Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Texas for his comments about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and would like to expand on those a little bit more. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act we sometimes refer to…
Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Texas for his comments about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and would like to expand on those a little bit more.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act we sometimes refer to as FISA or the FISA law. It is important we understand why we need to update this FISA law. In a word, it has to do with the fact that technology has moved forward faster than our ability to change the law. As a result, as the Senator from Texas just noted, we lost about two- thirds of the intelligence gathering on al-Qaida that we could have intercepted and were previously intercepting when it became clear we needed to change the law to keep pace with the advances in technology.
In the Protect America Act we restored access to that information, and we are now back to collecting that information. But the Protect America Act expires on February 1. As a result, we are now back to reauthorizing that act in a permanent way. We need to do so because, again, if this authority lapses, we are back to where we were when we were losing two-thirds of the information that we should be gathering on al-Qaida.
It is not as if we do not understand this is a serious problem. Al- Qaida still exists. It has not been destroyed. We know what it has done. We know what it would like to do. We know they continue to plot. It is critical for us not to ignore the threat. Of course, the first step in dealing with it is to do the best possible job we can in monitoring communications between people who would do us harm.
We all agree that congressional oversight is important to the effort, and all of the legislation we have adopted has enhanced congressional oversight. That is a good thing. That is not in question. But you do not have congressional oversight so oppressive that the intelligence folks cannot collect the information they need to collect. We need to be careful that in redrafting FISA we do not actually impede our intelligence collection in the name of congressional oversight.
There are some problems with legislation that came out of our committee, the Judiciary Committee--some big problems--much less so with the bill that passed out of the Intelligence Committee. Even Members who objected earlier agreed, and I think have agreed, we can provide the necessary statutory authorization for the President to act, and I think most would agree we have to have such authorization in place to deal with groups such as al-Qaida. But their concern was we simply wanted to have congressional authority for it, and that is what the act has done.
We have to be careful that in granting the authority we do not attach so many conditions to it that, once again, it is impossible for the intelligence agencies to do the job we have mandated they do. As I said, the bill reported out of the Judiciary Committee, and to some extent even the bill from the Intelligence Committee, does tie down our intelligence agencies with too many limits on how they can monitor foreign intelligence organizations.
What we are really looking at is some of my colleagues' efforts to take away core responsibilities and authority that the President has to protect our Nation in gathering foreign intelligence.
Let me cite a couple of examples. The Judiciary Committee bill makes FISA the ``exclusive means''--that is the language--of gathering foreign intelligence absent express statutory authority. That is too narrow. In other words, what it is saying is, if another intelligence- gathering tool is not actually authorized by a statute, then it cannot be used to gather intelligence on a group such as al-Qaida.
One obvious example of this is grand jury subpoenas. They are authorized by rules of evidence, not by a Federal statute. The way the Judiciary Committee bill appears to be written, the United States could not even use grand jury subpoenas to gather information about al-Qaida. Obviously, that is not an intended result--at least I would hope not-- but it is one of the things that would have to be fixed if we were to consider the Judiciary Committee bill.
Another provision is in both bills, and it has been referred to as the Wyden amendment, named after my good friend and colleague from the State of Oregon. But as that provision is written, a warrant would be required for any overseas surveillance that is conducted for foreign intelligence purposes and is targeted against a U.S. person.
Under current law, however, a warrant would not be required for overseas surveillance targeted at a U.S. person if that surveillance is conducted strictly for a criminal investigation. So you have the anomaly where a much lesser standard exists for mere criminal investigations and the tough standard for the intelligence community to try to meet exists for gathering foreign intelligence against terrorists, when you want to be able to gather that intelligence and may need to do so in a very quick fashion in order to prevent an attack.
So the Wyden amendment would create the anomaly whereby U.S. overseas surveillance in the course of, say, drug trafficking or money laundering does not require a warrant, but foreign surveillance against a terrorist does. That is not a wise way to write the statute. It should not be more burdensome to monitor al-Qaida than it is to monitor a drug cartel. So that, obviously, would need to be fixed.
Moreover, many foreign terrorist organizations engage in both terrorism and ordinary criminal behavior such as drug smuggling or money laundering. This provision, unfortunately, creates the perverse incentive for U.S. agents to monitor a group for its criminal activities rather than on account of its terrorist activities. The provision literally makes it easier to monitor a group on account of its smuggling of marijuana than on account of the fact that it is a foreign terrorist organization. These kinds of artificial distinctions, obviously, make no sense and overly complicate the mission that is very difficult to begin with that we have asked our intelligence community to engage in.
In another area the Judiciary Committee stripped provisions from the Intelligence Committee bill that protect from lawsuits those telecommunications companies that have assisted U.S. intelligence agencies. This is very wrong. These companies were asked by the United States to help monitor al-Qaida after the September 11 attacks. Being patriotic Americans who wanted to help the United States in responding to the threat, the phone companies agreed to provide the help, and now they are being punished with lawsuits that damage these companies' reputations and are very expensive for them to respond. These companies helped us after September 11. They are not going to help again if we do not protect them from these types of lawsuits. The Intelligence Committee bill included a provision in the bill to do exactly that. Yet that provision was stripped, as I said, in the Judiciary Committee. It took away the protection for those who helped monitor al-Qaida. We need to restore that protection for these folks who helped us.
The bottom line is, what is our goal? Do we want to allow our intelligence agencies to be able to use every legal tool at their disposal to track al-Qaida communications or do we want to again tie up our intelligence agencies in restrictions and procedures and then have some future 9/11 Commission--after, God help us, perhaps another terrorist attack--say Congress balled this up and included so many restrictions on intelligence gathering that they were not able to find out this attack was about to occur?
We have to enable our intelligence agencies, not unduly restrict them. Obviously, we need oversight to prevent abuses. That is included in the statutory language, and that is fine. But it does not make sense to impose other restrictions that primarily serve only the purpose of preventing us from collecting good intelligence. There is no excuse, in effect, for making the same mistake twice.
So, in summary, we are going to be dealing with the FISA reform on the floor of the Senate very soon. We need to. The authorization that currently exists expires on February 1. We need to have something in place before that occurs. The bill that came out of the Intelligence Committee by and large will provide the intelligence collection authority that is needed, although there are some problems with it as well. But the provisions that came out of the Judiciary Committee will not work. They will not allow our intelligence collection agencies to do their job properly and, as I said, create the anomalous situation where it is easier to go after intelligence on a criminal enterprise than it is against a terrorist organization. That cannot be.
So I hope my colleagues, when we bring this bill to the Senate floor, will consider the future, the threat of groups such as al-Qaida, and understand it is up to us to ensure our Nation can be protected and not make the same mistake we made before of unduly restricting our intelligence-gathering agencies in fulfilling the mission--the so very important mission--we have asked them to perform.