Thank you, Madam Speaker. I won't take that much time. I do want to thank the chairman for his masterful leadership on this bill, and I do want to clarify that the intent of this legislation is to authorize the Treasury Department to…
Thank you, Madam Speaker. I won't take that much time. I do want to thank the chairman for his masterful leadership on this bill, and I do want to clarify that the intent of this legislation is to authorize the Treasury Department to strengthen credit markets by infusing capital into weak institutions in two ways: By buying their stock, debt, or other capital instruments; and, two, by purchasing bad assets from the institutions, in coordination with existing regulatory agencies and their responsibilities under this legislation, as well as under already existing authorization for prompt, corrective action and least-cost resolution.
I'd be happy to yield.
Nice going, Chairman. Thank you.
Madam Speaker, under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the Treasury Department's Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) will have the ability to support the financial system through the purchase of securities and through investing in equity/preferred securities. I strongly believe equity infusion if used wisely will have greater benefits for our economy and yield higher returns to American taxpayers.
A strong consensus among financiers and economists has developed supporting these conclusions. George Soros, Joeseph Stigliz, Bradford Delong, Paul Krugman, John Makin, Alex Pollack, Lucien Bebchuk, and Edmund Phelps are a sample of the bipartisan expertise that has contributed to the debate and strongly support the finding that using capital infusions rather than distressed asset purchases alone will have a far greater re-invigorating effect on our economy.
If done effectively, equity infusions will introduce 10 to 12 times the amount of the initial government investment into our credit markets. This means that capital infusions of $700 billion would yield credit flow effects totaling $8.4 trillion. In contrast, distressed asset purchases of $700 billion yield credit flow effects of only $700 billion. Capital infusions could give us 12 times the support for the communities and small businesses that badly need credit.
The capital infusion approach would involve using Warren Buffett type investment strategies and would result in the government owning equity interests in the institutions which are assisted. If these government investments do only half as well as Buffett's investments in distressed institutions such as Goldman Sachs, U.S. taxpayers will earn as much as $200 billion profit when the financial sector recovers. This is far beyond any forecast return to taxpayers from buying distressed assets. In fact the difference for taxpayers of the two methods could be as large as $375 billion. This will result in lower taxes longer term and better health care, better schools, and a cleaner environment. Because it is sound, transparent and effective, it will restore global confidence in the U.S. economy.
I attach three articles from George Soros, Lucien Bebchuk, and Joseph Stiglitz, to be included in the Record.
[From the Financial Times, Oct. 1, 2008]
Recapitalise the Banking System
(By George Soros)
The emergency legislation currently before Congress was
ill-conceived--or more accurately, not conceived at all. As
Congress tried to improve what Treasury originally requested,
an amalgam plan has emerged that consists of Treasury's
original Troubled Asset Relief Programme (Tarp) and a quite
different capital infusion programme in which the government
invests and stabilises weakened banks and profits from the
economy's eventual improvement. The capital infusion approach
will cost tax payers less in future years, and may even make
money for them.
Two weeks ago the Treasury did not have a plan ready--that
is why it had to ask for total discretion in spending the
money. But the general idea was to bring relief to the
banking system by relieving banks of their toxic securities
and parking them in a government-owned fund so that they
would not be dumped on the market at distressed prices. With
the value of their investments stabilised, banks would then
be able to raise equity capital.
The idea was fraught with difficulties. The toxic
securities in question are not homogenous and in any auction
process the sellers are liable to dump the dregs on to the
government fund. Moreover, the scheme addresses only one half
of the underlying problem--the lack of credit availability.
It does very little to enable house owners to meet their
mortgage obligations and it does not address the foreclosure
problem. With house prices not yet at the bottom, if the
government bids up the price of mortgage backed securities,
the taxpayers are liable to lose; but if the government does
not pay up, the banking system does not experience much
relief and cannot attract equity capital from the private
sector.
A scheme so heavily favouring Wall Street over Main Street
was politically unacceptable. It was tweaked by the
Democrats, who hold the upper hand, so that it penalises the
financial institutions that seek to take advantage of it. The
Republicans did not want to be left behind and imposed a
requirement that the tendered securities should be insured
against loss at the expense of the tendering institution. The
rescue package as it is now constituted is an amalgam of
multiple approaches. There is now a real danger that the
asset purchase programme will not be fully utilised because
of the onerous conditions attached to it.
Nevertheless, a rescue package was desperately needed and,
in spite of its shortcomings, it would change the course of
events. As late as last Monday, September 22, Treasury
secretary Hank Paulson hoped to avoid using taxpayers'
money; that is why he allowed Lehman Brothers to fail.
Tarp establishes the principle that public funds are
needed and if the present programme does not work, other
programmes will be instituted. We will have crossed the
Rubicon.
Since Tarp was ill-conceived, it is liable to arouse a
negative response from America's creditors. They would see it
as an attempt to inflate away the debt. The dollar is liable
to come under renewed pressure and the government will have
to pay more for its debt, especially at the long end. These
adverse consequences could be mitigated by using taxpayers'
funds more effectively.
Instead of just purchasing troubled assets the bulk of the
funds ought to be used to recapitalise the banking system.
Funds injected at the equity level are more high-powered than
funds used at the balance sheet level by a minimal factor of
twelve--effectively giving the government $8,400bn to re-
ignite the flow of credit. In practice, the effect would be
even greater because the injection of government funds would
also attract private capital. The result would be more
economic recovery and the chance for taxpayers to profit from
the recovery.
This is how it would work. The Treasury secretary would
rely on bank examiners rather than delegate implementation of
Tarp to Wall Street firms. The bank examiners would establish
how much additional equity
capital each bank needs in order to be properly capitalised
according to existing capital requirements. If managements
could not raise equity from the private sector they could
turn to Tarp.
Tarp would invest in preference shares with warrants
attached. The preference shares would carry a low coupon (say
5 per cent) so that banks would find it profitable to
continue lending, but shareholders would pay a heavy price
because they would be diluted by the warrants; they would be
given the right, however, to subscribe on Tarp's terms. The
rights would be tradeable and the secretary of the Treasury
would be instructed to set the terms so that the rights would
have a positive value.
Private investors, including me, are likely to jump at the
opportunity. The recapitalised banks would be allowed to
increase their leverage, so they would resume lending. Limits
on bank leverage could be imposed later, after the economy
has recovered. If the funds were used in this way, the
recapitalisation of the banking system could be achieved with
less than $500bn of public funds.
A revised emergency legislation could also provide more
help to homeowners. It could require the Treasury to provide
cheap financing for mortgage securities whose terms have been
renegotiated, based on the Treasury's cost of borrowing.
Mortgage service companies could be prohibited from charging
fees on foreclosures, but they could expect the owners of the
securities to provide incentives for renegotiation as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are already doing.
Banks deemed to be insolvent would not be eligible for
recapitalization by the capital infusion programme, but would
be taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The FDIC would be recapitalised by $200bn as a temporary
measure. FDIC, in turn could remove the $100,000 limit on
insured deposits. A revision of the emergency legislation
along these lines would be more equitable, have a better
chance of success, and cost taxpayers less in the long run.