Mr. Speaker, there are key moments in the life of our country in the course of this Congress when the United States faces a path towards democracy or towards war. That choice may be approaching in the policies we face regarding Iran's…
Mr. Speaker, there are key moments in the life of our country in the course of this Congress when the United States faces a path towards democracy or towards war. That choice may be approaching in the policies we face regarding Iran's development of nuclear weapons.
I, for one, choose diplomacy over conflict; and I believe that the United States and our allies can achieve our ends to the Iranian nuclear program without a shot being fired in anger. This should be our goal; and towards that end I join with my Democratic colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), to form the bipartisan House Iran Study Group.
The mission of our group is to review the situation in Iran, to measure the potential threat, to examine our military options, but most importantly to find and promote diplomatic policies that advance our security interests without a resort to arms.
I could not have chosen a better partner for this effort than my colleague from New Jersey. He is, first and foremost, not a Republican or a Democrat. He is an American. We both agree with Senator Arthur Vandenberg's dictum, who said that partisanship should end at the water's edge. We are also dedicated to the ideal that, when acting abroad, Republicans and Democrats are joined together as Americans.
We formed the Iran Study Group last year to carefully review the facts about Iran, to make sure the U.S. government is reviewing all of its policy options and to push diplomacy towards a successful conclusion. And I want to recognize my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
When we review the situation in Iran, we see a nation with a proud Persian language and a culture that now is under a religious regime that has a very weak hold on the voters of its nation.
Time and again old revolutionary leaders of Iran have lost elections to reformers, but they keep power through the religious Guardian Council, Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian Intelligence Service. These ruling extremists have kept Iran as a pariah nation, unable to build lasting ties to the West.
While nearly everyone under 40 in Iran favors good relations with the West and even the United States, Iran's current Guardian Council maintains her isolation.
Now, all U.S. Presidents, Republican and Democrat, since 1979 have certified
that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, that Hezbollah would collapse in the Middle East without the direct support of Iran's intelligence service, the MOIS. And under the Guardian Council, Iran took a clear turn towards nuclear weapons despite her status as a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
Mr. Speaker, I would agree. Iran had grand ambitions under the Shah who planned to build 29 nuclear reactors. His plans and those of his successors are ironic given Iran's location atop one of the largest reserves of oil that emerged from the ground at less than a cost of $2 a barrel. With the fall of the Shah, Iran's nuclear ambitions were cut back but then revived with the help of Russia. Based at Bushehr, the Russian nuclear reactor project gives Iran a clear path to the production of plutonium despite Russia's assertions otherwise.
Until 2002, we had strong suspicions about Iran, but no clear allegations that she had violated her solemn commitment to the United Nations under the non-proliferation treaty; but then an exile group, the National Council For Resistance of Iran, exposed clear, undeclared nuclear activities, indicating uranium enrichment at that task; and the Arak heavy water production facility gives Iran a clear path towards the refinement of products which would become the center of a nuclear weapon.
This was just not according to the exile group. After 2 years of extensive inspections by the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, they reported that Iran had undeclared centrifuge atomic vapor, a laser isotope separation, a molecular laser isotope separation and plutonium separation activities, all in direct violation of Iran's formal obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safeguards agreement.
I yield to my colleague on these points.
Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and I want to emphasize his point that the violations we are talking about were not based on faulty intelligence from the U.S. CIA. These violations that we are talking about are documented in formal, open reports by the United Nations international staff under Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei of the IAEA. Inspections through June of 2003 showed many reporting failures by Iran; and by mid-year, Iran admitted to enriching uranium, purification, reprocessing and later admitted to the United Nations of losing nuclear material that had been covered by her U.N. safeguards agreement.
Iran built a centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz with 1,000 rotors and started construction at another facility with 50,000 rotors. Iran first claimed that it had not enriched uranium at all, and the IAEA reported then that it had found contaminations of enriched uranium at the Kalaye Electric Company, at one place, of 36 percent enriched uranium; at another, 54 percent on imported components; and at another, 70 percent enriched uranium inside its workshop. Until these discoveries by the U.N., Iran had only admitted to enriching uranium once to a level of 7 percent.
After the A.Q. Khan network was exposed in Libya, Iran also admitted to using advanced rotors of Pakistani design to enrich uranium. It also admitted in May 2004 that it had separated plutonium in much larger amounts than previously reported.
All of these actions point to a continuing effort by Iran to develop nuclear materials beyond an enrichment level ever needed for civilian power, giving us and the United Nations clear and convincing evidence that it is dedicated to the production of a nuclear weapon in violation of its commitment under the non-proliferation treaty at the U.N.
Now, Iran also has backed up its public statements with policy and announced just last month enacting legislation requiring the Iranian Government to develop nuclear technology, including enrichment of uranium, but this is not just the only part of the threat.
Iran not only has a nuclear program; it also has an aggressive missile development program, based on a North Korean missile, the No Dong, which the Iranians call the Shahab 3.
Iran's missile program brings many key U.S. facilities and friends into range, especially Israel. This is a picture of the latest Shahab 3 missile, almost 98 percent North Korean; and when you look at the range of these systems, you see that U.S. facilities like the Fifth Fleet, or our allies in Israel, come clearly into range.
When we look at this, we have a real danger now, nuclear weapons and missiles to promptly deliver them that represent a long-term threat to the Jewish State.
I yield to my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. Speaker, I point out the record of Iran is already clear in the late 1980s and early 1990s when she used chemical weapons and fired several hundred missiles in her war with Iraq.
Now, the U.S. and Israel, they are already spending hundreds of millions of dollars building a defense system against incoming Iranian missiles. If Iran's nuclear and missile programs go further, then the United States and Israel will have to commit hundreds of millions of more dollars to make sure that our allies in the Jewish State are able to resist incoming Iranian weapons. I will note that a missile fired from Iran, aimed, for example, at Tel-Aviv would arrive just 11 minutes after lift off, putting the Middle East on a hair trigger.
Given all of this, the United Nations' reports of violations, Iran's record of terror, nuclear and missile developments, all reported not by the CIA or MI6, but by the United Nations, what should we do?
Some say that we should let Iran have nuclear weapons, that we cannot stop technology, that we should not be able to classify the laws of physics, and so Iran will get nuclear weapons; but if we acquiesce to this, then this policy would commit us to a vast and expensive course of building missile defenses to protect our allies. While the Middle East would descend into a tense hair trigger peace, one irrational leader, one miscalculation and millions could die in a nuclear Jihad.
It would also put nuclear weapons in the hands of the Guardian Council, the same council that Presidents Carter and Reagan and Bush and Clinton and Bush all certified were the number one supporters of state terror, the men and women who funded operations like the gentleman said who would put a suitcase or a car bomb in a Western city.
I think we can do better. Some might say if this is so bad, then let Israel remove this threat by military means. In fact, in 1981 Israel destroyed Iraq's path to plutonium when it bombed the Osiraq reactor; but when we look at Israel and a potential attack on Iran, we see a vastly complicated operation of great cost and a chance of failure. At best, such an operation could set back Iran for a few years. At worst, it would enrage an enemy who would then use all of the means at her disposal to attack the Jewish homeland.
An attack by Israel on Iran would also destroy what is our greatest long-term asset in Iran, her young people, her young people who overwhelmingly report that they support better relations with America.
I think we can do better. We can stand between appeasement under an Iranian nuclear trigger or an attack against Iran. What could America do?
Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague from New Jersey.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and I support diplomacy with teeth. Over the last 18 months, the Iran Study Group has met with our allies, the U.K., Germany and France, and they have formed the EU-3 group to bring Iran back from the brink of an unstable and expensive nuclear arms race.
The essence of the EU-3 offer is to provide Iran with a set of carrots, spare parts for civilian aircraft, membership in the WTO, access to loans, all if Iran provides international guarantees and inspections to end the development of nuclear weapons. The EU-3's goal is not quite as idealistic as it may sound. South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine all gave up nuclear weapons programs, and recently so did Libya. Iran can, too, if we can find the right mix of diplomatic incentives and disincentives for them.
I find the current U.S. policy debate on Iran is too simplistic. It is just two-dimensional: Either let Iran have the bomb, putting the Middle East under a nuclear hair trigger, or let Israel do it and have another war.
President Kennedy faced a similar dilemma looking at Cuba, but he broke out of the intellectual box that some would have him in to either let the Cubans have nuclear weapons or invade. He thought of a new policy, a quarantine, which allowed us to resolve the Cuban missile crisis without a shot being fired.
Are there policies which we can employ which will help the European Union succeed? I think there are. We all know this matter could be referred to the United Nations Security Council. We know, using its broad powers under Chapter 7 of the U.N. charter, the Security Council could impose sanctions, putting enormous pressure on Iran and isolate her completely.
What could those sanctions look like? We could do small things like outlaw Iran's participation in the Football Soccer World Cup. We could also ban airline flights in and out of Iran. We could block travel of anyone in the Iranian government outside her borders. We could impose comprehensive sanctions that would shrink Iran's economy. All of these means have been authorized by the U.N. Security Council against other countries and could be authorized by the United Nations against Iran if she says no to the European Union.
But what if one member of the Security Council vetoes action against Iran? Russia could veto action against Iran. She is, in fact, building a reactor in Iran. China also has extensive and growing relations with Iran. They could also veto action.
Some have talked about an oil quarantine against Iran. In fact, 20 percent of Iran's income is dependent on oil sales. An oil quarantine would implode Iran's economy, but it would also hurt our economy. The mullahs have threatened, if their sales were stopped, oil on the world market could hit $100 a barrel. That would hurt us. It would also hurt our allies in Japan and in Europe.
Are there other options available? In our bipartisan work in the Congressional Iran Study Group, we found that Iran has a unique vulnerability, one that opens a new window of diplomacy that could help us achieve all of our objectives without a shot being fired, and here is the vulnerability she has. Despite being a leading member of OPEC and one of the largest oil producers in the world, Iran is heavily dependent on foreign gasoline for her economic progress. In fact, one- third of all Iranian gasoline must be imported from overseas.
Iran's director of planning at the National Iranian Oil Derivative Distribution Company reported that Iran uses 67 million liters of gasoline. Only 39 million liters can be produced in Iran. Policies to expand oil refining capacity in Iran could in no way meet the demand; and in fact in Tehran they regularly debate rationing gasoline, ironically in a country that is a leading OPEC nation.
So we have this lever, a potential gasoline quarantine on Iran, a quarantine which would not affect international oil markets but would heavily affect just Iran alone. And if this policy was discussed, it could give a huge impetus to the European Union effort which my colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), and I both think offers the best chance for working our way out of this threat without anyone being hurt.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman.
When we look at Iran, we have got an election coming up, not only just six candidates, they just added two more, but there is a key choice for the Iranian nation and the government to make, whether to pursue this nuclear weapons program, against the wishes of France, against the wishes of the United Kingdom, against the wishes of Germany and the United Nations, the IAEA and the formal commitments of Iran under the nuclear nonproliferation path, or to join the community of nations and build a growing economy in Central Asia, at peace with her neighbors, offering economic opportunity to her families.
But if she chooses the path of nuclear weapons and confrontation with the European Union, we do not have to resort, in my judgment, to any military means. We could impose a gasoline quarantine on Iran that would quickly implode her economy. This gasoline quarantine on Iran could be imposed by a coalition of the willing naval powers. But when you look at the position of anyone trying to import gasoline into Iran under an order of quarantine, you would find quickly that it would make no economic sense to try to run that quarantine. In fact, in my judgment, working with our British allies, Lloyd's of London likely would pull the insurance contracts for nearly all of the tankers attempting to service the Iranian market.
And working with our allies in the gulf who largely supply Iran's need for gasoline, they could by bilateral action simply abrogate contracts with Iran, making this quarantine fairly simple to operate and administer. The effect of this would be heavily on Iran, would put a number of people out of work, and with those thousands unemployed, then asking their government, why are we embracing a policy of confrontation, violating treaty commitments of our government and throwing me and my family out of work instead of going the direction that most people under the age of 40 would like to go in Iran, and that is embracing the West and having positive direction.
I think this is diplomacy with teeth. This is a way to break out of the intellectual box of either surrendering to an Iranian nuclear program run by a government who has the most extensive terror connections in the world or having some sort of war break out in the Middle East between our Israeli allies and Iran. I for one think that we should embrace a creative diplomatic posture that supports the European Union, that increases their likelihood of success and makes the Iranian government want to embrace a verifiable inspection regime that follows the path of Ukraine, that follows the path of Libya, that follows the path of Brazil and Argentina and South Africa and embraces a non-nuclear future.
For us, this is tense times ahead. My colleague talked about reference to the U.N. Security Council and any further action. We think that Iran is quickly moving towards a nuclear capability and, if the Guardian Council gets their way, could bring about a Middle East on a nuclear hair trigger. I think we can do much better. I think pitting our strength against their weakness, we can resolve this in a way that everyone is much more secure.
I thank my colleague. I also want to conclude by saying this, before I hand it over to him. We have had this debate on this floor as two colleagues from different parties working together in a bipartisan fashion. We have worked through the problem. We have met with ambassadors, with officials from the State Department, with our Israeli allies and reviewed carefully all of the options. I think on a bipartisan level when you work through all of these options and you listen to our allies and you listen to the experts, you will come to about where we are, a chance for a peaceful resolution of this that enhances security on a bipartisan basis. I think that represents the best traditions of this House, especially in our foreign policy where we set partisan differences aside.
I yield to conclude to my colleague from New Jersey.
Did you lose constituents on September 11?
I thank the gentleman and look forward to working with him and advancing this. We will be introducing our resolution next week.