Madam President, this morning our former National Security Adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Colin Powell will visit the White House, and I expect they will discuss the current mission against the…
Madam President, this morning our former National Security Adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Colin Powell will visit the White House, and I expect they will discuss the current mission against the Qadhafi dictatorship in Libya.
When we look at this mission, I think it is important to review the wise words of General Powell in his recommendation in considering any military mission for the United States in her coming years. When we think about his advice--many times, it has been called the Powell doctrine, and it was memorialized in a 1992 article in Foreign Affairs magazine called ``U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead.'' This article became known very much as the Powell doctrine, with two additions that the public and press often put on his thoughts about military missions for the United States.
In short, the Powell doctrine includes answers to a number of questions that any President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense should answer prior to or at the very least during a military mission involving the United States. Those questions are as follows:
Is the political objective we seek important, clearly defined, and understood?
Next, have all other nonviolent policy means failed?
Third, will military force achieve the objective?
Fourth, at what cost?
Next, have the gains and risks been analyzed?
Finally, how might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?
Added to this, the press and public have offered two more additions often called part of the Powell doctrine: Can we hit the enemy with overwhelming force, and can we demonstrate the support of the American people for the mission as shown by a vote of the U.S. Congress?
When we look at the current Libyan mission and apply the Powell doctrine, we see a mixed picture, one that should be fixed by a rigid application of its questions and answers to them reported back to the American people.
I support our mission in Libya, and I think the President's address to the Nation was a good start. But I think we
would serve our troops well if we proceeded to answer the Powell doctrine questions rigidly.
First, is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined, and understood?
I think the end of the Qadhafi regime is important. I think the protection of civilians from an impeding massacre is also important. And I think it would be clearly understood by the American people. But in practical terms, we cannot protect, for example, the people of Benghazi unless we stop the killer, and the only way to stop him is to disarm him and remove him from power. I think that objective would be clearly understood, would be welcomed by our European and Arab allies, and would bring about the long-term protection of the civilian communities by which the administration first justified this action.
Secondly, have all nonviolent policies means failed?
There is a 30-year record of diplomacy with regard to the Libyan dictatorship. Muammar Qadhafi has shown himself to be one of the most violent, corrupt, and at times even crazy leaders from the continent of Africa. While the United States has had difficulties with him for three decades, while Secretary Gates has referred to the imposition of Jersey barriers here in Washington, DC, as early as 1983 when there were reports of potential Qadhafi threats to our President--at the time, President Reagan--it took several decades for the rest of the world to lose patience with Muammar Qadhafi.
The decision by the United Nations and Arab League and surrounding nations not just to support resolutions in internal forums but then for some of those nations, numbering over a dozen, to take military action, shows that finally the international community has broken with Muammar Qadhafi and feels that diplomacy and nonviolent means no longer can work with regard to managing him and the threat he poses.
Will military force achieve the objective?
I think it can. But here is a situation that is somewhat mixed. If air power is only applied to a combat air patrol to enforce a no-fly zone, there is the potential for Libyan armor and artillery to overwhelm what is a very disorganized and rag-tag civilian army that initially made gains against Qadhafi, then lost them and stood at the gates of Benghazi, then retook key communities, such as al-Bayda, Brega, and came to the outskirts of Sirte, then relost nearly all of those gains this week.
When we look at how we should support the end of this dictatorship and the final protection of civilians in Libya, we should understand that the provision of close air support to take out Libyan armor and artillery is essential to this mission and that we should develop the means to command, control, and direct this effort.
I am concerned that today, I am unsure--maybe uninformed but unsure-- as to how the close air support mission is handled. Originally when this mission was undertaken, it was falling under the command and control of standard U.S. military doctrine. Since Libya is part of the AFRICOM combatant command area of operations, this operation, as I understood it, fell under the command of the President of the United States, to the Secretary of Defense, to GEN Carter Ham, commander of AFRICOM. As the United States then moved to more internationalize internalize the military effort, it sought to transfer command to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and its commander, who also happens to be an American, Admiral Stavridis, who stands not only as the commander of U.S. forces in Europe but as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.
I understand the administration has put forward a task force to be commanded potentially by a senior Canadian general who would command this operation. I understand that diplomacy went well with regard to the command of the anti-air operation in this endeavor, but the negotiations with regard to the provision of close air support were much more difficult.
Today, I am not exactly sure who is in command of those operations. Is it General Ham at AFRICOM? Is it the Canadian general at the joint task force? Is it Admiral Stavridis, as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe? My hope is that we identify one key allied commander who is not just in charge of combat air patrol enforcing a no-fly zone but also close air support to ensure that the rebels are not defeated, to attrite armor and artillery from Muammar Qadhafi's army, and to eventually achieve a lasting victory, which, in my mind, could only mean the end of the Qadhafi dictatorship.
I am particularly concerned today about key weapons systems that are available to the United States and not to other countries, particularly the A-10 Warthog and the AC-130 gunship. These are unique assets, critical in the ability to take out Libyan tanks and artillery.
If we internationalize this conflict and as I have heard potential talk of removing combat platforms of the United States from executing close air support missions, my question is, Would AC-130 gunships and A-10s be available for these missions? They are uniquely effective and would make this conflict shorter and more likely to end victoriously. And my hope is that they would continue to be provided to the allied commander so that the progress could move forward on eventually ending this conflict.
General Powell also asked that we estimate the cost of this operation. My understanding this morning is that this operation has cost roughly about $500 million and would likely entail greater cost if it lasts for a long time.
We should estimate this cost, and we should also tell the Congress how we are going to pay for it. My understanding right now is that the administration will not seek a supplemental and will take this out of the core budget of the Department of Defense. What implications does this have for procurement, for military construction, for pay and benefits, and for other critical operations of the United States, led, in order of importance, the Afghan mission, the Iraq mission, and the dozen-plus ships that are now providing the critical humanitarian relief and nuclear recovery of our allies in Japan?
General Powell also asked us to ask the question, have the gains and risks been thoroughly analyzed?
While they may not have been thoroughly analyzed, I am comfortable with the administration's answers to those questions. Had Qadhafi taken Benghazi, had he defeated the rebel government, I think he would have then moved, over time, to destabilize the new government in Egypt.
An end to the Camp David peace accords would be a strategic reversal for the United States. It would put at jeopardy the operations of the Suez Canal. It would have increased the dangers to our allies in the State of Israel. And I think the administration was wise to see a tremendous additional risk had Qadhafi won this war. Now, at least we know the rebels are likely not to be defeated, but a stalemate is also not in our interest. And I would hope we would recall the advice of General Sherman, who said that we should make this as rough and as difficult as possible to the enemy so that, ironically, in most humanitarian terms, it ends, and it ends on the terms of the United States, our allies, and the new rebel government.
Powell also asked us how we might see the situation, once it is altered by force, further develop and what consequences there are there.
My hope is that we would quickly follow the direction of the French Government and recognize the Jalil government, to see that government as a growing potential partner for the United States and the allies so that the people of Libya would see who their potential transitional leaders are and so that we would have clear political authority for them. My hope is that a U.S. envoy would deal directly with the Jalil government and that we would follow the suit of our allies and we would make sure there are clear lines of authority, not just on the military side for combat air patrol and close air support but also political direction for the potential new leaders of Libya.
Added to the Powell doctrine are the two other points often included. One is, can we hit the enemy with overwhelming force?
I strongly support the administration's limitation on no combat boots on the ground. I think that is a wise decision by the United States, and I think we can still direct terrific, tremendous, overwhelming, and decisive
force to end this conflict as quickly as possible. My understanding is that other allied governments may not be so completely constricted on their ability to provide especially the critical role of forward air controllers, who will direct allied air power to the most effective targets to attrite and eventually eliminate the Libyan military. My hope is, though, that we bring all combat assets to bear of the United States and our allies so that we quickly eliminate especially Qadhafi's armor and artillery force and so that this comes to a quick end on the military battlefield.
Finally, the Powell doctrine often has included a final point, which is, Can the support of the American people be demonstrated?
I think in this case we have fallen short. While the Congress and the Senate have adopted a resolution calling for a no-fly zone in Libya, cosponsored by myself and the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez, I think this is inadequate in fully demonstrating the American people's support for what our troops are doing over in Libya.
I think it is clear that our mission is sustained, and the critical political will of the United States is enhanced if we can formally express support for what our men and women are doing overseas. This has been done in some pretty tough conflicts in the past, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq.
For this conflict, the administration should call for a resolution of approval, and the elected representatives of the American people should vote. In general, I support the President's policy and would vote for this resolution. But I think it is essential for those who are on the field to understand that the Congress is formally with them in a vote cast up or down for this mission and for all of its unintended consequences, potential upsides or downsides.
As Colin Powell leaves the White House today, I hope he carries this advice. I hope all of us recall the key points he laid out. He has wisely put forward for past Presidents and this President a key checklist that all of us as citizens, or those of us who are Senators, as policymakers, can have in reviewing the Powell doctrine.
In the end, the Powell doctrine is a key checklist to use to make sure we resist the call for military action until absolutely necessary; but once necessary, that we hit the enemy with everything we have; that we make the conflict as short and, therefore, as humanitarian as possible; that we demonstrate the full support of the American people for the men and women of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and that we give them a clear mission with one allied commander. I hope the President gets this advice directly from the general today. I hope the President and the Senate follow it.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.