Mr. Speaker, I was not intending to speak on the rule. I will be speaking a little later on the bill itself, as I am the original sponsor of the bill and have been since the 105th Congress, but I felt it necessary to clarify the discussion…
Mr. Speaker, I was not intending to speak on the rule. I will be speaking a little later on the bill itself, as I am the original sponsor of the bill and have been since the 105th Congress, but I felt it necessary to clarify the discussion somewhat in that, as I have heard the discussion, it has focused on some issues that the bill does not cover, as well as does not discuss some of the issues that the bill is attempting to remedy.
First of all, the words from the gentleman from Texas suggested that this bill had to do with the first 16 words of the first amendment. That is not true. The first 16 words to the first amendment say the following: ``Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.''
It has been concluded that there are essentially two clauses to that portion of the first amendment. First is the so-called Establishment Clause and the second is the Free Exercise Clause. This bill addresses the issue of the Establishment Clause and the attorney's fees awarded as a result of cases brought regarding Establishment Clauses. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the Free Exercise Clause, the last portion of the gentleman from Texas' 16 words to the first amendment.
So with regard to free exercise cases, the Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 will still apply, and attorneys's fees will still be awarded with no alteration of the laws as a result of passage of this bill.
Secondly, the suggestion was that somehow Mr. Madison left the Constitution sterile with regard to the discussion of religion. Mr. Madison, who many claim to be the chief architect of the Constitution, I believe probably even including my friends from Texas and Massachusetts, included in the signatory clause two dates of reference for the United States Constitution's approval by the constitutional convention. When he said, ``Done in convention by unanimous consent of the States present the 17th day of September in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the independence of the United States of America, the 12th.''
So James Madison, chief architect of the Constitution, as well as the rest of the delegates who signed the Constitution, gave two dates of reference that every schoolchild should know, every public schoolchild, private schoolchild, home schoolchild should know, with regard to the discussion of the approval of the Constitution of the United States.
The delegates thought it was so important that these two dates be referenced that they ensconced them in the very wording of the Constitution. The first primary, most important, date of reference would be the 17th day of September, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven. So the first date, the primary date of reference for the delegates of the constitutional convention as placed in the Constitution itself, was the birth of Jesus Christ.
The second important day, the secondary important day for the ratification of the United States Constitution was the day that was placed secondarily in the signatory clause, and that is the independence of the United States of America, the 12th. It had been since July 4, 1776, a little over 11 years since that celebration, and so
they were in the 12th year of the independence of the United States, the Declaration of Independence being effectively the birth certificate of the United States of America.
So there would be those on the other side, first of all, that would suggest that this bill has something to do with the free exercise of religion. It has nothing to do with the free exercise of religion. And some that would suggest that the Framers of the Constitution and the Founders of this country would somehow sterilize government from the very mention of religion.
Now, if someone today in the State of Virginia where Mr. Madison come from and Jefferson would suggest erecting a monument to the individual whose birth is the primary date of reference for the delegates for the approval of the United States Constitution to be later sent to the States for ratification would raise a life-size monument to that one individual, they would be sued by the ACLU. They would be sued by the ACLU, and the ACLU would come to those people and say, we are going to sue you, just like they did educators in the State of Indiana. And they would say, we are going to sue you and we are going to win, and when we win you will not only have to pay your attorney's fees but you will have to pay our attorney's fees, too, as a result of the Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 by erecting a monument to the individual's whose birth is celebrated in the United States Constitution.
Now, that case could go to court, but it probably would not. Because those county officials, those officials would have this sword of Damocles hanging over their head, meaning we are going to take you to court, and when we win, you will have to pay our attorney's fees as well.
The Public Expression of Religion Act would simply say let that case go to court, do not allow that sword of Damocles, that notion of intimidation to continue and let the case go to court.
The gentleman from Massachusetts says that we cannot trust the courts as conservatives. We do trust the courts, which is exactly what the Public Expression of Religion Act allows. It allows these cases to go to court. Whereas in many cases they do not go to court, and the gentleman from Georgia and others have given examples. They will go to court and will allow the cases to go to court, but that is exactly what the other side does not want to have happen because let us give recent experience.
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court came down with two decisions, the same day, on the first amendment to the Constitution, the Establishment Clause, and in those two decisions, they said that the Ten Commandments posted on public property, public property paid for and maintained with government dollars, was constitutional in the State of Texas. Then they said, on the same day, in a different case, they said the public display of the Ten Commandments on government- funded, government-maintained property in Kentucky was unconstitutional. Constitutional in Texas, unconstitutional in Kentucky. I think the Ten Commandments were pretty well the same. They are pretty well the same wherever you read them, but in Texas it was constitutional, and in Kentucky it was unconstitutional.
What the other side does not want to have happen is for these cases to actually go to court. Because if they go to court, it is likely with the new makeup of the United States Supreme Court that had those two cases come out of that Supreme Court, the Texas case would have probably been a 6-3 majority in favor of maintaining the Ten Commandments in Texas and a 5-4 majority in maintaining the Ten Commandments in the State of Kentucky.
This is an issue of allowing the cases to go to court and not to have the threat or intimidation by the ACLU and their minions to hang over all of these heads.
I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Taking back my time, because in both cases the United States Constitution grants Congress the exclusive explicit authority to do those things, and that is why I am saying this is the exclusive authority of the United States Congress. We have that authority. We do not have to be in one particular area allowing the court to consider cases. In other cases, we can allow the cases to go to court. That is what the legislative process is about.
And the gentleman has heralded the idea of democracy and the legislative process. Today, we continue to exercise that.
Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
And I can understand that concern, but let me remind you that the awards act came in 1976. In 1962, the United States Supreme Court struck down the notion of school prayer without the attorneys fees award act. In 1963, the Supreme Court struck down Bible reading in public schools, without the attorneys fees award act. This bill will simply allow the cases to actually continue to go to court.
The gentleman from Massachusetts concluded his remarks by saying this is going to keep people out of the courts. In fact, the precedent is just the opposite. In 1962, in Engel v. Vitale, the United States Supreme Court said, 14 years before the attorneys fees award act was put into place, that the state sanctioning of prayer in public schools was unconstitutional. In 1963, 13 years before the attorneys fees award acts came into play, the United States Supreme Court held it was unconstitutional to have Bible reading in public schools.
This will not change anything from what happened before this law was created that we are amending today. The same things will happen. And this bill, most importantly, does not remove injunctive relief. If it is the desire of the plaintiff to stop an activity or to remove a monument or remove a display, this bill does nothing to stop that from taking place. The injunctive relief available in all of these cases continues to be available in establishment clause cases.
And, in fact, the court can say, remove the monument, stop the practice. This bill does not change that, and I want to make that clarification.
I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
And that is perfect, so the gentleman can support my bill. I appreciate that, which is why it does something very important, which is why the gentleman and his cohorts are opposing the bill, because they understand that by removing the chilling effect on these closed-door sessions with county commissioners, with schoolteachers, with mayors and the like, without that ability for the ACLU and others to go into these closed-door sessions and say, Mayor, we are going to sue you, we are going to win, and you are going to have to pay our attorneys fees, that without that chilling effect, these cases will go to court.
Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
From the gentleman's perspective, because of the benign nature and virtual nonutilitarian nature of the bill, please support it.
Because a blatant violation is determined by a court of law.
We are letting them go to court. That is exactly right, we are going to let them go to court. A blatant violation is determined by a court of law and not by ACLU attorneys behind closed doors.
Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
I cannot name one. Will the gentleman yield for a discussion?
First of all, Mr. Jefferson was in France during the approval process of the Bill of Rights.
He was not in France during the ratification by the States of the Bill of Rights, but he was in France during the approval by the Congress of the Bill of Rights, which took place 2 years prior.
