Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that in addition to my time, I receive 10 minutes from Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, we are currently engaged in a fierce battle to salvage something, anything, from the…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that in addition to my time, I receive 10 minutes from Senator Harkin.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, we are currently engaged in a fierce battle to salvage something, anything, from the administration's effort at regime change and reconstruction in Iraq. Each day, the costs in lives and dollars accumulate, as the Iraqi people become more restive and impatient. International and regional support for our efforts is eroding at a time when an international effort, as distinct from the administration's unilateral approach, may be the only effective way to change the political dynamic and allow us to avoid being trapped in a long, bloody, and uncertain conflict.
Many Americans are asking how we came to this point. Some are asking why we must remain. The President has responded with a slogan: ``We must not waiver.'' What we need is a plan, a plan based on reality, not on ideology.
The administration launched the preemptive attack on Iraq to counter, according to their claims, the overwhelming danger of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and alleged ties between Saddam Hussein and terrorists. In the last year, no weapons of mass destruction have been found, and no strong link has been established between Saddam and terrorists. Ironically, today, there is no shortage of terrorists in Iraq. They have been drawn there not by Saddam but by his demise.
Now, the administration returns to the subtext of its justification for preemptive action in the fall of 2002, the unalloyed evil of Saddam. That, of course, is a point beyond debate; indeed, a point that was acknowledged by all sides during the debate in the fall of 2002.
When Secretary Wolfowitz testified recently before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he continually reiterated the depravity of Saddam stressing, in his words, the ``density of evil'' that gripped Iraq under Saddam. Looking backward at Saddam will not help us find a way ahead today. Today, more relevant than the ``density of evil'' that gripped Iraq is the ``density of illusion'' that continues to grip the
administration and the Pentagon. The administration and the Pentagon stubbornly cling to illusions about the situation in Iraq. Let me suggest some of the most salient.
For months, they have attempted to convince the world--and, perhaps, themselves--that Iraqi security forces were capable of making a significant contribution to establish order and to defeat the insurgency. No such capability exists at this time, and it may take years to train a competent and cohesive force that can assume the security role in Iraq that currently falls primarily upon the United States.
For months, the Pentagon regaled us with charts showing the astronomical and rapid growth of Iraqi security forces from mere handfuls to hundreds of thousands. They repeatedly stressed the proportional decrease of the American presence as a sign of progress. All this was wishful thinking and political spinning.
The last few weeks have revealed the fact that a significant number of Iraqi security forces are ill prepared, ill equipped, and unmotivated.
A Washington Post article pointed out that on April 5, a new Iraqi battalion of several hundred Iraqi soldiers refused to join U.S. Marines in the offensive in Fallujah. In the south, police units as well as members of the Iraqi Civilian Defense Corps, equivalent to the National Guard of the United States, refused to engage Sadr's forces. MG Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq, estimated that one in 10 members of the Iraqi security forces actually worked against the U.S. forces and 40 percent simply walked away from their post because of intimidation during the recent violence in Fallujah and in the south of Iraq.
The Pentagon likely had indications of problems with these forces. Several months ago MG Karl Eikenberry was dispatched to Iraq to conduct a survey of Iraqi security forces. General Eikenberry is an extremely competent and experienced officer who played a key role in establishing the new national army in Afghanistan after Operation Enduring Freedom.
For many weeks, I have been attempting to obtain this report to become informed and to inform my colleagues about the state of readiness of the Iraqi security forces. The Pentagon has been completely uncooperative. This lack of cooperation and respect for the responsibilities of Congress to perform oversight over the Department of Defense has been characteristic of this administration's approach throughout the conduct of operations in Iraq, and it has contributed to the predicament we find ourselves in today. Too often a small group of civilians in the Pentagon has displaced normal planning functions and instead, insulated from appropriate congressional oversight, has hatched plans for the occupation in Iraq that have proven to be misguided and inept. The formation of credible and effective Iraqi security forces is imperative, but not just because it reduces the burden and the threat to our forces. It is imperative we establish these forces because today our goals for Iraq are being thwarted by a climate of violence that affects every Iraqi and saps their willingness to commit to the reform of their country.
We often see the violence in Iraq as those attacks against our forces. When we do, we miss the pervasive and disturbing violence that touches the lives of every Iraqi and, in a cruel irony, has many Iraqis comparing the order under Saddam with the chronic disorder under the United States.
The following is an article, translated from Arabic, in the April 25th edition of Al Manar, a newspaper from Baghdad:
The Iraqi society has never known or, even in U.S. gang
movies, seen such acts of looting, robbery, and murder as the
current crimes taking place in Iraq today, which cause
newborn's hair to turn gray. The crimes have become so common
that hardly an hour passes without hearing that some people
are being plundered or a number of cars are being stolen. The
drivers of the new and expensive cars have become a target
for the thieves and burglars.
Someone may think that such crimes occur in other places at
night; however, the strange thing is that in Iraq, they take
place during the day for everyone to see. In addition, the
numbers of these looting gangs have become very well known to
the ordinary citizens of Baghdad.
A few days ago, my relative's car was stolen at gun point
in Baghdad, but he managed to escape without being physically
harmed or injured in the incident. Having recovered from the
shock a few days later, his friends advised him to meet with
a former gang leader who enjoyed considerable status and
reputation among the members of the other criminal gangs.
Having no other option, my relative went to see the guy who
promised to take him to the gangs operating in the zone where
his car was stolen.
As promised, the man secretly took my relative to meet well
known gangsters where one of them congratulated him [my
relative] for his good luck because his car was stolen by a
gang ``that only steals cars but does not kill the owners;
otherwise, you would have been killed if it was another
gang.'' The strange thing is that most of the gangsters are
young boys between the age of 15 and 20 years.
After several terrifying trips, my relative found his car
when tough negotiations began. He was asked to pay $500, a
special offer out of honor and respect for their repentant
comrade who brought him to get his car back.
This true story is an example of dozens of other similar robbery, looting, and murder crimes taking place in Baghdad where stealing and murdering gangs have dramatically increased. Unless we are able to protect the people of Iraq from criminal gangs and from situations as illustrated in these comments in the newspaper, we will fail in our mission because we have a situation where the basic elements of order, the basic sense of safety and security have been completely eviscerated for a vast number of Iraqis.
These are off the TV screens. But this is one of the constant drumbeats that is turning the people of Iraq to become resentful of our presence.
The administration has also, together with the Pentagon, consistently underestimated the number of troops necessary for the successful occupation of Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks adroitly planned the air and ground campaign that shattered the Iraqi army in a matter of days. They correctly judged our overwhelming technological advantages, together with the extraordinary courage and skill of our fighting forces, would quickly overwhelm the much larger Iraqi forces. But winning a swift victory over a conventional military force is not the same as successfully occupying a large country with a population of 25 million.
From the beginning, our forces, including international allies, were insufficient to physically and psychologically dominate the scene. The absence or limited presence of coalition forces in many parts of Iraq gave the insurgents opportunities to organize and the perception they could initiate hostile actions against our forces. One of the first clues I had suggesting a lack of adequate forces was the briefing I received last July from the 4th Infantry Division in Kirkuk on my first trip to Iraq. I was taken aback, frankly, to learn there were hundreds, if not thousands, of Iraqi ammo dumps. Many of them were totally unsecured while others had some security barriers but were not secured by military personnel. This was the case all over the country.
Today munitions in these ammo dumps are being used to craft the improvised explosive devices that bedevil our forces. This is one example indicating additional troops could have been used effectively.
Another indication of the insufficient number of coalition military forces is the proliferation of private security forces. Why is it necessary to have 20,000 armed private security guards in Iraq performing essential military duties? The answer is simple. We did not deploy sufficient military forces. These private security forces are generally highly trained professionals, typically veterans of our special operations forces. But their presence raises numerous questions.
How, for example, do they coordinate with our military forces? What rules of engagement may they use? What is their legal status, particularly after June 30, when limited sovereignty is transferred to some Iraqi authority? I am still awaiting the answer to these questions from the Pentagon. Once again, my request has not been responded to promptly with detailed information or any information.
Last September, Senator Hagel and I proposed an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill to increase the size of our Army by 10,000 soldiers. That is a necessary initial step to provide the manpower to continue to commit further forces to Iraq and to continue to meet the worldwide demands
upon our Army. The Senate supported that amendment. Unfortunately, the administration vociferously opposed it. They claimed Iraq was just a spike and that in the months ahead, the Army could begin to withdraw forces.
In January, they suddenly reversed this position and announced they would take steps to increase the Army by 30,000 soldiers by tapping into the supplemental appropriations bill. I am pleased the Pentagon is finally convinced we need more forces for our Army, but they still maintain this is a temporary emergency condition that is best funded through the supplemental appropriations process.
The reality is, this condition is not temporary. If we are serious about succeeding in Iraq and meeting other demands throughout the world, we must admit this is a task that will take many years and a larger army for many years. We must provide for increases in end strength for our Army in the regular budget process, not the supplemental, by directing more resources to the Army from the other services or by increasing the overall defense budget.
The administration and the Pentagon continually insist that we are being opposed by a small group of unrepentant holdouts from the former Baathist regime and an even smaller cadre of terrorists who have flocked to Iraq after the defeat of Saddam.
This view dangerously misconstrues the growing resentment of the Iraq population to our presence and the very real possibility that many Iraqis will sympathize with the insurgents not because they agree with their political or religious views but because they see them as fellow Iraqis resisting a foreign occupation.
Anthony Cordesman, a very prescient analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out that ``it is important to note that an ABC poll in February found a large core of hostility to the Coalition before the tensions unleashed by current fighting, and that core involved many Shi'ites as well as Sunnis.'' And, as reported in a new USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll, ``only a third of the Iraqi people now believe that the American-led occupation of their country is doing more good than harm, and a solid majority support an immediate pullout even though they fear that could put them in greater danger . . .'' Although half the Iraqis who responded to the poll said that they and their families were better off now then under Saddam, 71 percent of the respondents when asked to classify the Americans as ``liberators'' or ``occupiers'' chose ``occupier.'' The figure increases to 81 percent if you exclude respondents from the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. More startling is the fact that more than half the respondents outside of the Kurdish region ``say killing U.S. troops can be justified in at least some cases.''
What might have begun as the desperate acts of diehards from Saddam's regime has rapidly morphed into a widespread resentment of the United States as ``occupiers.'' The insurgents have touched a nationalistic nerve that vastly complicates our efforts. Popular support is the critical element in political warfare, and the administration is squandering that support.
The latest revelations of gross abuse of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison have further fanned the flames of resentment and anger. It is an aberration in the conduct of American soldiers, but its occurrence has confirmed in a very suspicious population the worst lies spread by our adversaries. In addition, these actions have poisoned our already strained relations with many countries and their citizens around the world.
For months now, the Coalition Provisional Authority has been in power, and the administration touted that as an example of our reconstruction efforts. Frankly, I believe it has been dysfunctional from the beginning.
The President vested the Department of Defense with extraordinary powers in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. Even before the initiation of military operations, the decision was made to exclude experts from the State Department from planning for the reconstruction and administration of Iraq. The task was given to a small group of ideologues in the Department of Defense. They relied on the self- serving declarations of Chalabi and the exile crowd to assume away most of the problems that we later encountered in Iraq. Problems such as a dilapidated infrastructure an ancient rivalries between religious and ethnic factions were conveniently ignored as the ``neocons'' predicted that we would be welcomed with open arms in a country that was economically and culturally ready for a rapid transition to democracy.
The institutional responsibilities for the transformation of Iraq were given to Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, the ``CPA''. And, in this regard, the record is one of confusion and ineptness.
The decision to disband the Iraqi army threw thousands of desperate and dangerous individuals onto the streets of Iraq. Many of these individuals formed the heart of the insurgency that continues to attack our troops.
The decision to eliminate the Baath party from the civic life of Iraq was quite correct in principle, but carried to such extremes that it alienated the Sunni community and provided additional fuel for the growing fires of resistance. To add insult to injury, the process of debaathification was placed under the control of Chalabi, a figure of immense distrust and dislike in Iraq.
I first heard these complaints from our military commanders last November during one of my trips to Iraq. They complained that thousands of teachers were being excluded from schools at a time when there was a concerted effort to reopen schools throughout the country. These officers explained that membership in the Baath Party was obligatory for anyone who hoped to obtain a job like teaching in Iraq. Most of these individuals were motivated not by political impulses but by economic and career goals. Nevertheless, they were categorically excluded subject to the discretion of Chalabi. It was a situation that further antagonized the Sunni community. The policy has been belatedly amended but not after doing great damage.
This episode also illustrates the gap between the CPA and the military commanders that actually were doing the work of rebuilding Iraq. The CPA existed in a security bubble in Baghdad disconnected from the field where Army division commanders and their staffs were taking pragmatic actions to restore services, rebuild communities and instill hope in the people of Iraq. The CPA added little to these actions except indecision that simply complicated the action of commanders on the ground.
In the past few days, a revealing memorandum by someone who served in the CPA has surfaced that provided additional details illustrating the incompetence of the CPA. The anonymous author of the memo is a fan of Chalabi and is hopeful for success in Iraq. This makes his criticism even more telling.
He describes the CPA as handling ``an issue like six-year-olds play soccer: Someone kicks the ball and one hundred people chase after it hoping to be noticed, without a care as to what happens on the field.'' My view is that the CPA quickly became a 30-day summer camp for ``neocons.'' Subject-matter experts were displaced by ideological true believers who rotated in and out at a dizzying rate.
The CPA installed the Iraqi Governing Council composed of representatives from the major factions and then allowed the Governing Council to pick ministers to run the major ministries, like Oil and Public Works. The result was nepotism and corruption. As the memo points out, ``both for political and organizational reasons, the decision to allow the Governing Council to pick 25 ministers did the greatest damage. Not only did we endorse nepotism, with men choosing their sons and brothers-in-law; but we also failed to use our prerogative to shape a system that would work . . . our failure to promote accountability has hurt us.
I met with a member of the Iraqi Governing Council on March 17 in Baghdad. He explained to me the importance of the June 30 date. As Chalabi explained it to him, it is important because on that date they get to ``write the checks.'' I am sure there are competent and patriotic Iraqis involved in the Governing Council, but I am deeply skeptical of many, like Chalabi, who seem interested only in self- promotion based on deceit and deception.
Despite the institutional failings of the CPA, it has acquired some hard-
won experience. That experience disappears on July 1 as our new Embassy replaces the CPA. I fear that we will witness once again a lack of coordination and direction as a new team tries to organize itself in the complicated and unforgiving environment of Iraq. I was hoping to hear Ambassador Negroponte describe in detail the organization and policies that will guide the new Embassy. I didn't hear much.
There are numerous questions. What is the status of contracts with the CPA, particularly contracts with security firms? Will American civilian contractors in Iraq be subject to Iraq law or United States jurisdiction? How will the Embassy be organized to avoid being ``captive'' in the Green Zone in Baghdad? How will responsibilities be divided between the Department of State and the Department of Defense? I'm still waiting for good answers.
We are in danger of repeating the mistakes we made a year ago. Once again, we are approaching a critical juncture without a plan, just a new set of players. And the clock is ticking.
The administration is pinning most of its hopes for political progress in Iraq on the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi entity on June 30. In doing so, they confuse the difference between sovereignty and legitimacy. The new Iraqi entity--yet to be devised or to be fleshed out with Iraqis--may have some formal powers that may qualify it as a sovereign for the purposes of international law, but I doubt that the vast majority of Iraqi citizens will see it as a legitimate government. This new entity lacks the key components that people ascribe to legitimate governments. Legitimate governments are created by internal political forces, preferably by elections, and legitimate governments control their territory.
This new entity will be a creation of the United States with the belated and uncertain participation of the United Nations, and this new government will exist because American military forces control the territory of Iraq.
In a sense, the administration has already made June 30 both irreversible and irrelevant. Having held out the prospect of a transition to Iraqi rule on June 30, it is impossible to turn back. But on July 1, a prevailing sentiment in Iraq is likely to be disappointment and a sense that the United States has, once again, failed to carry out its word. This will further aggravate tensions, not diminish them.
We can hope the participation of the United Nations will give us a reprieve from this fate, but the administration's disdain for and distrust of the United Nations suggests to me that the current arrangement of necessity will not be sufficient to truly give a sense of legitimacy despite recent efforts.
The surest route to legitimacy is through elections, but we are far from that day. Indeed, that day may continue to recede. Recent polling in Iraq underlines a disturbing fact:
Seventy-five percent of the Iraqis polled--that's the
largest percentage of people agreeing on virtually any
issue--say they would never join a political party and oppose
the existence of a political party.
If that is the case, the likelihood of a democratic Iraq is many years away.
The administration's gravest illusion has been and continues to be that the United States can do it alone.
Recent events show the necessity for significant international involvement, not unilateral action. The administration has made overtures to the United Nations, but, as I have suggested, these overtures smack more of political expediency than a new realization of the value of broad-based collective action.
The monetary cost alone to the United States is staggering. We have spent $100 billion on the effort in Iraq with no end in sight. More importantly, we have lost 767 men and women of our Armed Forces. Indeed, according to an article in today's Washington Post, Yale economist William D. Nordhaus has estimated that the additional $25 billion just requested for the war in Iraq will make it more costly than the inflation-adjusted expenditures of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American war, the Spanish-American War, and the Persian Gulf war combined.
These monetary costs are just a fraction of what we will end up paying. Each day we are accruing significant costs to recapitalize the equipment and materiel we are using up at alarming rates. The aircraft and the tactical and logistical vehicles will require massive overhauls and replacement. None of these costs are being adequately addressed in or outside the supplemental budgetary process or the regular budgetary process.
Without broad-based international support, we will be unable to accomplish our political goals, and we will be hard pressed to sustain the billions of dollars necessary to sustain our effort in Iraq. As long as we dominate the military and political forces deployed to Iraq, we will be seen as occupiers serving our self-interest rather than a force to advance the interests of the Iraqi people.
The administration has long maintained that Iraq is the ``central front'' in the war on terrorism. They are badly mistaken. The ``central front'' in the war on terrorism is the United States. The ultimate objective of our terrorist adversaries is to once again inflict a catastrophic attack against the United States. They are not distracted in this objective by Iraq. We should not be either.
Today, al-Qaida and sympathetic terrorist cells throughout the world continue to plot to conduct an attack against the United States or the homelands of our allies.
The insurgents that we are engaging in Iraq may hate us with the same intensity as an al-Qaida operative, but they have chosen a different path--a path of guerrilla war against our military forces and the citizens of Iraq. The majority are Iraqis motivated by specific grievances involving our presence in Iraq. The ``foreign fighters'' who are in Iraq are drawn by the desire to fight the infidel. They are temperamentally and technically much different than the plotters who attacked us on September 11. In contrast, there are still many al-Qaida and associated operatives who continue to plan stealthy attacks against Americans rather than seek out a guerilla war against our military forces. To assume we will lure these terrorists into Iraq and destroy them there is a dangerous misperception.
Once again, the value of a truly international approach to the war on terror becomes more evident. The key element in this struggle is intelligence, not simply military might. This intelligence is not the province of one country, even a country with the resources of the United States. It is the sum of the collective efforts of many countries. To the extent we have alienated other countries or made their intelligence contributions more difficult, then we have diminished the key element in defeating those who continue to plot to strike our homeland.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed an additional 5 minutes and that the other side be given an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. President, considering all of this, it is alarming to see the inattention that the administration is paying to homeland security.
What is also very disconcerting about the administration's view is that they see al-Qaida as an institution rather than an ideology. It is an ideology, and it is an ideology that is spreading in the Islamic world despite our huge efforts in Iraq, some might say even because of our efforts in Iraq.
This ideological battle will not be won by military means alone. It will be won by providing Muslim populations around the world with a compelling alternative to the jihad as a means of enhancing their sense of empowerment and defusing their sense of frustration.
Education and economic development spring to mind as ways to begin to counter the appeal of the jihad. Once again, our choice of massive military involvement in Iraq has constrained the resources that we can deploy throughout the Muslim world to directly challenge the ideology of al-Qaida through education and economic development. Here also is another example of where an international approach would have given us much more credibility and, potentially, more resources to advance this agenda of education and economic development.
The administration entered Iraq with illusions, and they struggle today in Iraq because of these illusions. The unfolding crisis in Iraq can no longer tolerate illusion. It demands a realistic assessment of the risks and resources, and a pragmatic plan to prevail.
The administration must develop a true plan for the war's financing with realistic numbers in a timely manner.
The administration must commit more soldiers to the struggle in Iraq. This means increasing the overall end strength of the Army through the regular budget process.
The administration must recognize that the struggle in Iraq is separate from the war on terrorism and that the war on terrorism requires more robust funding at home to protect America.
The administration must recognize and admit that we are committed to a long and dangerous struggle in Iraq that will cover many years and cost many billions of dollars. The administration must seek to truly institutionalize our efforts in Iraq.
A government that deceives its people may sustain itself for a while. Lincoln reminded us that ``you can fool some of the people some of the time,'' but a government that deceives itself is doomed to failure, and its policies are doomed to failure.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.