Floor Statements

Mr. President, I join my colleagues, Senators Smith, Dodd, DeWine, and Reid, to discuss the Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act which will be introduced today. I thank and commend them.

I particularly commend Senator Gordon Smith. We are here today literally because he has worked tirelessly to bring this legislation to the Senate floor, to work with us and to advocate strenuously that this legislation come to the floor of the Senate today. It is rightfully designated the Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act.

Garrett, unfortunately, struggled for years and sadly took his own life last September. We heard this afternoon the heartfelt words of his father talking about this wonderful young man. We all sense that as Garrett struggled, he did it with loving and caring parents.

As my colleague Senator DeWine pointed out, the Smiths have taken their pain and transformed it into purposeful action to ensure that other families and other young people do not have to suffer and endure even today the pain that lingers at the loss of this fine young man, and I thank the Senator for his leadership and for his decent and gallant heart.

We are here today because we are responding to an extraordinary problem, a problem that seems to many of us to be difficult to comprehend: why a young person, in the prime of life, with so much ahead, would take their own life.

Sadly, suicide takes the lives of over 4,000 children and young adults each year. It is now the third leading cause of death among 10 to 24 year olds in America. The rate of suicide has tripled from 1952 to 1995. Yet despite the astounding statistics, we still do not fully understand what is driving so many young people to the extreme of taking their own life.

What we hope to achieve with this legislation is to show them that there is an answer, that suicide is not the way out, that there is help for whatever is troubling them, and that they can live lives that are full, happy, and complete.

A Chronicle of Higher Education survey found that rates for depression in college freshmen are on the rise. Without treatment, the Chronicle points out, depressed adolescents are at risk for social failure, social isolation, promiscuity, self-medication with drugs and alcohol, and suicide. That is a description of failure, not a description of successful living.

A 2003 Gallagher's Survey of Counseling Center Directors found that 85 percent of counseling centers on college campuses are reporting an increase in the number of students in need of services.

Mr. President, 81 percent were concerned that increasing numbers of students are there with severe psychological problems; 67 percent reported a need for more psychiatric services, and 63 percent reported problems with growing demand for services without an appropriate increase in resources. That is why, working with Senator DeWine, working with my colleagues Senator Dodd and Senator Smith, we have incorporated in this act support for college counseling centers. It is not coincidental that Garrett was beginning his first year at the University of Utah, had left home, was in a new environment, was struggling with all of the powerful forces of independence and of change young people experience when they go off to school. That is a particularly vulnerable time.

We understand college is a time of great intellectual development, but it is also a time of extraordinary personal and interpersonal growth and change. When children go off to college, we need to make sure they have the support they need during this critical transitional period.

Additionally, there are many adults going to college and they have a particular dilemma of balancing their studies with their family responsibilities. Yet campus after campus lacks the resources to support their counseling staffs to deal with these real issues, these real psychological issues.

Part of what we seek to do through the Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act is ensure colleges and universities around the country have the resources to reach out to students, to provide essential mental and behavioral health services, and to educate families about potential signs of trouble.

Part of this process is not only treating the youngster, it is making parents aware of these signs so they can intervene successfully and in a timely fashion. Our colleges and universities are struggling to address the wide range of problems experienced by students--drug and alcohol problems, eating disorders, depression, schizophrenia, suicide attempts. With insufficient resources, many schools offer limited or very cursory services to students. We hope to begin to change that with this legislation.

We hope through this legislation to begin to shine a light on the growing problem of youth suicide. This legislation provides resources and technical assistance to States to develop and implement robust early intervention and suicide prevention strategies across the Nation. It also seeks to address the overwhelming need for mental and behavioral health services on college campuses, as I have discussed. This is an important bipartisan measure and a tribute, a fitting tribute to Garrett and to the faith and dedication and decency of the Smith family, Gordon and Sharon.

I again express my thanks to Senator Dodd and Senator DeWine. When you look at legislation in this body that attempts to provide practical support and help to young people, you usually find two names on the legislation--Dodd and DeWine. It is always a privilege to join these gentlemen.

I also want to thank Senator Harry Reid, who spoke movingly of his own experience, the death of his father through suicide. Senator Don Nickles similarly gave a moving tribute to Sharon and Gordon. Let me also thank Dr. Harsh Trivedi, a fellow in my office, a psychiatrist who is now on a fellowship up in Boston. He did most of the work on the Campus Care and Counseling Act, which is the legislation incorporated in this act. I also thank Lisa German of my staff, who does so much to help us on these issues, and also Catherine Finley on Senator Smith's staff, who has been of remarkable help and assistance.

Let me thank the leadership, Senator Daschle, Senator Frist, Senator Reid, Senator Nickles, because they let us bring this bill to the floor today to move forward to pass it.

This is an example of the kind of work we can do when we work together, the kind of work the American people demand of us. It is, as I said, a fitting tribute to Garrett and I hope an enduring tribute to his father who worked so hard to get it to the floor today and to pass it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise today with my colleagues, my fellow Rhode Islanders, and our Cape Verdean community in celebration of Cape Verde Independence Day.

Every country is rich with its own history and unique story of how it achieved democracy, and Cape Verde is no exception. In 1462, Portuguese settlers arrived at Santiago and founded the first permanent European settlement city in the tropics. In 1951, Portugal changed Cape Verde's status from a colony to an overseas province in an attempt to blunt growing nationalism. Five years later, a group of Cape Verdeans, led by Amilcar Cabral, and a group from neighboring Guinea-Bissau organized the clandestine African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, PAIGC, demanding improvements in economic, social, and political conditions in Cape Verde and Portuguese Guinea. This important action formed the basis of the 2 nations' independence movements.

By 1972, the PAIGC controlled much of Portuguese Guinea despite the presence of the Portuguese troops, but did not disrupt Portuguese control in Cape Verde. It was not until the April 1974 revolution in Portugal that the PAIGC and Portugal signed an agreement providing for a transitional government composed of Portuguese and Cape Verdeans. On June 30, 1975, Cape Verdeans elected a national assembly, which received the instruments of independence from Portugal on July 5, 1975, making it the official national day of independence.

For its first 15 years of independence, Cape Verde was ruled by one party. Then in 1990, opposition groups came together to form the Movement for Democracy. Working together they ended the 1-party state and the first multi-party elections were held in January 1991.

Cape Verde enjoys a stable democratic system where 4 parties share seats in the National Assembly. It is an example to other nations as to what can be accomplished. These democratic changes meant better global integration as the government has pursued market-oriented economic policies and welcomed foreign investors.

Today there are close to 350,000 Cape Verdean-Americans living in the United States, almost equal to the population of Cape Verde itself. These Americans hold a special right since the Cape Verdean Constitution formally considers all Cape Verdeans at home and abroad as citizens and voters. Thus, July 5th is a day of independence for all Cape Verdean-Americans as well as those in Cape Verde.

Recently we celebrated the independence of our own country, reflecting on the personal sacrifices many have made to ensure our own freedom and democracy. It is fitting we do the same with Cape Verde and I urge my colleagues to join me in wishing all those with direct and ancestral ties to Cape Verde a happy Independence Day.

Mr. President, last week, the Senate by a vote of 94 to 3, passed the Reed-Hagel-McCain amendment to increase the Army's end strength by 20,000.

This overwhelming vote was an acknowledgement that the administration has consistently underestimated and tried to avoid publicly admitting the real number of troops needed to win the peace in Iraq. That amendment was one step to bring our Iraq policy in line with the realities of Iraq.

However, the Defense authorization bill and the Defense appropriations bill before us today both continue to sidestep the budgetary realities of our military involvement in Iraq. Just 2 days ago, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz testified that ``it's entirely possible'' that U.S. troops could be stationed in Iraq for years.

If a long-term deployment of U.S. troops is ``entirely possible'', then the administration and Congress have a duty to properly budget for it.

When we know we are adding more troops and we know that we have significant commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Colombia, and elsewhere, we should put those costs into the annual Defense appropriations bill, not a supplemental appropriations bill or a contingency fund as the administration calls it.

By making these known costs subject to supplemental appropriations, we not only pretend that these costs are not long term, we also create an ongoing budget problem for the Army. This situation is all the more shocking when one considers the consistent claims from both sides of the aisle that we will provide our military with whatever it needs to win the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, since the Iraq war began, the Army has had to continuously cobble together the resources to pay for more troops out of its regular budget. So instead of replacing or repairing destroyed equipment, buying HUMVEEs or body armor, or fulfilling other obligations, the Army has had to eat its seed corn.

It is true that the Army has also gotten supplemental funds on occasion to pay for additional soldiers, but only after it has exhausted all of the reprogramming options I just mentioned.

In the short run, reprogramming and supplemental appropriations are an option, but Iraq, Afghanistan and Korea are not options. They are real, and the pressure on the Army's budget is real. Unless, we increase the size of the Army's regularly appropriated budget to include the costs of the Army's real personnel levels, I fear that the Army will continue to delay needed expenditures, put off necessary investments, all so the administration can attempt to minimize the costs of the war on terror.

I want to be clear, this is not the fault of the Appropriations Committee. It has done its job well and has continually worked to make the Army whole. But, the committee and the bill before us are constrained by the administration's inflexibility and demands that known, long-term costs must be hidden in contingency reserve accounts and other budgetary maneuvers.

It would be my desire to increase the size of the Army's personnel budget by moving the $2 billion in supplemental funds for this very purpose into the Army's annual fiscal year 2005 appropriation. I believe it would be more appropriate to take the $2 billion we know we'll spend out of the supplemental section of this bill and put it into the Army's regular budget just like all of the Army's other long term costs.

In deference to the chairman and ranking member and the fact that such a proposal would likely require waiving the Budget Act as well as the Senate's endorsement of my amendment and Senator Levin's amendment that calls on the administration to put the true costs of Army end strength in its fiscal year 2006 budget request, I did not offer this amendment.

However, if the administration persists in trying to sweep these costs under the rug, Congress must act to include these funds in the regular budget of the Army.

I am also concerned that this year's bill has consolidated the Peer Reviewed Cancer Research Program under a single line item. While the peer review programs are united in their goal of improving detection, treatment and hopefully one day, prevention of deadly diseases such as leukemia, prostate, ovarian and breast cancer, they are each unique in their design, focus and stage of development. However, there is a valid concern that placing these programs under a single line item may inevitably pit them against one another. The fledgling Ovarian Cancer Research Program, which was only established in 1997 and has been level funded at $10 million per year, will be competing with the much larger breast cancer program that has been in operation for over 12 years and is funded at a healthy $150 million.

I hope that I and other Senators can work with the Chairman and ranking member to find a way to protect the critical and specific health research on cancer that the Department of Defense has been able to support in the past.

Mr. President, I rise as an original cosponsor of the Improving Access to Assistive Technology for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2004. This important legislation reauthorizes the Assistive Technology, AT, Act, which helps States strengthen their capacity to address the assistive technology needs of individuals with disabilities and supports loan and device demonstration programs, for six years.

This legislation improves current law in several ways which will help individuals with disabilities gain access to the assistive technology devices and services that will help them lead full and productive lives. Importantly, the legislation removes the sunset provision included in the last reauthorization and increases the minimum State allotment to $500,000, ensuring that all States can continue this vital work. Assistive technology devices and services are increasingly necessary, particularly as our population ages and for soldiers returning from battle with injuries that used to be life ending.

I am particularly pleased that this legislation contains language I sought to address areas of need that I heard from assistive technology users, providers, advocates, and administrators in my State of Rhode Island. First, the bill enhances training activities to improve the capacity of local education,

early intervention, adult providers, and employers to assess, implement, and integrate AT devices. Secondly, funding is authorized for inventing and developing new AT devices and adapting, maintaining, servicing, and improving existing AT devices. Finally, the bill makes great strides to promote interagency coordination and collaboration to effectively deliver assistive technology devices and services.

I want to thank Senators Gregg, Kennedy, and Harkin for working so closely with me and my staff on this bill. It is my hope that we will be able to maintain this same cooperative, bipartisan spirit in which this bill was crafted as the reauthorization process moves forward.

Mr. President, I rise as an original cosponsor of the Improving Access to Assistive Technology for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2004. This important legislation reauthorizes the Assistive Technology, AT, Act, which helps States strengthen their capacity to address the assistive technology needs of individuals with disabilities and supports loan and device demonstration programs, for six years.

This legislation improves current law in several ways which will help individuals with disabilities gain access to the assistive technology devices and services that will help them lead full and productive lives. Importantly, the legislation removes the sunset provision included in the last reauthorization and increases the minimum State allotment to $500,000, ensuring that all States can continue this vital work. Assistive technology devices and services are increasingly necessary, particularly as our population ages and for soldiers returning from battle with injuries that used to be life ending.

I am particularly pleased that this legislation contains language I sought to address areas of need that I heard from assistive technology users, providers, advocates, and administrators in my State of Rhode Island. First, the bill enhances training activities to improve the capacity of local education,

early intervention, adult providers, and employers to assess, implement, and integrate AT devices. Secondly, funding is authorized for inventing and developing new AT devices and adapting, maintaining, servicing, and improving existing AT devices. Finally, the bill makes great strides to promote interagency coordination and collaboration to effectively deliver assistive technology devices and services.

I want to thank Senators Gregg, Kennedy, and Harkin for working so closely with me and my staff on this bill. It is my hope that we will be able to maintain this same cooperative, bipartisan spirit in which this bill was crafted as the reauthorization process moves forward.

Mr. President, I yield myself 8 minutes.

My amendment would condition the acquisition of interceptors 21 through 30 for the ground-based midcourse national missile defense system on the implementation of operational evaluation and testing under the auspices of the director of testing in the Pentagon.

I will try to give a brief explanation of where we are with this system that is to be deployed. It is a combination of existing elements and some brandnew technology. The existing elements, first, the defense support system, a satellite system, is a cold war system designed to pick up the initial lift-off of missiles. That is in place. Then there is a group of Aegis ships that are out around the potential threat area of North Korea. That is a relatively new application of these ships. They were designed to intercept and detect cruise missiles and aircraft. Now we are attempting to expand that to track, at least partially, the flight path of an ICBM coming from a threat, specifically North Korea. Then there is the Cobra Dane radar, an older radar system. It is not particularly well adapted at discriminating, so it is therefore not the best radar we could have. The administration has canceled the X-band radar system, which is better. Then there are the interceptors with the kill vehicles on top.

The subject of this amendment is the interceptors. For many years, this ground-based system was designed to deploy 20 interceptors. Today, we are taking five for this deployment. But 20 was a rather significant number for technology that has not yet been proven. What the administration did this year is say, well, we want to go beyond that 20; we want 40. We want to buy 10 more, 21 through 30, and have long lead-time acquisition funds for 31 through 40. Well, the Congress in its wisdom already terminated the long lead time for 21 through 40, but we still have to budget this money for 21 through 30.

I don't propose to take that money away. I want to simply fence it, make as a condition to spend that money that this system will begin testing and evaluation. We had a vigorous debate about imposing this operational testing scheme. The result was now the Secretary of Defense is required to promulgate some criteria for operational testing and conduct these tests by October of 2005.

My amendment differs, and I think significantly so. It says we cannot depend upon the Defense Secretary's criteria and evaluation--a self- evaluation by the Missile Defense Agency. We need to get this program back into the traditional system of operational testing and evaluation, which is conducted by an independent agency in the Pentagon which designs, supervises the tests, and makes sure the tests will do what we want to do: deliver to the field a system that actually works. I don't think it is unreasonable. In fact, I think it is entirely appropriate to say that before we buy these additional interceptors--10 more--we are at least in a situation where this rudimentary system has been entered into operational testing.

Let me specifically highlight the issue of the interceptors. The operation of the interceptor and kill vehicle is brand new. Neither has been tested in an interceptor test. We have not tried to fly them with a kill vehicle even against a target. Yet we are buying 10 more of them. It would be prudent to say let's wait and at least do a few tests with these new interceptors and kill vehicles. The new version of the kill vehicle, by the way, where the warhead would actually impact the incoming enemy missile, has never even been flight tested. We don't know what it will look like. In fact, problems with the kill vehicle have delayed the scheduled flight test from March until July 31 of this year; and, frankly, we are weeks away from that and it is entirely plausible that this would be delayed even further. So we are deploying a system in which we have not yet even tested in flight one of the most critical aspects of the system, let alone the fact that the rest of the system has been cobbled together by existing pieces of technology being used in new ways.

That is a strong argument, in my mind, to say how serious are we about saying this is deployment. But it is more compelling, in my mind, to say at some point we have to get operational testing and evaluation--not some improvised form by the Secretary of Defense being implemented by the Missile Defense Agency but a traditional system where the director of test and evaluation at the Pentagon does evaluation and testing. This amendment would do that. It would take no money away. It would simply say we cannot spend the money on the next 10 interceptors--21 through 30--until we have entered the traditional mode of operational test and evaluation. This amendment makes a great deal of sense. There are examples of how useful operational testing is.

The Patriot PAC-3 system--probably the closest analogy to this, even though it is a theater missile system--is designed to go against targets that are not as fast and don't leave the atmosphere. But it is the same hit-to-kill technology. In fact, I was bemused years ago when they would show the film clips of how successful we are in this new technology, and they would use PAC-3 film clips about the hit-to-kill technology.

The PAC-3 system was being tested developmentally. Then it went into operational testing and it failed four consecutive operational tests against a realistic target, one in which you try to simulate the conditions of battlefield use. Even though it was successful in the developmental tests, it failed four consecutive operational tests.

Why are we buying missiles today that have the potential of duplicating the PAC-3 experience? Frankly, we could be in the unenviable position where the first time we try to fly this against a potentially real target, it fails. We have to have operational testing and the PAC-3 is a very good example. These operational tests are extremely useful in finally coming up with a system that is much more reliable.

So, as a result, I urge my amendment strongly. It doesn't take the money away. It simply lays out as a condition that we not spend it until we at least have operational testing. By the way, we are already buying 20 missiles.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. President, it actually did lead to changes in the operational use of the system, and those changes were very valuable once deployed in a combat situation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute.

I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute.

I respect the chairman and the chairman of the subcommittee who have engaged in this debate. The question to me is: Will this system work? We really do not know if it will work. If we do not know it is going to work, why are we buying 10 additional interceptors at a price of about $500 million?

So this is not the same amendment, the amendment written over and over again. This is an amendment about scarce resources--will we devote them to these interceptors that are untested or will we devote them to other issues?

I point out that there is nothing in this amendment that slows up the program. There is nothing in this amendment that would take away funds. It simply says, let us get into an operational testing mode before we buy these additional systems.

Final point. This system has been plagued by delays, but they are technological delays. The reason we are not having a test--we did not have one in March, and we are having it in July--is because this kill vehicle is not ready for such testing. There is nothing about our amendment or about our procedures. This is a hard technology, but let us make sure it works.

I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Corzine be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues Senators Warner, Levin, Gregg, Hollings and McCain for working with Senator Kohl and I on this important amendment preserving the Manufacturing Extension Partnership, MEP, Program. I particularly want to thank Senators Hollings and Gregg for their strong support of the MEP Program and their efforts to restore funding to a program that is vital to our Nation's small manufacturers. I look forward to working with them this year to ensure funding is restored in fiscal year 2005.

Senator Kohl and my amendment clarifies that the Secretary of Commerce has the ability to transfer and reprogram $21.8 million to the MEP Program this fiscal year in order to assist our nation's small manufacturers. Senator Gregg, Hollings, Kohl and I believe that the Secretary already has the ability to transfer and reprogram this funding; however, rather than honor the request of 55 Senators and work with the Senate and Congress to help reprogram funds, the Department of Commerce has chosen to hide behind a legal interpretation that it lacks such authority.

Small manufacturers have a direct impact on national security. Small manufacturers are the backbone of our defense production capacities. Firms with fewer than 500 employees comprise more than 80 percent of the defense supply chains. Small businesses are responsible for a significant share of defense contracting. They receive 21 percent of prime contracts and 41 percent of the subcontracts awarded to businesses by, or on behalf of, the Department of Defense.

The National Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing in a 2002 report identified five key challenges that confront the defense industrial base. First, the loss of small and medium-sized firms that participate in the defense supply chain is taking its toll on our Nation's defense readiness as many makers of components and spare parts for the larger defense contractors have left the marketplace or are ill-prepared to respond to swift increases in orders. There is no known source of supply for over 11,000 products used by the Department of Defense. Second, our Nation needs to maintain sufficient surge production capacity to meet unanticipated national defense needs. The production of platform systems, components and munitions is constrained by the surge capacity of prime contractors and the capabilities of the supplier base. Being able to provide for these defense needs is vital to our military. Third, outdated and aging manufacturing systems and processes are involved in the production of major weapon systems. The need for quality and technology improvements along with increased productivity and cost reduction makes the shortage of capable small manufacturers more problematic. Fourth, large defense companies often have the knowledge and resources to make investments in productivity and efficiency improvements; however, small manufacturers frequently lack the necessary technical knowledge, staff and resources to take advantage of new techniques and technology. Lastly, to increase participation in defense production, small manufacturers need assistance adapting commercial production practices and techniques to the needs of the defense industrial base.

The MEP program can help our Nation address these challenges. MEP Centers have a strong track record of solving supply management issues. MEP helps preserve and strengthen domestic production of unique defense technologies and provides a strong strategic edge over threats to national security. MEP is active within U.S. defense supply chains assisting small sub-tier suppliers to cut costs, boost productivity, integrate technology and accelerate delivery times. Officials from Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon expressed their reliance on MEP for cost and quality improvements at small manufacturing firms on which they rely for component parts and assemblies.

To date, the actions of the Department of Commerce have been unacceptable. The administration needs to make resources available to help our Nation's small manufacturers. The administration should immediately reprogram $21.8 million to support the MEP Centers this year as directed by Senator Kohl and my amendment. Given the broad bipartisan and national support for this program, the administration should send a Budget Amendment to Congress to support $106.9M for the MEP program in fiscal 2005.

fuel cell program

Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate passed legislation, H.R. 3942, earlier this month to redesignate the U.S. Post Office in Middletown the ``Rhode Island Veterans Post Office Building,'' and I thank Congressman Patrick Kennedy for introducing this important legislation in the House of Representatives. I recognize the important contributions and sacrifices that our military veterans have made for our country. The celebration of the 60th anniversary of the D-Day invasion at Normandy this month again highlighted the great sacrifices that our brave soldiers have made, and continue to make today in Afghanistan, Iraq and throughout the world. I am proud to support naming the U.S. Post Office in Middletown in their honor.

I call up amendment No. 3353.

I have no objections. I understand Senator Sessions also-- --

It is being reported right now.

Thank you.

Mr. President, I understand my amendment has been reported and we are on the amendment now. Let me endeavor to explain the amendment and do it as quickly as possible.

The amendment I support today would provide a condition on the acquisition of interceptors 21 through 30 of the national missile defense. The condition would be that the operational testing would be completed--or initiated, at least--prior to the acquisition of these missiles.

In a sense, it embraces two issues. The first issue is the unwise acquisition of another 10 missiles beyond the 20 that already have been designed for this initial rudimentary deployment of the national missile defense system. That issue is one. The second issue, again, is the issue of making sure we have realistic operational testing.

Yesterday we engaged in a very vigorous debate. I believe the debate was productive. My legislation, as amended by that of Chairman Warner, would require realistic testing. In fact, it set a date of October 1, 2005, to complete such testing. But I do believe it is important to once again look at this issue of testing, particularly in the context of the acquisition of these additional missile systems.

Initially, when the administration talked about the rudimentary deployment of a national missile defense system, they conceived of a system with 20 interceptors. Suddenly, this year, they have moved forward and added an additional 10 interceptors, interceptors 21 through 30. More than that, they requested an additional long lead time funding for interceptors 31 through 40.

That is an unwise use of very scarce resources at a time when we are trying to expand the size of the Army, when we are trying to do so many things that are putting huge pressure on the bottom line of the Department of Defense. It is unwise. We are talking about an extremely premature acquisition of missiles before we have ``proved out'' the system.

I was struck yesterday when Senator Allard submitted a letter from Thomas Christie, Director of the Office of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon. Dr. Christie said:

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is

currently at a maturity level that requires continued

developmental testing with oversight assistance from

operational test personnel. Conducting realistic operational

testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be

premature and not beneficial to the program.

We have the chief testing official in the Department of Defense saying this system is so immature that we cannot even do operational tests. Yet in this proposal, the administration is asking to go ahead and buy additional interceptors that have not yet been adequately proven and adequately tested. Once again, it is a misuse of very scarce resources.

I have no qualm today with acquiring the 20 interceptors initially planned for the system. But to go beyond that is a mistake in terms of using scarce resources for, basically, unproven interceptors.

It is useful to review the situation of this midcourse ground system and where we are in terms of the system. First, as I mentioned yesterday, one of the key elements is a DSP satellite system that will monitor the initial launch of a missile. That is from a cold war legacy system. It is reliable; it is limited. You simply identify the lift-off of the aggression missile.

The second part of the system is the Aegis ships which have been pressed into service. They were originally designed simply to track and to defend against cruise missiles and aircraft. Now they have been given this extra task of trying to monitor the target as it rises out of the North Korean peninsula headed toward--we hope never but at least hypothetically--the United States.

A third element is the Cobra Dane radar, another system of 1970 vintage, designed not for missile defense but for looking at Russian missiles and their missile rangers. It is not even capable, most people concede, of tracking effectively a missile bound for Hawaii. It has been upgraded but still it is not the X-band radar, the big powerful radar originally designed for the system.

Then there is the interceptors element which is the subject of this amendment. Originally, as I indicated, the plan was to have 20. Now the administration is talking about 40. The interceptors have not been tested together with the new ``kill'' vehicle. In fact, the new kill vehicle, the warhead that sits on top, has not even been flight tested. As a result, we are rushing into this deployment. In fact, the whole system has not been tested. So bits and pieces have been tested. It is premature to go ahead now and ramp up production of these missiles.

If it turns out there is a systematic flaw in the missiles, and they have been acquired and deployed, if they have not been worked on in the silo, they will have to be removed from the silo and transported. It is very expensive.

I beg the obvious question. If we have not tested the system adequately, if we are planning for years now to have a 20-interceptor structure of our missiles, why are we rushing ahead now and buying additional missiles? My amendment says, at least before we get to this point of buying the additional missiles, we should be in the area of planning and carrying out realistic operational testing.

Yesterday, again, we had a very good debate. We were able to make some progress. But I point out again, the amendment proposed by Senator Warner, and adopted to change my language, moves the responsibility from the Office of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Pentagon to the Secretary of Defense. It takes away that objective independent voice, which is the traditional way in which we evaluate any weapon system, not just the missile defense system.

I hope by the time we get around to making these acquisitions, acquiring interceptors 21 through 30 and 21 through 40, that we would not have the specialized testing regime under the Secretary of Defense, and that we would be back in a situation where we are doing operational testing the way it was designed and carried out.

That is the essence of my amendment. It would not in any way inhibit the deployment of the system. It would not in any way try to shrink the number below 20, which has been the plan for years. It would not decrease funding for missile defense. If this operational testing regime was in place, then these 21 through 30 interceptors could be acquired. It is really designed to first highlight and underscore the fact that we are rushing ahead, not just in terms of deployment but in actually building out this system way beyond what has been proven by testing; and, second, also, to emphasize the need for a thorough testing not beyond, frankly, what was required in yesterday's amendment.

Although I think yesterday's amendment was a good step forward, operational realistic testing by October 1 of 2005 is a very laudable goal. I hope we can follow through and carry it out.

Ultimately, we want to get the whole system back into the situation of practically every other major defense program; that is, before deploying the system, build the system, go to production, and that you have actually done operational testing, independent operational testing, supervised, conducted, monitored by Dr. Christie and his colleagues in the Defense Department Office of Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation.

One other point I make, in the discussion yesterday, there was some mention of how this system was going to protect us from threats around the world, including threats from Iran. This system is exclusively designed to protect from a missile launch from North Korea. It will provide no protection from a missile launch from any other point on the globe, as far as I can tell. It is not a comprehensive system defending the United States. It is a limited system focused on North Korea.

One can fairly ask, if North Korea is such a dangerous threat that requires this very hasty emergency deployment of a missile system, why are we withdrawing troops from North Korea, ground forces that could complement our diplomacy? We are we not taking aggressive diplomatic steps to try and disarm North Korea when they have made it clear they have nuclear material. They very well may have fashioned multiple nuclear weapons in the last year while we have been trying to negotiate but doing so unsuccessfully.

Again, this raises the whole question of how do you deal with these threats through this very expensive, very limited missile defense system or through other means complementing the development of the system. I argue, of course, that we have to be much more aggressive diplomatically with the North Korean situation; that we have to do it from a position of strength. That position is not enhanced when we take out troops.

I also suggest if we did that, we would have the time to develop this system properly, to declare it deployed--not now, but when we have had a test of the entire system, of all the elements, so that we know this system will work and it will work effectively.

An interesting final point I make is that in the discussion yesterday about operational testing, there was an example given about the Patriot system, which is the PAC-3 system. That is a complicated missile system, hit-to-kill technology, the same basic technology that will be employed in this national missile defense system.

We talk about this midcourse system. It did extremely well in all its developmental tests, and then it had operational tests. They had four consecutive operational test failures; that is the PAC-3.

Now, certainly we do not want a situation where the first operational test is the acquisition of an incoming missile from a hostile power, and we don't know if we are going to have the PAC-3 record of four failures in a row or we are going to do much better. I think that, essentially, is where we are today.

So my amendment, in summary, which will be disposed of next week, would condition the acquisition of interceptors 21 through 30--the new requirement that sprung up this year, after years of looking at 20--it would condition it on having operational testing according to the standard procedures that are in place in the Department of Defense.

With that, I yield the floor.

Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?

I want to understand and make sure that I am accurate. In reference to the system being deployed this September in Alaska, my understanding, which I stated, is that it would only provide coverage for essentially the North Korean threat. And then I heard you say the system--it might be in the future--but the system would cover all threats. My sense is that this system that will be deployed would cover North Korea.

I understand, as the system is eventually designed to be. But, if you will indulge me, I also understand that other radars have to be put in place beyond Cobra Dane, beyond the Aegis systems that they have not yet put in place. There are other elements that have to be in place for a more comprehensive system.

The other point on which I raise a question is the simple fact reflected in Mr. Christie's letter. This isn't a question of logic as much as technology. He seems to be saying the system is so premature or has a lack of maturity such that you can't do operational testing. I must say, I find it difficult, then, to say we can't do operational testing but we are going to put it in operation. That is the situation we face in September. But that is more of a comment than a question.

I thank the Senator for his kindness.

Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3354.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, I think if I could have an hour on my side.

I would not attempt to simply fill the hour. I would yield back time if we have reached a point where we have sufficiently discussed it.

If I may respond, it would be appropriate if we took an hour debating both the Reed first degree and the Warner second degree. At the conclusion of a vote on the Warner second-degree amendment, then there would be no time agreement entered into. It would be my intention to offer----

Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise to offer an amendment which would implement the recommendations of the General Accounting Office for missile defense testing and base alignment. Last month the GAO issued a report on missile defense entitled ``Missile Defense Actions Are Needed To Enhance Testing And Accountability.'' In its report, the GAO makes some commonsense recommendations to improve the testing of missile defense and to increase accountability of Congress for missile defense programming.

The principal recommendation is that at some point there is developed and executed a plan for operational testing. That is a very critical point. As the GAO pointed out, they would recommend to the Missile Defense Agency that they prepare for and conduct, on an independent basis, not within the purview of the Missile Defense Agency but on an independent basis, operationally realistic tests of those missile defenses. This is the way we develop and deploy major weapons systems in the United States. We do initial testing. We prove out the technologies. But before we field them, we go ahead and do a test on their operational capacities. That is the basic approach. It is a good approach, a sound approach. The GAO recommendations would make the missile defense programs consistent in this regard with all other programs.

The second aspect of the proposed amendment would be to require the Missile Defense Agency to require course baselines so that we know how much we are spending with respect to missile defense. We know what the course goals are. We know when they are exceeded or when they are constrained by good planning and good management. These are two fundamental aspects of any sound military procurement program.

Missile defense is one of the most complicated programs we will ever attempt to field in the history of this country.

I believe it is appropriate at this juncture to take a look at this missile defense system as it exists today. I think you will hopefully concur with

me that we do need some realistic operational testing.

First, this is the basic architecture of the system. The system we are deploying in Alaska is designed principally, if not exclusively, to counter one potential threat--the threat of a missile coming from North Korea. Now, the system is composed of several major elements. I will review them.

First is the DSP early warning satellite. This is a defense system that has been flying since the 1970s. It is well proven, but essentially all this system does is spot the lift-off of an enemy missile, or potential adversary missile, coming out of North Korea or anyplace else. It was put up in the 1970s as part of the cold war to identify a Russian missile or Chinese missile being ignited. That is a rather established technology. It provides just the cue that an enemy missile has been launched.

The next part of the proposed system is the Aegis ships. They have radar, but it was designed not to track ICBMs. Rather, it is to track cruise missiles and close-in aircraft. They are being essentially pushed into the role of trying to acquire the target after it lifts off and track it as far as it can. It really cannot track that far because of built-in limitations. Again, this version was not designed to track long-range ICBMs. Their radar doesn't seem to be powerful enough to protect and track accurately to places such as Hawaii. Also, these Aegis ships have never guided an interceptor to its target in a single intercept test. They have done preliminary activities but have not guided an interceptor to a target in a test. The operational tracking software of Aegis has never been tested in an integrated test. So you have one element that is still not quite up to the speed we would like it to be in terms of the Aegis system.

The next part is the Cobra Dane radar system in Alaska. Cobra Dane is another 1970s version. It has been updated, but it has no real discrimination capability in terms of determining what a missile warhead would be or what a decoy would be. It is incapable of tracking a North Korean missile bound for Hawaii. So, again, we have a problem in terms of providing coverage. It has never been used in an intercept test, and there are no plans to do so because we do not have an ICBM target that can fly in Cobra Dane's field of view. Then we were going to have to replace Cobra Dane and x-band radar on Shemya Island. We don't have the x-based, land-based system. We are working on a sea- based x-band radar, not primarily for operational use but for test use, to be ready in fiscal year 2005.

The final one is the interceptor with the kill vehicle on top. Both the interceptor and kill vehicle are brand-new, and neither have been tested together in an intercept test. The new version of the kill vehicle hasn't been flight tested at all. It is coming off of production. There are new systems within the kill vehicle. It is an improvement, we hope, over the previous prototypes but has not yet been flight tested. Problems with the kill vehicle are seen as delaying the next scheduled test. That is the IFT-13c. That test is being touted by the Missile Defense Agency as a fly-by. So the next test--the one before this system is declared deployable and deployed--is not designed to knock the missile down but to simply fly by it. If it does knock it down, I am sure the Missile Defense Agency will take great pleasure in it, with great claim. By declaring it just a fly-by, they will have wiggle room for saying the test succeeded and saying we didn't intend to knock it down either. Ask yourself, if we are deploying a missile system in a most recent test to fly by the missile, is that going to protect the U.S.? I don't think that is the case.

My amendment would require that we do operational testing, which is something done on every major system. It is under the purview of Dr. Tom Christie in the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense. He is charged by Congress with independently evaluating these systems on behalf of the Defense Department.

Some argue that we need to go ahead and deploy this system right away, that we have done it before, and that is fine. It turns out that we have deployed systems before in emergencies, such as the Predator in Kosovo in 1999. That system had already on the books operational testing plans. Indeed, when this emergency deployment was completed, that operational test was carried out the following year, 2000. This system is a rudimentary system with huge gaps in technology, which has never been fully tested on an integrated basis. None of these parts have been put together in one intercept test yet. This system has no plans for operational testing, which denies the obvious point of the custom and practice and the law in many cases.

The JSTAR surveillance system is another one which individuals will say was put into the fray before it was operationally tested. That is also true. In 1991, JSTARs were deployed in Desert Storm. Following the deployment, even though the Senate Armed Services Committee was so impressed that they wanted to deploy it without testing, the Air Force insisted upon operational testing. They found defects because of the testing. They completed the operational testing in 1995, and this testing revealed problems with respect to the inability to operate at the right altitude and inadequate mission reliability. These were corrected, so the JSTAR system is much more reliable today than it would have been without operational testing.

Once again, this system is untested in a systematic way, and it is not even scheduled for operational testing. The point of my amendment is not to delay or defer this deployment; it is simply to say at some point in time--some point when the Missile Defense Agency feels they are ready for operational testing--we should at least have operational testing. I believe that is absolutely critical.

There are examples now, too, of the tests that have been conducted. These suggest that the tests are not up to the level of operational testing. For example, for the tests conducted so far on this system, all of the targets have had beacons on them, telling the National Missile Defense Agency and the shooters, if you will, the exact location of the missiles coming in. I don't think anybody believes that an adversary would put a beacon on the missile to warn us. Those are the types of rudimentary tests taking place today. They are important tests but not operational tests. Indeed, I asked the Director of the MDA in March when we would stop using beacons on our target vehicles. He simply said he didn't know. That is not exactly the kind of realistic testing the General Accounting Office called for.

I mentioned Cobra Dane, which is the radar that is a critical piece. It will track this target for a long way, and it would hopefully be able to discriminate between decoys and the actual warheads. But we have, as I mentioned before, no plans to test this radar because we lack an appropriate testing vehicle, ICBM.

The other point, which is very important--and it goes to the heart of realistic testing--is that every intelligence analyst who looks at this problem has suggested that if a nation is capable of putting a nuclear device on a long-range missile, and particularly if they are so motivated to use it against us, they are likely to be just as capable of having sophisticated decoys or even rudimentary decoys on the missile.

We have never conducted tests against very sophisticated or even realistic decoys. As a result, we are prepared to deploy a system that has not been adequately tested. But more importantly, there are no plans to adequately test it.

My amendment would simply ask the Department of Defense, through the normal procedures, through the Office of Test and Evaluation, to prepare such plans and conduct those tests when appropriate.

These are just some of the examples I have given with respect to this particular system. There is a whole laundry list of what should be done to ensure that this system, when deployed, is appropriately ready for the challenge. This chart shows yes and no in terms of obvious parameters for a system that is about to be fielded. Most of the parameters have not been accomplished. In fact, the vast majority have not been accomplished.

There is no full system operational test. There are no tests, to my mind, that have integrated every part of this system, from Cobra Dane, the Aegis warships, to the interceptor with the new-kill vehicle with the new booster

attached and flying out and engaging a target.

There is no full system operational test scheduled. We are not talking about a situation where we have to wait a few months or a year and there is an operational test planned for. By the way, these operational tests are not something that can be done on 2 or 3 days' notice. These takes months and months to prepare and plan and are extremely costly.

I do not really know, because it is hard to figure out the budget for MDA, whether they have put aside money for operational testing. It is hard to tell. We are not even scheduling these tests.

It has not been tested in bad weather. It has not been tested at night. Experts in the field indicate that is a very important aspect of ensuring the system will work.

Again, I do not think there is any American who does not want to see a workable system in place, but we have to raise questions when we have not done the testing to assure the American public that this system will work and will work as it is designed to work.

Tested three-stage booster and intercept test: This new package of the booster and kill vehicle has not been tested yet.

Tested without interceptor knowing in advance warheads infrared and radar signature, I mentioned that before. All of the data of the enemy warhead is essentially given to the forces that are trying to engage it. That is not a realistic test.

It has not been tested against a tumbling warhead, when the warhead detaches from the boost vehicle and spinning. That has not been tested.

Tested against realistic decoys and countermeasures: Realistic decoys would be something that looked like a warhead; just one other body that looks like a warhead. We have not done that. The decoys that have been used to date have been large spheres that look completely unlike the warhead.

It has not been tested against complex decoys. These are much more sophisticated decoys. We certainly have not done that. We have not reached the realistic level, let alone the complex level.

It has not been tested against more than one warhead on a missile. Again, if there is a nation out there that is capable of producing a nuclear warhead and putting it on a missile, they are probably capable--it may take a little longer--of producing multiple warheads and putting them on a missile.

It has not been tested against more than one incoming missile. If North Korea is going to attack us, why would they do something that would spell doom, first because of our overwhelming power to deter them, but second, what makes us think they will fire just one missile at us? I would assume they would fire multiple missiles, and we have not tested against that.

Again I mention this, we have not tested this without a GPS system, a beacon on the adversary missile and warhead.

Tests have been conducted by the contractors and managers. That is the first ``yes'' accomplished.

Tests overseen by Pentagon's independent test office: No, and that is the core of our debate today, because looking at the chairman's amendment to my amendment, what they are essentially saying is: Listen, we do not want the independent tester to look at this; we want the Secretary of Defense to prescribe this. That is not the way to do this because it just invites all of the problems with individuals testing themselves.

This is not as much a technical problem as a problem of human nature. You tend to pass every test you give yourself, particularly if it is important you pass the test. That is why we set up, in the eighties, this Office of Test and Evaluation with an individual who is appointed by the President, not the Secretary of Defense, to conduct these tests.

SBIRS high early warning satellites: This will be the follow-on to the DSP satellites. SBIRS is not yet flying. The original plan was to have SBIRS in this system instead of the old DSP system.

SSTS space tracking and surveillance system: This is another system not in place.

Cobra Dane radar upgraded: Yes, it has been upgraded, but not the x- band radar contemplated for this system. It does not have the power of the x-band. Even with this upgrade, it is still not capable of the discrimination that you need to separate decoys from the warheads.

The ground-based x-band radar I mentioned is not deployed. It has been essentially canceled.

Sea-based x-band radar is being developed. It is not yet deployed.

Question: Will it protect Hawaii? It is a question because of the coverage of the Cobra Dane, because the fact the Aegis system is providing an important part of the tracking system.

Fly before you buy: We are certainly violating that. We are buying the system without flying. That is the fundamental problem we are facing today. Yet we are going to declare the system operational. We can argue about that, and we have. Senator Boxer had an amendment which talked to that specifically.

My amendment is not about deploying the system. My amendment is about conducting operational tests at some juncture. I believe this operational testing scheme has hit a nerve because, as I saw the chairman's substitute to my amendment, he basically said yes, we will do operational--in fact, he specifies a date. I believe it is October of 2005. That is pretty ambitious since we are not planning for any tests yet. It is also pretty ambitious since we do not have a suitable missile target vehicle that could fly from the vicinity of North Korea and go through the space in which Cobra Dane operates.

As a result, in a very short time, we would have to build a target missile, we would have to plan for the test, and we would have to integrate all these other pieces. Yet that is what the amendment offered by my colleague from Virginia would say.

The problem with the amendment is that it takes out of the loop the one person who is there to guarantee the independence, the rigor, and the accuracy of this test, and that is the Director of the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon. That is something I think is critical.

Again, given this list of items to be accomplished, it seems stunning to me that we are actually debating about whether we should just authorize and require at some point--and at this point, after deployment--operational testing, or at least to plan it. But that is the substance of the debate, and just as importantly, not just the operational testing, but the fact it is going to be conducted by an independent agency within the Pentagon, not by the people who are graded by whether they pass or fail. Again, not high tech but human nature. I think more people are comfortable with having someone objectively design the test and supervise the test than having the people who have everything to lose and everything to gain do that.

There is one other aspect of my amendment I want to mention, which is important, and that is the notion of baselines. The GAO came back to us and said: No one seems to know how much the system is costing because there are no baselines.

They pointed out, for example, that there was a $1 billion overrun of the cost goal of missile defense to be fielded starting in September, but the Department of Defense never explained to Congress this overrun. Instead, they simply changed the cost goal.

How can we evaluate this system? How can we make difficult choices between investing in missile defense and increasing the end strength of our Army, if MDA suddenly says, well, our objective was X, but we found it cost us a billion dollars more, so now it is X plus one billion? We have to have a baseline. This is all designed to have appropriate control and appropriate notification to the Congress about the status of this very complex system.

Additionally, this cost goal change was surprising because the GAO also noted that originally the system in Alaska to be deployed in September was to have 10 interceptors, and now it is 5. So not only did they change the cost goal by increasing the amount of money they are spending, but they lowered the number of interceptors and also, I think by fair inference, the capability of the system. High cost, lower capability, but yet it was not communicated to us.

My amendment would ask them to prepare the baseline, to communicate to us when those baselines are exceeded. If we do not have that, then we will

not have the ability to do our job, which is to supervise appropriately and oversee the activities of the Missile Defense Agency in the development of this very complicated system.

There has been a great debate about whether we should deploy this system. I found it interesting to note that President Reagan was approached years ago by some Congressmen and Congresswomen who wanted to deploy then the existing system. This was in August of 1986. According to the Frances Fitzgerald's book about President Reagan ``Way Out There in the Blue,'' here is what he told those Congressmen:

I know there are those who are getting a bit antsy [to

deploy a missile defense] but to deploy systems of limited

effectiveness now would divert limited funds and delay our

main research. It could well erode support for the program

before it's permitted to reach its potential.

Once again, we are not debating today the deployment in this amendment. We have had that debate previously with Senator Boxer. We are not debating deployment. We are simply debating let us plan to do the operational testing. Let us get that operational testing done at some point because otherwise we are literally getting a system that is untried. No one wants the first time this system is fully operationally tested to be in the deplorable and horrific situation of a missile heading toward us.

So I would hope that we could, in fact, adopt the Reed amendment, have operational testing planned for it, have baselines established to be able to monitor this system as we should and be able, I hope, to assure the American public that when we say it is in service, it will work. There is a difference between telling them it works and proving it in operational and realistic testing. I hope we can do that.

I reserve the remainder of my time in response to my colleagues.

Mr. President, how much time do I have?

Mr. President, if you could interrupt in 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I was very interested in hearing about the letter from Mr. Christie. I have not seen it. I am getting a copy of it.

But as I heard my colleague from Colorado, Mr. Christie seems to be saying that this system is not ready for operational testing yet, that it was premature to operationally test it. But it is ready for deployment in September? I think the notion of deployment is this thing is ready to operate; certainly it is at least ready to begin the threshold operation for testing. So I can't think of anything else that more strongly emphasizes the need for operational testing.

We have all heard the terminology, evolutionary spiral development, new techniques, et cetera, but the basic question here is: Does it work? No evolutionary spiral jargon avoids that question. Related to the question, does it work, is: What can it do? What do we expect this system to do? And then, of course, you validate that by testing under realistic conditions.

None of this is taking place. None of this is planned. I believe my colleagues when they say they want to see this operational testing. But there is no plan to operationally test now.

I find interesting the notion that Mr. Christie says it is premature to test, yet in the amendment to my amendment offered by Senator Warner there is a specific deadline of October 1, 2005, that a test will be completed.

My amendment doesn't do that because I do recognize the fact that these are very difficult technological issues, that there is great concern about getting the system up and running. There are multiple pieces from space-based radar to ships at sea to land-based radar to booster rockets and kill vehicles. Yet interestingly enough, the Warner amendment would lock in a date of October 1, 2005, to test the ballistic missile system. Yet Mr. Christie is talking about it is too premature, et cetera.

I think the approach I have taken is simply saying at some time in the future we need operational testing. Please lay out a plan--a plan, of course, can be modified--and before these new steps in the process are put into effect, let's have the operational testing. I think it makes a great deal more sense.

Also, there is a question about limiting developmental testing and operational testing by saying, when you do operational testing, you can't do developmental testing. Actually both can be conducted in virtually the same test. I think one of the major differences between developmental testing and operational testing is that developmental testing is designed by the proponent agency and the contractors and they are supervised by the proponent agencies and contractors. Operational testing is designed by Dr. Christie's office, the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, and supervised and conducted by those individuals from that particular office. It is quite appropriate. It is done frequently.

The Patriot was an example of a system that had both operational and developmental testing taking place. Indeed, the Patriot is another good example of the need for operational testing.

The upgrade PAC-3 missile defense system had a very good record when it was in its developmental phase. It was just doing extremely well. Then they started the operational combat, realistic test phase, and the Patriot PAC-3 failed each of these operational tests. It had four consecutive operational test failures. What did that suggest to you about this system? This system might pass all these tests, as some have argued watered down as they are, but it could pass all of them. Well, the PAC-3 system passed all the development tests and then had four consecutive failures in a row in an operational test.

If we have four consecutive failures in a real operational test of this system, I think the American people will be quite shocked, given the fact we are not planning any operational test, yet we are deploying the system.

Luckily, with the PAC-3, there was time to fix the problem.

These operational tests were not only conducted, but the problems were fixed. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the system was deployed. It worked very well when it engaged missiles. But again, there are still some difficulties. At least one friendly aircraft was engaged and destroyed by a PAC-3 system. Two were destroyed, suggesting that all the problems with the system in terms of target identification, in terms of proper response and enemy versus friendly targets in the air have not been fully resolved. It is a complex system. This system is much more complex and complicated. But the PAC-3 is a very good example of what we should be doing here--that is, operational testing, learning from those tests, fix the system, and keep doing it continuously.

Again, I think it is an interesting notion about this spiral development and everything else. There has to be consistent, constant testing because that is how you learn so you can make the changes. Yet, again, we don't have an operational test planned for this particular system. I believe we have to have something like that. Again, the national missile system is very complex. We have to have this system.

Part of the Warner amendment to my amendment takes out the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and lets the Secretary of Defense prescribe the criteria. Let me suggest that in the last several years, Dr. Christie has been advising and consulting. But nothing has happened in terms of operational testing. Each year, he reports to his superiors and to the public at large. In each one of those reports, he calls for more realistic testing. Apparently he is consulting and is not particularly effective. But that is exactly what the Warner amendment to my amendment would do--simply make him a consultant.

The reality is, as a consultant, his voice would be no more prominent than it is today. We don't have an operational testing plan. We have not conducted operational testing yet, and yet we are deploying the system. It seems to me that the Warner amendment waters down further the operational testing. He calls it operational testing, but then it takes out the operational testing, giving it to the Secretary of Defense.

We have seen that this Secretary of Defense is committed to getting this program into the ground by September of this year regardless. That doesn't give me and I don't think it should give the public the confidence that a rigorous realistic testing scheme will be developed. But then the amendment goes on to say within a year we are going to have that, we are going to mandate the test. It seems to be slightly schizophrenic. We don't want the normal procedures, we don't want the Director of Test and Evaluation to be doing it, we want the Secretary of Defense to do it, but he is going to do it by October 1 of 2005.

Again, I don't think the amendment really responds to the problem and the issue. The issue and the problem is developing, as we have done for every other system. PAC-3 is an excellent example of operational testing and planning, and then ensuring that the operational tests take place--not just calling for operational tests but having the independent operational testing agency within the Pentagon designing and conducting the test. That is what my amendment does. It doesn't call for any specific deadline. If the conclusion of Mr. Christie were to be that it couldn't be feasible for 18 months or 2 years, at least we have gotten an operational test plan, and we will conduct the test. That, to me, would be a vast improvement over the current situation.

I hope my colleagues will not favorably respond to Senator Warner's amendment and give me a chance to have this amendment agreed to.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I am just a bit taken aback by the claim of flexibility. The Warner amendment actually sets out a date certain when the tests will be conducted. Particularly, since it is a year away, particularly Mr. Christie is talking about it is premature because it is in the developmental stage. I thought his letter was quite specific. The ground-based midcourse defense element is currently at a material level which requires continued developmental testing with oversight and assistance from operational testing personnel conducting realistic testing in the near term. I guess the question is, What is ``in the near term''? I suggest it would be a year or more. It would be premature and not beneficial to the program.

Let me reiterate that this is an extraordinary letter. It says basically this system is not mature enough to test, but we are going to deploy it. I think that is very unusual, particularly given the history of having other systems where, even though they had not completed their operational testing--like the Predator and JSTARS--the plan for operational testing had already been sketched out--not by the Secretary of Defense but by the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

I think the flexibility is in my central amendment. It talks about before you deploy a block or a spiral--the new terminology might be ``spiral,'' but what they are going to do essentially is what we do so often: build the system to a certain capability; then, through tests or experience or through actual field trials, develop new software, new technology, and new complements that can make it better. At a certain point, rather than just simply tweaking here and there, you go back in and you develop a new block. That is roughly to me what the spiral development is, minus the catchphrase. Before you do that, we should have operational testing.

I think this is a very critical aspect. My amendment does not intend to stifle flexibility. It has no correlation with deployment. That is an issue that is going to be determined--and has been determined. We had votes on that, but somewhere along the line we need to do operational testing.

I must say I would be much more impressed with the degree of commitment to this operational testing if at least we had a plan for operational tests, a plan prepared by Mr. Christie. We do not have that. At least that would signal that we are serious about operational testing. In fact, that should have been done. It says this system is so immature that we cannot even get to the point of developing a plan to test.

Once again, the amendment is not only reasonable but it is compelling. This is what we do when we develop systems. Again, I suggest it is something we should do.

There is another aspect of my amendment which is very important and that is the baseline. Again, we have to know how much is being spent, what are the cost goals, what are the capability goals with respect to the system.

The GAO discovered--we did not discover this because of the way the books are kept--a $1 billion cost overrun. Rather than reporting it, making it obvious or tracking it, they simply changed the cost goals. In conjunction with that, we find that rather than having 10 interceptors, as they originally talked about in terms of cost goals, they now have 5 interceptors. The situation is that the costs have gone up by $1 billion and capability has gone down by half. Now we have a situation where we were unaware of it until the GAO discovered this.

Call it spiral development, call it evolutionary development, that should not be. One would hope this sophisticated development process, this new form of development, would mean that costs are more transparent, more accurate, and the capability is more obvious. That does not seem to be the case.

Along with the notion of developing operational testing is developing the baseline. None of that is in the Warner substitute to my amendment. I cannot see any discussion of establishing baselines, of making sure the costs are appropriate, of alerting Congress to overruns, rather than just changing goals.

I hope my amendment would be adopted and could be adopted.

I yield the floor, and ask at the conclusion we might think about whether it is appropriate to continue debating or to yield back time.

Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Six minutes.

Mr. President, how much time remains on each side?

I think I will speak for about 5 minutes, and at that point we can call for a vote.

Mr. President, first, I want to emphasize, again, that this amendment does not affect the deployment decisions that have been made with respect to the missile system. Again, also, we have all talked about operational testing, its importance, and that you have to do it. I would be much more confident if, in fact, there was at least a plan today for operational testing. Mr. Christie and the Department of Defense could have developed that over the last year or two. His letter said this system is so immature that I cannot even begin to think about operational testing.

Once again, let me raise the obvious. If it is that immature, then what do we have up in Alaska? Is it going to be a deployed missile system or a test bed? Or is it going to be both? That is the real core of my amendment. The real core is that sometimes, unrelated to deployment, we have to have operational testing.

I argue that my amendment provides even more flexibility to the Department of Defense because it doesn't set a date certain of October 1, 2005, when this test must be conducted. I don't think we can make that date, frankly. I think we will find ourselves back here on the next Defense authorization bill striking that, extending it, or pushing it out because, to me, that is an unrealistic, inflexible deadline.

For that reason alone, I urge my colleagues to think particularly about the Warner amendment. There is a suggestion I would unduly hobble development. As I read Senator Warner's language, he directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that each block configuration of the ballistic missile system is consistent with the operational scheme, which is precisely what I am saying. But I am not dictating a specific time to do that. The real key difference between Senator Warner's proposal and mine is that he is reversing the customary and prudent way to do independent operational testing. He is taking away the independence.

The independence, institutionally, is found in Mr. Christie's office, the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, not in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Everybody here has to recognize that there is no more political, ideological issue than missile defense in terms of the national security debate. It has been that way for 20 years.

To suggest that the Secretary of Defense and members of the Cabinet are going to be as independent as someone whose job and career it has been to render objective judgments about weapons systems and deployability and effectiveness is, I think, defying logic. This is not rocket science, it is human behavior. Why are we going to build into the system all those objective judgments and objective pressures that any Secretary, regardless of party, regardless of administration, must feel when something this big is before him to decide?

That is why we created a system 20 years ago where there is an independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, with a director appointed by the President and who is not directly subject to political whims, the whims of contractors, or the needs of contractors to make sure the funds keep flowing. That is the big distinction between our amendments. We want operational testing, but we want it to be independent. That is the GAO recommendation--independent, realistic operational testing.

We are not specifying to do it next week. We are not saying you cannot deploy until you test. In fact, I am removing myself from the timing. As I said before, I think it is unrealistic to assume that there can be an accurate operational test by October 1 of next year. It is not going to slow down the deployment or development; I don't think so. It is going to make sure we learn from each step, each mistake, and each achievement. That is what good operational testing does.

I feel very strongly that the Warner amendment is trying to talk about operational testing, but the heart of it is not. It is subjective evaluation that has been going on now for years with respect to this missile program. I think we have to get back to independent evaluation. We can do it with my amendment, and we can also ensure that we get baseline information about how much is being spent, and the MDA cannot, in 1 year, decide that they are a billion dollars off in the cost estimate so they change the cost estimate.

That is another example documented by GAO of the temptation to funding programs when you are the tester and the testee. That is what the Warner amendment would do.

So I hope, sincerely, that the Warner amendment can be defeated and that we can move on and adopt the Reed amendment. In the spirit of our prior comments, I will yield back my time.

I am here.

Mr. President, I ask for regular order for No. 3352.

Mr. President, I understand that Senator Warner has a second-degree amendment which I will accept.

That is correct.

I want to thank the chairman for his instructive work on this amendment. He recognizes, as I recognize, along with my colleagues and principal cosponsors Senators Hagel, McCain, Corzine, Akaka, and Biden, that our Army is stretched very thin across the globe with numerous missions, and in order to fulfill these missions we have to raise the end strength of the Army.

The amendment before us today would put within the authorized end strength a 20,000 increase in the number of soldiers in the U.S. Army. These are the number of troops the Army has indicated that they can absorb this year, and that they can train and utilize this year. It represents the recognition that we cannot simply depend upon emergency powers through supplementals to increase the end strength of the Army. We have to, as we do in this amendment, put in the actual end strength number to reflect a larger Army and also to reflect the fact that this is not a temporary occurrence.

Our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the globe are going to require a substantially larger Army for an indefinite period of time.

As a result, working together with the chairman, we have placed in the Defense authorization bill the precise number of soldiers, this precise increase of 20,000 troops.

What the chairman has added, though, is the fact that these troops have to be paid for. There is a strong argument that we should pay for them in terms of regular budget authority, but he has suggested that we again go the emergency supplemental route to pay for these troops, which are now fully authorized in law. What I wanted to accomplish in the amendment first is to make sure we do incorporate a suitable end strength number. That has been accomplished.

Second, I wanted to avoid a situation where the Army had to go within its existing programs to search high and low for dollars to pay for these extra troops. That has been accomplished by the chairman's suggestion that we move some funds already identified in the emergency supplemental and designate those to pay for these additional troops.

So we have avoided a situation where the Army this year is going to be forced to come up with funds by going through and ransacking their existing programs, and we have set it in the authorization bill, the appropriate forum for such a decision. We have set in the precise number of end strength that is appropriate this year for the U.S. Army.

The question still arises, What happens in succeeding years? The argument myself, Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, and others have made is we cannot continue to depend upon supplemental and emergency funding. This is not an emergency. This is a fact of life in the world today. We need a larger Army.

We are accomplishing our objectives today for this fiscal year in this authorization, but I think the chairman and we all recognize we will eventually confront a situation where we have to raise the bottom line of the Army in terms of the funds they have. We do not want to see a situation a year from now or 2 years from now when the supplementals are inadequate but the needs of these troops are still persistent.

Senator Levin has language in this authorization bill that indicates in succeeding years, after this fiscal year and after this authorization bill, any increase in end strength will have to be put in the Army budget. I think that is an appropriate response. I think the Reed amendment as modified by Senator Warner will, in effect, accomplish that.

This is the thrust of the amendment. I have had an opportunity to explain it. At this point I reserve the remainder of my time to allow the Senator from Virginia to comment.

Mr. President, I yield such time as remained.

I thank the chairman for his constructive participation in this process and also to emphasize what he has emphasized and that is the extraordinary stress our Army is withstanding at this point. They are doing it magnificently, performing with great skill and professionalism.

We have 126,000 soldiers in Iraq; we have 13,000 soldiers in Afghanistan; we have soldiers still in the Balkans, 2,500; we have forces in Kuwait, about 17,000; we still have our mission in the Sinai; we have 1,700 soldiers in Guantanamo maintaining the detention facilities there; we have 16,000 soldiers, Noble Eagle, which is the heart of our defense of our homeland; we have soldiers in the Philippines; 31,600 soldiers in South Korea. We have them all over the world doing an extraordinary task and job for our company. Frankly, they need more help and that is the heart of the Reed amendment.

In addition to that, we have seen troubling signs that this operational tempo is putting great stress and duress on our soldiers. Recently, there was a stop-loss order announced by the G-1 of the U.S. Army that said essentially any soldier who is scheduled to depart within 90 days for deployment cannot leave the service, even if that soldier's time in service has expired. Essentially what they have said is: You can't get out of the service. The Volunteer Army is no longer completely volunteer. That is just one example.

We are withdrawing troops from Korea at a time when there is a huge crisis on the peninsula. The North Koreans indicated they have plutonium; they are intending to process it. They may have already constructed eight nuclear devices. We don't know for sure. Yet at this time when we need maximum military force to complement our diplomacy, we are withdrawing troops, which is perhaps sending a signal to the North Koreans that they can wait us out or that we are not able or ready to match our diplomacy appropriately with military force.

That is another prime example, I believe. In fact, frankly, I think that if North Korea 2 or 3 years ago brazenly declared they had nuclear weapons, our response would not have been to withdraw troops. The calls in this Chamber would have been for more troops in Korea. But now because of Iraq that is difficult; we are pulling them out to send them to Iraq.

Then we have a situation in our training centers, the infrastructure of the Army. This is one of the major reasons why we have such extraordinarily skilled soldiers.

First, they are men and women of courage and character, but second they received the greatest, most realistic training in the world. They are individuals who can and will do any job, but they do that so well because they are the best trained.

We are taking soldiers from our training centers--those trainers who are preparing the troops to go overseas--and we are deploying them.

As a result, these are indications that we have a military force which is significantly stretched. That is why it is so important to raise the number of troops that we have entering the Army.

Today, the Army has 495,374 soldiers serving on active duty. The end strength has to increase. The Reed amendment increases it by 20,000 troops.

There are those who have predicted we would get in this predicament. General Shalikashvili's predictions and other predictions are coming true. Our responsibility is now to give the military, particularly the Army, sufficient resources and sufficient personnel to do the job which we are asking them to do.

Last December, in 2003, the Army's Strategic Studies Institute published a report which stated that the ground force requirements in Iraq have forced the U.S. Army to the breaking point.

We have to prevent that breaking point from being reached, and that means putting more troops into the force structure.

Last year, during the appropriations debate, Senator Hagel and I sponsored an amendment that would have raised the end strength by 10,000 in the supplemental appropriations. It passed the Senate. I thank my colleagues on both sides who were very supportive of that. But, unfortunately, at that point the administration thought it was unnecessary and they were able to successfully defeat that proposal in conference. At least now they recognize the need for additional troops. But what they are still adhering to is this notion that the emergency is temporary.

I hope by putting the actual number of the end strength increase in this bill we are sending a signal to everyone that we will, in fact, stay the course--not just rhetorically but with actual resources and actual troops.

Senator Warner explained the funding mechanism was one where some of us would have preferred, frankly, if we could have, to increase just the bottom line of the Army. But given these other demands on resources and this authorization bill, it was his suggestion that we, once again, use emergency funding to fund this now authorized end strength. That gets us through this year. But the concern I have and the concern others have is that we will reach a point within a year or two where the Army is going to have these troops in uniform but their baseline is not going to be sufficient if a supplemental or emergency funding is not made readily available. That is a real crisis and we have to start thinking about that now.

Senator Levin has been very thoughtful on this topic. He has language in the bill that says any increases in the next fiscal year of the end strength have to be budgeted through regular budget processes. Again, I hope that takes place. But that means giving more resources to our Army, and we will work--I think I can speak for Senator Warner--to make sure the Army has those resources.

I am very pleased we are able to make this adjustment--overdue adjustment--in the end strength of the U.S. Army.

I retain the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

I thank the Senator from Alabama for his kind words also.

We are all in agreement that there is tremendous stress on our Army. Let me suggest this chart shows the deployments in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom projected not just over the next several months but actually into 2007. The dark green demonstrates the actual planned deployment today, the projection of February 2004. On July 19, 2003, last year, these are the force projected, brigades equivalents.

It was projected for July of 2004 we would be roughly at about 8 brigade equivalents. Today in Iraq and Afghanistan there are 18 brigades, more than twice as many soldiers, or about 130,000-plus soldiers in these two operations.

This is not just a spike. This is, as you can see on the chart, a plateau. We are expected, under the projections today, to have 17 brigades all the way out to the end of 2005, the beginning of January of 2006. They come down a little bit if things stabilize a bit in March of 2006, to around 13 or 14 brigades.

This is a long way out to project. So far, if we look at the projections, we have ended up with more troops needed than what we thought we could entertain.

My point is that this is not a temporary spike in requirements for soldiers in the U.S. Army. This stretches out to 2007, 3 years from now. It is entirely appropriate we put this number into the Defense bill, that we do not simply give some emergency powers to the Secretary of Defense.

The challenge we have going forward--we have met the challenge this year by tapping into that emergency fund, but the challenge going forward is giving the Army the resources in succeeding budgets in their own bottom line so they can continue to field these forces. That is what we are projecting today. It is not as if in 6 months we will be fine, Iraq will be resolved, Afghanistan will be resolved, we will be back to a low level of participation.

Our planners' best thoughts today are for 17 brigades for a long time. So that is what is at the heart of the amendment I have proposed, along with Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, Senator Corzine, Senator Akaka, and Senator Biden. I believe we are taking a very important step by putting the end strength number in our authorization bill, not as an emergency but as a reality, as a near- and medium-term reality. That is what this chart says. Three years from now we are going to have to still find troops to put in about 14 or 15 brigades in these 2 operations.

But the issue that is still outstanding--not this year because we have bridged it with the emergency funding--is, how do we build up the resources within the Army budget to carry these soldiers forward 2 and 3 years hence? We will be working on that, obviously, over the next few weeks into conference and beyond.

I know there are other colleagues--Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, and others--who might want to talk. We have made arrangements prior to the vote for 10 minutes, which I would gladly offer to them for their comments.

Mr. President, may I inquire how much time I have?

Thank you, Mr. President. I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor.

If the Senator will yield, I believe we were waiting for Senator Hagel, another cosponsor.

I thank the Senator.

I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) is necessarily absent.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Gabrielle Chapin and Dr. Harsh Trivedi, fellows in my office, be granted floor privileges during the debate on S. 2400.

Mr. President, I have an amendment numbered 3352.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, it is my intention this evening to spend a few minutes to lay the amendment down and then I presume at the end of the evening, with unanimous consent, I will be given at least an hour of debate tomorrow which I will share with Senators McCain, Hagel, and others. That is my understanding. I ask the Senator from Virginia if that understanding is correct.

Mr. President, I understand from the chairman that he will offer a second-degree amendment at the appropriate time. At this juncture, I would like to briefly explain the amendment and then have the opportunity to discuss it in more detail tomorrow with my colleague.

My amendment will increase the end strength of the Army to meet the incredible mission that has been thrust upon them in the wake of the war on terror and the operations in Afghanistan and the operations in Iraq. I believe it is incumbent that we formally increase the end strength of the Army and we incorporate within the Army budget the requirements for these additional soldiers.

At this juncture, the Army is being increased on an emergency basis through supplemental appropriations. I think that is not the appropriate way to do it. I think we have to recognize that the struggles we are engaged in are long term; they are not temporary. We have to have an end strength within the authorization bill that reflects that long-term effort we are engaged in.

I also believe we have to have within the Army budget the baseline established so that if a supplemental is delayed or is not sufficient to cover these additional troops, the Army does not have to go among its own programs and root about and find moneys to pay for these troops.

These troops are necessary. It is expedient that we should in fact engage and correct this discrepancy between the missions and the men and women who are serving our Army so well.

This is a quick glimpse of our soldiers who are committed throughout the world: 310,000 soldiers in 120 countries. The most significant, of course, are operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. There are 13,000 in Afghanistan and 126,000 in Iraq. There are soldiers all across the globe and I think we all understand the stresses of these operations are wearing our Army down rapidly.

Some of the indications that we have too few troops can be cited very quickly. First, literally a few days ago the Army announced a stop-loss policy that would prevent soldiers from leaving the Army 90 days before their unit deploys into Iraq. We are essentially telling volunteers that they cannot leave at the end of their enlistment. That is an obvious indication we have too few troops.

Second, we are withdrawing troops from Korea. There might be strategic reasons to pull troops out of Korea. There might be logistical reasons. Technology might be aiding them. But, frankly, this is an indication of, again, the shortage of troops within the Army, because we have huge risks in North Korea. This is a regime that has announced they have nuclear weapons. This is a regime that has been involved in on-and-off negotiations with us for a matter of many months to see if we can resolve the situation peacefully.

The signal we are sending to the North Koreans, albeit unwittingly, is this is not a major priority; we are actually taking troops away.

When troops are taken away, we may still have the ability to deter the North Koreans from attacking South Korea but, frankly, our mission over there is no longer just deterrence, it is disarmament, and that requires diplomacy backed up by force. We hope diplomacy works, but we are weakening our hand.

One of the most interesting and insightful indications of the shortage of

troops is we are actually beginning to take apart the training infrastructure of the U.S. Army. Recently it was announced that troops from our training centers, the 11th Army Cavalry Regiment, which serves as the op force, the enemy force, in training our units, is being notified for deployment overseas. In addition to that, the 1st Battalion of the 509th Infantry, which acts as the opposition force to train our troops at Fort Polk, LA, is also on notice.

What can be more demonstrative of the shortage of troops than the fact we are, in a sense, dismantling our training structure? That in the long term is going to do great harm to the service. We need more troops.

I am sure those who are opposed to the amendment will say we have authorized in this bill again access to emergency authorization and supplemental funding, but that is not doing it the right way, doing it up front, doing it in a straightforward manner, increasing end strength statutorily, and putting this into the regular budget process.

I hope tomorrow we can debate this bill. I am unaware of the second- degree amendment. I will get with the chairman to see what his language is. I feel very strongly that this is the way to do it, and I am joined in that by my colleagues Senators McCain, Hagel, Corzine, Akaka, Biden, and many others who feel very strongly this is the way to do it and it should be done. I hope it will be done tomorrow.

With the expectation and the understanding that we will have at least an hour tomorrow on my side to engage in debate on this issue, at this point I yield the floor.

The Senator is correct.

If I may respond to the chairman, he is quite right about the offset. I have some ideas from where the money could come. It is my feeling it should come from funds outside the Army. I think what we have done is we have increased it, but we haven't offset it by Army programs. So there is the possibility--I hope the likelihood--the offset would come from other programs.

I have had an opportunity to read the amendment. It seems, in keeping with the Senator's commitment to be constructive and helpful, to be very constructive and very helpful, on first examination.

Yes. Myself, Senator Hagel, and Senator McCain wish to speak.