least 15 nuclear-related U.S. firms,

including General Electric and Westinghouse, participated in

a business delegation led by the Commerce Department in

December 2006.

In addition, participation in India's market will help make

the American nuclear power industry globally competitive,

thereby benefiting our own domestic nuclear power sector.

This initiative will permit U.S. companies to enter the

lucrative and growing Indian market--something they are

currently prohibited from doing. In addition, access to

Indian nuclear infrastructure will allow U.S. companies to

build reactors more competitively here and in the rest of the

world--not just India.

Question 2: What scientific and technical benefits does the

U.S. expect as a result of this agreement?

Answer. A successfully implemented civil nuclear

cooperation initiative with India will allow scientists from

both our nations to work together in making nuclear energy

safer, less expensive, more proliferation-resistant, and more

efficient. Newly forged partnerships in this area may also

facilitate scientific advancement in the many facets of

nuclear energy technology. Indian involvement in

international fora such as the International Thermonuclear

Experimental Reactor and the Generation-IV Forum can expand

the potential for innovation in the future of nuclear energy,

as well as the stake of emerging countries in developing

cheaper sources of energy.

In addition, we could choose to allow India to participate

in the future in the Department of Energy's Global Nuclear

Energy Partnership and collaborate with other countries with

advanced nuclear technology in developing new proliferation-

resistant nuclear technology. Such interaction could only be

contemplated subsequent to the completion of the civil

nuclear cooperation initiative.

Question 3: Does the Administration believe that the

nuclear cooperation agreement with India overrides the Hyde

Act regarding any apparent conflicts, discrepancies, or

inconsistencies? Does this include provisions in the Hyde Act

which do not appear in the nuclear cooperation agreement?

Answer. In his September 19 statement, Assistant Secretary

Boucher twice made clear that ``we think [the proposed 123

Agreement with India] is in full conformity with the Hyde

Act.'' Indeed, the Administration is confident that the

proposed agreement is consistent with the legal requirements

of both the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act. The proposed

agreement satisfies the particular requirements of Section

123 of the Atomic Energy Act with the exception of the

requirement for full-scope safeguards, which the President is

expected to exempt prior to the submission of the agreement

to Congress for its approval, as provided for in section 104

of the Hyde Act. The agreement is also fully consistent with

the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.

Question 4: Why are dual-use items for use in sensitive

nuclear facilities mentioned in the proposed U.S.-Indian

nuclear cooperation agreement, when such items are not

transferred pursuant to an agreement for cooperation?

Answer. The Agreement provides for such transfers,

consistent with the ``full'' cooperation envisaged by the

July 18, 2005 Joint Statement. Article 5(2) of the 123

Agreement provides for such transfers by the Parties,

however, only ``subject to their respective applicable laws,

regulations and license policies.'' It is not unusual for

U.S. agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation to provide

for transfers of items that would in fact be transferred

outside the agreement, if they are to be transferred at all.

For example, many U.S. agreements, including the proposed

U.S.-India Agreement, cover transfers of ``components'' and

``information,'' even though such transfers would normally

take place outside the agreement. Most importantly, it should

be noted that while the proposed U.S.-India Agreement

provides for transfer of the items in question, as a

framework agreement it does not compel any such transfers;

and as a matter of policy the United States does not transfer

dual-use items for use in sensitive nuclear facilities.

Question 5: Is it the intention of the U.S. government to

assist India in the design, construction, or operation of

sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-

use items outside the agreement? If so, how is this

consistent with long-standing U.S. policy to discourage the

spread of sensitive nuclear technology and with Section

103(a)(5) of the Hyde Act? Has the U.S. transferred such

dual-use items to sensitive nuclear facilities in other

cooperating parties and, if so, to which countries?

Answer. Consistent with standing U.S. policy, the U.S.

government will not assist India in the design, construction,

or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the

transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or

outside the Agreement. The United States rarely transfers

dual-use items for sensitive nuclear activities to any

cooperating party and no such transfers are currently

pending.

Question 6. Does the Administration have any plan or

intention to negotiate an amendment to the proposed U.S.-

India agreement to transfer to India sensitive nuclear

facilities or critical components of such facilities? If so,

how would such transfers be consistent with the above-cited

provision of the Hyde Act and the long-standing U.S. policy

to discourage the spread of such technologies?

Answer. The Administration does not plan to negotiate an

amendment to the proposed U.S.-India Agreement to transfer to

India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical components of

such facilities.

Question 7. Is it the intention of the Administration to

transfer or allow the transfer of sensitive nuclear

technology outside of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation

agreement? If so, how would such transfers be consistent with

the Hyde Act and the long-standing U.S. policy to discourage

the spread of such technologies?

Answer. Although the Hyde Act allows for transfers of

sensitive nuclear technology under certain circumstances, it

is not the intention of the Administration to transfer or

allow the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to India

outside the U.S.-India Agreement for peaceful nuclear

cooperation.

Question 8. What is the State Department's position

regarding the manner by which an amendment to the proposed

U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement would be submitted

to the Congress? Because it would be an amendment to an

exempted agreement, does the Administration agree that it

would require a Joint Resolution of Approval before entering

into force?

We would look at any future amendment on a case-by-case

basis. Regarding the specific example discussed in the

question, the Administration has no plan or intention to

negotiate an amendment to the proposed U.S.-India agreement

to transfer to India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical

components of such facilities.

Question 9: Would the U.S. limit any transfer of dual-use

technology to India's enrichment and reprocessing facilities

to those that were participants in a bilateral or

multinational program to develop proliferation-resistant fuel

cycle technologies?

Answer. As previously stated, it is not the intention of

the U.S. government to assist India in the design,

construction, or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies

through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the

Agreement or outside the Agreement. India does not have any

facilities that participate in a bilateral or multinational

program to develop proliferation-resistant fuel cycle

technologies. If India were to develop such facilities,

potential dual-use transfers could be considered only under

the exceptions granted in the Hyde Act.

Question 10. Why does Paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the

U.S.-India agreement rely on an IAEA decision regarding the

impossibility of applying safeguards rather than either

party's judgment that the Agency is not or will not be

applying safeguards? Would this permit a situation to arise

in which there were a period of time during which safeguards

might not be applied but the IAEA had not reached a

conclusion that the application of safeguards was no longer

possible?

Answer. Paragraph 4 of Article 10 addresses one situation--

the same situation as is addressed in paragraph 4(a) of the

Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines--in which fall-back

safeguards would be required because the International Atomic

Energy Agency has decided that the application of Agency

safeguards is no longer possible. It does not, however,

constitute the fundamental basis provided by the Agreement

for the application, if needed, of fall-back safeguards. That

basis is provided by Paragraph 1 of Article 10 which states

categorically that ``[s]afeguards will be maintained with

respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred

pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special

fissionable material used in or produced through the use of

such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material

or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the

cooperating Party.''

This guarantee follows the formula prescribed by section

123(a)(1) of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Taken together with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the

Agreement, it provides that safeguards in some form--

International Atomic Energy Agency or other--must always be

maintained with respect to all nuclear items in

India subject to the Agreement so long as they remain under

the jurisdiction or control of India irrespective of the

duration of other provisions in the Agreement or whether the

Agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason,

precisely as section 123(a)(a) of the Atomic Energy Act

requires.

Regarding the second part of the question, for the reasons

just given, Paragraph 1 of Article 10 precludes there arising

such a situation.

Question 11: Why does the provision not call for rectifying

measures, as in the Japan agreement? Why does it not call for

the parties to immediately enter into arrangements which

conform to safeguards principles and procedures of the

Agency?

Answer. Different approaches to fall-back safeguards are

possible, consistent with the requirement of section

123(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act. If for some reason

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards fail to be

applied to nuclear items in India subject to the U.S.-India

Agreement, the Parties of necessity must enter into

arrangements for alternative measures to fulfill the

requirement of paragraph 1 of Article 10.

Question 12. Have ``appropriate verification measures''

been discussed, defined, or otherwise outlined with Indian

officials? If Indian officials have shared their views on

appropriate verification measures, what are those views? Do

U.S. and Indian views diverge and if so, how?

Answer. The United States has not discussed in detail with

India what form ``appropriate verification measures'' might

take if the International Atomic Energy Agency decides that

it is no longer possible for it to apply safeguards as

provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the U.S.-India

Agreement. The United States has expressed its view to India

that acceptable alternative measures in that case might range

from an alternative safeguards arrangement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency, to some other form of

international verification. The Government of India has

expressed its view that for purposes of implementing the

U.S.-India Agreement, Agency safeguards can and should be

regarded as being ``in perpetuity.'' At the same time it

fully appreciates that paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the

Agreement does not limit the safeguards required by the

Agreement to Agency safeguards.

Question 13: In the U.S. view, how would potential

appropriate verification measures provide effectiveness and

coverage equivalent to that intended to be provided by

safeguards in paragraph 1 of Article 10?

Answer. The ``appropriate verification measures'' referred

to in paragraph 4 of Article 10 would be an alternative to

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applied

pursuant to the India-Agency safeguards agreement referenced

in paragraph 2 of Article 10, the implementation of which in

the normal course of events would satisfy the safeguards

requirement of paragraph 1 of Article 10 with respect to

India. If it were no longer possible for the Agency to apply

safeguards to nuclear items subject to the U.S.-India

Agreement in India, alternative verification measures agreed

by the Parties would need to be carried out on some other

international basis to maintain continuity of safeguards as

required by paragraph 1 of Article 10. The United States

would expect such measures to provide effectiveness and

coverage equivalent to that intended to be provided by the

India-Agency safeguards agreement referenced in paragraph 2

of Article 10, albeit without a necessary role for the

International Atomic Energy Agency in their application.

Question 14. Which of the commitments that the United

States made in Article 5 are of a binding legal character?

Does the Indian Government agree?

Answer. The question quotes paragraph 6 of article 5, which

contains certain fuel supply assurances that were repeated

verbatim from the March 2006 separation plan. These are

important Presidential commitments that the U.S. intends to

uphold, consistent with U.S. law.

Question 15. What is the definition of ``disruption of

supply'' as used in Article 5? Do the U.S. and Indian

governments agree on this definition?

Answer. It is the understanding of the United States that

the use of the phrase ``disruption of fuel supplies'' in

Article 5.6 of the 123 Agreement is meant to refer to

disruptions in supply to India that may result through no

fault of its own. Examples of such a disruption include (but

are not limited to): a trade war resulting in the cut-off of

supply; market disruptions in the global supply of fuel; and

the potential failure of an American company to fulfill any

fuel supply contracts it may have signed with India. We

believe the Indian government shares our understanding of

this provision.

Question 16. Would any of these commitments continue to

apply if India detonated a nuclear explosive device? If so,

under what circumstances?

Answer. As outlined in Article 14 of the 123 Agreement,

should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the United

States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with

India immediately, including the supply of fuel, as well as

to request the return of any items transferred from the

United States, including fresh fuel. In addition, the United

States has the right to terminate the agreement on one year's

written notice. (Notice of termination has to precede

cessation of cooperation pursuant to Article 14). In case of

termination, the commitments in Article 5.6 would no longer

apply.

Question 17. Do the assurances in Article 5 require the

United States to assist India in finding foreign sources of

nuclear fuel in the event that the United States ceases

nuclear cooperation with India?

Answer. Ceasing nuclear cooperation with India would be a

serious step. The United States would not take such a serious

step without careful consideration of the circumstances

necessitating such action and the effects and impacts it

would entail. Such circumstances would include, for example,

detonation of a nuclear weapon, material violation of the 123

Agreement, or termination, abrogation, or material violation

of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The

provisions in article 14 on termination of the agreement and

cessation of cooperation would be available in such

circumstances, and their exercise would render article 5.6

inapplicable. Moreover, such circumstances would likely be

inconsistent with the political underpinnings of the U.S.-

India Initiative upon which the commitments in article 5.6

were based.

Question 18. How is this fuel supply assurance consistent

with Section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act which states that it

is U.S. policy to: ``Seek to prevent the transfer to any

country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from

other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers

Group or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that

country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title,

the Atomic Energy Act, or any other United States law''?

Answer. There is no inconsistency between the fuel supply

assurances contained in Article 5 of the U.S.-India Agreement

and section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act. Paragraph 6 of Article

5 of the U.S.-India Agreement records assurances given by the

United States to India in March 2006. In particular, the

United States conveyed its commitment ``. . . to work with

friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear

Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India

to obtain full access to the international fuel market,

including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to

fuel supplies from firms in several nations,'' and ``[i]f

despite these arrangements a disruption of fuel supplies to

India occurs, the United States and India would jointly

convene a group of friendly countries . . . to pursue such

measures as would restore fuel supply to India.''

These fuel supply assurances are intended to guard against

disruptions of fuel supply to India that might occur through

no fault of India's own. Instances of such a disruption might

include, for example, a trade war resulting in the cut-off of

supply, market disruptions in the global supply of fuel, or

the failure of a company to fulfill a fuel supply contract it

may have signed with India. In such circumstances the United

States would be prepared to encourage transfers of nuclear

fuel to India by other Nuclear Suppliers Group members.

The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to

insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear

explosive test or a violation of nonproliferation

commitments. The language of Article 5.6(b), particularly in

the context of Article 14, does not provide for any such

insulation.

Question 19. How are these provisions regarding a life-time

strategic reserve for the operating life of India's

safeguarded reactors consistent with subparagraph (10) of

paragraph (a) of Section 103 of the Hyde Act, which states

that: ``Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to

the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian

nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable

operating requirements?''

Answer. We do not read these provisions to be inconsistent.

The parameters of the proposed ``strategic reserve'' and of

India's capacity to acquire nuclear fuel for its reactors

will be developed over time. Thus, it is premature to

conclude that the strategic reserve will develop in a manner

inconsistent with the Hyde Act.

Question 20. Do the U.S. and India agree on the definition

of reasonable reactor operating requirements for Indian

reactors? If yes, what is it? If not, how do they disagree?

Does the U.S. have an assessment of how much nuclear material

would be required for a life-time strategic reserve for each

safeguarded Indian power reactor that could receive fuel

pursuant to the proposed agreement?

Answer. The U.S.-India Agreement does not define

``reasonable operating requirements,'' and the two

governments have not discussed a definition. Any definition

would have to take into account among other things the

physical characteristics of the reactors, their expected

operating cycles, their expected time in service, the

likelihood of fuel supply disruptions over decades of

operation, and many similar factors that are difficult to

quantify in the abstract. We would expect that the actual

amount of fuel put in the reserve would depend not only on

the factors just mentioned, but also on such factors as

availability of fuel in the market, price, Indian storage

capacity, costs of storage, and similar practical

considerations. The Agreement itself establishes neither a

minimum nor a maximum quantity of nuclear material to be

placed in India's reserve.

Question 21. How are these assurances consistent with

subparagraph (6) of paragraph (a) of Section 103 of the Hyde

Act which states that it is U.S. policy to: ``Seek to prevent

the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or

technology from other participating governments in the

Nuclear Suppliers Group or from any other

source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or

terminated pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of

1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States

law''?

Answer. Please see the response to Question 18.

Question 22. What impact will these U.S. commitments of

nuclear fuel supply to India have on the U.S. initiatives to

discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing

facilities?

Answer. We do not foresee any negative impact on these

initiatives. India already possesses both types of

facilities. We do not believe that the provision of fuel

assurances to India will have any effect on our efforts to

offer reliable access to nuclear fuel to persuade countries

aspiring to develop civil nuclear energy to forgo enrichment

and reprocessing capabilities of their own.

Question 23. Have the Indians explained to the U.S. or to

the International Atomic Energy Agency their definition of

the term ``an India-specific safeguards agreement?'' If so,

what is it?

Answer. The Indian government has not yet explained to the

United States what it means by the term ``India-specific''

safeguards agreement. The Indian government has been in

discussions with the IAEA regarding its safeguards agreement.

However, these discussions have not concluded. The United

States remains confident that the safeguards agreement to be

negotiated between India and the IAEA will address all of the

concerns associated with the term ``India-specific.''

Question 24. Which provisions of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2

agreements provide for safeguards in perpetuity? Would these

apply to civil nuclear reactors that a country such as India

requests the IAEA to safeguard?

Answer. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 is not a ``model agreement'' as is

INFCIRC/153 (the basis for NPT safeguards agreements)--

INFCIRC/66-type agreements are not as rigidly determined as

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards agreements.

Because INFCIRC/66-type agreements do not involve fullscope

safeguards (safeguards applied to all nuclear material in a

state), but have been aimed at the application of safeguard

to specific supplied materials or facilities, the scope of

safeguards application is delineated uniquely in each

agreement.

This is generally done through the mechanism of a dynamic

list of inventory items to which the agreement stipulates

that safeguards must be applied. The main part of the

inventory list contains facilities and material that are

permanently under safeguards. The subsidiary part of the

inventory list contains facilities that are temporarily under

safeguards due to the presence of safeguarded material. There

is a third section of the list that contains nuclear material

on which safeguards are suspended or exempted (e.g., because

the material has been diluted to the point where it is no

longer usable, has been transferred out of the state, etc.).

We would expect that the Indian safeguards agreement will be

based on this general structure, and that the nuclear

facilities India declares to be ``civil'' will be placed in

the main (permanent safeguards) part of the inventory list.

Also in the main part of the inventory would be nuclear

material exported to India, and any nuclear material

generated through the use of that material.

Consistent with International Atomic Energy Agency Board

Document GOV/1621 (which is referenced in the Hyde Act, Sec.

104(b)2), the safeguards agreement should also contain

language that ensures that: (1) the duration of the agreement

is related to the period of actual use of the items in the

recipient state; and (2) the rights and obligations with

respect to safeguarded nuclear material shall apply until

such time as the International Atomic Energy Agency

terminates safeguards pursuant to the agreement (e.g. the

material is no longer usable or has bee transferred from the

recipient state).

Question 25. Has the Indian government provided U.S.

officials with a definition of ``corrective measures''? If

so, what is it? Does it involve removing IAEA-safeguarded

material from such safeguards in certain circumstances? If

so, does the U.S. support the conclusion of an Indian

agreement with the IAEA that provides for perpetuity of

safeguards while at the same time making such perpetuity

contingent on the invocation of ``corrective measures?''

Answer. The Indian government has not provided the United

States with a definition of ``corrective measures.'' Until a

safeguards agreement is completed between India and the

International Atomic Energy Agency and the issue of

``corrective measures'' is clarified, we cannot comment on

the appropriateness of the agreement. However, we expect that

the Indian government will implement in letter and in spirit

its commitment to ``safeguards in perpetuity,'' to which it

agreed on March 2, 2006. As Secretary Rice stated during her

testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

April 5, 2006, ``We've been very clear with the Indians that

the permanence of safeguards is the permanence of safeguards

without condition.''

Question 26. Since India is not a party to the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not accept full-scope

safeguards, does this long-term consent for reprocessing for

India change U.S. policy for granting long-term consent to

reprocessing and the use of plutonium? If so, what criteria

will the U.S. now use to consider requests for reprocessing

and the use of plutonium either on a case-by-case basis or

for long-term advance programmatic arrangements?

Answer. The consent to reprocessing is contingent upon the

construction of a new, dedicated reprocessing facility that

will be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The criteria applied by the United States in considering the

Indian request were the same as those applied in the earlier

instances (EURATOM and Japan). They are that (1) the

reprocessing will not be inimical to the common defense and

security, and (2) the reprocessing will not result in a

significant increase in the risk of proliferation beyond that

which exists at the time the approval is requested, giving

foremost consideration to whether the reprocessing will take

place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the

United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at

which the diverted materiel could be transformed into a

nuclear explosive device. These are the criteria for granting

approval for reprocessing established by section 131 of the

Atomic Energy Act.

Article 6(iii) of the Agreement provides that India and the

United States must agree on ``arrangements and procedures''

under which the reprocessing will take place before India can

physically reprocess any material subject to the Agreement.

The Administration will ensure that the safeguards, physical

protection and other measures to be set forth in the agreed

``arrangements and procedures'' will be both rigorous and

consistent with the criteria described above.

Question 27. What special challenges will the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) face in safeguarding a

reprocessing plant in a non-NPT state that does not have

full-scope safeguards?

Answer. Assuming that, consistent with the terms of the 123

Agreement, India builds a new reprocessing plant dedicated to

the processing of material under International Atomic Energy

Agency safeguards, there would be little, if any, difference

in the technical challenge of applying safeguards to such a

facility as opposed to a comparable facility in a State with

a comprehensive safeguards agreement. There are some

differences under an INFCIRC/66 agreement in the state's

record-keeping and material accounting report requirements,

but these should not have an impact on safeguards

effectiveness. The technical objectives and technical

measures applied in the two cases would not differ in any

significant way. In each case the International Atomic Energy

Agency would seek to provide assurance that the declared

material was not diverted, and that the facility was operated

in the manner declared. The facility would be under

uninterrupted safeguards, and the material entering, exiting,

and resident in the facility would all be subject to

safeguards. In the case of India, the Agency's safeguards

conclusions would have to be limited to the civil facilities

and materials under safeguards, and could not be extrapolated

to apply to the nuclear program as a whole.

Question 28. Will the U.S. insist that the safeguards

agreement for the planned Indian reprocessing plant include

all the safeguards procedure and approaches that the IAEA

applies to the Rokkasho reprocessing facility in Japan,

including state-of-the-art, near-real-time accountancy and

containment and surveillance?

Answer. U.S. policy is that safeguards should be applied to

meet established technical standards of effectiveness, as

efficiently as possible; that is the policy we pursue in the

context of our bilateral agreements with other states such as

Japan, and we would continue to pursue such a policy in

discussions with India in connection with arrangements for

reprocessing. The safeguards methods employed at the Rokkasho

Reprocessing Plant are consistent with both International

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards criteria, and with the

results of a lengthy international cooperative effort to

address the technical problems of safeguarding large

reprocessing plants. We would expect the same approaches to

apply to a new Indian reprocessing plant dedicated to

processing safeguarded material. However, we cannot yet

speculate that safeguards would be carried out in exactly the

same manner, although containment, surveillance, and some

sort of continuous material monitoring would certainly be

involved. A new reprocessing plant may well be many years

off, and safeguards technology constantly moves forward; by

the time a new Indian plant is in operation, there will

almost certainly be a new generation of surveillance and

radiation measurement devices available, and lessons

learned from Rokkasho safeguards.

Question 29. Will the Administration submit any consent

arrangements for Indian reprocessing to Congress as an

amendment to the U.S.-India agreement for cooperation so that

Congress will have a full 90 days to give adequate time to

review its provisions? Or will the Administration submit

these only as a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of

the Atomic Energy Act, thereby allowing Congress only 15 days

of continuous session for review of this complex issue?

Answer. Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act provides

explicitly for review and execution of subsequent

arrangements related to the reprocessing of U.S. origin

material. However, if proposed ``arrangements and

procedures'' for reprocessing involved changes to provisions

in the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, an amendment to the

agreement would be required.

Question 30. Why are the programmatic consent arrangements

that the U.S. is proposing to India, a non-NPT signatory,

much

less specific and rigorous than the procedures that the U.S.

required of EURATOM and Japan?

Answer. The advance, long-term consent accorded to India in

the U.S.-India Agreement by Article 6(iii) centers on a new

Indian national reprocessing facility that has not yet been

designed, let alone built. Many relevant nonproliferation

considerations that could readily be dealt with in the texts

of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-EURATOM agreements (or in related

documents) could not be dealt with immediately in the U.S.-

India Agreement.

Nevertheless, the U.S.-India Agreement establishes as

fundamental criteria that a new national reprocessing

facility must be dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded

nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards, and that any special fissionable material (i.e.,

plutonium) separated by the facility may only be utilized in

national facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards. Further, it provides that the consent does not

become effective until the United States and India consult

and agree on arrangements and procedures under which

activities at the new facility will take place.

Finally, Article 6(iii) provides that the arrangements and

procedures must address nonproliferation considerations

identical to those addressed in the procedures relating to

the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-EURATOM agreements (e.g. safeguards,

physical protection, storage, environmental protection), as

well as ``such other provisions as may be agreed by the

Parties.'' At the appropriate time the United States will

consult with India for the purpose of agreeing on the

requisite arrangements and procedures and will ensure that

they are no less rigorous than those governing the U.S.

consent arrangements with Japan and with EURATOM.

Question 31.Why are there no notification procedures for

adding new Indian facilities to the list of facilities that

may use plutonium derived from U.S.-supplied fuel?

Answer: The procedures established by Article 7.1 of the

U.S.-India Agreement whereby each Party records all

facilities storing separated plutonium subject to the

Agreement on a list and makes its list available to the other

Party serve equally to notify to the other Party all

facilities utilizing (or potentially utilizing) plutonium

subject to the Agreement, since the plutonium-bearing fuel

must first be located at the facility before it can be

utilized. A similar approach is taken in the U.S.-EURATOM

Agreement, where facilities formally notified as being added

to a party's ``Delineated Program'' (Annex A) do not include

utilization facilities; the latter are notified, as

appropriate, when they are added to a ``Storage'' list as

provided for by Article 8.3.

Question 32. Will the United States insist that any

plutonium and uranium recovered from the reprocessing of

U.S.-origin fuel at the proposed dedicated Indian

reprocessing facility be subject to IAEA safeguards and

peaceful, non-explosive use assurances in perpetuity,

including any such material recycled in Indian reactors?

Answer. Yes. Article 9, Article 10, and Article 16 of the

U.S.-India Agreement guarantee this coverage.

Question 33. Will the U.S. insist that any uranium or

plutonium used in or produced through the use of U.S.-

supplied material be subject to safeguards in perpetuity if

such material is used in India's breeder reactors?

Answer. Yes. Article 10 of the U.S.-India Agreement

guarantees this coverage.

Question 34. If India decides at some point in the future

to reprocess spent breeder reactor fuel that contains U.S.-

origin material, how will the U.S. ensure that it is subject

to all the non-proliferation conditions and controls in the

proposed agreement, including safeguards and consent rights?

Answer. Article 10.6 of the U.S.-India Agreement provides

that ``[e]ach Party shall establish and maintain a system of

accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred

pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or

produced through the use of any material, equipment, or

components so transferred.'' Article 10.7 provides that

[u]pon the request of either Party, the other Party shall

report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party

on the status of all inventories of material subject to this

Agreement.'' Thus, the United States will be able to track

all clear material in India subject to the Agreement,

including at India's breeder reactors (which would have to be

brought under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

before U.S.-obligated nuclear material could be introduced to

them), at India's new dedicated reprocessing facility (when

built), and at any other Indian facility where U.S.-obligated

plutonium may be located. In tracking this material the

United States will be able to ensure that all conditions and

controls required by the Agreement, including International

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, are in fact being

maintained.

Question 35. In light of these requirements of U.S. law,

why doesn't the proposed U.S.-Indian peaceful nuclear

cooperation agreement contain an explicit reference to the

actions that would give the U.S. the right to terminate

nuclear cooperation and to require the return of equipment

and materials subject to the agreement, if India detonates a

nuclear explosive device?

Answer. Article 14 of the proposed U.S.-India agreement for

cooperation provides for a clear right for the U.S. to

terminate nuclear cooperation and a right to require the

return of equipment and materials subject to the agreement in

all of the circumstances required under the Atomic Energy

Act, including if India detonated a nuclear explosive device

or terminated or abrogated safeguards (per section 123(a)(4)

of the Act). Thus, it fully satisfies the relevant

requirements of the Act.

Question 36.Does the U.S. possess the right under Article

14, without any precondition or consent by India, to take

back any and all U.S.-origin nuclear material or equipment

provided to India pursuant to the nuclear cooperation

agreement?

Answer. Under Article 14 of the proposed agreement, the

U.S. would be able to exercise the right to require the

return of material and equipment subject to the agreement

after (1) giving written notice of termination of the

agreement and (2) ceasing cooperation, based on a

determination that ``a mutually acceptable resolution of

outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be

achieved through consultations.'' Thus, both of the actions

that must be taken to exercise the right of return would be

within the discretion of the U.S. Government, and both

actions could be taken at once in the unlikely case that the

U.S. believed that a resolution of the problem could not be

achieved through consultations.

Article 14 does not require that the other party consent to

the exercise of the right to terminate the agreement, the

right to cease cooperation, or the right of return. Prior to

the actual removal of items pursuant to the right of return,

the parties would engage in consultations regarding, inter

alia, the quantity of items to be returned, the amount of

compensation due, and the methods and arrangements for

removal. These consultations are a standard feature of right

of return provisions and are included in all 123 agreements

that the United States has signed with other cooperating

parties.

Question 37. Under what circumstances does the termination

provision allow the United States to terminate cooperation

with India? Does the U.S. have the unconditional right to

cease cooperation immediately upon its determination that

India has taken action that the U.S. believes constitutes

grounds for termination of cooperation?

Answer. Like all other U.S. agreements for nuclear

cooperation, the proposed U.S.-India agreement is a framework

agreement and foes not compel any specific cooperation. Thus,

a cessation of cooperation would not be inconsistent with the

provisions of the agreement. Also, as in other agreements for

cooperation, the proposed U.S.-India agreement provides

specifically (in article 14) for a right to cease

cooperation. Article 14 makes clear that the U.S. would have

the right to cease cooperation immediately if it determined

that India had taken actions that constituted grounds for

such cessation and that a resolution of the problem created

by India's actions could not be achieved through

consultations. This is a reciprocal right that India enjoys

as well. Article 14 does not elaborate the specific

circumstances that might bring about such a formal cessation

of cooperation. However, the provisions of article 14

underscore the expectation of both parties that termination

of the agreement, cessation of cooperation, and exercise of

the right of return would be serious measures not to be

undertaken lightly.

Question 38. Could the U.S. terminate cooperation pursuant

to Article 14 of the nuclear cooperation agreement for

reasons other than India's detonation of a nuclear explosive

device or abrogating or violating a nuclear safeguards

agreement? Does the government of India agree?

Answer. As noted in the previous answer, Article 14 of the

U.S.-India Agreement does not elaborate the specific

circumstances that might trigger a cessation of cooperation

pursuant to that article. As explained in the answer to

question 17, the circumstances for possible termination would

include, for example, detonation of a nuclear weapon,

material violation of the 123 Agreement, or termination,

abrogation, or material violation of a safeguards agreement.

The provisions of Article 14 underscore the expectation of

both parties that termination of the agreement, cessation of

cooperation, and exercise of the right of return would be

serious measures not to be undertaken lightly. We believe the

language establishing these rights is clear and well

understood by both countries.

Question 39. Do the nonproliferation assurances and

conditions in the proposed new agreement apply to the nuclear

materials and equipment that the U.S. supplied for the

Tarapur reactors, as well as the spent fuel from those

reactors? If not, why?

Answer. The proposed U.S.-India Agreement would not apply

retroactively to the spent fuel from the Tarapur reactors.

The Atomic Energy Act does not require such retroactive

application, but it does impose certain conditions with

respect to previously exported material before embarking on

new cooperation (see section 127). The Administration

believes it will be able to satisfy these requirements of the

Atomic Energy Act.

Question 40. Does the U.S. continue to hold the position

that India legally obligated to adhere to the

nonproliferation assurances and controls, including peaceful-

use assurances, safeguards, consent to reprocessing and

retransfer to their countries with respect to the nuclear

equipment and materials that were subject to the expired 1963

agreement for cooperation? Does the Indian Government share

the U.S. views?

Answer. The U.S. and India have maintained differing legal

positions on the question of residual conditions and controls

on

nuclear material subject to the 1963 agreement following

expiration of the agreement in 1993. However, India has

agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the

application of safeguards to nuclear material from the

Taracur reactors. Moreover, the material is subject to the

INFCIRC/66 Agreement. And the U.S. is confident that there

would be consultations between the U.S. and India before any

change in the status of the nuclear material (e.g.,

reprocessing).

Question 41. Will the Indian Government have any legal

right to suspend or eliminate safeguards, reprocess U.S.-

origin material, or otherwise take any action that would be

prohibited under the proposed agreement after the termination

by either party of the proposed?

Answer. Article 16 of the proposed U.S.-India Agreement

expressly provides for the survival of essential rights and

conditions on items subject to the agreement even after

termination or expiration of the agreement, including inter

alia with respect to the application of safeguards (article

10), reprocessing consent (article 6), and peaceful use

(article 9).

Question 42. Does the Administration agree with Prime

Minister Singh that there will be no derogation of India's

right to take corrective measure in the event of fuel supply

interruption? Will any corrective measures that India might

take involve any derogation of the U.S. nonproliferation

assurances, rights, and controls that are set out in articles

5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10?

Answer. The language of article 16 clearly provides for the

applicability of the referenced provisions to items subject

to the proposed agreement even after termination or

expiration of the agreement. Until India has completed its

safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy

Agency and the parameters of ``corrective measures'' are

known, we will not be in a position to speak definitively to

the potential effect on other provisions of the proposed

agreement. That said, it would not be consistent with the

proposed agreement text for such corrective measures to

extract from the applicability of the provisions referenced

in article 16 to items subject to the proposed agreement,

including after termination or expiration of the agreement.

Question 43. What are the explicit linkages and

interlocking rights and commitments that Prime Minister Singh

was referring to? Do the U.S. and India governments agree on

the definition of these linkages and interlocking rights and

commitments? If not, how do they differ?

Answer. International agreements, by their nature,

typically involve interlocking rights and commitments, and

this is the case with our agreements for nuclear cooperation.

The creation of a framework for nuclear cooperation is

predicated on a set of rights and conditions that serve

essential nonproliferation purposes. Beyond that, we can only

say that the quoted statement is at a high level of

generality, and we are not in a position to speak for the

Indian government as to whether anything more specific was

intended by these words.

Question 44. What is the Administration's understanding of

the Prime Minister's statement that India's reprocessing

rights are ``permanent''? Specifically, does it mean that the

U.S. will not have the right to withdraw its consent to

India's reprocessing of U.S.-obligated nuclear material, even

if the U.S. determines that the continuation of such

activities would pose a serious threat to our national

security or nonproliferation?

Answer. The U.S. has agreed to the reprocessing of U.S.-

origin materials, to come into effect when the parties agree

on ``arrangements and procedures'' and India establishes. a

new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing

safeguarded material under IAEA safeguards. As with the

arrangements governing reprocessing consents granted by the

U.S. in connection with the Japan and EURATOM agreements, the

proposed arrangements and procedures with India will provide

for withdrawal of reprocessing consent. Such a right is also

included in Article 14.9 of the U.S.-India Agreement.

Question 45. In the conference report of the Hyde Act,

Congress stated that it intended for the United States to

``seek agreement among Nuclear Suppliers Group members that

violations by one country of an agreement with any Nuclear

Suppliers Group member should result in joint action by all

members, including, as appropriate, the termination of

nuclear exports.'' Will the administration be seeking such a

commitment when it proposes that the Nuclear Suppliers Group

provide a nuclear trade rule exemption for India? If not, why

not?

Answer. Paragraph 16 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1)

provides that suppliers should (1) consult if, inter alia,

one or more suppliers believe there has been a violation of a

supplier/recipient understanding; (2) avoid acting in a

manner that could prejudice measures that may be adopted in

response to such a violation; and (3) agree on ``an

appropriate response and possible action, which could include

the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.''

Assuming the Nuclear Suppliers Group agrees by consensus to

an exception for India, this guideline would apply in the

case of any nuclear transfers by a Nuclear Suppliers. Group

supplier to India. The Administration believes that the

existing provisions of paragraph 16 of the Guidelines serve

the Congressional concerns expressed in the conference report

on the Hyde Act, and therefore no further elaboration is

needed in connection with the proposed exception for India.

,Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, this bill also gives the right to disapprove a Presidential decision to resume civil nuclear cooperation with any country, not just with India, that tests a nuclear weapon. It will also ensure that India takes the necessary remaining steps to bring its IAEA safeguards agreement fully into force and to conclude an additional protocol with the IAEA as India has committed to do. It gives Congress the ability to review the future reprocessing arrangements that will allow India to reprocess spent U.S. fuel.

Finally, late yesterday, Secretary of State Rice made a personal commitment to me that, in a change of policy, the United States will make its highest priority at the November meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group the achievement and the decision by all of the nuclear suppliers to prohibit the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to states that are not members of the treaty on nonproliferation. This would be consistent with the intent of the Congress as expressed in the Hyde Act.

In light of the improvements for congressional oversight in this bill and in light of the Secretary's commitment, I will be voting for H.R. 7081.

Mr. Speaker, I'm a strong advocate of closer U.S.-India ties, and I support peaceful nuclear cooperation between our two countries. In 2006, I voted for the Hyde Act, which established a framework for such cooperation. The bill before us today, the ``United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act,'' would approve the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, and allow that agreement to come into effect for the United States.

Under the Hyde Act, Congress was to have 30 days to review the agreement before beginning consideration of a privileged resolution of approval. Unfortunately, because of months of delay in New Delhi and the Administration's acceleration of the deliberations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to grant India an exemption from its restrictions on trade to India, the Agreement is now before us in the waning days before adjournment.

We therefore have two choices: approve the Agreement now, with the safeguards built into this bill; or wait until. the next Congress and start again. If we wait, however, we will likely only vote on a simple resolution of approval, without the safeguards of this bill, and without the additional enhancements to Congressional oversight over these types of agreements that are required. Our leverage on the Administration--this one or the next--will only decrease with time.

On balance, integrating India into the global nonproliferation regime is a positive step. And before anyone gets too sanctimonious about India's nuclear weapons program, we should acknowledge that the five recognized nuclear weapons states haven't done nearly enough to fulfill their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including making serious reductions in their own arsenals. Nor has the U.S. ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Having said that, I continue to have concerns about ambiguities in the nuclear cooperation agreement that the Bush Administration negotiated with the government of India, particularly with regard to the potential consequences if India tests another nuclear weapon, and to the legal status of so-called ``fuel assurances'' made by our negotiators.

Section 102(a) of the legislation before us declares that the agreements have the meanings contained in the authoritative representations by the President and his representatives.

I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record5st a message from the President and a letter from the State Department that directly pertain to the interpretation of the U.S.-India agreement and that constitute some of the authoritative representations made by the President described in section 102(a).

These documents make clear that the assurances contained in Article 5(6) of the Agreement are political commitments, and do not constitute a legal obligation on behalf of the United States or any official, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of the United States to provide nuclear fuel in any form to the Government of India, or to any Indian organization, individual, or entity under any circumstances whatsoever. They also make clear that the political commitments contained in Article 5(6) of the Agreement do not apply in the event of a disruption of the foreign supply of nuclear fuel to India as a consequence of a detonation of nuclear explosive device or a violation of nonproliferation commitments by India.

I am also deeply troubled that the Administration completely disregarded important nonproliferation requirements in the Hyde Act--

thus putting American companies at a competitive disadvantage--when seeking a special exemption for India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

This bill therefore includes a number of provisions designed to improve Congressional oversight of the India nuclear cooperation agreement and help ensure that the agreement is interpreted in a manner consistent with the constraints in the Hyde Act.

It gives Congress the right to disapprove, under expedited procedures, a Presidential decision to resume civil nuclear cooperation with any country--not just India--that tests a nuclear weapon. We, the Congress, should be involved in that process.

And the legislation will ensure that India takes the necessary remaining steps to bring its IAEA safeguards agreement fully into force, to place the reactors and other facilities under those safeguards, and to conclude a more extensive Additional Protocol for enhanced safeguards with the IAEA, all of which it has previously committed to do.

And, Mr. Speaker, this legislation gives Congress the ability to review the reprocessing arrangement yet to be negotiated that will set out the conditions and safeguards to allow India to reprocess spent U.S. fuel.

Finally, late yesterday, Secretary of State Rice made a personal commitment to me that--in a change of policy--the United States will give its ``highest priority'' to achieving an agreement at the November Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting to prohibit the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to states that are not members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This would be consistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Hyde Act to further restrict the international transfers of this sensitive technology.

In light of the improvements for Congressional oversight in this bill, I will be voting for H.R. 7081.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the Chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, someone who was involved in this issue since the first announcement of the joint declaration in the summer of 2005, which was the first time Congress was ever told about this issue, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the Chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).

Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to a member of our committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley).

Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from American Samoa, Eni Faleomavaega, chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment.

Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1 minute to a very active member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone).

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7112) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran, to provide for the divestment of assets in Iran by State and local governments and other entities, and to identify locations of concern with respect to transshipment, reexportation, or diversion of certain sensitive items to Iran.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, to me, is one of the great national security challenges of our age. A nuclear- armed, fundamentalist Iran would become the dominant power in its region. The global nonproliferation regime would crumble. Already today we know that many of Iran's neighbors are contemplating their own nuclear programs. And can anyone be sure that Iran, with a leader who speaks like he speaks now, would not resort to either the use of nuclear weapons or to the handoff of those weapons to terrorist organizations?

The sanctions that the United States and the international community have thus far placed on Iran have squeezed Iran's economy somewhat, but clearly not enough to slow down its nuclear program. The present strategy is not working. I'm disappointed--and I believe the Iranian regime is surely heartened--by the failure of the administration's program to produce the kinds of results we need regarding Iran's nuclear program.

We need to make our foreign policy priorities clear. And Iran must be at the very top of the agenda in all our dealings with other countries. Sanctions will never work unless we have buy-in and support from other key countries. And if the process of achieving that buy-in requires us to engage directly with Iran, that is certainly something we should do.

Two months ago, the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany offered Iran all kinds of generous incentives to persuade it to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Just for the sake of initiating further talks on this package, they offered what they called a ``freeze-for-freeze,'' meaning we will agree not to pursue further sanctions for 6 weeks and Iran agrees not to increase the number of its centrifuges. But these offers weren't good enough for Iran, which responded only with a noncommittal letter.

If Iran won't change its behavior as a result of the sanctions the international community has already imposed, and if it won't change its behavior as a result of the generous incentives package offered in Geneva, then we should be pursuing tougher and more meaningful sanctions.

The legislation before us won't put an end to Iran's nuclear program, but it may help to slow it down. It will send a strong signal to Tehran that the U.S. Congress views this matter with urgency. And it will send a message to companies and countries that invest or consider investing in Iran's energy sector.

This bill before us contains a somewhat diluted version of two measures put together in the other body that had previously been passed by the House by votes of 397-16 and 408-6.

This legislation would codify and expand export and import bans on goods to and from Iran. It would freeze assets in the U.S. held by Iranians closely tied to the regime. It would render sanctionable a U.S. parent company if that parent company uses a foreign subsidiary to circumvent sanctions. It expands the Iran Sanctions Act to

cover not only oil and all natural gas but related industries. It authorizes State and local governments in the United States to divest from any company that invests $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector. It increases U.S. export controls on countries that are directly involved in trans-shipment or illegal diversion of sensitive technologies to Iran. And it requires the administration to report all foreign investments of $20 million or more made in Iran's energy sector, an action which they have not done notwithstanding the existing law, and determining whether each such investment qualifies as sanctionable.

Since 1996, the executive branch has never implemented the sanctions in the Iran Sanctions Act, even though well over a dozen sanctionable investment deals have been concluded with Iran by international companies. The administration hasn't even made a determination as to whether any of those investors are sanctionable. This bill will close that loophole.

This legislation before us also reaffirms our Nation's commitment to multilateral diplomacy to increase pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, and it exclusively states that nothing in this act authorizes the use of force.

Based on previous votes, this body is committed to ending Iran's illicit nuclear program by taking measures that are peaceful but meaningful. I believe this legislation is a useful step forward toward that end.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, two issues: first, the gentlelady has mentioned several times that this bill is not as strong as we wanted, and she is right. But it does many good things, many important things.

If we went on and fully extrapolated her comments, we would know the reason it isn't quite as strong as we wanted. It is because the White House, working with the other body, has worked very hard to not make it as strong as we would like.

Even this good, but not good as we wanted bill, would have been much stronger. I would love to see a letter of support from the administration for this measure.

On the issue she asked me to clarify, she got a very important piece of legislation through a couple of years ago that codified our sanctions and did not contain waiver authority. We don't believe this bill did, but we have made clear, by the language in section 108, that this waiver does not affect the provisions of the executive order codified by the Iran Freedom Support Act, that the waiver in this legislation has no impact whatsoever on her legislation, which passed in 2006, I am glad of that, and the specific provisions of section 108.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to place two exchanges of letters with the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Ways and Means in the Record.

House of Representatives,

Committee on Ways and Means,

Washington, DC, September 26, 2008.

Hon. Howard L. Berman,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing regarding H.R. 7112--to

amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, to expand and clarify

the entities against which sanctions may be imposed--is

expected to be on the suspension calendar today.

As you know, the Committee on Ways and Means has

jurisdiction over import matters, such as the import ban and

restrictions on imports imposed by the Iran Sanctions Act and

the International Emergency Powers Act. Accordingly, the

certain provisions of H.R. 7112 fall under the Committee's

jurisdiction.

There have been some very productive conversations between

the staffs of our committees, during which we have proposed

some changes to H.R. 7112 that I believe help clarify the

intent and scope of the measure. My understanding is that

there is an agreement with regard to these changes.

In order to expedite this legislation for floor

consideration, the Committee will forgo action on this bill

and will not oppose its consideration on the suspension

calendar. This is done with the understanding that it does

not in any way prejudice the Committee or its jurisdictional

prerogatives on this, or similar legislation in the future.

I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming

our understanding with

respect to H.R. 7112, and would ask that a copy of our

exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Record.

I look forward to the bill's consideration on the floor and

hope that it will command the broadest possible support.

Sincerely,

Charles B. Rangel,

Chairman.

Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 1361) expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to defeat the campaign by some members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to divert the United Nation's Durban Review Conference from a review of problems in their own and other countries by attacking Israel, promoting anti-Semitism, and undermining the Universal Charter of Human Rights and to ensure that the Durban Review Conference serves as a forum to review commitments to combat all forms of racism, as amended.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution, and I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

First, I want to express my appreciation to the ranking member of our Foreign Affairs Committee, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, along with the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Mr. Payne, and my colleague from California, Ms. Barbara Lee, for their hard work on this resolution aimed at preventing a repeat of the tragic outcome of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism.

As my colleagues know, the convening of the first World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, in 2001 marked an important recognition of the historic wounds caused by slavery, colonialism, and ongoing racism and racial discrimination.

The Durban conference's explicit recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as ``a crime against humanity'' was a watershed event in the global community's effort to begin confronting this indelible stain in human history.

Tragically, the seminal achievements of this conference were overshadowed and diminished when some conference participants diverted the focus of the conference from problems in their own countries to a pathological focus on Israel and Jews.

The worse abuses took place in and around the NGO forum that took place on the margins of the conference. This forum devolved into a hate-filled circus, as anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rallies spilled onto Durban's streets.

The official document produced by the NGO forum contained abusive language branding Israel an ``apartheid state'' that is guilty of ``racist crimes against humanity.''

The government document, while not as inflammatory as the NGO document, singled out one and only one regional conflict in a biased way by highlighting the ``plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation,'' and in so doing, wrongly branded Israel's treatment of Palestinians as racist.

The U.N. is now preparing a Durban Review Conference set to take place in Geneva in 2009. Despite the fact that the U.N. Human Rights Council agreed in Resolution 3/2 on December 8, 2006, that the review conference would be limited in its scope to a focus on countries' implementation of commitments to fight racism and discrimination, the same actors that hijacked the initial Durban conference are threatening to do so once again.

In preparatory meetings for the Durban Review Conference in Geneva, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, led by Pakistan, and the African Group, led by Egypt, have boldly stated--and that's the governments of both Pakistan and Egypt here--have boldly stated their determination to go beyond the boundaries established for the Durban Review Conference to attack Israel and to make so-called new forms of racism a centerpiece of the review conference agenda.

Our government and the governments of France, Canada, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Israel have stated that unless the direction of the conference is refocused, the review process will not be credible or worthy of support.

I strongly support these ``redlines'' and will urge the next administration not to participate in the Durban review process if it continues on its current path.

But up to this point, neither the State Department nor the White House has undertaken any kind of sustained diplomatic effort to ensure that this outcome is not a forgone conclusion.

Our resolution confronts the diplomatic inaction by calling on the Secretary of State to convey in the strongest possible terms to the governments of Pakistan and Egypt that their campaign to hijack Durban II is completely unacceptable to us.

It also calls on the State Department to undertake a worldwide demarche of foreign capitals to seek support for refocusing the conference on its agreed-upon purpose.

A focused high-level diplomatic effort on the part of the State Department and the White House could force the OIC and the Arab League to stand down in their campaign to usurp the Durban review and to further unravel global adherence to human rights norms.

Unlike in the run-up to the original Durban Conference in 2001, many key U.S. allies have spoken out forcefully and resolutely in opposition to the campaign to hijack Durban II.

President Sarkozy of France, for example, has stated that the Government of France will not tolerate ``a repeat of the digression and extremes of 2001.''

It is time for the administration to end any diplomatic retreat from U.N. human rights mechanisms. We have ceded far too much space to human rights abusers by sitting on the sidelines in Geneva. We must confront the fact that among the key spoilers of U.N. human rights bodies are governments we should be in a position to influence, such as Pakistan and Egypt.

The United States is in a position to lead. We need the will to do so.

Our European allies feel far more threatened than they have been in the past by the intense OIC campaign to unravel key global human rights standards such as the right to freedom of expression.

They would certainly respond to the re-emergence of the United States as the leading advocate for universal standards of human rights.

The need for a credible global forum to review United Nations member states' efforts to combat racism remains urgent. The scourge of racism and related intolerance has not abated. If anything, discrimination against people of African, Jewish and Muslim descent has increased. We have also seen recently alarming outbreaks of violence against refugees and migrants. It makes no sense, therefore, to cede this critical forum provided by the Durban Review to a group of countries who are hostile to democratic principles and human rights standards.

Madam Speaker, I strongly support the resolution.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, before I yield to my colleague from California, I would like to yield myself 1 minute.

The gentlelady and I, my ranking member, we're coming from the same place in the sense that we do not want the United States participating in a conference which produces the kind of statements and the kinds of activities that happened the last time. Perhaps in this case I'm a little more of an optimist than the gentlelady from Florida because I can't think of anything better, that, before the last preparatory meeting, the House speaks on what our red lines are--yes, we want the conference to succeed, it's an incredibly important purpose, as the gentlelady has agreed to and acknowledged and has always been supportive of. But we know what's happened before, we know what's being set up to happen this time. But I want to see delegations from the kinds of organizations that are supporting this resolution that plan to go to Geneva for that preparatory meeting to say, in the United States, we speak with one voice, and that includes not simply the American Jewish Committee and APAC and the other Jewish community organizations that support this resolution----

I yield myself 1 additional minute.

But it also includes the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Human Rights First--one of the preeminent human rights organizations--the NAACP, and all the other organizations that are going to Geneva, supporting this resolution and telling them that we're not going to stand for another hijacking. And this resolution creates the framework, with the support of those kinds of organizations, to make that last effort. While I can't tell you what's going to happen there, let's give it our best shot.

Passing this resolution, allowing these organizations to go with a statement from the House of Representatives that is clear on the red lines, is very important.

I now yield 4 minutes to my friend and colleague, who has been very involved in this process from the very beginning and has helped us to fashion the final product with a tremendous contribution, the gentlelady from California (Ms. Lee).

I yield the gentlelady an additional 2 minutes.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from Nevada (Ms. Berkley).

I have one additional speaker. I'm very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlelady from Texas, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a participant in the last conference, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee.

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

I yield the gentlelady an additional 30 seconds.

Madam Speaker, I yield back our time.

Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 1369) recognizing nongovernmental organizations working to bring just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution, and I yield myself 3 minutes.

I would like to thank, Madam Speaker, my friend and distinguished colleague, Representative Barbara Lee, for introducing this important resolution to highlight the work done by the NGO community in support of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. In spite of the shaky cease-fire reached between Israel and Hamas on the Gaza Strip, Hamas and other extremist Palestinian groups have neither changed their stated aim, namely, the destruction of the State of Israel, nor given up the use of terrorism and violence as a means to achieve that end.

But while the terrorists of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic jihad continue to threaten innocent civilians and undermine peace efforts, we should recognize the courageous efforts being made by many nongovernmental organizations to do just the opposite, that is, to foster conditions that can lead to peace. Many of these groups work tirelessly and selflessly not only to improve the daily lives of Palestinians but also to effect peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis. One example, Seeds of Peace, brings Israeli and Arab youth together for summer retreats that cultivate a culture of understanding and tolerance among tomorrow's leaders.

As this resolution affirms, it shall remain U.S. policy to actively support all those nongovernmental organizations that provide humanitarian assistance, promote democracy, human rights and work towards Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation while unequivocally opposing the use of violence. This resolution lends that encouragement and backing only to those NGOs that explicitly renounce violence, accept Israel's right to exist and support existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.

I join the author of this resolution, Congresswoman Lee, in lauding contributions to peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians made by nongovernmental organizations. I hope, and believe and want to believe that this is the way of the future. I urge all my colleagues to support this resolution.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, we have one speaker, the sponsor of the resolution, and I yield her, Congresswoman Barbara Lee, 4 minutes.

I yield the gentlelady an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 374) supporting the spirit of peace and desire for unity displayed in the letter from 138 leading Muslim scholars, and in the Pope's response, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume but no longer than 3 minutes as I need an arbitrary restraint.

I want to begin first by thanking both the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp) and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison) for this resolution and for coming to the committee with a sense of the importance of this resolution and for the broader sentiment this resolution reflects, which is a broad and sincere commitment to global interfaith dialogue. I think it's a brilliant proposal.

I am pleased to have before us this resolution that supports such interfaith dialogue. I know its authors were inspired by a dialogue that 138 Muslim scholars, from all major sects of Islam, initiated in a letter to the Pope and to other Christian leaders. The letter emphasizes the importance of religious tolerance and of mutual respect between Christians and Muslims. In fact, the Pope graciously responded to this letter by agreeing to host a summit of

Catholic and Muslim leaders that is scheduled for this November.

This initiative reflects the same spirit as that of several other major interfaith initiatives meant to strengthen relations among the Abrahamic faiths, such as the 2005 Amman Initiative of King Abdullah II of Jordan and the 1998 initiative launched by the now Israeli President Shimon Peres, by King Juan Carlos I of Spain and by the late King Hassan II of Morocco.

Ever since Samuel Huntington coined the phrase, much is said in our public discourse about a ``clash of civilizations'' and about how to avoid it, but we really have to shoot higher than that. We have to aim to seek a comedy of civilizations. To do so, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and other religious leaders must emphasize the core similarities of their faiths and values.

This resolution encourages understanding and partnership among Christians, Muslims and Jews. Much of the cultural heritage of the West and the Middle East can be ascribed to these three Abrahamic religions, but of course interfaith dialogue doesn't need to and should not stop there. We should support and encourage the sentiments expressed in this resolution in favor of dialogue, not only among Abrahamic religions but among all religions.

While there is much work still to be done to reach our goals, I again want to thank Mr. Ellison and Mr. Wamp for this resolution that points the way towards developing societies, in the words of the resolution, based on peace, reconciliation and on a commitment to tolerance.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to a cosponsor of the resolution, to a gentleman who brought it to my attention some months ago. He is the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison).

Mr. Speaker, with great appreciation to both of the sponsors of this resolution, I yield back the remainder of our time.

Madam Speaker, on July 15, the Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, was honored at the annual Tribute Dinner of the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, USGLC, for his leadership in supporting our Government's foreign affairs budget. The USGLC has been an important organization supporting adequate funding levels for the conduct of our country's foreign affairs and international assistance programs. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice introduced Secretary Gates and acknowledged his contributions.

In his remarks, Secretary Gates strongly advocated for a robust civilian capacity within the U.S. Government: ``When it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is--and is clearly seen to be--in a supporting role to civilian agencies.'' In order to further U.S. national security, Secretary Gates argued that our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development

must be adequately staffed and properly funded. It is a message that Secretary Gates has been giving to the American people and to our nation's leadership here in Washington.

I wholeheartedly agree with Secretary Gates' thoughtful statement and welcome his support for rebuilding the US civilian diplomatic and development capacity. Over the last four months, I have held a number of hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on reforming American foreign assistance programs and rebuilding our civilian capacity. We will be having another hearing on this issue in September.

Madam Speaker, the next Congress and the next Administration will have to take on the necessary, but difficult task of reforming our foreign assistance programs, and equally important, improving the diplomatic and development functions within our government. I look forward to this job that lies ahead of us.

Madam Speaker, I ask that the full text of Secretary Gates' remarks to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign be placed in The Record, and I urge my colleagues to give careful attention to the Secretary's thoughtful speech.

America's Voice for Security, Prosperity, and Humanitarian Values--

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at USGLC Tribute

Dinner, July 15, 2008

Thank you very much for the introductions. Thank you Condi

Rice for the kind words, and above all, for your principled

and visionary leadership of the Department of State.

One of the reasons I have rarely been invited to lecture in

political science departments--including at Texas A&M--is

because faculty correctly suspect that I would tell the

students that what their textbooks say about government does

not describe the reality I have experienced in working for

seven presidents. Organization charts, institutions,

statistics, structures, regulations, policies, committees,

and all the rest--the bureaucracy, if you will--are the

necessary pre-condition for effective government. But whether

or not it really works depends upon the people and their

relationships. For significant periods since I entered

government 42 years ago, the Secretary of State and Secretary

of Defense were not on speaking terms. The fact that Condi

and I actually get along means that our respective

bureaucracies understand that trying to provoke us to fight

with one another is not career-enhancing. Such efforts still

occur, of course. After all, this is Washington. But the

bureaucratic battles are a good deal more covert.

Of course, the human side of government is always a source

of both humor and embarrassment. Will Rogers once said, ``I

don't make jokes. I just watch the government and report the

facts.'' And the conduct of diplomacy, where--as Secretary

Rice can attest--protocol and propriety are so very

important, provides an especially fertile ground for

amusement.

For example, there was the time that President Nixon met

with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, shortly after Nixon

had appointed Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. With

Golda Meir in that meeting was her very erudite foreign

minister, Abba Eban, a graduate of Cambridge. At one point in

the meeting, Nixon turned to Golda Meir and said, ``Just

think, we now both have Jewish foreign ministers.'' And

without missing a beat Golda Meir said, ``Yes, but mine

speaks English.''

Then there was the time that President Nixon visited Italy

and had a meeting with the Pope. Kissinger and Nixon had

along with them Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, but they

decided that Laird as, in effect, secretary of war shouldn't

be invited to a meeting with the Pope. So, Nixon the next

morning went in for his private audience with the Pope, and

the other Americans waited outside for the general audience.

And who should come striding down the hall of the papal

apartments but Mel Laird smoking an enormous cigar, he had

decided he wanted in on the meeting. Kissinger was beside

himself, but finally said, ``Well, Mel, at least extinguish

the cigar.'' And so Laird stubbed out his cigar and put it in

his pocket.

The rest of the American party a few minutes later went in

to their meeting with the Pope, everyone took a seat. A

couple of minutes into the Pope's remarks, Kissinger heard

this little patting sound going on, he was in the second row

with Laird on the end, there was a wisp of smoke coming out

of Laird's pocket. Everything seemed under control. A couple

of minutes later, Kissinger heard this loud slapping noise.

He looked over smoke was billowing out of Laird's pocket. The

Secretary of Defense was on fire. Now the rest of the

delegation heard this slapping noise, and they thought they

were being cued to applaud the Pope. And so they did. And

Henry later told us, ``God only knows what his Holiness

thought, seeing the American secretary of defense immolating

himself, and the entire American party applauding the fact.''

I am honored to receive this award, and I consider it a

privilege to be associated with the United States Global

Leadership Campaign. It is a truly remarkable collection of

``strange bedfellows''--from Save the Children to

Caterpillar, from Catholic Relief Services to AIPAC, and even

Boeing and Northrop Grumman. This organization has been a

prescient, and often lonely, advocate for the importance

of diplomacy and international development to America's

vital national interests--and I commend you for that.

Though my views on these subjects have become better known

through recent speeches, in many ways they originated and

were reinforced by my prior experience in government during

the Cold War. Looking back, it is clear that the strength of

America's military forces and intelligence capabilities--

along with the willingness to use them--held the Soviets at

bay for more than four decades. But there was another side to

that story and to that struggle. There was the Agency for

International Development overseeing development and

humanitarian assistance programs that improved--if not

saved--the lives of millions of people from disease,

starvation, and poverty. Our diplomats forged relationships

and bonds of trust, and built up reservoirs of expertise and

goodwill that proved invaluable over time. Countless people

in foreign countries wandered into a United States

Information Agency library, or heard from a visiting speaker

and had their opinions about America transformed by learning

about our history and culture and values. Others behind the

Iron Curtain were inspired to resist by what they heard on

Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America.

In all, these non-military efforts--these tools of

persuasion and inspiration--were indispensable to the outcome

of the defining ideological struggle of the 20th century. I

believe that they are just as indispensable in the 21st

century--and maybe more so.

Just last month I approved a new National Defense Strategy

that calls upon us to ``Tap the full strength of America and

its people''--military and civilian, public and private--to

deal with the challenges to our freedom, prosperity, and

security around the globe.

In the campaign against terrorist networks and other

extremists, we know that direct military force will continue

to have a role. But over the long term, we cannot kill or

capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls

``kinetic'' operations should be subordinate to measures to

promote participation in government, economic programs to

spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that

often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the

discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take

the patient accumulation of quiet successes over time to

discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.

We also know that over the next 20 years and more certain

pressures--population, resource, energy, climate, economic,

and environmental--could combine with rapid cultural, social,

and technological change to produce new sources of

deprivation, rage, and instability. We face now, and will

inevitably face in the future, rising powers discontented

with the international status quo, possessing new wealth and

ambition, and seeking new and more powerful weapons. But,

overall, looking ahead, I believe the most persistent and

potentially dangerous threats will come less from ambitious

states, than failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs--

much less the aspirations--of their people.

In my travels to foreign capitals, I have been struck by

the eagerness of so many foreign governments to forge closer

diplomatic and security ties with the United States--ranging

from old enemies like Vietnam to new partners like India.

Nonetheless, regard for the United States is low among the

populations of many key nations--especially those of our

moderate Muslim allies.

This is important because much of our national security

strategy depends upon securing the cooperation of other

nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our

efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The

solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by

trying to out-propagandize al-Qaeda, but rather through the

steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust

and credibility over time.

To do all these things, to truly harness the ``full

strength of America,'' as I said in the National Defense

Strategy, requires having civilian institutions of diplomacy

and development that are adequately staffed and properly

funded. Due to the leadership of Secretary Rice and before

her Secretary Powell, and with the continuing strong support

of the President, we have made significant progress towards

pulling ourselves out of the hole created not only by the

steep cutbacks in the wake of the Cold War--but also by the

lack of adequate resources for the State Department and the

entire foreign affairs account going back decades.

Since 2001, international affairs spending has about

doubled, State has begun hiring again, billions have been

spent to fight AIDS and malaria in Africa, the Millennium

Challenge Corporation is rewarding better governance in the

developing world, and Secretary Rice has launched a program

of transformational diplomacy to better posture the

diplomatic corps for the realities of this century. The

President's budget request this year, as Condi said, includes

more than 1,100 new Foreign Service officers, as well as a

response corps of civilian experts that can deploy on short

notice. And, for the first time in a long time, I sense real

bipartisan support in Congress for strengthening the civilian

foreign affairs budget.

Shortfalls nonetheless remain. Much of the total increase

in the international affairs budget has been taken up by

security costs and offset by the declining dollar, leaving

little left over for core diplomatic operations. These

programs are not well understood or appreciated by the wider

American

public, and do not have a ready-made political constituency

that major weapons systems or public works projects enjoy. As

a result, the slashing of the President's international

affairs budget request has too often become an annual

Washington ritual--right up there with the blooming of the

cherry blossoms and the Redskins' opening game.

As someone who once led an agency with a thin domestic

constituency, I am familiar with this dilemma. Since arriving

at the Pentagon I've discovered a markedly different budget

dynamic--not just in scale but the reception one gets on the

Hill. Congress often asks the military services for lists of

things that they need, but that the Defense Secretary and the

President were too stingy to request. As you can imagine,

this is one congressional tasking that prompts an immediate

and enthusiastic response.

It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of

diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned

and underfunded for far too long--relative to what we spend

on the military, and more important, relative to the

responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the

world. I cannot pretend to know the right dollar amount--I

know it's a good deal more than the one percent of the

federal budget that it is right now. But the budgets we are

talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of

government, a steep increase of these capabilities is well

within reach--as long as there is the political will and

wisdom to do it.

But even as we agree that more resources are needed, I

believe that there is more to this problem than how much

money is in the 150 Account. The challenge we face is how

best to integrate these tools of statecraft with the

military, international partners, and the private sector.

Where our government has been able to bring America's

civilian and the military assets together to support local

partners, there have been incredibly promising results. One

unheralded example, one you will not read about in the

newspapers, is in the Philippines. There the U.S.

Ambassador--Kristie Kenney--has overseen a campaign involving

multiple agencies working closely together with their

Philippine counterparts in a synchronized effort that has

delegitimized and rolled back extremists in Mindanao. Having

a strong, well-supported chief of mission has been crucial to

success.

The vastly larger, more complex international effort in

Afghanistan presents a different set of challenges. There are

dozens of nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities,

development banks, the United Nations, the European Union,

NATO--all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty,

a bumper opium crop, and a ruthless and resilient insurgency.

Getting all these different elements to coordinate operations

and share best practices has been a colossal--and often all

too often unsuccessful--undertaking. The appointment this

spring of a UN special representative to coordinate civilian

reconstruction in Afghanistan is an important step forward.

And at the last NATO defense ministerial, I proposed a

civilian-military planning cell for Regional Command South to

bring unity to our efforts in that critically important part

of the country. And I asked Kai Eide, when I met with him

last week, to appoint a representative to participate in this

cell.

Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq--forced regime change

followed by nation-building under fire--probably is unlikely

in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, even a

certainty, is the need to work with and through local

governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next

failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.

Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the

United States armed forces has shifted--away from solely

focusing on direct American military action, and towards new

capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that

obviate the need for military intervention in the future.

This approach forms the basis of our near-term planning and

influences the way we develop capabilities for the future.

This perspective also informed the creation of Africa

Command, with its unique interagency structure, a deputy

commander who is an ambassador not a general, as well as

Southern Command's new orientation and priorities in Latin

America.

Overall, even outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the United

States military has become more involved in a range of

activities that in the past were perceived to be the

exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations.

This has led to concern among many organizations--perhaps

including many represented here tonight--about what's seen as

a creeping ``militarization'' of some aspects of America's

foreign policy.

This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment. As a career

CIA officer I watched with some dismay the increasing

dominance of the defense 800 pound gorilla in the

intelligence arena over the years. But that scenario can be

avoided if--as is the case with the intelligence community

today--there is the right leadership, adequate funding

of civilian agencies, effective coordination on the

ground, and a clear understanding of the authorities,

roles, and understandings of military versus civilian

efforts, and how they fit, or in some cases don't fit,

together.

We know that at least in the early phases of any conflict,

contingency, or natural disaster, the U.S. military--as has

been the case throughout our history--will be responsible for

security, reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and

public services. I make it a point to reinforce this message

before military audiences, to ensure that the lessons learned

and re-learned in recent years are not forgotten or again

pushed to the margins. Building the security capacity of

other nations through training and equipping programs has

emerged as a core and enduring military requirement, though

none of these programs go forward without the approval of the

Secretary of State.

In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy,

and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit

the neat organizational charts of the 20th century. All the

various elements and stakeholders working in the

international arena--military and civilian, government and

private--have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone

to work together and achieve results.

For example, many humanitarian and international

organizations have long prided themselves on not taking sides

and avoiding any association with the military. But as we've

seen in the vicious attacks on Doctors Without Borders in

Afghanistan, and the U.N. Mission in Iraq, violent extremists

care little about these distinctions.

To provide clearer rules of the road for our efforts, the

Defense Department and ``InterAction''--the umbrella

organization for many U.S.-based NGOs--have, for the first

time, jointly developed guidelines for how the military and

NGOs should relate to one another in a hostile environment.

The Pentagon has also refined its guidance for humanitarian

assistance to ensure that military projects are aligned with

wider U.S. foreign policy objectives and do not duplicate or

replace the work of civilian organizations.

Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement

with the rest of the world, you probably don't hear this

often from a Secretary of Defense, it is important that the

military is--and is clearly seen to be--in a supporting role

to civilian agencies. Our diplomatic leaders--be they in

ambassadors' suites or on the seventh floor of the State

Department--must have the resources and political support

needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in

leading American foreign policy.

The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new

realities while preserving those core competencies and

institutional traits that have made them so successful in the

past. The Foreign Service is not the Foreign Legion, and the

United States military should never be mistaken for the Peace

Corps with guns. We will always need professional Foreign

Service officers to conduct diplomacy in all its dimensions,

to master local customs and culture, to negotiate treaties,

and advance American interests and strengthen our

international partnerships. And unless the fundamental nature

of humankind and of nations radically changes, the need--and

will to use--the full range of military capabilities to

deter, and if necessary defeat, aggression from hostile

states and forces will remain.

In closing, I am convinced, irrespective of what is

reported in global opinion surveys, or recounted in the

latest speculation about American decline, that around the

world, men and women seeking freedom from despotism, want,

and fear will continue to look to the United States for

leadership.

As a nation, we have, over the last two centuries, made our

share of mistakes. From time to time, we have strayed from

our values; on occasion, we have become arrogant in our

dealings with other countries. But we have always corrected

our course. And that is why today, as throughout our history,

this country remains the world's most powerful force for

good--the ultimate protector of what Vaclav Havel once called

``civilization's thin veneer.'' A nation Abraham Lincoln

described as mankind's ``last, best hope.''

For any given cause or crisis, if America does not lead,

then more often than not, what needs to be done simply won't

get done. In the final analysis, our global responsibilities

are not a burden on the people or on the soul of this nation.

They are, rather, a blessing.

Thank you for this award and I salute you for all that you

do--for America, and for humanity.

Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6456) to provide for extensions of certain authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes, as amended.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The legislation before the House today extends certain expiring authorities of the Department of State. A couple of examples. The bill continues the Department's ability to hire experienced retired officer to fill positions in Iraq or Afghanistan. This bill extends two broadcasting authorities, Radio Free Asia for an additional year and the authority to hire personal service contractors in the United States for specialized language and other skills, and several other technical provisions involving those authorities.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, has the gentleman yielded back his time?

I yield back.