Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition to the motion. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. My colleagues come here today proposing this new, intensified legislation on the basis that they would like to stop Iran…
Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition to the motion.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
My colleagues come here today proposing this new, intensified legislation on the basis that they would like to stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon. So do we.
Everything that my colleague, Mr. Royce, detailed a moment ago is something that we are concerned about.
But we have a changed circumstance, a changed circumstance that this legislation does not acknowledge, and that is that the Iranian people had a choice between candidates, and they selected the candidate who decided to reject extremism and actually campaign on the basis of moderation. Why not? At least until Mr. Rouhani has a chance to forestall legislation like this and engage in
diplomacy to reach the goals that Mr. Royce has identified.
Mr. Rouhani ran on a policy of promise to pursue a path of moderation. He promised to pursue a ``policy of reconciliation and peace.'' Obviously, we don't have rose-colored glasses. We don't know. But why don't we wait and see. Why aren't we at least curious to find out whether or not President Rouhani means that he wants to pursue this course of peace. It is what we want--negotiated settlement. Why are we slapping his hand down when apparently the Iranian people are willing to support a candidate who is willing to extend a hand?
The New York Times agrees. It said:
While sanctions are an important element of American
strategy, piling on more at this time and this moment could
harm, rather than advance, the chances for a negotiated deal
with Iran.
In fact, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that additional sanctions at this moment might undermine diplomatic efforts.
The fact of the matter is, why do we want to strengthen the hand of extremists who will say to Rouhani, See, you thought you could work with them. We were right all along.
I say they're wrong. I say let's accept the olive branch extended by the Iranian people who selected a more moderate candidate.
In fact, I would like to submit this document into the Record. The headline reads:
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Nominee for Foreign Minister,
Seen as Olive Branch to United States.
Let me also acknowledge and put into the Record this letter, dated July 19, by 130 Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis to say President Obama pursued negotiations in this window of time when we have a President who won on the basis of extending a hand for negotiation.
We don't have to do this now. We can do this when we come back after at least Mr. Rouhani is inaugurated into the presidency of Iran.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time, and I do have a number of speakers, when we're ready for that.
[From HuffPost World, July 31, 2013]
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Nominee for Foreign Minister, Seen as
Olive Branch to United States
(By Marcus George and Paul Taylor)
Dubai/Paris, July 29, 2013 (Reuters).--If Iranian
President-elect Hassan Rouhani wanted to signal his
determination to rebuild relations with the United States and
strike a ``grand bargain,'' he could hardly do better than
pick Mohammad Javad Zarif as his foreign minister.
Iranian news agencies reported on Monday that Zarif, a
former ambassador to the United Nations and Tehran's leading
connoisseur of the U.S. political elite, is set to be in the
cabinet Rouhani will announce after taking office on Sunday.
A source close to Rouhani confirmed Zarif will be nominated
as foreign minister.
A fluent English speaker who earned his doctorate at the
University of Denver, Zarif has been at the centre of several
secret negotiations to try to overcome 35 years of
estrangement between Washington and Tehran, diplomats said.
Those talks failed because of deep mistrust on a range of
disputes from Iran's secretive nuclear programme and support
for anti-Israeli militants to U.S. sanctions and hopes of
engineering ``regime change'' in Tehran.
Zarif's elevation, however, suggests the moderate new
president is keen to make another try at breaking the
deadlock.
``He was always trying to do what was possible to improve
relations in a very intelligent, open and clear way,'' said a
senior Western diplomat who had repeated dealings with Zarif.
``This is someone who knows the United States very well and
with all the frustrations of the past is still someone they
know in Washington,'' he said.
The usual caveats about Iran apply: under the Islamic
Republic's complex institutional set-up, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls the shots in foreign and
security policy and controls the nuclear programme, which
Western powers say is aimed at developing atomic weapons.
The foreign minister ranks roughly fourth in the foreign
policy pecking order, after Khamenei, the head of the
National Security Council, who also serves as Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator, and the president.
Nevertheless, assuming he is confirmed by Iran's prickly,
conservative-dominated parliament, Zarif's appointment would
be a strong gesture of positive intent towards the United
States.
The two countries have had no official ties since 1980
after Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran,
taking 52 diplomats hostage in protest against Washington's
admission of the former Shah after he was toppled by the
Islamic revolution.
contact book
Zarif's Washington contact book includes Vice President Joe
Biden, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and a who's who of
U.S. national security officials on both sides of the aisle.
The soft-spoken career diplomat resigned from the nuclear
negotiating team after hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
was elected in 2005.
In 2007, he returned from New York after five years as
Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations and
found himself out of favour as his country turned its back on
the notion of seeking better ties with the West and
Ahmadinejad sidelined English-speaking diplomats.
Since then, Zarif has been in a holding pattern, nominally
senior adviser to the foreign minister from 2007 to 2010,
then from 2011 international director of Islamic Azad
University, a network of educational institutions established
by ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his political
patron.
Rafsanjani, who is also Rouhani's mentor, has long favoured
a pragmatic rapprochement with the United States, but
Khamenei has stamped on all such efforts since he succeeded
the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, in 1989.
Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat who served as
President Barack Obama's top Middle East adviser until 2011,
said Zarif had shown a willingness to negotiate in good faith
and his appointment would be seen in Washington and Europe as
an indication that Rouhani wants to ``do business'' with the
West.
But he cautioned that the question remained whether this
would translate into an easing of Tehran's resistance to
curbing its nuclear drive. ``Zarif is not someone who does
favours for the United States,'' Ross said. ``He fits the
category of a sign or signal until you see Iran actually
doing something.''
Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President
George H.W. Bush, described Zarif as ``reasonable'' but said
much would depend on how much leeway he is given.
Western diplomats said Zarif was a central negotiator in
the last major effort to negotiate a ``grand bargain''
between Tehran and Washington that began after the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks on the United States and foundered in mid-2003.
U.S. newspapers published in 2007 the bare text of a draft
agreement, put together in secret talks in Paris, Geneva and
New York, that would have established negotiations between
the two countries on all outstanding issues.
While the draft fell short of an agreement on substance, it
noted both sides' expectations on issues such as assurances
that Iran's nuclear programme has no military capability, and
assurances that the United States would act against anti-
government People's Mujahideen activists based in Iraq.
``The texts are authentic,'' said a Western diplomat who
was involved in the back-channel talks, confirming that
Khamenei had given the green light for negotiations to go
ahead.
hostage negotiator
Years earlier, as a junior diplomat Zarif was involved in
negotiations to win the release of U.S. hostages held by pro-
Iranian gunmen in Lebanon, according to the memoirs of former
U.N. envoy Giandomenico Picco. Even though the United States
did not make a promised reciprocal goodwill gesture at the
time, Zarif remained committed to improving ties.
In Washington, Trita Parsi, president of the pro-dialogue
National Iranian American Council, said Zarif has been
involved in multiple U.S.-Iranian negotiations, including
talks on Afghanistan after the U.S.-led 2001 invasion, and
Tehran's 2003 proposal for a ``grand bargain'' with the
United States.
``Based on my interviews with him, (Zarif) was involved in
the drafting of it,'' Parsi said of that offer of a
comprehensive new start, which then President George W.
Bush's administration spurned.
Veteran U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, the U.S. point man at
a 2001 Bonn conference that formed a new Afghan government
after the overthrow of the Taliban, credited Zarif with a
pivotal, positive role in the diplomacy--and with a sense of
humour.
Dobbins--now the State Department's special envoy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan--recalled in 2007 testimony to the
U.S. Congress how Zarif, then a deputy foreign minister,
persuaded the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to drop its
demand for control of an outsize proportion of Afghan
ministries.
The Northern Alliance delegate ``remained obdurate.
Finally, Zarif took him aside and whispered to him for a few
moments, following which the Northern Alliance envoy returned
to the table and said: `Okay, I agree. The other factions can
have two more ministries. And we can create three more, which
they can also have.' We had a deal,'' Dobbins recalled.
``Zarif had achieved the final breakthrough without which
the (Hamid) Karzai government might never have been formed.''
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional minute to the gentleman from North Carolina.
May I inquire as to the time we have remaining.
I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott)
(Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)