I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, as the former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, I rise in strong opposition to House Resolution 676, which would authorize the Speaker to file suit against the President…
I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, as the former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, I rise in strong opposition to House Resolution 676, which would authorize the Speaker to file suit against the President of the United States for failing to enforce the Affordable Care Act, which has been attacked more than 51 times unsuccessfully in the House.
Now, why do I oppose this seriously flawed measure? One, the fact that it addresses a nonexistent problem. Two, it violates constitutional requirements and fundamental separation of power principles. And three, it diverts Congress from focusing on truly critical matters that require prompt legislative responses.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the Record a letter received only today signed by eight constitutional law scholars explaining the reasons why a lawsuit filed pursuant to H. Res. 676 is likely to fail.
July 30, 2014.
Hon. John Boehner,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Boehner, We write as law professors who
specialize in constitutional law and federal courts to
express our view that the members of the House of
Representatives lack the ability to sue the President of the
United States in federal court for his alleged failure to
enforce a federal statute, even if an Act of Congress were to
authorize such a suit and especially without such legislative
authorization. Never in American history has such a suit been
allowed. In fact, in many cases, the United States Supreme
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit have held that members of Congress lack
standing to sue in federal court. An entire House of Congress
is in no stronger a position to sue. Moreover, this is
exactly the type of political dispute which courts have found
to pose a non-justiciable political question and that should
be resolved in the political process rather than by judges.
In Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), members of Congress
sued to challenge the constitutionality of the line-item
veto. The Court dismissed the case for lack of standing and
said that the members of Congress ``have alleged no injury to
themselves as individuals, the institutional injury they
allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed, and their
attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this
form is contrary to historical experience . . . . We
therefore hold that these individual members of Congress do
not have a sufficient `personal stake' in this dispute and
have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have
established Article III standing.''
After Raines v. Byrd, it is clear that legislators have
standing only if they allege either that they have been
singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to
other members of their bodies or that their votes have been
denied or nullified. This is consistent with a large body of
lower court precedent, primarily from the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that
requires a showing of nullification of a vote as a
prerequisite for standing. The Court of Appeals has stated
that a member of Congress has standing only if ``the alleged
diminution in congressional influence . . . amount[s] to a
disenfranchisement, a complete nullification or withdrawal of
a voting opportunity.'' Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697,
702 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
444 U.S. 996 (1979); see also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
It is just for this reason that the House of
Representatives as a body, like its members individually,
lacks standing to sue. The claim that the President has not
fully enforced provisions of the Affordable Care Act, or
other laws, does not amount to a ``disenfranchisement, a
complete nullification, or withdrawal of a voting
opportunity.'' Congress retains countless mechanisms to
ensure enforcement of a law, ranging from use of its spending
power to assigning the task to an independent agency.
On many occasions throughout American history, the Supreme
Court has seen the need for the federal judiciary to stay out
of disputes between the elected branches of government. That
is exactly the lesson that the proposed lawsuit would ignore.
Thus the suit likely would be dismissed both for want of
standing and because it poses a non-justiciable political
question. As Justice Scalia pointed out years ago, courts
frequently fail
to review actions or inaction by the Executive when a
decision involves ``a sensitive and inherently discretionary
judgment call, . . . the sort of decision that has
traditionally been nonreviewable, . . . [and decisions for
which] review would have disruptive practical consequences.''
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The question presented here poses the very
essence of what the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962), said is a political question because of
``the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government.'' The idea of a judge
telling a President how to exercise his discretion in
enforcing a law cuts at the heart of separation of powers and
thus presents a question non-justiciable in the courts.
Under long-standing practice and precedents, disputes, such
as this one between members of the House of Representatives
and the President, must be worked out in the political
process, not the courts.
Disclaimer: institutional affiliations are for
identification purposes only.
Erwin Chemerinsky,
Dean, University of California, Irvine School of Law;
Janet Cooper Alexander,
Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford Law School;
Peter Edelman,
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center;
Lawrence Lessig,
Roy L. Furman Professor of Law, Harvard Law School;
Burt Neuborne,
Inez Milholland Professor of Civil Liberties, New York
University Law School;
Kermit Roosevelt,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
Suzanna Sherry,
Herman O. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
University Law School;
Charles Tiefer,
Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
To begin with, H. Res. 676 seeks to solve a nonexistent problem because the President has, in fact, fully met his obligations to fully execute the laws.
Allowing flexibility in the implementation of a major new program, even where the statute mandates a specific deadline, is neither unusual nor a constitutional violation.
Indeed, in the case of the Affordable Care Act's employer mandate, the administration acted pursuant to statutory authorization granted to it by Congress.
Section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Treasury Secretary to issue any rules necessary for the enforcement of the Code, including the provisions that enforce the employer mandate.
Exercising discretion in implementing a law is the reality of administering sometimes complex programs and is inherent in the President's duty to ``take care'' that he ``faithfully'' execute laws.
This has been especially true with respect to the Affordable Care Act. The President's decision to extend certain compliance dates to help phase-in the Act is not a novel tactic.
Yet, even though not a single court has ever concluded that reasonable delay in implementing a complex law constitutes a violation of the Take Care Clause, the Majority insists there is a constitutional crisis.
In addition, a suit initiated under H. Res. 676 would itself be unconstitutional and would violate separation of powers principles.
This is because such a lawsuit would essentially allow federal courts to second-guess decisions by the Executive Branch in how it chooses to implement a policy.
The federal judiciary, under the political question doctrine, avoids answering such questions precisely because a court is not appropriate forum to resolve issues of complex policy.
Additionally, it is highly unlikely that Congress could satisfy the standing requirements of Article III of the Constitution that must be met in order to enforce the Take Care Clause.
To meet those requirements, a plaintiff--under the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd--must show, among other things, that it suffered a concrete and particularized injury.
Injury amounting only to an alleged violation of a right to have the Government act in accordance with law--which is what this resolution contemplates--is not judicially cognizable for Article III standing purposes.
This is in stark contrast to cases where Congress has sought to protect a fundamental power, like its subpoena authority.
In subpoena enforcement cases, courts have found standing for one House of Congress to sue because a specific legislative prerogative was at stake, constituting a sufficiently concrete injury to Congress to confer Article III standing.
Article III's standing requirements enforce the Constitution's separation-of-powers principles. Congress cannot simply legislate away these constitutional standing requirements.
Finally, H. Res. 676 is obviously just pure political theater that distracts the public from the fact that this Republican-controlled House has failed to address a whole host of critical issues.
These include immigration reform, extending unemployment insurance, enhancing environmental protections, ensuring worker safety, and helping those who are financially struggling.
Coincidentally, H. Res. 676 shares a number with H.R. 676, the ``Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act,'' which I introduced in February of 2013.
H.R. 676 would create a publicly-financed, privately-delivered health care system that would greatly improve and expand the already existing Medicare program.
My legislation would ensure that all Americans have access, guaranteed by law, to the highest quality and most cost effective health care services regardless of their employment, income or health care status.
Instead of discussing this and other critical matters, today we continue to waste precious resources on a patently unconstitutional measure that would authorize a lawsuit destined to fail.
We owe it to the American people to address real, not imaginary, challenges facing our Nation, including enhancing health care for all Americans.
I would also note that the litigation referred to by the gentleman from Texas that I was involved in eight years ago involved a situation where the House and Senate passed different versions of the same budget bill that was signed by the President. That was brought in our individual capacity as Members, not the House as a whole, and did not involve the use of additional taxpayer funds. The resolution before us today is of course an entirely different matter.