Mr. President, on February 29, 2008, the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, announced that the Air Force had made a selection in the KC-X competition for development and procurement of up to 179 tanker aircraft, which are…
Mr. President, on February 29, 2008, the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, announced that the Air Force had made a selection in the KC-X competition for development and procurement of up to 179 tanker aircraft, which are urgently needed to support our armed forces.
This was a critical step forward in the recapitalization of an aging fleet of aircraft that are essential for force projection, intelligence, surveillance, and global strike capabilities. A modern tanker force is at the heart of our national security.
I understand that it was a carefully constructed and transparent process that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force structured and faithfully implemented to reach this decision. As Secretary Wynne said, the announcement ``is the culmination of years of tireless work and attention to detail by our acquisition professionals and source selection team, who have been committed to maintaining integrity, providing transparency and promoting a fair competition for this critical aircraft program.''
The Boeing Company has filed a protest, as is their right under law, with the Government Accountability Office concerning the Air Force's award of this contract to Northrop Grumman. Further, as provided by law, the GAO will issue their decision within the next 100 days.
I now would like to provide some context and historical background to the ongoing discussion by reviewing the oversight process employed by Senate oversight committees beginning
with the original proposed tanker lease procurement.
Nearly 6 years ago, a $30 billion authorization provision, placed in the fiscal year 2002 Defense appropriations bill, provided the Air Force the authority to lease, not purchase, up to 100 767s from Boeing, a sole source contract, for use as aerial refueling tankers.
Authority to fund and execute this lease required approval of the 4 congressional committees of jurisdiction over defense programs. Three approved; but, the fourth, the Senate Armed Services Committee, disapproved.
Under Senate procedure, the chairman of the committees made the decision for their respective committees. As chairman of Armed Services at the time, I found fault with the proposed lease contract and after consultations with Members--in particular Senator McCain, who provided valuable oversight of the entire process--the committee declined to approve the proposal.
Additionally, consultations with outside experts had corroborated that procedures and provisions related to the lease contract required further oversight by Congress.
Following a full committee hearing on September 4, 2003, I directed the Department of Defense, by letter to investigate the Air Force's initial proposal and analyze alternatives that would meet the operational requirement.
Furthermore, in letters to the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Management and Budget, among others, I directed that these other agencies provide assessments of the proposal.
These assessments, as well as further oversight conducted by both the Senate Armed Services and Commerce Committees, led Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to order a ``pause'' in the execution of the proposed lease contract.
On December 2, 2003, I sent a letter to the Deputy Secretary to concur with the decision requiring a ``pause'' in execution, and stated further:
The Department of Defense Inspector General inquiry should
pursue the trail of evidence wherever it leads, in accordance
with standard IG procedures.
By February 2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld put a ``halt'' to the entire tanker lease process, pending the DOD inspector general report.
During the following 3 years, the investigative process uncovered evidence revealing serious, criminal breaches in the very process that Americans trust to provide their service members with the equipment necessary to defend our great Nation. In fact, these efforts resulted in jail sentences for senior persons from the Air Force and Boeing, and a settlement of $600 million that was paid to the U.S. Treasury.
The findings confirmed--the view of the Senate Armed Services Committee--that the Air Force's tanker lease proposal was faulty. Actions by the Congress allowed for the requisite time within which the executive branch could establish a free and fair competition. This ultimately resulted in a new proposed contract.
On December 1, 2006, Senator McCain, then chairman of the Airland Subcommittee, wrote a letter to Robert Gates, then the President's nominee to be Secretary of Defense. In his letter, Senator McCain encouraged Secretary Gates to ensure a fair and open competition by issuing a second draft request for proposals in an effort to make certain that there was no ambiguity in the competition process. As chairman of the committee, I concurred with his initiative, given I have been a very strong proponent of competition.
Since the announcement on February 29, 2008, by the Secretary of the Air Force with regard to the Department's acquisition decision, there has been, in my opinion, an injection of considerable misinformation in the public forum. Consequently, I believe I had an obligation to recite--and document--portions of the history relative to the debate.
I am particularly concerned about allegations that the proposed contract would adversely affect job opportunities in America, given parts of the aircraft would be manufactured abroad.
I draw on my experience as Under then as Secretary of the Navy, 1969- 74, when I solicited bids, for major procurements of fleets of new aircraft, from an American industrial base of many companies sized, financed, and experienced to compete.
For many reasons that base, comprised of numerous large domestic companies, has consolidated and narrowed, but America remains the preeminent provider for the vast majority of our military procurements. Today, we also rely on our global partners for a wide diversity of technologies and support in joint military procurements. A prime example is the Joint Strike Fighter procurement.
In closing, we must respect the right of Boeing to seek a review by the GAO as provided by law. It is my judgment that until the GAO acts and reports to Congress their findings; we should lower the emotional rhetoric, be accurate with the facts, and withhold judgment of the work done by a large dedicated group of uniformed and civilian acquisition specialists.
I ask unanimous consent that several letters be printed in the Record.