Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor humbly as a fourth- generation immigrant family of Lithuania. Of course, I, like many Americans today, are really a Heinz 57 mutt, also having German ancestry and Irish ancestry, and we think some American…
Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor humbly as a fourth- generation immigrant family of Lithuania. Of course, I, like many Americans today, are really a Heinz 57 mutt, also having German ancestry and Irish ancestry, and we think some American Indian ancestry. But ``Shimkus'' is ethnically Lithuanian.
So I always kid and joke that it's only in Washington, D.C., that you automatically become an expert in a region of the world based upon the ethnicity of your last name. But it's a labor of love that I've taken, and, hence, I bring this resolution to the floor to place Lithuania in the spotlight.
Before I do that, I want to read a letter from three friends and former leaders of the Baltic countries and 22 total leaders: Valdas Adamkus, a former President of the Republic of Lithuania; Vaira Vike- Freiberga, former President of the Republic of Latvia; and Mart Laar, who is the former Prime Minister of Estonia.
I'm not going to read the whole letter. I'm going to highlight a few sections, and then I'm going to transition to state why resolutions like this are important, because sometimes we go, Oh, why do we do these resolutions? I think the letter that they have written highlights the importance of us continuing to mention our friends and allies and talk about the strengths of the relationships.
This letter is about three pages long, but I just highlight a few short snippets in each one. Again, these are 22 leaders of not just the Baltic areas, but the Central and Eastern European democracies. Most of these are now no longer in public service but are former leaders.
They say, ``Twenty years after the end of the cold war, however, we see that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy.''
``Americans have largely stopped worrying about. . .'' Now, that's positive about some of our successes, but it also raises concerns.
``There is a growing sense of nervousness in the region.''
``NATO today seems weaker than when we joined.'' They also say, ``The region's deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome and should not necessarily lead to a weakening of the transatlantic relationship.''
Also stated is ``there are fewer and fewer leaders who emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced Washington's key role in securing our democratic transition and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new
generation of leaders is emerging who do not have those memories and follow a more `realistic' policy.''
I think that's important for us to understand. These countries fought for freedom, but the leaders who fought for freedom are now leaving power. And this new generation needs to be reminded of the strength of the U.S. relationship to the former captive nations from the Eastern European countries.
They also, in here, talk about, ``We welcome the `reset' '' . . . ``but there is also nervousness in our capitals.''
``Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to `realism' at Yalta. And it benefited when the United States used its power to fight for principle.'' And that's what I hope we continue to do.
``We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe need to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship.''
So I appreciate the committee allowing the resolution to come to the floor because this is another way in which we can talk about the important relationship that we have.
The resolution, itself, talks about the 1,000 years which they're celebrating in Lithuania, the 1,000 years when the name Lithuania first appeared in written documents. Lithuania was around before that, but that makes us look like little kids here in the United States; hence, the world is much older than our great Constitutional Republic.
There's a lot of ``whereas'' in the resolution. Whereas, under the cover of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on June 17, 1940, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in violation of preexisting peace treaties.
Another whereas: Lithuania is a full and responsible member of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Full partners--full voting partners and full participants in the defense organization known as NATO and the article 5 guarantee to both themselves and other NATO countries.
Another whereas: As contributing to international civilian and military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Georgia, which are all important aspects that they have stepped up to the plate to be part of this commitment to securing democracy and freedom in the war on terror.
So we, as a country, get a chance, through this resolution, to congratulate the people of the Republic of Lithuania for this historical timeframe. We commend the Government of Lithuania for their commitment to democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and being allies in the campaigns that we, in connection with our treaty obligations and the greatest organization that's kept peace and stability that the world has known, which is NATO, their role in that. And we want to continue to recognize that this relationship is strong now and we will do all we can in our part to make it strong in the future.
I think my colleague from Florida mentioned, also, challenges that we've addressed, and we will continue to work on those so that our relationship becomes stronger in a world where democracy and freedom needs to flourish for people to live the lifestyles that they will grow and flourish individually.
I thank the committee for allowing this to the floor, and I thank Congressman Smith for allowing me this time.
An Open Letter to the Obama Administration From Central and Eastern
Europe
We have written this letter because, as Central and Eastern
European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers, we care
deeply about the future of the transatlantic relationship as
well as the future quality of relations between the United
States and the countries of our region. We write in our
personal capacity as individuals who are friends and allies
of the United States as well as committed Europeans.
Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many
of us know firsthand how important your support for our
freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years.
U.S. engagement and support was essential for the success of
our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty
years ago. Without Washington's vision and leadership, it is
doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.
We have worked to reciprocate and make this relationship a
two-way street. We are Atlanticist voices within NATO and the
EU. Our nations have been engaged alongside the United States
in the Balkans, Iraq, and today in Afghanistan. While our
contribution may at times seem modest compared to your own,
it is significant when measured as a percentage of our
population and GDP. Having benefited from your support for
liberal democracy and liberal values in the past, we have
been among your strongest supporters when it comes to
promoting democracy and human rights around the world.
Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see
that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at
the heart of American foreign policy. As the new Obama
Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities, our region
is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped
worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that
U.S. policy was so successful that many American officials
have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all
and that they could ``check the box'' and move on to other
more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so close
that many on both sides assume that the region's
transatlantic orientation, as well as its stability and
prosperity, would last forever.
That view is premature. All is not well either in our
region or in the transatlantic relationship. Central and
Eastern Europe is at a political crossroads and today there
is a growing sense of nervousness in the region. The global
economic crisis is impacting on our region and, as elsewhere,
runs the risk that our societies will look inward and be less
engaged with the outside world. At the same time, storm
clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon.
Like you, we await the results of the EU Commission's
investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But
the political impact of that war on the region has already
been felt. Many countries were deeply disturbed to see the
Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core
principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris,
and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member
of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euroatlantic
Partnership Council--all in the name of defending a sphere of
influence on its borders.
Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new
members, NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many
of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant--
and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question
whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense
in some future crises. Europe's dependence on Russian energy
also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance.
President Obama's remark at the recent NATO summit on the
need to provide credible defense plans for all Alliance
members was welcome, but not sufficient to allay fears about
the Alliance's defense readiness. Our ability to continue to
sustain public support at home for our contributions to
Alliance missions abroad also depends on us being able to
show that our own security concerns are being addressed in
NATO and close cooperation with the United States.
We must also recognize that America's popularity and
influence have fallen in many of our countries as well.
Public opinions polls, including the German Marshall Fund's
own Transatlantic Trends survey, show that our region has not
been immune to the wave of criticism and anti-Americanism
that has swept Europe in recent years and which led to a
collapse in sympathy and support for the United States during
the Bush years. Some leaders in the region have paid a
political price for their support of the unpopular war in
Iraq. In the future they may be more careful in taking
political risks to support the United States. We believe that
the onset of a new Administration has created a new opening
to reverse this trend but it will take time and work on both
sides to make up for what we have lost.
In many ways the EU has become the major factor and
institution in our lives. To many people it seems more
relevant and important today than the link to the United
States. To some degree it is a logical outcome of the
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. Our
leaders and officials spend much more time in EU meetings
than in consultations with Washington, where they often
struggle to attract attention or make our voices heard. The
region's deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome
and should not necessarily lead to a weakening of the
transatlantic relationship. The hope was that integration of
Central and Eastern Europe into the EU would actually
strengthen the strategic cooperation between Europe and
America.
However, there is a danger that instead of being a pro-
Atlantic voice in the EU, support for a more global
partnership with Washington in the region might wane over
time. The region does not have the tradition of assuming a
more global role. Some items on the transatlantic agenda,
such as climate change, do not resonate in the Central and
Eastern European publics to the same extent as they do in
Western Europe.
Leadership change is also coming in Central and Eastern
Europe. Next to those, there are fewer and fewer leaders who
emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced
Washington's key role in securing our democratic transition
and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation
of leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and
follow a more ``realistic'' policy. At the same time, the
former Communist elites, whose insistence on political and
economic power significantly contributed to the crises in
many CEE countries, gradually disappear from the political
scene.
The current political and economic turmoil and the fallout
from the global economic crisis provide additional
opportunities for the forces of nationalism, extremism,
populism, and anti-Semitism across the continent but also in
some our countries.
This means that the United States is likely to lose many of
its traditional interlocutors in the region. The new elites
replacing them may not share the idealism--or have the same
relationship to the United States--as the generation who led
the democratic transition. They may be more calculating in
their support of the United States as well as more parochial
in their world view. And in Washington a similar transition
is taking place as many of the leaders and personalities we
have worked with and relied on are also leaving politics.
And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia, Our
hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that
Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty
and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been
fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power
pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and
methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most
issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-
a-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one.
It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences.
It asserts a privileged position in determining our security
choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare,
ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated
investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to
advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic
orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.
We welcome the ``reset'' of the American-Russian relations.
As the countries living closest to Russia, obviously nobody
has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in
Russia and better relations between Moscow and the West than
we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want
to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western
interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia.
Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and
the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for
a ``Concert of Powers'' to replace the continent's existing,
value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's
creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region
could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the
region. There are differing views within the region when it
comes to Moscow's new policies. But there is a shared view
that the full engagement of the United States is needed.
Many in the region are looking with hope to the Obama
Administration to restore the Atlantic relationship as a
moral compass for their domestic as well as foreign policies.
A strong commitment to common liberal democratic values is
essential to our countries. We know from our own historical
experience the difference between when the United States
stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did
not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to
``realism'' at Yalta. And it benefited when the United States
used its power to fight for principle. That was critical
during the Cold War and in opening the doors of NATO. Had a
``realist'' view prevailed in the early 1990s, we would not
be in NATO today and the idea of a Europe whole, free, and at
peace would be a distant dream.
We understand the heavy demands on your Administration and
on U.S. foreign policy. It is not our intent to add to the
list of problems you face. Rather, we want to help by being
strong Atlanticist allies in a U.S.-European partnership that
is a powerful force for good around the world. But we are not
certain where our region will be in five or ten years time
given the domestic and foreign policy uncertainties we face.
We need to take the right steps now to ensure the strong
relationship between the United States and Central and
Eastern Europe over the past twenty years will endure.
We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe
need to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship. We also
believe this is a time when the United States and Central and
Eastern Europe must reconnect around a new and forward-
looking agenda. While recognizing what has been achieved in
the twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is
time to set a new agenda for close cooperation for the next
twenty years across the Atlantic.
Therefore, we propose the following steps:
First, we are convinced that America needs Europe and that
Europe needs the United States as much today as in the past.
The United States should reaffirm its vocation as a European
power and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on
the continent even while it faces the pressing challenges in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and Asia.
For our part we must work at home in our own countries and in
Europe more generally to convince our leaders and societies
to adopt a more global perspective and be prepared to
shoulder more responsibility in partnership with the United
States.
Second, we need a renaissance of NATO as the most important
security link between the United States and Europe. It is the
only credible hard power security guarantee we have. NATO
must reconfirm its core function of collective defense even
while we adapt to the new threats of the 21st century. A key
factor in our ability to participate in NATO's expeditionary
missions overseas is the belief that we are secure at home.
We must therefore correct some self-inflicted wounds from the
past. It was a mistake not to commence with proper Article 5
defense planning for new members after NATO was enlarged.
NATO needs to make the Alliance's commitments credible and
provide strategic reassurance to all members. This should
include contingency planning, prepositioning of forces,
equipment, and supplies for reinforcement in our region in
case of crisis as originally envisioned in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act.
We should also re-think the working of the NATO-Russia
Council and return to the practice where NATO member
countries enter into dialogue with Moscow with a coordinated
position. When it comes to Russia, our experience has been
that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow
will not only strengthen the West's security but will
ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as
well. Furthermore, the more secure we feel inside NATO, the
easier it will also be for our countries to reach out to
engage Moscow on issues of common interest. That is the dual
track approach we need and which should be reflected in the
new NATO strategic concept.
Third, the thorniest issue may well be America's planned
missile-defense installations. Here too, there are different
views in the region, including among our publics which are
divided. Regardless of the military merits of this scheme and
what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has
nevertheless also become--at least in some countries--a
symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region.
How it is handled could have a significant impact on their
future transatlantic orientation. The small number of
missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia's strategic
capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide
the future of the program as allies and based on the
strategic plusses and minuses of the different technical and
political configurations. The Alliance should not allow the
issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition.
Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too
deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic
can undermine the credibility of the United States across the
whole region.
Fourth, we know that NATO alone is not enough. We also want
and need more Europe and a better and more strategic U.S.-EU
relationship as well. Increasingly our foreign policies are
carried out through the European Union--and we support that.
We also want a common European foreign and defense policy
that is open to close cooperation with the United States. We
are the advocates of such a line in the EU. But we need the
United States to rethink its attitude toward the EU and
engage it much more seriously as a strategic partner. We need
to bring NATO and the EU closer together and make them work
in tandem. We need common NATO and EU strategies not only
toward Russia but on a range of other new strategic
challenges.
Fifth is energy security. The threat to energy supplies can
exert an immediate influence on our nations' political
sovereignty also as allies contributing to common decisions
in NATO. That is why it must also become a transatlantic
priority. Although most of the responsibility for energy
security lies within the realm of the EU, the United States
also has a role to play. Absent American support, the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would never have been built. Energy
security must become an integral part of U.S.-European
strategic cooperation. Central and Eastern European countries
should lobby harder (and with more unity) inside Europe for
diversification of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit
routes, as well as for tough legal scrutiny of Russia's abuse
of its monopoly and cartel-like power inside the EU. But
American political support on this will play a crucial role.
Similarly, the United States can play an important role in
solidifying further its support for the Nabucco pipeline,
particularly in using its security relationship with the main
transit country, Turkey, as well as the North-South
interconnector of Central Europe and LNG terminals in our
region.
Sixth, we must not neglect the human factor. Our next
generations need to get to know each other, too. We have to
cherish and protect the multitude of educational,
professional, and other networks and friendships that
underpin our friendship and alliance. The U.S. visa regime
remains an obstacle in this regard. It is absurd that Poland
and Romania--arguably the two biggest and most pro-American
states in the CEE region, which are making substantial
contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan--have not yet been
brought into the visa waiver program. It is incomprehensible
that a critic like the French anti-globalization activist
Jose Bove does not require a visa for the United States but
former Solidarity activist and Nobel Peace prizewinner Lech
Walesa does. This issue will be resolved only if it is made a
political priority by the President of the United States.
The steps we made together since 1989 are not minor in
history. The common successes are the proper foundation for
the transatlantic renaissance we need today. This is why we
believe that we should also consider the creation of a Legacy
Fellowship for young leaders. Twenty years have passed since
the revolutions of 1989. That is a whole generation. We need
a new generation to renew the transatlantic partnership. A
new program should be launched to identify those young
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic
who can carry forward the transatlantic project we have spent
the last two decades building in Central and Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the onset of a new Administration in the
United States has raised great hopes in our countries for a
transatlantic renewal. It is an opportunity we dare not miss.
We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how important
the relationship with the United States has been. In the
1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting
Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the
United States was critical to locking in peace and stability
from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the goal must be to
keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist,
and Atlanticist part of our broader community.
That is the key to our success in bringing about the
renaissance in the Alliance the Obama Administration has
committed itself to work for and which we support. That will
require both sides recommitting to and investing in this
relationship. But if we do it right, the pay off down the
road can be very real. By taking the right steps now, we can
put it on new and solid footing for the future.
Valdas Adamkus, Former President of the Republic of
Lithuania; Martin Butora, Former Ambassador of the
Slovak Republic to the United States; Emil
Constantinescu, Former President of the Republic of
Romania; Pavol Demes, Former Minister of International
Relations and Advisor to the President, Slovak
Republic; Lubos Dobrovsky, Former Minister of Defense
of Czechoslovakia, former Czech Ambassador to Russia;
Matyas Eorsi, Former Secretary of State of the
Hungarian MFA; Istvan Gyarmati, Ambassador, President
of the International Centre for Democratic Transition
in Budapest; Vaclav Havel, Former President of the
Czech Republic; Rastislav Kacer, Former Ambassador of
the Slovak Republic to the United States; Sandra
Kalniete, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Latvia;
Karel Schwarzenberg, Former Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Czech Republic; Michal Kovac, Former President
of the Slovak Republic; Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the
Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria;
Aleksander Kwasniewski, Former President of the
Republic of Poland; Mart Laar, Former Prime Minister of
Estonia; Kadri Liik, Director of the International
Centre for Defense Studies in Tallinn, Estonia; Janos
Martonyi, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungary;
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Former Vice-president of the
European Parliament, former Defense Minister, Poland;
Adam Rotfeld, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Poland; Alexandr Vondra, Former Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, Czech Republic;
Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Former President of the Republic
of Latvia; Lech Walesa, Former President of the
Republic of Poland.