United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas) as well for his leadership on the U.S.- Morocco Free Trade Agreement. I am a free trader and believe that free trade helps our Nation and the nations of the…
Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas) as well for his leadership on the U.S.- Morocco Free Trade Agreement. I am a free trader and believe that free trade helps our Nation and the nations of the world. However, I am deeply concerned about the issue of Western Sahara, and I have had concerns that the U.S. needed to make clear that this free trade agreement covers only the internationally- and the U.S.-recognized borders of Morocco and does not include the disputed territory of Western Sahara. It is my understanding that the language in the conference report makes clear that the free trade agreement does not cover resources, goods, services, or any other entity related to trade that originates in Western Sahara.
I would ask the gentleman, does the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement cover trade with the disputed territory of Western Sahara?
I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
I thank the chairman for that clarification.
The following is a letter from USTR making clear that we do not support Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara and the FTA does not recognize or include the Western Sahara.
Executive Office of the President, the United States
Trade Representative,
Washington, DC, July 20, 2004.
Hon. Joseph R. Pitts,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Congressman Pitts: Thank you for your letter of July
19, 2004, concerning our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with
Morocco and the status of Western Sahara.
The Administration's position on Western Sahara is clear:
sovereignty of Western Sahara is in dispute, and the United
States fully supports the United Nations' effort to resolve
this issue. The United States and many other countries do not
recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have
consistently urged the parties to work with the United
Nations to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.
The FTA will cover trade and investment in the territory of
Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include
Western Sahara. As our Harmonized Tariff Schedule makes
clear, for U.S. Customs purposes, the United States treats
imports from Western Sahara and Morocco differently. Nothing
in the FTA will require us to change this practice. The
Administration will draft the proclamation authorized in the
legislation implementing the FTA (H.R. 4842) to provide
preferential tariff treatment for goods from the territory of
Morocco. Preferential tariff treatment will not be provided
to goods from Western Sahara.
I hope this letter addresses your question regarding the
FTA and the status of Western Sahara. I encourage you to
support the FTA. It will create economic opportunities for
U.S. manufacturing and service firms, workers, and farmers,
and will support economic reforms and foreign investment in
Morocco.
Thank you again for your letter. Please feel free to
contact me should you have further questions.
Sincerely,
Robert B. Zoellick.
Mr. Speaker, thank you for your leadership.
While trade is a vital component to strengthening with the greater Middle East, promoting the spread of democracy is even more so. The Sahrawi are a peaceful pro-Western, pro-democracy people. They want the international community, including the U.N. Security Council and the United States, to uphold its commitment to a free and transparent referendum for self-determination, and it is unacceptable that Morocco has been allowed to prevent that vote from taking place.
During his tenure the former Secretary of State Baker proposed a plan that both parties accepted at first, and the Moroccans accepted the plan, but as soon as the people of Western Sahara accepted they withdrew their support, and I am deeply concerned that the Moroccan government, as patterned, will use this agreement with help from friends in France and others to attempt to increase its exploitation of the resources.
I just want to clarify the statement about the people of Western Sahara. Earlier today someone said that the Sahrawis are terrorists. I take exception to this remark, as the people of Western Sahara, and like many others in North Africa and the Middle East, have actually tried to peacefully solve the conflict. The State Department does not consider the people of Western Sahara to be terrorists. It is a misstatement. It is wrong. It is unproductive in our fight against terrorism to suggest that they are, and our own State Department does not believe the people of Western Sahara are terrorists.
Secondly, I visited there. I visited the refugee camps. I know the people. They are not terrorists. Members of this House should go to the refugee camps. They should see the terrible malnutrition of the people, the lack of health care, the refugee camps. If they would visit the refugee camps they would know that the information fed to them by supporters is inaccurate.
Mr. Chairman, I am voting for the FTA because there is protection for the people and resources of Western Sahara and because I believe the free trade will help the people of Morocco and those of surrounding countries.
The following is a series of items that would make clear that this agreement should not be abused by Morocco to profit off of land that it has no legitimate claim to.
Western Sahara--Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975
International Court of Justice
In its Advisory Opinion which the General Assembly of the
United Nations had requested on two questions concerning
Western Sahara, the Court,
With regard to Question I, ``Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro
and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a
territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?'',
--decided by 13 votes to 3 to comply with the request for
an advisory opinion;
--was unanimously of opinion that Western Sahara (Rio de
Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain
was not a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius).
With regard to Question II, ``What were the legal ties
between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the
Mauritanian entity?'', the Court
--decided by 14 votes to 2 to comply with the request for
an advisory opinion;
--was of opinion, by 14 votes to 2, that there were legal
ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco of the
kinds indicated in the penultimate paragraph of the Advisory
Opinion;
--was of opinion, by 15 votes to 1, that there were legal
ties between this territory
and the Mauritanian entity of the kinds indicated in the
penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion.
The penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion was to
the effect that:
The materials and information presented to the Court show
the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal
ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of
the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They
equally show the existence of rights, including some rights
relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between
the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the
territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's
conclusion is that the materials and information presented to
it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty
between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of
Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not
found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the
application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the
decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the
principle of self-determination through the free and genuine
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.
For these proceedings the Court was composed as follows:
President Lachs; Vice-President Ammoun; Judges Forster, Gros,
Bengzon, Petren, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto, de Castro,
Morozov, Jimenez de Arechaga, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Nagendra
Singh and Ruda; Judge ad hoc Boni.
Judges Gros, Ignacio-Pinto and Nagendra Singh appended
declarations to the Advisory Opinion; Vice-President Ammoun
and Judges Forster, Petren, Dillard, de Castro and Boni
appended separate opinions, and Judge Ruda a dissenting
opinion.
In these declarations and opinions the judges concerned
make clear and explain their positions.
Course of the Proceedings
(paras. 1-13 of Advisory Opinion)
The Court first recalls that the General Assembly of the
United Nations decided to submit two questions for the
Court's advisory opinion by resolution 3292 (XXIX) adopted on
13 December 1974 and received in the Registry on 21 December.
It retraces the subsequent steps in the proceedings,
including the transmission of a dossier of documents by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (Statute, Art. 65,
para. 2) and the presentation of written statements or
letters and/or oral statements by 14 States, including
Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain and Zaire (Statute, Art.
66).
Mauritania and Morocco each asked to be authorized to
choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the proceedings. By an Order
of 22 May 1975 (1.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 6), the Court found
that Morocco was entitled under Articles 31 and 68 of the
Statute and Article 89 of the Rules of Court to choose a
person to sit as judge ad hoc, but that, in the case of
Mauritania, the conditions for the application of those
Articles had not been satisfied. At the same time the Court
stated that those conclusions in no way prejudged its views
with regard to the questions referred to it or any other
question which might fall to be decided, including those of
its competence to give an advisory opinion and the propriety
of exercising that competence.
Competence of the Court
(paras. 14-22 of Advisory Opinion)
Under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the Court
may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the
request of any duly authorized body. The Court notes that the
General Assembly of the United Nations is suitably authorized
by Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and that the two
questions submitted are framed in terms of law and raise
problems of international law. They are in principle
questions of a legal character, even if they also embody
questions of fact, and even if they do not call upon the
Court to pronounce on existing rights and obligations. The
Court is accordingly competent to entertain the request.
Propriety of Giving an Advisory Opinion
(paras. 23-74 of Advisory Opinion)
Spain put forward objections which in its view would render
the giving of an opinion incompatible with the Court's
judicial character. It referred in the first place to the
fact that it had not given its consent to the Court's
adjudicating upon the questions submitted. It maintained (a)
that the subject of the questions was substantially identical
to that of a dispute concerning Western Sahara which Morocco,
in September 1974, had invited it to submit jointly to the
Court, a proposal which it had refused: the advisory
jurisdiction was therefore being used to circumvent the
principle that the Court has no jurisdiction to settle a
dispute without the consent of the parties; (b) that the case
involved a dispute concerning the attribution of territorial
sovereignty over Western Sahara and that the consent of
States was always necessary for the adjudication of such
disputes; (c) that in the circumstances of the case the Court
could not fulfill the requirements of good administration of
justice with regard to the determination of the facts. The
Court considers (a) that the General Assembly, while noting
that a legal controversy over the status of Western Sahara
had arisen during its discussions, did not have the object of
bringing before the Court a dispute or legal controversy with
a view to its subsequent peaceful settlement, but sought an
advisory opinion which would be of assistance in the exercise
of its functions concerning the decolonization of the
territory, hence the legal position of Spain could not be
compromised by the Court's answers to the questions
submitted; (b) that those questions do not call upon the
Court to adjudicate on existing territorial rights; (c) that
it has been placed in possession of sufficient information
and evidence.
Spain suggested in the second place that the questions
submitted to the Court were academic and devoid of purpose or
practical effect, in that the United Nations had already
settled the method to be followed for the decolonization of
Western Sahara, namely a consultation of the indigenous
population by means of a referendum to be conducted by Spain
under United Nations auspices. The Court examines the
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject,
from resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, to resolution 3292 (XXIX) on Western
Sahara, embodying the request for advisory opinion. It
concludes that the decolonization process envisaged by the
General Assembly is one which will respect the right of the
population of Western Sahara to determine their future
political status by their own freely expressed will. This
right to self-determination, which is not affected by the
request for advisory opinion and constitutes a basic
assumption of the questions put to the Court, leaves the
General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the
forms and procedures by which it is to be realized. The
Advisory Opinion will thus furnish the Assembly with elements
of a legal character relevant to that further discussion of
the problem to which resolution 3292 (XXIX) alludes.
Consequently the Court finds no compelling reason for
refusing to give a reply to the two questions submitted to it
in the request for advisory opinion.
Question I: ``Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El
Hamra) at the Time of Colonization by Spain a Territory
Belonging to No One (terra nullius)?''
(paras. 75-83 of Advisory Opinion)
For the purposes of the Advisory Opinion, the ``time of
colonization by Spain'' may be considered as the period
beginning in 1884, when Spain proclaimed its protectorate
over the Rio de Oro. It is therefore by reference to the law
in force at that period that the legal concept of terra
nullius must be interpreted. In law, ``occupation'' was a
means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory
otherwise than by cession or succession; it was a cardinal
condition of a valid ``occupation'' that the territory should
be terra nullius. According to the State practice of that
period, territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a
social and political organization were not regarded as terrae
nullius: in their case sovereignty was not generally
considered as effected through occupation, but through
agreements concluded with local rulers. The information
furnished to the Court shows (a) that at the time of
colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which,
if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes
and under chiefs competent to represent them; (b) that Spain
did not proceed upon the basis that it was establishing its
sovereignty over terrae nullius: thus in his Order of 26
December 1884 the King of Spain proclaimed that he was
taking the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of
agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes.
The Court therefore gives a negative answer to Question I.
In accordance with the terms of the request for advisory
opinion, ``if the answer to the first question is in the
negative'', the Court is to reply to Question II.
Question II: ``What Were the Legal Ties of This Territory
with the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian Entity?''
(paras. 84-161 of Advisory Opinion)
The meaning of the words ``legal ties'' has to be sought in
the object and purpose of resolution 3292 (XXIX) of the
United Nations General Assembly. It appears to the Court that
they must be understood as referring to such legal ties as
may affect the policy to be followed in the decolonization of
Western Sahara. The Court cannot accept the view that the
ties in question could be limited to ties established
directly with the territory and without reference to the
people who may be found in it. At the time of its
colonization the territory had a sparse population that for
the most part consisted of nomadic tribes the members of
which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes,
sometimes reaching as far as southern Morocco or regions of
present-day Mauritania Algeria or other States. These tribes
were of the Islamic faith.
Morocco (paragraphs 90-129 of the Advisory Opinion)
presented its claim to legal ties with Western Sahara as a
claim to ties of sovereignty on the ground of an alleged
immemorial possession of the territory and an uninterrupted
exercise of authority. In the view of the Court, however,
what must be of decisive importance in determining its answer
to Question II must be evidence directly relating to
effective display of authority in Western Sahara at the time
of its colonization by Spain and in the period immediately
preceding. Morocco requests that the Court should take
account of the special structure of the Moroccan State. That
State was founded on the common religious bond of Islam and
on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through
their caids or sheiks, rather than on the notion of
territory. It consisted partly of what was called the Bled
Makhzen, areas actually subject to the Sultan, and partly of
what was called the Bled
Siba, areas in which the tribes were not submissive to him;
at the relevant period, the areas immediately to the north of
Western Sahara lay within the Bled Siba.
As evidence of its display of sovereignty in Western
Sahara, Morocco invoked alleged acts of internal display of
Moroccan authority, consisting principally of evidence said
to show the allegiance of Saharan caids to the Sultan,
including dahirs and other documents concerning the
appointment of caids, the alleged imposition of Koranic and
other taxes, and acts of military resistance to foreign
penetration of the territory. Morocco also relied on certain
international acts said to constitute recognition by other
States of its sovereignty over the whole or part of Western
Sahara, including (a) certain treaties concluded with Spain,
the United States and Great Britain and Spain between 1767
and 1861, provisions of which dealt inter alia with the
safety of persons shipwrecked on the coast of Wad Noun or its
vicinity, (b) certain bilateral treaties of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whereby Great
Britain, Spain, France and Germany were said to have
recognized that Moroccan sovereignty extended as far south as
Cape Bojador or the boundary of the Rio de Oro.
Having considered this evidence and the observations of the
other States which took part in the proceedings, the Court
finds that neither the internal nor the international acts
relied upon by Morocco indicate the existence at the relevant
period of either the existence or the international
recognition of legal ties of territorial sovereignty between
Western Sahara and the Moroccan State. Even taking account of
the specific structure of that State, they do not show that
Morocco displayed any effective and exclusive State activity
in Western Sahara. They do, however, provide indications that
a legal tie of allegiance existed at the relevant period
between the Sultan and some, but only some, of the nomadic
peoples of the territory, through Tekna caids of the Noun
region, and they show that the Sultan displayed, and was
recognized by other States to possess, some authority or
influence with respect to those tribes.
The term ``Mauritanian entity'' (paragraphs 139-152 of the
Advisory Opinion) was first employed during the session of
the General Assembly in 1974 at which resolution 3292 (XXIX),
requesting an advisory opinion of the Court, was adopted. It
denotes the cultural, geographical and social entity within
which the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was to be created.
According to Mauritania, that entity, at the relevant period,
was the Bilad Shinguitti or Shinguitti country, a distinct
human unit, characterized by a common language, way of life,
religion and system of laws, featuring two types of political
authority: emirates and tribal groups.
Expressly recognizing that these emirates and tribes did
not constitute a State, Mauritania suggested that the
concepts of ``nation'' and of ``people'' would be the most
appropriate to explain the position of the Shinguitti people
at the time of colonization. At that period, according to
Mauritania, the Mauritanian entity extended from the Senegal
river to the Wad Sakiet El Hamra. The territory at present
under Spanish administration and the present territory of the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania thus together constituted
indissociable parts of a single entity and had legal ties
with one another.
The information before the Court discloses that, while
there existed among them many ties of a racial, linguistic,
religious, cultural and economic nature, the emirates and
many of the tribes in the entity were independent in relation
to one another; they had no common institutions or organs.
The Mauritanian entity therefore did not have the character
of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the
several emirates or tribes which comprised it. The Court
concludes that at the time of colonization by Spain there did
not exist between the territory of Western Sahara and the
Mauritanian entity any tie of sovereignty, or of allegiance
of tribes, or of simple inclusion in the same legal entity.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly does not appear to have so
framed Question II as to confine the question exclusively to
those legal ties which imply territorial sovereignty, which
would be to disregard the possible relevance of other legal
ties to the decolonization process. The Court considers that,
in the relevant period, the nomadic peoples of the Shinguitti
country possessed rights, including some rights relating to
the lands through which they migrated. These rights
constituted legal ties between Western Sahara and the
Mauritanian entity. They were ties which knew no frontier
between the territories and were vital to the very
maintenance of life in the region.
Morocco and Mauritania both laid stress on the overlapping
character of the respective legal ties which they claimed
Western Sahara to have had with them at the time of
colonization (paragraphs 153-160 of the Advisory Opinion).
Although their views appeared to have evolved considerably in
that respect, the two States both stated at the end of the
proceedings that there was a north appertaining to Morocco
and a south appertaining to Mauritania without any
geographical void in between, but with some overlapping as a
result of the intersection of nomadic routes. The Court
confines itself to noting that this geographical overlapping
indicates the difficulty of disentangling the various
relationships existing in the Western Sahara region at the
time of colonization.
For these reasons, the Court (paragraphs 162 and 163 of the
Advisory Opinion) gives the replies indicated on pages 1 and
2 above.
[From Reuters News Service, Jan. 13, 2004]
Sardines and Sovereignty in Western Sahara
(By Eileen Byrne)
Laayoune, Western Sahara.--On trawlers at the quayside near
Laayoune, the main city in Moroccan-controlled Western
Sahara, the crew unload sardines in wicker baskets thrown
from hand to hand.
The traditional baskets are misleading, because the yield
of sardines, octopus and squid from the Western Saharan ports
of Laayoune, Boujdour and Dakhla has come to represent more
than 60 percent of Morocco's total annual fisheries yield of
almost one million tons. With sovereignty over the Western
Sahara still in dispute, this is a politically significant
catch.
The uncertainty about the future of this vast, mainly
desert territory in the northwest corner of Africa puts a
dampener, for now, on investment in tourism for winter sun-
seekers, officials in Laayoune admit.
But against the backdrop of diplomatic stalemate, as the
United Nations strives for a solution to the dispute between
Morocco and the Polisario separatist movement, Morocco is
keen to show that the regional economy is developing apace.
The fishing sector is one area where the authorities can
point to significant growth, always under the firm guiding
hand of the central government.
southern-most subjects
Claiming Western Sahara as its historic ``southern
provinces,'' Morocco controls most of the territory.
The Polisario movement, based across the border in Algeria,
sees the future of the area as an independent state, governed
by its Saharan Arab inhabitants, known as Sahrawis.
Since a 1991 cease-fire, successive U.N. initiatives aimed
at ending a dispute which dates from 1975, and asserting the
Sahrawis' right to ``self-determination,'' have failed.
Advocates of independence for Western Sahara stress the
territory's mineral wealth, with the phosphate mine at Boukra
near Laayoune, and possible offshore oil reserves.
But the Boukra mine is loss-making and subsidized by the
Office Cherifien des Phosphates' more important phosphate
production near Khouribga, according to officials. It is
fishing that generates new jobs and export earnings. Western
Sahara fish products now account for up to seven percent of
Morocco's total export earnings of 85.6 billion dirhams
($9.80 billion).
Morocco declined to renew a fishing accord with the
European Union which until the late 1990s had allowed foreign
boats into Moroccan waters. It has instead spent heavily
since then on port infrastructure in Western Sahara, as
though consolidating its hold on the territory.
Like all other businesses in Western Sahara, the sardine
canning businesses, and plants processing octopus for
Japanese dinner tables, pay no taxes except for payroll
contributions.
They also benefit from the subsidies in the prices of fuel,
power and water with which Morocco woos its southern-most
subjects, who account for less than two percent of the
kingdom's 29.6 million population.
Local investors are often Sahrawi notables who see the
territory's future with Rabat rather than the Polisario and
who play a prominent role in the local economy. A little over
a generation ago, the Sahrawis' lifestyle revolved around
camel and goat rearing. Fish did not figure at all in the
Sahrawi diet and even today few Sahrawis work directly with
fish.
But among new investors, the favorable conditions for
businesses can sometimes encourage over-hasty decisions.
octopus for the japanese
Lining the walls of the conference room in the Laayoune
governor's headquarters, photos showed a visit to Western
Sahara by Morocco's King Mohammed.
Some 40 men, and one woman wrapped in the colored veil worn
in Western Sahara, listened to Morocco's Fisheries Minister
Taieb Rhafes. He had flown down from Rabat to explain why he
was extending a ban on octopus fishing.
With him were representatives of Moroccan banks whose loans
to local investors had encouraged a proliferation of octopus-
freezing plants around Dakhla, from a handful in 1997 to 90
in 2003. The octopuses have been almost wiped out by over-
fishing, the minister explained. It takes only three months
to have an octopus-freezing plant up and running, said an
official.
At Laayoune port, the fishermen are not Sahrawis, but come
from Moroccan ports further north--Agadir, Essaouira and
Safi. A spontaneous movement of sardines southwards, traced
by Morocco's fisheries research institute, the INRH,
coincided with the development of infrastructure in the
Western Sahara. The fishermen followed the fish southwards,
bringing their expertise with them.
Moroccan officials have no separate figures for employment
among Sahrawis and non-Sahrawis. ``There are no two
communities here,'' only Moroccan citizens, Laayoune Governor
Mohamed Rharrabi told Reuters.
With the sea-faring culture far-removed from the
traditional Sahrawi lifestyle, it seems fishing will provide
only some of the jobs needed in the Laayoune region, where
unemployment at the last census was 40 percent among 20 to 24
year-olds.
Denmark Does Not Recognise Moroccan Sovereignty on Western Sahara
[From Sahara Press Service (SPS), June 22, 2004]
COPENHAGEN--Danish Government, does not ``recognise
Moroccan sovereignty on Western Sahara'', declared Danish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Per Stig Mfller, in
response to a question he answered before of his Parliament,
according to close sources to the Saharawi representation to
Denmark.
Answering a question asked by Danish Member of the
Parliamentary group Enhedslisten (Union list, in English),
Mr. Soern Soendergaard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
asserted that his Government ``does not recognise Moroccan
sovereignty on Western Sahara'', considering Moroccan
presence on the territory as illegal and unacceptable.
Regarding the peace plan, elaborated by UN Secretary
General's former Personal Envoy, James Baker, Mr. Mfller
affirmed that this plan remains applicable, recalling that it
``is accepted by Polisario Front and the neighbouring
countries and is unanimously adopted by Security Council in
its resolution 1495''.
Finally, the Head of Danish diplomacy reiterated ``the
support of Denmark of the efforts paid by UN's Secretary
General and his former Personal Envoy aimed at reaching a
just and lasting solution to the conflict'', in Western
Sahara conforming to international legality and by
implementing UN's resolutions.
[From Sahara Press Service (SPS), June 24, 2004]
German PDC/CSU Calls to Immediate Settlement of Western Sahara Conflict
Berlin.--The parliamentary group of German Christian
Democrat Party (PDC/CSU) in Bundestag (Parliament), called on
Thursday to an immediate settlement of Western Sahara's
conflict, exhorting international community to pay more
efforts in defending Saharawi people's ``right to self-
determination''.
In a communique publicised on Thursday, of which SPS
received a copy, PDC/CSU parliamentary Group's spokesperson,
Dr. Christian Ruck, asserted that ``Western Sahara conflict's
settlement tolerates no more delays'', calling international
community to pay more efforts in defending Saharawi people's
``right to self-determination''.
UN Secretary General's former Personal Envoy, James Baker's
resignation ``may push to failure'' the peace plan for self-
determination of Saharawi people, though this plan
constitutes ``a reasonable compromise to realise peace in
this region'', deplored the spokesperson.
Thus, the international community is called to ``prove to
the people of this region, who is still suffering this old
aging conflict, that its right to self-determination remains
a priority for the international community'', which should
also defend UN's principles and international law, so as to
reach a peaceful settlement to this problem, concluded the
communique.
[From Upstream Online & Hardcopy, July 2, 2004]
Svitzer Feels Heat in Western Sahara
(By Barry Morgan)
Fugro affiliate Svitzer has just completed a marine survey
on Kerr-McGee's Boujdour acreage off the disputed territory
of Western Sahara.
Based in Norfolk in the UK, Svitzer is the latest company
to attract brickbats from activists determined to persuade
industry players not to sign deals with Morocco, which
occupies the territory and claims its resources.
Following a one-year extension, KMG's reconnaissance permit
will expire on 29 October. However, its tenure is contested
by the Sahrawi independence militia, which has long fought
for sovereign control, stirring international controversy
over the licencing regime imposed by Rabat.
Fellow UK consultancy Robertson Research International
(RRI) is also poised to complete survey work in Western
Sahara, despite question marks over the legitimacy of UK
corporate involvement in what the UK government calls a
``non-self governing territory'' where it says sovereignty
remains to be determined under UN auspices. For its part, RRI
said it is not directly contracted to Rabat.
Confirmation of RRI's involvement comes hard on the heels
of a campaign launched by Western Sahara support groups
across Europe against exploration and production companies
doing business at the behest of Rabat.
Kerr-McGee, Total and TGS-Nopec were blasted for jumping
the gun on a fragile peace process in which the UN has sought
diplomatic consensus ahead of a referendum on self-
determination for the Sahrawi people.
Activists' primary target of late has been UK-registered
Wessex Exploration, which was recently invited to Rabat to
finalise a preliminary but open-ended deal to analyse onshore
data ahead of an exploration push outlined by Moroccan state
oil company managing director Amina Benkhadra.
Wessex has been warned that ``its reputation would suffer''
if it did not back off or negotiate with the Sahrawi
authorities.
In the meantime, several UK parliamentarians have moved to
seek clarification of the UK government's position on British
companies doing business in Western Sahara. Concerned MPs led
by the Labour Party's David Drew, want to pin down Whitehall
on its attitude.
Drew will shortly table a parliamentary question seeking
greater clarity. Drew now speaks for the Western Sahara
Support Group and two Conservative MPs are expected to join
existing members before they resurface as a parliamentary
force.
The UK Foreign Office insists sovereignty in Western Sahara
remains undetermined as long as UN calls to resolve the
crisis via the so-called Baker Peace Plan remain unheeded.
``We want to push the UK to promote the Plan so that Morocco
withdraws. It should also tell British companies that they
should not get involved in Western Sahara at this time while
the UN mandate remains unimplemented,'' said Drew.
The Foreign Office currently has no problem with companies
winning reconnaissance or E&P licences from Rabat, so long as
the practical effect complies with constraints laid down by
the UN Legal Office on ``disregarding the rights'' of the
Sahrawi people.
This means Kerr-McGee and Total can use TGS-Nopec and Fugro
to shoot seismic as long as rigs are not deployed to confirm
or produce oil finds.
Meanwhile, the acquisition of strategically important
seismic data for Rabat as the licensor remains legal under
the ``look but don't touch'' interpretation of both UK and US
governments. However, a UK official said that ``we'd have to
revisit this opinion if activity got this far. There is no
official endorsement''.
``Right now, our view is that UK companies going into
Western Sahara are on their own and we cannot link them to
the Department of Trade & Industry or offer the support of
any other government mechanisms,'' the source added.
Two UK-registered companies presently stand on both sides
of the fence. Sterling Resources has inherited an exclusive
offshore PSC from AIM-listed Fusion Oil & Gas following a
recent take-over, while Wessex is under increasing pressure
after retaining its exclusive study licence from Rabat.
After expending $600 million on peace-keeping efforts, the
UN system is tiring of the Western Sahara crisis, with UN
Special Envoy James Baker resigning in frustration last
month.
The UN's new representative, Alvaro de Soto, said this week
that he would pursue the same policy as Baker, suggesting no
new ideas to break the deadlock were on the table.