Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this is an unusual measure that is being brought forward under unusual circumstances. To begin with, this measure would, believe it or not, empower our Federal legislature to undo virtually every regulation submitted to the Congress since mid-June of last year through the end of 2016 last year. The bill accomplishes this--every regulation--by authorizing Congress to disapprove these rules through a single joint resolution, thereby depriving Members to consider the merits of each individual regulation. This presents a number of problems.

As the administration has stated, with a threat of veto of an identical bill that was considered last November, the legislation ``would create tremendous regulatory uncertainty, potentially impose additional costs on businesses, and represent a step backwards for applying sound regulatory principles to protect public health, safety, the environment, and other critical aspects of society.''

This, in my view, is a cynical way of trying to legislate. For those concerned about the continued improvement of clean air and clean water, if we care about the safety of the toys we give our children, if we care about the environment, then we must oppose this bill.

I urge my colleagues to join me. There hasn't been any deliberative process on the bill recently. It is amazing to me that we have such opposition to the bill. It would be overwhelming to put in the over 150 labor organizations, consumer organizations, environmental organizations, and others who have openly asked us to oppose this bill.

If that isn't enough, we have the business community itself in opposition. The American Sustainable Business Council, which represents over 200,000 businesses--and I have a partial list of them--also opposes this measure. It is one of the rare instances in which I have brought to the floor legislation that is opposed by both labor and by business as well.

It is a little bit of an insult that this bill is being considered, on top of that, under a closed rule. There can be no amendments to this measure.

I am in a state of surprise that on the second day of a new Congress we would come forward with a measure that could potentially jeopardize public health and safety in so many different ways.

I think that the opposition to this measure is so overwhelming that I am surprised that without hearings, without an opportunity for amendment, we are now considering a measure that has this much opposition.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a letter from Consumer Reports dated January 3, 2017.

Consumer Reports,

Washington, DC, January 3, 2017.

U.S. House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

Dear Representative: Consumer Reports and its policy and

mobilization arm, Consumers Union, strongly urge you to vote

no on H.R. 21, the so-called ``Midnight Rules Relief Act.''

This bill would severely undermine accountability to the

public regarding important protections and safeguards.

Although the rules targeted by this legislation were

finalized relatively recently, many have been under

development for several years. Consumers Union has provided

public comment on several of these regulations that were

designed to protect consumers against unsafe products,

dishonest business dealings, and other hazards in the

marketplace that place their health, safety, or well-being at

risk. Agency experts carefully examined these hazards and

considered various alternative approaches to address them.

They sought input and guidance from businesses, consumer

organizations, outside scientific and legal experts, and the

public at

large, and ultimately developed final rules, explaining

publicly the basis and rationale for the adopted approach.

The federal law known as the Congressional Review Act (CRA)

already permits a regulation carefully developed over many

years to be erased by Congress, in a rushed process that does

not reflect the same level of expertise or careful

consideration. Congress could even rescind a rule for reasons

that might be based not on any broader interests of the

public, but on the narrower, private special interests of

those seeking to avoid having appropriate obligations imposed

on their profit-making activities.

The potential for the CRA to be employed in the service of

special interests is at least somewhat held in check by the

fact that the law currently requires separate congressional

action for erasing each regulation. A regulation considered

for erasure under the CRA must be brought to the House and

Senate in its own separate resolution, given its own debate

and vote, and sent to the President for its own signature or

veto. All officials involved in considering whether to erase

the regulation and its protections are thus put on record,

and can be held accountable for their positions and the

consequences. Perhaps for this reason, there has only been

one regulation rescinded under the CRA in its 20-year

history.

This important accountability check would be removed under

the ``Midnight Rules Relief Act.'' By allowing erasure of

multiple regulations en bloc, this bill would enable Members

of Congress and the President to evade public accountability

for what Gould be ill-considered, politically motivated

decisions that result in devastating consequences. Under the

bill, no Member would ever have to be on record regarding any

specific regulation being erased. In fact, any Member who

actually wants to cast a more selective vote, to erase

certain regulations but not others, would be unable to do so.

We are somewhat encouraged that the House Majority, after

initially acting behind closed doors to weaken the Office of

Congressional Ethics, has reversed course in light of major

concerns raised about the impact on congressional

accountability. We urge all Members to also recognize the

damaging effects that this bill would have on accountability

and on the ability of the American public to trust their

elected representatives. We strongly urge you to vote no on

the ``Midnight Rules Relief Act.''

Sincerely,

Laura MacCleery,

Vice President, Consumer Policy and Mobilization Consumer

Reports.

George P. Slover,

Senior Policy Counsel, Consumers Union.

William C. Wallace,

Policy Analyst, Consumers Union.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), a senior colleague, to speak on the measure before us.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from California for pointing out how innocent this measure is, and I am astounded by his feeling that regulations shouldn't be examined one by one. Under this measure, 61 regulations could be considered en bloc. To me, just trying to put together two regulations to revoke them would be very, very hard to handle.

What we are talking about here is a bill that would provide special interests with yet another opportunity to block critical lifesaving regulations, and I want to say I have never had so much opposition to a bill brought to my attention before. 150 environmental organizations, consumer organizations, and labor organizations have urged the Members of this body to oppose H.R. 21. It is incredible. And then not only are workers and consumers against this measure as well as environmentalists, businesspeople are against it as well.

I feel like there is some missing part to this thing. The American Sustainable Business Council has over 200,000 businesses. So here is labor and commerce combined, urging Congress not to do this on the second day of a new Congress with all the challenges that are before us, and he says it wouldn't create any problems. It would be okay to put in 1 or 2 or 3 or 5 or 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 or 60. This is incredible. It is not that we are working so hard that we don't have time to examine each one on a particular basis.

Can you imagine this Congress trying to block regulations which would be offered in one bill that could be over 60 different regulations? I mean, it is unthinkable. It is not very practical at all.

When we talk about meat labeling regulations and then in another paragraph or another section there would be standards for school lunch nutrition, they would be combined. My friend from California would say, well, that is no problem. We will take them separately, but they will all come in the same package.

So if you wanted to examine all of these things individually, we could have an instance where the whole Congress could be consumed for weeks or for months trying to figure out why they should block all of these important and sensible safeguards.

Business and labor are joined with us, and, to me, it is beyond comprehension for us to be concerned about not taking them up one at a time. This is worse than a conservative point of view, which I haven't found myself often agreeing with. But just to say let's have unlimited numbers of these blocking provisions all into one is beyond my comprehension.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cohen), a distinguished member of our committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, how much time remains on each side?

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), who, up until recently, was a very active member of the House Judiciary Committee. He is now the ranking member on the Education and the Workforce Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Castor).

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a CRS Report that highlights the fact that it would be permissible under this proposed bill that as many as 61 regulations could be bundled into one package and blocked by this bill.

Congressional Research Service,

January 3, 2017.

Memorandum

Subject: ``Major'' Obama Administration Rules Potentially

Eligible to be Overturned under the Congressional Review

Act in the 115th Congress.

From: Maeve P. Carey, Specialist in Government Organization

and Management; Christopher M. Davis, Analyst on Congress

and the Legislative Process; Casey Burgat, Research

Assistant.

This memorandum lists ``major'' rules issued by federal

agencies under the Barack Obama Administration that are

potentially subject to consideration under the procedures of

the Congressional Review Act (CRA) in the 115th Congress.

This is an updated version of a general distribution

memorandum released by CRS on November 17, 2016, and

previously updated on December 6, 2016.

Background on the Congressional Review Act

The CRA is a tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule

issued by a federal agency, including, in some cases, rules

issued in a previous session of Congress and by a previous

President. The CRA requires agencies to report on their

rulemaking activities to Congress and provides Congress with

a special set of procedures under which to consider

legislation to overturn those rules. The CRA, which was

enacted in 1996, was largely intended to assert control over

agency rulemaking by establishing a special set of expedited

or ``fast track'' legislative procedures for this purpose,

primarily in the Senate.

Of the approximately 73,000 final rules that have been

submitted to Congress since the legislation was enacted in

1996, the CRA has been used to disapprove one rule: the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration's November 2000

final rule on ergonomics, which was overturned using the CRA

in March 2001. The primary reason the CRA has overturned one

rule in the 20 years since its enactment is that under most

circumstances, it is likely that a President would veto such

a resolution in order to protect rules developed under his

own administration, and it may also be difficult for Congress

to muster the two-thirds vote in both houses needed to

overturn the veto. However, under a specific set of

circumstances--a turnover in party control of the White

House, particularly a turnover in which the incoming

President shares a party affiliation with a majority in both

houses of Congress--the CRA is more likely to be used

successfully. The March 2001 rejection of the ergonomics rule

was the result of that set of circumstances. Similar

circumstances will take place in 2017 after the start of the

115th Congress and after President-elect Donald J. Trump is

sworn into office.

CRA ``Reset'' Mechanism

Section 801(d) of the CRA provides that, if Congress

adjourns its annual session sine die less than 60 legislative

days in the House of Representatives or 60 session days in

the Senate after a rule is submitted to it, then the periods

to submit and act on a disapproval resolution ``reset'' in

their entirety in the next session of Congress'' The purpose

of this provision is to ensure that both houses of Congress

have sufficient time to consider disapproving rules submitted

during this end-of-session ``carryover period.'' This

provision applies in every session of Congress, but it is of

particular relevance in sessions of Congress that coincide

with presidential transitions. This provision allows, for a

limited time period, a new Congress to consider a joint

resolution disapproving a rule issued late in the previous

administration. If introduced and considered at the proper

time, such a joint resolution cannot be filibustered in the

Senate.

The projected second-session meeting schedules of the House

and Senate issued by each chamber's majority leader may be

used to estimate the date in 2016 after which final rules

submitted to Congress will be subject to the renewed review

periods in 2017 described above. The estimated start of the

reset period for all rules was determined by counting back

from the projected sine die adjournment in the respective

chambers--60 days of session in the Senate and 60 legislative

days in the House--then taking the earlier of the two dates.

Under this calculation, CRS estimates that agency final

rules submitted to Congress on or after June 13, 2016, will

be subject to renewed review periods in 2017 by a new

President and a new Congress. CRS day count estimates are

unofficial and non-binding; the House and Senate

Parliamentarians are the sole definitive arbiters of the

operation of the CRA mechanism and should be consulted if a

formal opinion is desired.

``Major'' Obama Administration Rules Potentially Eligible for

Consideration under the CRA in 2017

Using this estimated reset date of June 13, 2016, CRS

compiled a list of major rules that would fall under this

reset period--i.e., rules that could be overturned in the

115th Congress using the CRA.

Table 1 lists the major rules CRS has identified as of

January 3, 2017, that could be eligible for the reset

mechanism. To identify these rules, CRS used a two-step

process. First, CRS consulted the Government Accountability

Office's (GAO's) federal rules database to identify major

rules that were issued during calendar year 2016 and posted

on GAO's website as of January 3, 2017. Second, CRS used

LIS's ``Executive Communications'' database to identify when

these rules were received in Congress.

Major Rules Issued by the Obama Administration That Are Potentially

Eligible for Disapproval Under the Congressional Review Act in the

115th Congress

major rules listed on gao's website as of january 3, 2017

Title of Rule (As Published in Federal Register) and RIN

Numbers are as follows:

Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities

Offerings, 3235-AL80; Investment Company Liquidity Risk

Management Programs, 3235-AL61; Retention of EB-1, EB-2, and

EB-3 Immigrant Workers and Program Improvements Affecting

High-Skilled NonImmigrant Workers, 1615-ACO5; Walking-Working

Surfaces and Personal Protective Equipment (Fall Protection

Systems), 1216-AB80; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to

Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 1004-AE14; Investment

Company Swing Pricing, 3235-AL61; Establishing a More

Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair

Market Rents in the Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of

the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, 2501-AD74; Medicare

Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician

Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2017;

Medicare Advantage Bid Pricing Data Release; Medicare

Advantage and Part D Medical Loss Ratio Data Release;

Medicare Advantage Provider Network Requirements; Expansion

of Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program Model; Medicare

Shared Savings Program Requirements, 0938-AS81.

Medicare Program; CY 2017 Inpatient Hospital Deductible and

Hospital and Extended Care Services Coinsurance Amounts,

0938-AS70; Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly

Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate,

and Annual Deductible Beginning January 1, 2017, 0938-AS72;

Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory

Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting

Programs; Organ Procurement Organization Reporting and

Communication; Transplant Outcome Measures and Documentation

Requirements; Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive

Programs; Payment to Nonexcepted Off-Campus Provider-Based

Department of a Hospital; Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

(VBP) Program; Establishment of Payment Rates Under the

Medicare Physician Fee Schedule for Nonexcepted Items and

Services Furnished by an Off-Campus Provider-Based Department

of a Hospital, 0938-AS82; Medicare Program; Merit-Based

Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment Model

(APM) Incentive Under the Physician Fee Schedule, and

Criteria for Physician-Focused Payment Models, 0938-AS69;

Medicare and Medicaid Programs; CY 2017 Home Health

Prospective Payment System Rate Update; Home Health Value-

Based Purchasing Model; and Home Health Quality Reporting

Requirements, 0938-AS80; Student Assistance General

Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family

Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan

Program, and Teacher Education Assistance for College and

Higher Education Grant Program, 1840-AD19; Energy

Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for

Miscellaneous Refrigeration Products, 1904-AC51.

Medicaid Program; Final FY 2014 and Preliminary FY 2016

Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotments, and Final FY 2014

and Preliminary FY 2016 Institutions for Mental Diseases

Disproportionate Share Hospital Limits, 0938-ZB30; Cross-

State Air Pollution Rule Update For The 2008 Ozone NAAQS,

2060-AS05; Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency

Standards for Medium-and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles--

Phase 2, 2060-AS16; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Fee Schedule, 1615-AC09; Treatment of Certain Interests in

Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 1545-BN40;

Establishment of the Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS),

1651-ABO8; ONC Health IT Certification Program: Enhanced

Oversight and Accountability, 0955-AA00; Clearing Requirement

Determination Under Section 2(H) of the Commodity Exchange

Act For Interest Rate Swaps, 3038-AE20; Standards For Covered

Clearing Agencies, 3235-AL48.

Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Reform of Requirements for

Long-Term Care Facilities, 0938-AR61; Child Care And

Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 0970-AC67; Establishing Paid

Sick Leave For Federal Contractors, 1235-AA13; OCC Guidelines

Establishing Standards For Recovery Planning By Certain Large

Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations,

And Insured Federal Branches; Technical Amendments, 1557-

AD96; Emergency Preparedness Requirements For Medicare And

Medicaid Participating Providers And Suppliers, 0938-A091;

Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations On Certain Federal Indian

Reservations And Ceded Lands For The 2016-17 Season, 1018-

BA70; Safety And Effectiveness Of Consumer Antiseptics;

Topical Antimicrobial Drug Products For Over-The-Counter-

Human Use, 0910-AF69; Head Start Performance Standards, 0970-

AC63; Standards Of Performance For Municipal Solid Waste

Landfills, 2060-AMO8; Emission Guidelines And Compliance

Times For Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 2060-AS23.

Federal Acquisition Regulation; Fair Pay And Safe

Workplaces, 9000-AM81; Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient

Prospective Payment Systems For Acute Care Hospitals And The

Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System & Policy

Changes & Fiscal Year 2017 Rates; Quality Reporting

Requirements For Specific Providers; Graduate Medical

Education; Hospital Notification Procedures Applicable To

Beneficiaries Receiving Observation Services; Technical

Changes Relating To Costs To Organizations & Medicare Cost

Reports; Finalization Of Interim Final Rules With Comment

Period On LTCH PPS Payments For Severe Wounds, Modifications

Of Limitations On Redesignation By The Medicare Geographic

Classification Review Board, & Extensions Of Payments To MDHS

And Low-Volume Hospitals, 0938-A577; 0938-A588; 0938-AS41;

Workforce Innovation And Opportunity Act; Joint Rule For

Unified And Combined State Plans, Performance Accountability,

And The One-Stop System Joint Provisions; Final Rule, 1205-

AB74; Workforce Innovation And Opportunity Act, 1205-AB73;

Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System And Consolidated

Billing For Skilled Nursing Facilities For FY 2017, SNF

Value-Based Purchasing Program, SNF Quality Reporting

Program, And SNF Payment Models Research, 0938-AS75.

Medicare Program; Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility

Prospective Payment System For Federal Fiscal Year 2017,

0938-AS78; Medicare Program; FF 2017 Hospice Wage Index And

Payment Rate Update And Hospice Quality Reporting

Requirements, 0938-AS79; Margin And Capital Requirements For

Covered Swap Entities, 3052-AC69; Medicare Program; FY 2017

Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities Prospective Payment System--

Rate Update, 0938-AS76; National School Lunch Program And

School Breakfast Program. Nutrition Standards For All Foods

Sold In School As Required By The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids

Act Of 2010, 0584-AE09; Revised Critical Infrastructure

Protection Reliability Standards No RIN provided; Amendments

To The Commission's Rules Of Practice, 3235-AL87; Disclosure

Of Payments By Resource Extraction Issuers, 3235-AL53;

Migratory Bird Hunting; Seasons And Bag And Possession Limits

For Certain Migratory Game Birds, 1018-BA70; Oil And Gas And

Sulfur Operations On The Outer Continental Shelf--

Requirements For Exploratory Drilling On The Arctic Outer

Continental Shelf, 1082-AA00.

Medication Assisted Treatment For Opioid Use Disorders,

0930-AA22; Department Of Labor Federal Civil Penalties

Inflation Adjustment Act Catch-Up Adjustments, 1290-AA31;

General Administrative Regulations; Catastrophic Risk

Protection Endorsement; Area Risk Protection Insurance

Regulations; And The Common Crop Insurance Regulations, Basic

Provisions, 0563-AC49; Transition Assistance Program (TAP)

For Military Personnel, 0790-AJ17; Operation And

Certification Of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2120-AJ60;

Transit Asset Management, National Transit Database; FTA-

2014-0020, 092132-ABO7; Revision Of Fee Schedules; Fee

Recovery For Fiscal Year 2016, 3150-AJ66; Medicare Program;

Medicare Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests Payment System,

0938-AS33; James Zadroga 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund

Reauthorization Act, 1105-AB49; Energy Conservation Program:

Energy Conservation Standards For Battery Chargers, 1904-

AB57; Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation

Standards For Dehumidifiers, 1904-AC81; Removal Of Mandatory

Country Of Origin Labeling Requirements For Beef And Pork

Muscle Cuts, Ground Beef, And Ground Pork, 0581-AD29.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Velazquez).

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 527, the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, threatens to substantially undermine agencies' abilities to effectively regulate areas such as consumer health and product safety, environmental protections, workplace safety, and financial industry misconduct.

Under the guise of protecting small businesses from allegedly burdensome regulatory requirements, this bill is just another attempt to prevent regulatory agencies from promulgating regulations that promote and protect the health and safety of Americans, overwhelm regulatory agencies with unnecessary and costly analysis, and give well-financed businesses and antiregulatory organizations even more opportunities to thwart the rulemaking process.

This explains why the administration has threatened to veto this legislation, stating that the bill would seriously undermine the ability of agencies to execute their statutory mandates and would impede the ability of agencies to provide the public with basic protections.

It also explains why many of the Nation's leading consumer, labor, and environmental organizations have expressed similar concerns about this ``dangerous'' measure, including the AFL-CIO, the American Lung Association, the Consumer Federation of America, the Consumers Union, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Public Citizen, the United Auto Workers, and the National Women's Law Center.

One of my principal concerns about this bill is that it could jeopardize America's health and safety. Our Federal agencies are charged with promulgating regulations that impact virtually every aspect of our lives, including the air we breathe, the water we drink, the food we eat, the cars we drive, and even the toys we give our children.

Small businesses, like all businesses, provide services and goods that also affect our lives. It makes no difference to a victim who breathes contaminated air or who drinks poisoned water whether the hazards were caused by a small or a large business. The far-reaching legislation before us today would undermine the ability of Federal agencies to quickly respond to emergent health and safety concerns.

Section 5 of the bill, for example, repeals the authority under the current law that allows an agency to waive or delay the initial analysis required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act in response to an emergency that makes timely compliance impracticable. So, if there is a widespread E. coli outbreak or an imminent environmental disaster that could be quickly addressed through regulation, this bill says: Don't worry. Don't rush. Let's have the Chief Counsel for Advocacy decide.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson).

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would like to continue our discussion on this side.

Another problem with this bill, my colleagues, is that it will waste millions of taxpayer dollars by forcing agencies to redirect their scarce resources to meet the bill's burdensome compliance requirements. Section 6 of the bill, for example, would require agencies to review not only all rules currently in effect, but, in addition, all guidance documents in effect as of the bill's date of enactment. Now, we are talking about thousands of pages of regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations and several hundred thousand guidance documents.

So, what is to be gained by that?

Thus, it is no wonder that the Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would cost $45 million over a 5-year period to implement the new requirements imposed under a substantively similar bill considered in the last Congress. Rather than burdening agencies responsible for protecting our health and safety, we should be exploring constructive ways to help small business comply with these regulations.

Finally, this bill will do little to help small businesses, while simultaneously giving corporate interests increased control over the rulemaking process. The bill's expansion in section 8 of judicial review to include challenges to the adequacy of regulatory flexibility analysis would open the door to endless litigation by well-funded antiregulatory business interests who could challenge agency compliance with the legislation's numerous vague, speculative, and cumbersome analytical and other requirements.

I think we get the drift here, where they are going and where they are coming from. I share my colleagues' belief that small business plays an important role in our economy, but this bill does nothing to alleviate the burden, the purported burden on small entities of complying with Federal regulations. In fact, it includes no provision that offers assistance to small entities, whether through subsidies, government-guaranteed loans, preferential tax treatment for small firms, or fully funded compliance assistance offices. Instead, the bill merely aggrandizes the power of the professional lobbying class in Washington, creating opportunities for a well-funded business interest to intervene in the process.

This is a very harmful bill that puts the health and safety of all Americans at risk, while adding nothing to the efficiency or cost- effectiveness of agency rulemaking. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose this dangerous legislation.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chairman, my amendment would preserve the ability of agencies to quickly respond to emergencies that threaten America's health and safety by striking one of the most pernicious elements of this legislation.

Section 5 of H.R. 527 contains one of the bill's most problematic provisions. As drafted, it could undermine the ability of agencies to quickly respond to emergent health and safety risks.

So this section repeals the authority under current law that allows an agency to waive or delay the initial analysis required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act ``in response to an emergency that makes compliance or timely compliance impracticable.''

Rather than leave this critical exception under current law in place, section 5 replaces it with a provision empowering the Chief Counsel for Advocacy to issue regulations about how agencies, in general, should comply with the act, without any provision allowing agencies to respond to emergencies through expedited rulemakings.

Thus, if there is a looming national pandemic or environmental disaster that could be avoided or mitigated through regulation, the bill prevents agencies from responding to such emergencies without first having to go through the arduous and time-consuming task of review and analysis.

For example, last year, OSHA issued guidance to assist hospitals in preparing to provide inpatient care for Ebola patients.

H.R. 527, however, would have significantly delayed this process. This is because the legislation broadly applies to both rules and interim guidance, requiring agencies to undertake a burdensome analysis and review process prior to issuing even interim guidance.

And because H.R. 527 eliminates the emergency exception, there would have been no way for OSHA to quickly act in the face of a possible Ebola outbreak.

This amendment would simply preserve the critical emergency exception under current law so that agencies can quickly respond to emergencies without being hampered or second-guessed by others.

I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

So if there is a looming environmental disaster or a national pandemic like Ebola that could be mitigated through regulation, this bill says: ``Don't worry, don't rush. Let's have the Office of Advocacy decide.''

And what is this Office of Advocacy?

Well, it is an office that is woefully ill-equipped to fulfill its current responsibilities. So I urge support for the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, I inadvertently did not vote during Roll Call #64 on passage of H.R. 50, the Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2015. Had I voted, I would have voted ``nay.''

personal explanation

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor one of the most prominent and important civil liberties and civil rights advocates of our time--my friend, Laura W. Murphy. Laura is the longest serving director of the Washington Legislative Office of the American Civil Liberties Union, and will be stepping down at the end of the month. It is my pleasure to honor her public service and to wish her well in her next chapter. Most recently, Laura was instrumental in advising Attorney General Eric Holder and the United States Sentencing Commission on ways to reduce overcrowding among federal prison populations. She worked closely with Attorney General Holder and leaders of the House and Senate in passing the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, a law that reduced the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, which ignited a movement to finally begin to end racial disparities in our criminal justice system. Among Laura's other profound legislative accomplishments was working closely with Congress and the White House to build support for essential and federally funded reproductive health services for servicemembers and their dependents in cases of rape and incest. This was among the few abortion rights victories of the last 40 years.

Laura has been a leading voice in Washington, D.C. and throughout the country for freedom of speech, including her office's tireless efforts to preserve the First Amendment in the face of calls for a constitutional amendment that would lead to laws against so-called flag desecration, that would restrict internet free speech, and that would censor lyrics in rap and other music genres. She has been a tenacious advocate for checks and balances to prevent abuses by Intelligence agencies and finally rolling back the significant overreach of the USA Patriot Act. Her work on LGBT rights, mass incarceration and racial profiling, comprehensive immigration reform, privacy, reproductive rights, and voting rights has been peerless.

Laura is a familiar face in Congress, and among the few people who can call both Representative Maxine Waters and Senator Mitch McConnell friends, an advocate who has shown the nation how to achieve bipartisan success in these hyper-partisan times. She has testified more than a dozen times before the House and Senate and is a frequent contributor to national dialogue on critical legislative issues. One of the ACLU's most prominent spokespersons, Laura is also an author, including book chapters on homeland security and the African American community's response to the 9/11 attacks. Repeatedly named among the most influential advocates in Washington, D.C. and frequently cited by the Washington Post, Laura has been an important voice for more than four decades, advising U.S. Presidents from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama.

We in Congress are losing not only a tireless advocate for civil liberties and civil rights, we are losing a dear friend, respected and admired by all who know her. I am hopeful that she will remain close at hand and active in the fight for basic American values. Those closest to her know that fighting for justice is in Laura's DNA--she is a direct descendent of one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, Philip Livingston.

I urge you to join me in wishing Laura Murphy all the best, to congratulate her as she faces new adventures, and to thank her for her many years of service.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 7, the so-called No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act.

Today, on the 42nd anniversary of Roe v. Wade, the majority is launching yet another attack on women's health and constitutionally protected right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term.

Most importantly, this bill will make it virtually impossible for a woman to obtain abortion services even when paid for with purely private, non-Federal funds. Through its novel tax penalty provisions, H.R. 7 departs radically from existing law, taking away women's existing health care and placing their health and lives at risk.

And despite the claims of its sponsors, H.R. 7 does not codify current law, and it is not about the regulation of Federal funds. There is no Federal funding of abortion due to the Hyde amendment, and the Affordable Care Act maintains that policy and law.

For more than 30 years, Congress has prohibited Federal funding of abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother, through provisions like the Hyde amendment in annual appropriations bills. Nothing in the Affordable Care Act changes this.

Finally, H.R. 7 also eradicates the authority of the District of Columbia to make decisions about how appropriated funds are used for the health care of the District's citizens.

So what is H.R. 7 really about? Plain and simple, it is an assault on women's health and freedom. It permanently blocks abortion coverage for low-income women, civil servants, D.C. residents, and the military. No committee has considered this legislation. Text was not even available until last night, when the Rules Committee met in a so-called emergency meeting. But the only emergency was the majority didn't have the votes to pass another mean-spirited, anti-choice bill so they are rushing to the floor with this bill in time for the anniversary of Roe v. Wade.

Isn't it time to stop playing politics with women's lives and start governing? Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose this egregious bill.

Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chair, I am very disturbed by the nature of this Blackburn amendment because it would prevent the use of Federal funds or resources to consider or adjudicate any new, renewal, or any previously denied application for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, DACA, or any subsequently similar program. This amendment is similar to the same Blackburn bill that passed the House in August of 2014.

This amendment clearly terminates the DACA program, the DREAMers, ladies and gentlemen, my colleagues. The amendment prevents new persons from applying for DACA and explicitly prohibits further efforts to renew deferred action under this amendment.

Hundreds of thousands of young people who came forward, passed background checks, obtained DACA, and have since followed the law would be deportable at the end of their 2-year deferred action period. This is serious; it is dangerous.

The amendment is anti-immigrant and antifamily. This is a vote to deport DREAMers. These applicants who have applied have positive impacts on both job growth and economy.

The amendment would leave DACA applicants without work authorization and would expose many of them to deportation to a country that they don't even know. We should be passing legislation to keep DACA recipients in our country because they have a net impact on our communities.

The amendment is one more of the same anti-immigrant-type rhetoric that has dominated conservatives and is further evidence that the majority is not interested in fixing our broken immigration system, but is only interested in penalizing members of our community who seek to work, go to school, and remain with their family.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez).

Madam Chair and members of the committee, I oppose the Schock amendment for many of the numerous reasons that have already been stated by our colleagues, but I want to make sure that we are all perfectly clear on what is occurring on the House floor today.

The majority is, unfortunately, playing politics with the lives, safety, and security of the American people. The ideologues are holding funding hostage for the Homeland Security Department here today. That is not right. They would rather deport DREAMers--the kids and their parents--rather than fund the Department of Homeland Security.

In the wake of the recent Paris tragedy, we need to remain vigilant with smart enforcement policies that protect Americans. The Department of Homeland Security plays a central role in our fight against terror, and we must fully fund the efforts as soon as possible. We should not be attaching poison pill amendments to this important legislation.

I urge all of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to really join us and govern with a sense of far more responsibility.

Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Members of the House, I strongly oppose H.R. 185, the so-called Regulatory Accountability Act. Under the guise of attempting to improve the regulatory process, H.R. 185 will, in truth, undermine that process. It invites increased industry intervention and imposes more than 60--6-0--new analytical requirements that could add years to the regulatory process.

They make no bones about it in this bill. As a result, H.R. 185 would seriously hamper the ability of government agencies to safeguard public health and safety, as well as environmental protections, workplace safety, and consumer financial protections. That is what we are debating at this moment.

My greatest concern is that H.R. 185 will undermine the public health, safety, and well-being of Americans. The ways in which it does it are almost too numerous to list here, but I will mention a few.

First, H.R. 185 would override critical laws that prohibit agencies from considering costs when public health and safety are at stake. Imagine, we would pass a law that would override critical laws that prohibit agencies from considering costs when public health and safety are at stake, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

This means that agency officials will now be required to balance the costs of an air pollution standard with the costs of anticipated deaths and illnesses that will result in the absence of such regulations.

At a hearing on an earlier version of this bill in the 112th Congress, one witness--our witness--testified that if this measure were in effect in the 1970s, the government ``almost certainly would not have required the removal of most lead from gasoline until perhaps decades later.''

This explains why numerous respected agencies, consumer organizations, public interest groups, labor movements, and environmental organizations all strongly oppose this dangerous legislation.

For example, the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards--consisting of more than 70 national public interest, labor, consumer, and environmental organizations--say the bill will ``grind to a halt the rulemaking process at the core of implementing the Nation's public health, workplace safety, and environmental standards.''

Another organization, very much respected, the Natural Resources Defense Council, adds that the practical impact of the measure before us now, H.R. 185, ``would be to make it difficult, if not impossible, to put in place any new safeguards for the public, no matter what the issue.''

Now, I am not sure if the authors of this measure understand the deep criticism and reservation that the scientific and academic community have about the practical impact of this measure.

Another, the Consumer Federation of America states that H.R. 185 ``would handcuff all Federal agencies in their efforts to protect consumers'' and that it ``would override important bipartisan laws that have been in effect for years, as well as more recently-enacted laws to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive financial services, unsafe food, and unsafe consumer products.''

Do we understand what it is we are dealing with here this day?

Further, the AFL-CIO warns that the bill's procedural and analytical requirements add years to the regulatory process--adds years to the regulatory process--delaying the development of major workplace safety rules and will ``cost workers their lives.''

As more than 80 highly-respected administrative law academics and practitioners observe, the bill's many ill-defined new procedural and analytical requirements will engender ``20 or 30 years of litigation before its requirements are clearly understood.'' What do we have in mind? What is trying to be accomplished here?

My next concern is that this legislation would give well-funded business interests the opportunity to exert even greater influence over the rulemaking process and agencies.

We already know that the ability of corporate and business interests to influence agency rulemaking far exceeds that by groups representing the public. In other words, the groups representing the public already have less influence to influence agency rulemaking, and we are here proposing in broad daylight to make it even worse, much worse.

But rather than leveling the playing field, this measure will further tip the balance in favor of business interests by giving them multiple opportunities to intervene in the rulemaking process, including through less differential judicial review.

Finally, this measure is based on the faulty premise that regulations result in economically stifling costs, kill jobs, and promote uncertainty.

While supporters of H.R. 185 will undoubtedly cite a study claiming the cost of regulation exceed $1.8 trillion, the Congressional Research Service, Center for Progressive Reform, and the Economic Policy Institute all found that a prior iteration of this study was based on incomplete and irrelevant data.

In fact, the majority's own witnesses at a hearing on nearly identical legislation clearly debunked this argument. Mr. Christopher DeMuth, who appeared on behalf of the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, testified that the employment effects of regulation ``are indeterminant.''

The other central argument put forth by proponents of this legislation--that regulatory uncertainty hurts businesses--has similarly been debunked.

Bruce Bartlett, a senior policy analyst in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations observes:

Regulatory uncertainty is a canard invented by Republicans

that allows them to use current economic problems to pursue

an agenda supported by the business community year in and

year out. In other words, it is a simple case of political

opportunism, not a serious effort to deal with high

unemployment.

That is from a Bush administrator, who was a senior policy analyst in the Reagan administration, Bruce Bartlett.

Not surprisingly, the administration issued a strong veto threat just yesterday, stating that the bill ``would impose unprecedented and unnecessary procedural requirements on agencies that will prevent them from efficiently performing their statutory responsibilities.''

Rather than heeding these serious concerns, the supporters of H.R. 185 simply want to push forward without any hearings, markups, or deliberative process in this Congress with a bill that has absolutely no political viability.

I urge, I plead with my colleagues to oppose this very dangerous legislation, and, Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia, Hank Johnson, a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee

I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), one of our most effective members of the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Chair, I am pleased now to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), a man who has served the House Judiciary Committee with great distinction.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Grijalva).

Mr. Chairman, I yield Mr. Grijalva another minute.

Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on both sides?

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I notice that my friends on the other side have not named one person, academic scholar, or organization that supports this measure. I would now like to identify the letters that we have received on our side that have been very critical--very disturbed--by the gross approach of the authors of this measure.

Supporting us and opposing the bill is the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. The AFL-CIO is opposed to this measure. The American Bar Association is opposed. The Americans for Financial Reform is opposed.

The Center for Effective Government is opposed. The Center for Progressive Reform is opposed. The Center for Responsible Lending is opposed. The Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, representing more than 70 national consumer, public interest, labor, and environmental organizations and more than 80 State and local organizations and affiliates is opposed.

The Consumer Federation of America is opposed. The Consumers Union is opposed to this measure. The Natural Resources Defense Council does not support this measure. Public Citizen is opposed to this. United Steelworkers is opposed. The Union of Concerned Scientists is opposed. The United States PIRG, which is the Public Interest Research Group, is opposed.

Ladies and gentlemen, I think that our case against this measure has been well-made.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Ladies and gentlemen of the House, last evening, the President of the United States indicated that he will not sign this bill, that he will veto it if it were to pass, and I am hoping that that doesn't happen.

The measure fails in a great way. It would create needless regulatory and legal uncertainty and would further impede the implementation protections for the American public.

This bill would make the regulatory process more expensive, less flexible, and more burdensome, dramatically increasing the costs of regulation of the American taxpayer and working class families.

This is an incredible situation that we have to debate here. I am hopeful that the logic, the rationale, the threat of the executive branch to veto the bill will all cause us to carefully consider how unnecessary this measure is. I urge that we not support H.R. 185.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the McKinley amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the McKinley amendment--as bad as things already are in the bill--adds an additional requirement to the bill's more than 60 analytical new requirements for the rulemaking process by requiring agencies to also consider economic competitiveness and impact on low-income populations in the rulemaking process. Now, the AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, and Coalition for Sensible Safeguards all oppose this amendment because it is redundant and inflexible.

This amendment is largely redundant of existing requirements. Executive Order 12898 already protects both low-income communities and communities of color. That executive order already requires agencies to take into account distributional impacts on these populations. So I want you to know that this is not the way to go. This amendment makes a totally unacceptable bill even more unacceptable.

I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson).

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a wolf in sheep's clothing. It would not change the bill's overarching regulatory purpose, nor does it address the many concerns expressed by scores of public interest groups that strenuously oppose the bill.

I think the President is very sensitive to the working class, the poor, and minorities especially, and I enjoy hearing this commentary coming from the other side of the aisle.

If the majority were serious about protecting the low-income population, it would have made in order the amendment offered by our colleague from Illinois, Bobby Rush, to promote environmental justice. The Rush amendment would have safeguarded existing protections while mitigating the devastating consequences of H.R. 185 on both minority and low-income populations.

I repeat, AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, and the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards all oppose the McKinley amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I want to say to my colleague on Judiciary, Ms. Jackson Lee, that this amendment is very important. It exempts any rule promulgated by Homeland Security, and as a result of this amendment, current law would apply to the Department of Homeland Security.

This is a very perceptive and important part of us moving forward on a really critical consideration because H.R. 185 will stall or prevent rulemaking, and it is essential that the Department of Homeland Security not be encumbered by such burdensome requirements.

Summary: This amendment exempts any rule promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from H.R. 185. As a result of this amendment, current law would apply to DHS.

This amendment is necessary because H.R. 185 will stall or prevent rulemaking and it is essential that the DHS not be encumbered by such burdensome requirements.

Effective rulemaking is a critical tool for DHS to be able to protect the Nation from acts of terrorism and to help communities recover from natural disasters, among many other things.

For instance, DHS has already proposed several rules to safeguard maritime security, as well as a rule proposed by the Coast Guard to revise regulations relating to the construction, design, equipment of deep-water ports that are used as terminals for importing and exporting oil and natural gas. This rule would provide for regulatory flexibility, while also preventing another environmental catastrophe like Deepwater Horizon.

DHS has also proposed a series of rules to protect against discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex. This rule guarantees the equal treatment of persons in all DHS programs under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

These proposed rules clearly demonstrate the need for this amendment, which underscores the importance of rulemaking across a wide spectrum of concerns.

Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman on his amendment.

Mr. Chair, this amendment would exempt from H.R. 185 all rules or guidance that relate to health or public safety, including food safety, workplace safety, consumer product safety, air quality, or water quality. Existing APA procedures would continue to apply to these types of rules.

The amendment highlights the real-world consequences of H.R. 185, which would be to stifle agencies' ability to promulgate rules that protect public health and safety.

Among other things, H.R. 185 requires agencies to perform cumbersome and lengthy cost-benefit analyses of all rules. Worst of all, it would override substantive provisions of numerous statutes, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, that prohibit or limit agencies from considering cost.

For instance, the Food and Drug Administration has begun proposing rules and guidance under the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), which was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in 2011, representing the most substantial reform to food safety in over 70 years.

In November 2014, the FDA proposed rules to implement this Act to prevent foodborne illness outbreaks associated with contaminated produce, among other things.

According to the Center for Disease Control, one in six Americans get sick every year from foodborne diseases, affecting about 48 million people yearly. Of these, 3,000 people die every year from these diseases, which are largely preventable.

Without this amendment, H.R. 185 would drown the FDA in additional requirements prior to issuing new rules to protect Americans from the contamination of produce and other rules that are critical to keeping the U.S. food supply safe.

The cumulative effect of these and the other changes wrought by H.R. 185 would be to substantially undermine agencies' ability to effectively regulate consumer health and product safety, environmental protection, workplace safety, and financial services industry misconduct, among other critical concerns, while doing little to help small businesses shape or comply with federal regulations.

Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regularly has reported to Congress that the benefits of regulations far exceed their costs.

Effective rulemaking is a critical tool for agencies to protect the public health and safety, from clean air and water to emergency transportation rules designed to keep Americans safe while traveling abroad.

Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chair, today the Majority has chosen to hold the Department of Homeland Security hostage with their extreme anti- immigrant policies. Rather than pass a bipartisan bill that would fund the agency tasked with securing our border and protecting our citizens from terrorism and violence--the Majority will consider poison pill amendments to appease an extreme faction of their party.

Playing politics with our national security is not responsible governance.

First, the Republican party is playing politics with the lives, safety and security of the American people. In the wake of the recent Paris tragedy, it is all too apparent that we need smart enforcement policies that protect the American people and root out any terror threats. The Department of Homeland Security plays a central role in our fight against terror, both in the United States and around the world and we should fully fund their efforts as soon as possible. We should not be debating ``poison pill'' amendments that have no chance of becoming law and will only further delay the funding of DHS.

Second, the Republican party is showing the American people that they only immigration policy they believe in is ``mass deportation.'' They have attached several policy riders to this appropriations bill that would further separate families, including the families of military service members and U.S. citizens.

Third, the amendments that we will later consider will prevent DHS from implementing smart enforcement policies, including ones that prioritize deporting felons before families. These smart policies allow DHS to focus valuable resources on individuals with criminal convictions and not immigrants with U.S. citizen and legal permanent resident family members.

I urge my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to stop playing politics with our national security and start governing.

Mr. Speaker, today, as Ranking Member and former Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, I join with my colleague, Rep. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, the former Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, in celebrating the life and recognizing the accomplishments of Karen Wilkinson, who sadly passed away on January 5.

Karen was a dedicated public servant, highly valued counsel to the Committee, and beloved colleague.

We were fortunate to get to know Karen through her work for the Committee in 2008 and 2009. During that time, Karen, an Assistant Federal Public Defender, was a detailee from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Her detail was the first of a Federal Public Defender to Congress. After her work with the Committee, she returned to Phoenix, Arizona to continue representing indigent clients in federal criminal cases, which she had done for eight years before coming to the Committee. Prior to that, she clerked for the U.S. District Court for Arizona and then joined the law firm of Brown & Bain. Karen graduated magna cum laude from Arizona State University Law School, received a Masters in Business Administration from Nova University and her Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Michigan.

Karen's accomplishments during her tenure with the Committee include a number of bills that dealt with issues that are very important to improving our country's criminal justice system. During the 111th Congress, she was responsible for guiding several legislative measures to approval on the floor of the House of Representatives, including: H.R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009; H.R. 632, the National Silver Alert Act 2009; H.R. 748, CAMPUS Safety Act of 2009; H.R. 908, the Missing Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert Program Reauthorization Act of 2009; H.R. 1333, amending chapter 40 of title 18 of the United States Code to exempt the transportation, shipment, receipt, or importation of explosive materials for delivery to a federally recognized Indian tribes; H.R. 1727, the Managing Arson Through Criminal History, MATCH, Act; H.R. 1933, a Child is Missing Alert and Recovery Center Act; S. 1289, the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act of 2009, and H.R. 2661, the Court Security Enhancement Act of 2009.

In addition, she served as lead counsel on several other very important bills under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee in the 111th Congress, such as: H.R. 503, the Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2009; H.R. 2289, the Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009; H.R. 2095, the Restitution for the Exonerated Act; H.R. 1149, the Child Protection Reauthorization Act of 2009 and H.R. 1422, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Reauthorization Act of 2009. Karen also developed proposals subsequently introduced as the Literacy Education and Rehabilitation Act, a bill to require a criminal defense representative to be appointed to the

United States Sentencing Commission, the Firearm Recidivist Sentencing Act, and legislation to correct the computation of good time credit in the federal prison system. Her work in developing H.R. 3327, the Ramos- Compean Justice Act of 2009, has led to subsequent bipartisan, bicameral introduction of that bill, now known as the Justice Safety Valve Act. This bill has become one of the critical proposals under consideration as a growing consensus in the country is recognizing the need to reform our sentencing laws in order to achieve greater fairness, save unnecessary costs in the criminal justice system, and reduce recidivism. These bills to reform the criminal justice system, developed through her efforts, are a lasting legacy of her dedication to achieving fairness and justice for all.

Karen's dedication to these issues during her time working for the Committee was representative of the professionalism and commitment she showed as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in representing her clients and vindicating their rights to equal and fair treatment under the law.

Today, we remember and appreciate Karen Wilkinson's dedication to public service, her commitment to fairness, her wise counsel, and the friendships she developed with us and her Judiciary Committee colleagues. We will honor her by pledging to advance the causes that were her life's calling.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following.

Summary

When a municipality files for bankruptcy, its employees and

retirees who have devoted their lives to public service--such

as police officers, firefighters, sanitation workers and

office personnel--risk having their hard-earned wages,

pensions and health benefits cut or even eliminated.

This is why I am introducing the ``Protecting Employees and

Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies Act of 2015.'' This

legislation strengthens protections for employees and

retirees under chapter 9 municipality bankruptcy cases by:

(1) clarifying the criteria that a municipality must meet

before it can obtain chapter 9 bankruptcy relief; (2)

ensuring that the interests of employees and retirees are

represented in the chapter 9 case; and (3) imposing

heightened standards that a municipality must meet before it

may modify any collective bargaining agreement or retiree

benefit.

While many municipalities often work to limit the impact of

budget cuts on their employees and retirees, as demonstrated

in the chapter 9 plan of adjustment approved by Detroit's

public employees and retirees, other municipalities could try

to use current bankruptcy law to set aside collective

bargaining agreements and retiree protections.

My legislation addresses this risk by requiring the

municipality to engage in meaningful good faith negotiations

with its employees and retirees before the municipality can

apply for chapter 9 bankruptcy relief. This measure would

also expedite the appellate review process of whether a

municipality has complied with this and other requirements.

And, the bill ensures employees and retirees have a say in

any plan that would modify their benefits.

Section-by-Section Explanation

Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 of the bill sets forth the

short title of the bill as the ``Protecting Employees and

Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies Act of 2015.''

Sec. 2. Determination of Municipality Eligibility To Be a

Debtor Under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the United States Code.

A municipality can petition to be a debtor under chapter 9, a

specialized form of bankruptcy relief, only if a bankruptcy

court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the

municipality satisfies certain criteria specified in

Bankruptcy Code section 109. In the absence of obtaining the

consent of a majority of its creditors, section 109 requires

the municipality, in pertinent part, to have negotiated in

good faith with its creditors or prove that it is unable to

negotiate with its creditors because such negotiation is

impracticable.

Section 2(a) of the bill amends Bankruptcy Code section 109

in three respects. First, it provides clear guidance to the

bankruptcy court that the term ``good faith'' is intended to

have the same meaning as it has under the National Labor

Relations Act at least with respect to creditors who are

employees or retirees of the debtor. Second, section 2(a)

revises the standard for futility of negotiation from

``impracticable'' to ``impossible.'' This change ensures that

before a municipality may avail itself of chapter 9

bankruptcy relief it must prove that there was no possible

way it could have engaged in negotiation in lieu of seeking

such relief. Third, the amendment clarifies that the standard

of proof that the municipality must meet is ``clear and

convincing'' rather than a preponderance of the evidence.

These revisions to section 109 will provide greater guidance

to the bankruptcy court in assessing whether a municipality

has satisfied the Bankruptcy Code's eligibility requirements

for being granted relief under chapter 9.

Bankruptcy Code section 921(e), in relevant part, prohibits

a bankruptcy court from ordering a stay of any proceeding

arising in a chapter 9 case on account of an appeal from an

order granting a municipality's petition to be a debtor under

chapter 9. Section 2(b) strikes this prohibition thereby

allowing a court to issue a stay of any proceeding during the

pendency of such an appeal. This ensures that the status quo

can be maintained until there is a final appellate

determination of whether a municipality is legally eligible

to be a chapter 9 debtor.

Typically, an appeal of a bankruptcy court decision is

heard by a district or bankruptcy appellate panel court.

Under limited circumstances, however, a direct appeal from a

bankruptcy court decision may be heard by a court of appeals.

Until a final determination is made as to whether a

municipality is eligible to be a debtor under chapter 9 of

the Bankruptcy Code, the rights and responsibilities of

numerous stakeholders are unclear. To expedite the appellate

process and promote greater certainty to all stakeholders in

the case, section 2(c) of the bill allows an appeal of a

bankruptcy court order granting a municipality's petition to

be a chapter 9 debtor to be filed directly with the court of

appeals. In addition, section 2(c) requires the court of

appeals to hear such appeal de novo on the merits as well as

to determine it on an expedited basis. Finally, section 2(c)

specifies that the doctrine of equitable mootness does not

apply to such an appeal.

Sec. 3. Protecting Employees and Retirees. The chapter 9

debtor must file a plan for the

adjustment of the municipality's debts that then must be

confirmed by the bankruptcy court if it satisfies certain

criteria specified in Bankruptcy Code section 943. Section 3

of the bill makes several amendments to current law intended

to ensure that interests of municipal employees and retirees

are better protected. With respect to plan confirmation

requirements, section 3 amends Bankruptcy Code section 943 to

require consent from such employees and retirees to any plan

that impairs--in a manner prohibited by nonbankruptcy law--a

collective bargaining agreement, a retiree benefit, including

an accrued pension, retiree health, or other retirement

benefit protected by state or municipal law or as defined in

Bankruptcy Code section 1114(a).

Such consent would be conveyed to the court by the

authorized representative of such individuals. Subject to

certain exceptions, section 3 specifies that the authorized

representative of individuals receiving any retirement

benefits pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is the

labor organization that signed such agreement unless such

organization no longer represents active employees. Where the

organization no longer represents active employees of the

municipality, the labor organization that currently

represents active employees in that bargaining unit is the

authorized representative of such individuals.

Section 3 provides that the exceptions apply if: (1) the

labor organization chooses not to serve as the authorized

representative; or (2) the court determines, after a motion

by a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, that

different representation is appropriate. Under either

circumstance, the court, upon motion by any party in interest

and after notice and a hearing, must order the United States

Trustee to appoint a committee of retired employees if the

debtor seeks to modify or not pay the retiree benefits or if

the court otherwise determines that it is appropriate for

that committee be comprised of such individuals to serve as

the authorized representative.

With respect to retired employees not covered by a

collective bargaining agreement, the court, on motion by a

party in interest after notice and a hearing, must order the

United States Trustee to appoint a committee of retired

employees if the debtor seeks to modify or not pay retiree

benefits, or if the court otherwise determines that it is

appropriate to serve as the authorized representative of such

employees. Section 3 provides that the party requesting the

appointment of a committee has the burden of proof.

Where the court grants a motion for the appointment of a

retiree committee, section 3 requires the United States

Trustee to choose individuals to serve on the committee on a

proportional basis per capita based on organization

membership from among members of the organizations that

represent the individuals with respect to whom such order is

entered. This requirement ensures that the committee, in a

case where there are multiple labor organizations, fairly

represents the interests of the members of those various

organizations on a proportional basis.

Finally, section 3 of the bill imposes a significant

threshold that must be met before retiree benefits can be

reduced or eliminated. Current law has no such requirement.

In a case where the municipality proposes in its plan to

impair any right to a retiree benefit, section 3 permits the

committee to support such impairment only if at least two-

thirds of its members vote in favor of doing so.

Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing two bills to help hold accountable corporations who market dangerous products and who violate the law. We rely on corporations to provide necessary goods and services to consumers and to provide jobs for our citizens. Unfortunately, sometimes corporations engage in acts that may harm us or that otherwise run afoul of the law. That is why I am introducing these measures.

The Dangerous Products Warning Act concerns businesses who learn that products they are marketing are dangerous but who do not inform the appropriate federal agency or warn the public.

It amends the federal criminal code to impose a fine and/or prison term of up to 5 years on any business entity or product supervisor with respect to a product or business practice who knows of a serious danger associated with such product or business practice and knowingly fails within 15 days after discovering such danger to inform an appropriate federal agency in writing, warn affected employees in writing, and inform other affected individuals. The bill imposes a fine and/or prison term of up to 1 year on any individual who intentionally discriminates against an employee who informs a federal agency or warns employees of a serious danger associated with a product or business practice.

The Corporate Crime Database Act deals with the concern that the public has inadequate means of learning about the degree to which companies are engaging in acts in violation of the law, and sets up a mechanism to track such violations and make the information available to the public.

The bill directs the Attorney General to: (1) acquire data, for each calendar year, regarding all administrative, civil, and criminal judicial proceedings against any corporation or corporate official involving a felony or misdemeanor or civil charge where potential fines may be $1,000 or more; (2) establish and maintain a publicly available website on improper conduct by all corporations with annual revenues of more than $1 billion; and (3) prepare an annual report to Congress detailing the number of civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement actions brought against any corporation or corporate official and the final dispositions of such actions.

With the enactment of these two bills, we would take important steps toward protecting our citizens from harm and empowering them to know which corporations are violating our laws.

Mr. Speaker, today, I am introducing an important bill to respond to the crisis that some jurisdictions are facing with respect to hiring police officers and funding programs to enhance public safety. This bill would establish two public safety grant programs.

Section 2 establishes Shield Police Hiring Grants, to be implemented by the Attorney General, to provide grants to law enforcement agencies that operate in Elevated Need Localities. An ``Elevated Need Locality'' is a county (or unit of local government which is not part of a county) which (1) has a crime rate above the national average, and (2) has had budget reductions during the most recent 5-year period. These law enforcement agencies could apply to the Attorney General to receive funds to hire law enforcement officers, or to rehire officers who have been laid off due to budget reductions.

Grants would last for three years and may be extended by two years at the discretion of the Attorney General. $100 million for each fiscal year 2016 through 2021 are authorized to be appropriated for this program.

Section 3 establishes Shield Public Safety Enhancement Grants, to be implemented by the Attorney General, to provide grants to units of local government that has jurisdiction over all or part of an Elevated Need Locality. Local governments could apply to the Attorney General to receive funds to enhance public safety in a number of ways, such as purchasing public safety equipment, finding public safety programs, making infrastructure improvements for the purpose of enhancing public safety, purchasing and installing street lights to deter crime, funding activities related to crime labs, and funding public defender programs. Non-profit organizations operating in Elevated Need Localities may also apply for grants under this program to fund initiatives designed to reduce crime in these jurisdictions.

Grants would be for one year but may be extended at the discretion of the Attorney General. $100 million for each fiscal year 2016 through 2021 are authorized to be appropriated for this program.

These programs will help enhance public safety in jurisdictions facing high crime rates and particularly acute budget issues. The programs would be available to fund the hiring of police officers and the operation of initiatives to address public safety and crime. Programs that enhance public safety will prevent crime, which will decrease the victimization of our citizens and reduce the financial costs associated with crime. That is why this legislation is necessary.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following.

Summary

Throughout our Nation's history, hardworking American men

and women have labored to make our businesses become the most

productive and dynamic in the world. Unfortunately, when some

of these businesses encounter financial difficulties and seek

to reorganize their debts under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy

Code, these very same workers and retirees are often asked to

make major sacrifices through lost job protections, lower

wages, and the elimination of hard-won pension and health

benefits, while the executives and managers of these business

are not required to make comparable sacrifices.

We must do more to ensure that America's most important

resource--workers and retirees--are treated more fairly when

these business seek to reorganize their financial affairs

under the protection of our bankruptcy laws. The Protecting

Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2015

accomplishes this goal by amending the Bankruptcy Code in

several respects. First, it improves recoveries for employees

and retirees by: (1) increasing the amount of worker claims

entitled to priority payment for unpaid wages and

contributions to employee benefit plans up to $20,000; (2)

eliminating the difficult to prove restriction in current law

that wage and benefit claims must be earned within 180 days

of the bankruptcy filing in order to be entitled to priority

payment; (3) allowing employees to assert claims for losses

in certain defined contribution plans when such losses result

from employer fraud or breach of fiduciary duty; (4)

establishing a new priority administrative expense for

workers' severance pay; and (5) clarifying that back pay

awards for WARN Act damages are entitled to the same priority

as back pay for other legal violations.

Second, the legislation reduces employees' and retirees'

losses by: (1) restricting the conditions under which

collective bargaining agreements and commitments to fund

retiree pensions and health benefits may be eliminated or

adversely affected; (2) preventing companies from singling

out non-management retirees for concessions; (3) requiring a

court to consider the impact a bidder's offer to purchase a

company's assets would have on maintaining existing jobs and

preserving retiree pension and health benefits; and (4)

clarifying that the principal purpose of Chapter 11

bankruptcy is the preservation of jobs to the maximum extent

possible

Third, the bill restricts excessive executive compensation

programs by: (1) requiring full disclosure and court approval

of executive compensation packages; (2) restricting the

payment of bonuses and other forms of incentive compensation

to senior officers and others; and (3) ensuring that insiders

cannot receive retiree benefits if workers have lost their

retirement or health benefits.

This legislation is identical to H.R. 100, introduced in

the 113th Congress, and H.R. 6117, introduced in the 112th

Congress. It is supported by the AFL-CIO and many of its

largest affiliates, and the United Steelworkers.

section-by-section explanation of the bill

Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 sets forth the short title

of the bill as the ``Protecting Employees and Retirees in

Business Bankruptcies Act of 2015.'' It also includes a table

of contents for the bill.

Sec. 2. Findings. Section 2 sets forth various findings in

support of this bill.

Title I--Improving Recoveries for Employees and Retirees

Sec. 101. Increased Wage Priority. Bankruptcy Code section

507 accords priority in payment status for certain types of

claims, i.e., these priority claims must be paid in full in

the order of priority before general unsecured claims may be

paid. Section 507(a)(4) accords a fourth level priority to an

unsecured claim up to $10,000 owed to an individual for

wages, salaries, or commissions (including vacation,

severance, and sick leave pay) earned within the 180-day

period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case or the

date on which the debtor's business ceased, whichever occurs

first. Section 101 amends section 507(a)(4) to increase the

amount of the priority to $20,000 and eliminate the 180-day

reachback limitation.

Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(5) accords a fifth level

priority for unsecured claims for contributions to an

employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within

the l80-day period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy

case or the date on which the debtor's business ceased

(whichever occurs first). The amount of the claim is based on

the number of employees covered by the plan multiplied by

$10,000, less the aggregate amount paid to such employees

pursuant to section 507(a)(4) and the aggregate amount paid

by the estate on behalf of such employees to any other

employee benefit plan. Section 101 amends Bankruptcy Code

section 507(a)(5) to: (1) increase the priority amount to

$20,000; (2) eliminate the offset requirements; and (3)

eliminate the 180-day limitation.

Sec. 102. Claim for Stock Value Losses in Defined

Contribution Plans. Section 102 amends the Bankruptcy Code's

definition of a claim to include a right or interest in

equity securities of the debtor (or an affiliate of the

debtor) held in a defined contribution plan for the benefit

of an individual who is not an insider, senior executive

officer or one of the 20 next most highly compensated

employees of the debtor (if one or more are not insiders),

providing: (1) such securities were attributable to employer

contributions by the debtor (or an affiliate of the debtor),

or by elective deferrals, together with any earnings thereon;

and (2) the employer or plan sponsor who commenced the

bankruptcy case either committed fraud with respect to such

plan or otherwise breached a duty to the participant that

proximately caused the loss of value.

Sec. 103. Priority for Severance Pay. Bankruptcy Code

section 503(b) establishes an administrative expense payment

priority for certain types of unsecured claims. Among all

types of unsecured claims, administrative expenses are

accorded the highest payment priority, i.e., they must be

paid in full before priority and general unsecured claims may

be paid. Section 103 amends section 503(b) to accord

administrative expense priority for severance pay owed to the

debtor's employees (other than an insider, other senior

management, or a consultant retained to provide services to

the debtor) under a plan, program or policy generally

applicable to the debtor's employees (but not under an

individual contract of employment) or owed pursuant to a

collective bargaining agreement for termination or layoff on

or after the date the bankruptcy case was filed. Such pay is

deemed earned in full upon such termination or layoff.

Sec. 104. Financial Returns for Employees and Retirees.

Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a) specifies various criteria

that must be satisfied before a chapter 11 plan of

reorganization may be confirmed. Section 104 amends section

1129(a) to add a further requirement. The plan must provide

for the recovery of damages for the rejection of a collective

bargaining agreement or for other financial returns as

negotiated by the debtor and the authorized representative

under section 1113 to the extent such returns are paid under,

rather than outside of a plan.

Section 104 also replaces Bankruptcy Code section

1129(a)(13), which pertains to the payment of retiree

benefits under section 1114. As revised, section 1129(a)(13)

requires a plan to provide for the continuation after the

plan's effective date of the payment of all retiree benefits

at the level established under

either section 1114(e)(1)(B) or (g) at any time prior to

confirmation of the plan, for the duration of the period for

which the debtor has obligated itself to provide such

benefits. If no modifications are made prior to confirmation

of the plan, the plan must provide for the continuation of

all retiree benefits maintained or established in whole or in

part by the debtor prior to the petition filing date. In

addition, the plan must provide for recovery of claims

arising from the modification of retiree benefits and other

financial returns as negotiated by the debtor and the

authorized representative to the extent such returns are paid

under, rather than outside of, a plan.

Sec. 105. Priority for WARN Act Damages. Section 105 amends

Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) to provide

administrative expense status to wages and benefits awarded

pursuant to a judicial or National Labor Relations Board

proceeding as back pay or damages attributable to any period

of time occurring after the commencement of the bankruptcy

case. This provision applies where the award was made as a

result of the debtor's violation of federal or state law,

without regard to the time of the occurrence of unlawful

conduct on which the award is based or to whether any

services were rendered on or after the commencement of the

bankruptcy case. It includes an award by a court under

section 2901 of title 29 of the United States Code of up to

60 days' pay and benefits following a layoff that occurred or

commenced at a time when such award period includes a period

on or after the commencement of the case, if the court

determines that payment of wages and benefits by reason of

the operation of this clause will not substantially increase

the probability of layoff or termination of current employees

or of nonpayment of domestic support obligations during the

case under this title.

Title II--Reducing Employees' and Retirees' Losses

Sec. 201. Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements.

Bankruptcy Code section 1113 sets forth the requirements by

which a collective bargaining agreement may be assumed or

rejected. Section 201 amends section 1113 in several

respects. First, it amends section 1113(a) to clarify that a

chapter 11 debtor may reject a collective bargaining

agreement only in accordance with section 1113.

Second, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(b) to

clarify that no provision in title II of the United States

Code may be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally

terminate or alter the terms of a collective bargaining

agreement absent compliance with section 1113. The provision

further specifies that the trustee must timely pay all

monetary obligations arising under such agreement and that

any payment required to be made pre-confirmation has the

status of an allowed administrative expense under Code

section 503.

Third, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(c) to require

a trustee, when seeking to modify a collective bargaining

agreement, to provide notice of such proposed modification to

the labor organization representing the employees covered by

the agreement. The trustee must also promptly provide an

initial proposal for modification. In addition, the trustee

must confer in good faith with the labor organization, at

reasonable times and for a reasonable period, given the

complexity of the case, in an effort to reach a mutually

acceptable modification of the agreement. Each modification

proposal must be based on a business plan for the

reorganization of the debtor and reflect the most complete

and reliable information. As amended, section 1113(c)

requires the trustee to provide to the labor organization all

information relevant for negotiations. If such disclosure

could compromise the debtor's position with respect to its

competitors in the industry, the provision authorizes the

court to issue a protective order, subject to the needs of

the labor organization to evaluate the trustee's proposal and

any application to reject the collective bargaining agreement

or for interim relief under section 1113.

In consideration of federal policy encouraging the practice

and process of collective bargaining and in recognition of

the bargained-for expectations of the employees covered by

the agreement, any modification proposed by the trustee must:

(1) only be proposed as part of a program of workforce and

nonworkforce cost savings devised for the debtor's

reorganization, including savings in management personnel

costs; (2) be limited to modifications designed to achieve a

specified aggregate financial contribution for employees

covered by the agreement, taking into consideration any labor

cost savings negotiated within the 12-month period prior to

the filing of the bankruptcy case; (3) be no more than the

minimum savings essential to permit the debtor to exit

bankruptcy, such that confirmation is not likely to be

followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial

reorganization of the debtor; and (4) not be disproportionate

or overly burden the employees covered by the agreement,

either in the amount of the cost savings sought from such

employees or the nature of the modifications.

Fourth, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(d) to

provide that if the trustee and the labor organization (after

a period of negotiations) do not reach an agreement over

mutually satisfactory modifications and further negotiations

are not likely to produce mutually satisfactory

modifications, the trustee may file a motion seeking

rejection of the collective bargaining agreement after notice

and a hearing. Absent agreement by the parties, the hearing

may not be held earlier than 21 days from when notice of the

hearing is provided. Only the debtor and the labor

organization may appear and be heard at the hearing. An

application for rejection must seek rejection effective upon

the entry of an order granting such relief.

In consideration of federal policy encouraging the practice

and process of collective bargaining and in recognition of

the bargained-for expectations of the employees covered by

the agreement, section 1113(d) (as amended) provides that the

court may grant a motion seeking rejection of such agreement

only if the court: (1) finds that the trustee has complied

with the requirements of section 1113(c); (2) has considered

alternative proposals by the labor organization and concluded

that such proposals do not meet the requirements of section

1113(c)(3)(B); (3) finds that further negotiations regarding

the trustee's proposal or an alternative proposal by the

labor organization are not likely to produce an agreement;

(4) finds that implementation of the trustee's proposal will

not: (a) cause a material diminution in the purchasing power

of the employees covered by the agreement, (b) adversely

affect the debtor's ability to retain an experienced and

qualified workforce; or (c) impair the debtor's labor

relations such that the ability to achieve a feasible

reorganization will be compromised; and (5) concludes, based

on clear and convincing evidence, that rejection of the

agreement and immediate implementation of the trustee's

proposal is essential to permit the debtor's exit from

bankruptcy such that confirmation is not likely to be

followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial

reorganization of the debtor in the short term. If the

trustee has implemented a program of incentive pay, bonuses

or other financial returns for insiders, senior executive

officers, or the 20 next most highly compensated employees or

consultants (or such a program was implemented within 180

days before the bankruptcy case was filed), the court must

presume that the debtor has failed to satisfy the

requirements of section 1113(c)(3)(C).

Subsection (d), as amended, prohibits the court from

entering an order rejecting a collective bargaining agreement

that would result in modifications to a level lower than that

proposed by the trustee in the proposal found by the court to

have complied with the requirements of section 1113.

At any time after an order rejecting a collective

bargaining agreement is entered (or mutually satisfactory

agreement between the trustee and the labor organization is

entered into), the labor organization may apply to the court

for an order seeking an increase in the level of wages or

benefits or relief from working conditions based on changed

circumstances. The court must grant such relief only if the

increase or other relief is not inconsistent with the

standard set forth in section 1113(d)(2)(E).

Fifth, section 201 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(e)

to provide that during the period in which a collective

bargaining agreement at issue under this section continues in

effect and if either essential to the continuation of the

debtor's business or in order to avoid irreparable damage to

the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may

authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the

terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by

the collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this

provision must be scheduled in accordance of the trustee's

needs. The implementation of such interim changes will not

render the application for rejection moot.

Sixth, section 201 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(f)

to provide that the rejection of a collective bargaining

agreement constitutes a breach of such agreement and is

effective no earlier than the entry of an order granting such

relief. Solely for the purpose of determining and allowing a

claim arising from rejection of a collective bargaining

agreement, such rejection must be treated as a rejection of

an executory contract under Bankruptcy Code section 365(g)

and shall be allowed or disallowed in accordance with section

502(g)(1). Subsection (f), as amended, further provides that

no claim for rejection damages may be limited by section

502(b)(7). In addition, the provision permits economic self-

help by a labor organization upon a court order granting

rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under either

subsection (d) or (e) of section 1113. It further provides

that neither title 11 of the United States Code nor other

provisions of State or Federal law may be construed to the

contrary.

Seventh, section 201 adds new subsection (g) to require the

trustee to provide for the reasonable fees and costs incurred

by a labor organization under section 1113, upon request and

after notice and a hearing.

Eighth, section 201 adds new subsection (h) to require the

assumption of a collective bargaining agreement to be done in

accordance with section 365.

Sec. 202. Payment of Insurance Benefits to Retired

Employees. Bankruptcy Code section 1114 sets out criteria

pursuant to which a debtor may modify retiree benefits, among

other matters. Retiree benefits include payments to retired

employees, their spouses, and dependents for medical,

surgical, and hospital care benefits. It also includes

benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or

death under any plan, fund or program.

Section 202 amends section 1114 in several respects. First,

it amends the provision's definition of ``retiree benefits''

to specify that

it applies whether or not the debtor asserts a right to

unilaterally modify such benefits under such plan, fund or

program.

Second, it amends Bankruptcy Code section 1114(b)(2), which

specifies the rights, powers and duties of a committee of

retired employees appointed by the court. As amended, the

provision would apply to a labor organization serving as the

authorized representative under section 1114(c)(1).

Third, section 202 replaces Bankruptcy Code section

1114(f), which requires a trustee to make a proposal to the

authorized representative before seeking modification of

retiree benefits. As amended, section 1114(f)(1) specifies

that if a trustee seeks to modify retiree benefits, the

trustee must provide notice of such proposed modification to

the authorized representative as well as promptly provide the

initial proposal. In addition, the trustee must thereafter

confer in good faith with the labor organization, at

reasonable times and for a reasonable period, given the

complexity of the case, in attempting to reach a mutually

satisfactory modification. Each modification must be based on

a business plan for the reorganization of the debtor and

reflect the most complete and reliable information available.

The trustee must provide the authorized representative all

information relevant for the negotiations. If such disclosure

could compromise the debtor's position with respect to its

competitors in the industry, the court may issue a protective

order, subject to the needs of the authorized representative

to evaluate the trustee's proposal and an application

pursuant to subsection (g) or (h).

Modifications proposed by the trustee must: (1) only be

proposed as part of a program of workforce and nonworkforce

cost savings devised for the reorganization of the debtor,

including savings in management personnel costs; (2) be

limited to modifications designed to achieve a specified

aggregate financial contribution for the retiree group

represented by the authorized representative (taking into

consideration any labor cost savings negotiated within the

12-month period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case

with respect to the retiree group); (3) be no more than the

minimum savings essential to permit the debtor to exit

bankruptcy, such that confirmation is not likely to be

followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial

reorganization of the debtor; and (4) not be disproportionate

or overly burden the retiree group, either in the amount of

the cost savings sought from such group or the nature of the

modifications.

Fourth, section 202 amends Bankruptcy Code section 1113(g)

to provide that if the trustee and the authorized

representative do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement

(after a period of negotiations) and further negotiations are

not likely to produce mutually satisfactory modifications,

the trustee may file a motion seeking to modify the payment

of retiree benefits after notice and a hearing. Absent

agreement of the parties, the hearing may not be held earlier

than 21 days from when notice of the hearing is provided.

Only the debtor and the authorized representative may appear

and be heard at the hearing.

The court may grant a motion to modify the payment of

retiree benefits only if the court: (1) finds that the

trustee complied with the requirements of section 1114(f);

(2) considered any of the authorized representative's

alternative proposals and determined that such proposals do

not meet the requirements of section 1114(f)(3)(B); (3) finds

that further negotiations are not likely to produce a

mutually satisfactory agreement; (4) finds that

implementation of the trustee's proposal will not cause

irreparable harm to the affected retirees; and (5) concludes

that, based on clear and convincing evidence, an order

granting the trustee's proposal and its immediate

implementation is essential to permit the debtor's exit from

bankruptcy such that confirmation is not likely to be

followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial

reorganization of the debtor in the short term.

If the trustee has implemented a program of incentive pay,

bonuses, or other financial returns for insiders, senior

executive officers, or the 20 next most highly compensated

employees or consultants (or such program was implemented

within 180 days before the bankruptcy case was filed), the

court must presume that the debtor failed to satisfy the

requirements of section 1114(f)(3)(C).

Fifth, section 202 strikes subsection (k) and makes

conforming revisions.

Sec. 203 Protection of Employee Benefits in a Sale of

Assets. Section 203 amends Bankruptcy Code section 363(b),

which authorizes a debtor to sell or use property of the

estate other than in the ordinary course of business (under

certain circumstances), to add a new requirement. New section

365(b)(3) requires the court, in approving a sale, to

consider the extent to which a bidder's offer: (1) maintains

existing jobs; (2) preserves terms and conditions of

employment, and (3) assumes or matches pension and retiree

benefit obligations in determining whether such offer

constitutes the highest or best offer for the property.

Sec. 204. Claim for Pension Losses. Section 204 adds a new

subsection to Bankruptcy Code section 502, which pertains to

the allowance of claims and interests. New subsection (1)

requires the court to allow a claim by an active or retired

participant (or by a labor organization representing such

participants) in a defined benefit pension plan terminated

under section 4041 or 4042 of the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) for any shortfall in pension

benefits accrued as of the effective date of the pension

plan's termination as a result of such termination and

limitations upon the payment of benefits imposed pursuant to

section 4042 of such Act, notwithstanding any claim asserted

and collected by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

with respect to such termination.

In addition, section 204 adds subsection (m) to Bankruptcy

Code section 502 to require a court to allow a claim

described in Bankruptcy Code section 101(5)(C) (as amended by

this legislation) by an active or retired participant (or a

labor union representing such participant) in a defined

contribution plan (within the meaning of section 3(34) of

ERISA). The amount of such claim must be measured by the

market value of the stock at the time of contribution to, or

purchase by, the plan and the value as of the commencement of

the case.

Sec. 205. Payments by Secured Lender. Bankruptcy Code

section 506(c) authorizes the debtor to recover from property

securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable and

necessary expenses incurred to preserve or dispose of such

property to the extent the secured creditor benefits from

such expenditures. Section 205 amends section 506(c) to add a

new provision. As amended, section 506(c) deems unpaid wages,

accrued vacation, severance or other benefits owed under the

debtor's policies and practices or owed pursuant to a

collective bargaining agreement, for services rendered on and

after commencement of the case to be necessary costs and

expenses of preserving or disposing of property securing an

allowed secured claim. Such obligations must be recovered

even if the trustee has otherwise waived the provisions of

section 506(c) pursuant to an agreement with the allowed

secured claimant or a successor or predecessor in interest.

Sec. 206. Preservation of Jobs and Benefits. Section 206

adds a statement of purpose to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy

Code specifying that a chapter 11 debtor must have as its

principal purpose the reorganization of its business to

preserve going concern value to the maximum extent possible

through the productive use of its assets and the preservation

of jobs that will sustain productive economic activity.

In addition, section 206 amends Bankruptcy Code section

1129(a), which sets out the criteria for confirming a plan,

to add a new requirement. New section 1129(a)(17) requires

the debtor to demonstrate that the reorganization preserves

going concern value to the maximum extent possible through

the productive use of the debtor's assets and preserves jobs

that sustain productive economic activity.

Section 206 also amends Bankruptcy Code section 1129(c),

which requires the court to consider the preferences of

creditors and equity security holders in determining which

plan to confirm. Section 1129(c), as amended, instead

requires the court to consider the extent to which each plan

would preserve going concern value through the productive use

of the debtor's assets and the preservation of jobs that

sustain productive economic activity. The court must confirm

the plan that better serves such interests. It further

provides that a plan that incorporates the terms of a

settlement with a labor organization shall presumptively

constitute the plan that satisfies this provision.

Sec. 207. Termination of Exclusivity. Bankruptcy Code

section 1121, in pertinent part, gives a debtor the exclusive

authority to file a plan and obtain acceptances of such plan

for stated periods of time, under certain circumstances.

Section 207 amends section 1121 to specify that cause for

shortening these exclusive periods includes: (1) the filing

of a motion pursuant to section 1113 seeking rejection of a

collective bargaining agreement, if a plan based upon an

alternative proposal by the labor organization is reasonably

likely to be confirmed within a reasonable time; or (2) the

proposed filing of a plan by a proponent other than the

debtor, which incorporates the terms of a settlement with a

labor organization, if such plan is reasonably likely to be

confirmed within a reasonable time.

Title III--Restricting Executive Compensation Programs

Sec. 301. Executive Compensation Upon Exit From Bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy Code section 1129 specifies the criteria for

confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. Section 1129(a)(4), for

example, requires that certain services, costs and expenses

in connection with the case (or in connection with the plan

and incident to the case) to have either been approved by the

court (or subject to approval by the court) as reasonable.

Section 301 amends section 1129(a)(4) to add a requirement

that payments or other distributions under the plan to or for

the benefit of insiders, senior executive officers, and any

of the 20 next most highly compensated employees or

consultants providing services to the debtor may not be

approved unless: (1) such compensation is subject to review

under section 1129(a)(5), or (2) such compensation is

included as part of a program of payments or distributions

generally applicable to the debtor's employees and only to

the extent that the court determines that such payments are

not excessive or disproportionate as compared to

distributions to the debtor's nonmanagement workforce.

In addition, section 301 amends section 1129(a)(5), which

requires the plan proponent to disclose the identity and

affiliations of the debtor's officers and others, such as the

identity of any insider who will be employed or retained by

the reorganized debtor and such insider's compensation.

Section 301 amends section 1129(a)(5) to add a requirement

that such compensation must be approved (or subject to

approval) by the court in accordance with the following

criteria: (1) the compensation is reasonable when compared to

that paid to individuals holding comparable positions at

comparable companies in the same industry; and (2) the

compensation is not disproportionate in light of economic

concessions by the debtor's nonmanagement workforce during

the case.

Sec. 302. Limitations on Executive Compensation

Enhancements. In general, Bankruptcy Code Section 503(c)

prohibits a debtor from making certain payments to an

insider, absent certain findings by the court. Section 302

amends section 503(c)(1), which prohibits such payments when

they are intended to induce the insider to remain with the

debtor's business, in several respects. First, it expands the

provision so that it applies a debtor's senior executive

officer and any of the debtor's 20 next most highly

compensated employees or consultants. Second, it clarifies

that the provision prohibits the payment of performance or

incentive compensation, a bonus of any kind, and other

financial returns designed to replace or enhance incentive,

stock, or other compensation in effect prior to the

commencement of the case. And, third, it specifies that the

court's findings must be based on clear and convincing

evidence in the record.

In addition, section 302 also amends Bankruptcy Code

section 503(c)(3), which prohibits other transfers made or

obligations incurred outside of the debtor's ordinary course

of business and not justified by the facts and circumstances

of the case, including transfers made and obligations

incurred for the benefit of the debtor's officers, managers

or consultants hired postpetition. Section 302 replaces

section 503(c)(3) with a provision prohibiting other

transfers or obligations incurred to or for the benefit of

insiders, senior executive officers, managers or consultants

providing services to the debtor unless they meet certain

criteria. First, the court must find, based on clear and

convincing evidence (without deference to the debtor's

request for authorization to make such payments), that such

payments are essential to the survival of the debtor's

business or, in the case of a liquidation, essential to the

orderly liquidation of the debtor's business and maximization

of the value of the debtor's assets. Second, the services for

which compensation is sought must be essential in nature.

Third, such payments must be reasonable compared to

individuals holding comparable positions at comparable

companies in the same industry and not disproportionate in

light of economic concessions made by the debtor's

nonmanagement workforce during the case.

Sec. 303. Assumption of Executive Retirement Plans. Section

303 amends Bankruptcy Code section 365, which sets forth the

criteria pursuant to which executory contracts and unexpired

leases may be assumed and rejected, to add two provisions.

New subsection (q) provides that no deferred compensation

arrangement for the benefit of a debtor's insiders, senior

executive officers, or any of the 20 next most highly

compensated employees may be assumed if a defined benefit

pension plan for the debtor's employees has been terminated

pursuant to section 4041 or 4042 of ERISA on or after the

commencement of the case or within 180 days prior to the

commencement of the case.

New subsection (r) provides that no plan, fund, program, or

contract to provide retiree benefits for insiders, senior

executive officers, or any of the 20 next most highly

compensated employees of the debtor may be assumed if the

debtor: (1) has obtained relief under subsection (g) or (h)

of section 1114 to impose reductions in retiree benefits; (2)

has obtained relief under subsection (d) or (e) of section

1113 to impose reductions in the health benefits of the

debtor's active employees; or (3) or reduced or eliminated

active employee or retiree benefits within 180 days prior to

the commencement of the case.

Sec. 304. Recovery of Executive Compensation. Section 304

adds a new provision to the Bankruptcy Code. New section

563(a) provides that if a debtor reduces its contractual

obligations under a collective bargaining agreement pursuant

to section 1113(d), or retiree benefits pursuant to section

1114(g), then the court, as part of the order granting such

relief, must make certain determinations. The court must

determine the percentage of diminution in the value of the

obligations as a result of such relief. In making this

determination, the court must include any reduction in

benefits as a result of the termination pursuant to section

4041 or 4042 of ERISA of a defined benefit plan administered

by the debtor, or for which the debtor is a contributing

employer, effective at any time within 180 days prior to the

commencement of the case. The court may not take into

consideration pension benefits paid or payable under title IV

of ERISA as a result of such termination.

If a defined benefit pension plan administered by the

debtor, or for which the debtor is a contributing employer,

is terminated pursuant to section 4041 or 4042 of ERISA,

effective at any time within 180 days prior to the

commencement of the case, and the debtor has not obtained

relief under section 1113(d), or section 1114(g), new section

563(b) requires the court, on motion of a party in interest,

to determine the percentage in diminution in the value of

benefit obligations when compared to the total benefit

liabilities prior to such termination. The court may not take

into account pension benefits paid or payable pursuant to

title IV of ERISA as a result of such termination.

After such percentage diminution in value is determined,

new section 563(c) provides that the estate has a claim for

the return of the same percentage of the compensation paid,

directly or indirectly (including any transfer to a self-

settled trust or similar device, or to a nonqualified

deferred compensation plan under section 409A(d)(1) of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986) to certain individuals. These

individuals include: (1) any officer of the debtor serving as

a member of the debtor's board of directors within the year

before the filing of the case; and (2) any individual serving

as chairman or as lead director of the board of directors at

the time when relief under section 1113 or section 1114 is

granted, or if no such relief has been granted, then the

termination of the defined benefit plan.

New section 563(d) provides that a trustee or committee

appointed pursuant to section 1102 may commence an action to

recover such claims. If neither commences such action by the

first date set for the confirmation hearing, any party in

interest may apply to the court for authority to recover such

claims for the benefit of the estate. The costs of recovery

must be borne by the estate.

New section 563(e) prohibits the court from awarding

postpetition compensation under section 503(c) or otherwise

to any person subject to the provisions of section 563(c) if

there is a reasonable likelihood that such compensation is

intended to reimburse or replace compensation recovered by

the estate pursuant to section 563.

Sec. 305. Preferential Compensation Transfer. Bankruptcy

Code section 547 authorizes preferential transfers to be

avoided. Section 305 adds a new subsection to section 547 to

permit the avoidance of a transfer to or for the benefit of

an insider (including an obligation incurred for the benefit

of an insider under an employment contract) made in

anticipation of bankruptcy. The provision also permits the

avoidance of a transfer made in anticipation of a bankruptcy

to a consultant who is formerly an insider and who is

retained to provide services to an entity that becomes a

debtor (including an obligation under a contract to provide

services to such entity or to a debtor) made or incurred

within one year before the filing of the bankruptcy case. In

addition, new section 547(j) provides that no provision of

section 547(c) (specifying certain exceptions to section 547)

may be utilized as a defense. Further, section 547(j) permits

the trustee or a committee to commence such avoidance action.

If neither do so as of the date of the commencement of the

confirmation hearing, any party in interest may apply to the

court for authority to recover the claims for the benefit of

the estate. The costs of recovery must be borne by the

estate.

Title IV--Other Provisions

Sec. 401. Union Proof of Claim. Section 401 amends

Bankruptcy Code section 501(a) to permit a labor organization

(in addition to a creditor or indenture trustee) to file a

proof of claim.

Sec. 402. Exception from Automatic Stay. Section 402 amends

Bankruptcy Code section 362(b) to create an additional

exception to the automatic stay with respect to the

commencement or continuation of a grievance, arbitration or

similar dispute resolution proceeding established by a

collective bargaining agreement that was or could have been

commenced against the debtor before the filing of the

bankruptcy case. The exception also applies to the payment or

enforcement of awards or settlements of such proceeding.

Mr. Speaker, the ``Stopping Abusive Student Loan Collection Practices in Bankruptcy Act of 2015'' targets ruthless collection tactics employed by some student loan creditors against debtors who have sought bankruptcy relief, as documented by the New York Times in its cover story last year.

Specifically, my legislation bill would empower a bankruptcy judge to award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a debtor who successfully obtained the discharge of his or her liability for a student loan debt based on undue hardship if: (1) the creditor's position was not substantially justified, and (2) there are no special circumstances that would make such award unjust. The Bankruptcy Code already grants identical authority to a bankruptcy judge to award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to debtor where a creditor requests the determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt based on the allegation that it was fraudulently incurred and the court thereafter finds that the creditor's position was not substantially justified and there are no special circumstances that would make such award unjust.

Although parties typically do and should pay their own attorney's fees in litigation, dischargeability determinations concerning student loan debts present compelling factors that warrant the relief provided by this legislation. Under current bankruptcy law, debtors must meet a very high burden of proof, namely, that repayment of the student loan debt will present an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents. The litigation typically requires extensive discovery, trial-like procedures, and legal analysis.

Unfortunately, some student loan debt collectors engage in abusive litigation tactics that exponentially drive up the potential cost of legal representation for a debtor. As a result, debtors, who may legally qualify for the Bankruptcy Code's undue hardship dischargeability exception for student loans, may be unable to obtain such relief because of the potential risk of excessive and unaffordable legal fees that the debtor may have to incur not only to meet the high standard of proof, but also to combat an abusive litigation stance taken by a well-funded adversary.

The ``Stopping Abusive Student Loan Collection Practices in Bankruptcy Act of 2015'' will help level the playing field for debtors overwhelmed by student loan debts, the repayment of which would present an undue hardship for themselves and their families. It is my hope that should this measure become law, bankruptcy judges will not hesitate to award debtors attorney's fees in appropriate cases of abusive litigation engaged in by student loan creditors.