Floor Statements

Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of my colleague from Arizona's amendment to cut funding to USAID.

For the American taxpayer watching, USAID is essentially a venture capital fund that Americans pay for that invests in businesses and economic development in other countries overseas.

At a time when we are $33 trillion in debt and facing $2 trillion annual deficits in this country, it would seem to me to be an easy decision to reduce the investments in Albania or the developing world, for which we are borrowing money from China to make. That seems like an easy thing to do, yet our colleagues call it drastic.

I would take the USAID fund down to zero. They would fund it to the tune of billions of dollars. Maybe a compromise position is that we would be willing to send USAID everything that was found in Senator Menendez' jacket.

Maybe that is something that can bring us all together. If there is going to be international bribe money paid that we are going to be involved in, rather than sourcing it from the American taxpayer, we could source it from corrupt Democratic politicians. I am here to bring us together.

Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chair, this amendment reduces the amount of funding allocated to USAID by $4.5 billion.

As I mentioned earlier, USAID is a vehicle through which the American taxpayer pays for economic development in other countries. I think instead we should spend more money on economic development of our own country, and actually, if we spent less money overall, we probably would see less inflation, more prosperity, and the type of economic growth that we saw during President Trump's time in office.

USAID may have started with laudable goals, but today, they are promoting abortion globally with American tax dollars. They are pushing President Biden's national gender strategy.

I never thought we needed a national gender strategy, but if we need a national gender strategy, can we at least not spend so much money promoting it abroad?

It is silly.

The DEI programs that are embedded in The 1619 Project have been embraced by United Nations Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and we see that continue to manifest through USAID.

American taxpayers should focus their resources and their efforts on the American people and the American economy. This is a thoughtful reduction. It should be easily agreed to.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, my amendment makes a $4.5 billion cut; $3.5 billion of that stops us from retiring global debt for Ukraine.

Now, I don't think it is an unrealistic position to say that the United States of America should not deficit spend to retire the debt of other countries.

Think about that. We are borrowing money from China to go settle the debts of Ukraine that they accrued far before this war with Russia.

My colleagues say this exists to counter the PRC. We are never going to out-bribe the PRC on the global scene. We are going to need another strategy.

If you listen to the debate of those opposing my amendment, hear the substance: Oh, my goodness, people around the world are having problems buying food and buying fuel, and if the U.S. taxpayer would just sacrifice a little more, it might be easier to buy food and fuel in other countries.

I have a message for my Democratic colleagues: People are having a hard time buying food and fuel in this country as a consequence of the very inflationary spending that I am trying to reduce with this amendment.

We should retire our debt before we retire Ukraine's debt.

That is such an obvious statement, I am shocked I have to say it on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, where I am just glad we are still hanging our flag.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, it is hard to believe what I am hearing.

The gentlewoman is saying: But there is malaria and tuberculosis and sickness and ailment all around the world.

The gentlewoman need look no further than her home State of California where the human condition continues to decline. She would need to look no further than the major cities throughout our country that are under Democrat control.

Maybe before we go solve all of the world's problems, maybe before we function as the world's policeman and the world's piggy bank and the world's debt payer, we ought to focus on the issues that we have here in this country. They are real, and frankly, too often, they metastasize from the gentlewoman's home State.

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, the reason we are here debating this issue is because my colleague from Georgia (Ms. Greene) has found there are distributions that could possibly go to Ukraine. She is fighting admirably, often alone, and she is the reason that we are actually making some progress in this Congress to comport the will of this body to the will of the American people who think we have sent too much to Ukraine.

$115 billion--it is inflationary, escalatory, and could likely lead to an accident that could sleepwalk us into world war III.

I am in strong support of the Taylor Greene amendment and all of her amendments to engage in this very noble effort to stop the United States from funding the war in Ukraine.

Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chair, this amendment ensures that none of the funds appropriated in this act will be used to administer the Paris climate accord.

The Paris climate accord is the unilateral surrender of the American economy, not for the sake of any environmental improvement; it merely uses the veneer of climate change to execute a permission structure for some of the dirtiest countries in the world, for some of the greatest polluters to be able to benefit at the expense of the United States.

The Paris climate accord represents a circumstance where we were dead money at the table, putting up cash in exchange for economic development in faraway lands that would not benefit our people.

This was a globalist enterprise. It was America last, and U.S. taxpayers should not be funding the Paris climate accord. That is the amendment.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart).

Mr. Chair, it is neither moral nor smart to drive our Nation deeper into debt, to jeopardize the future of this country so that we can engage in a globalist virtue signal.

If this global agreement were real and benefiting our country, I think you would find more people that were open-minded about a desire to ensure that we have an environment that is good for all of the inhabitants of the planet Earth, but, unfortunately, that is not what the Paris accord did.

The Paris accord required the United States to put up the cash, and then it gave the exemptions to China and India and the worst polluters on the planet Earth.

This isn't a question of whether or not we support the environment, this is a question about whether or not under the veneer of environmentalism we are going to kill American jobs, kill American manufacturing, make our country less competitive, drive down our GDP while China and India play us like fools.

We are better than that.

The underlying bill does great work to ensure that our resources are directed to America's interests, not to the interests of these global institutions.

Mr. Chair, I would encourage adoption of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, the American people need to observe what is happening on this floor. My colleague from Arizona is simply saying that in the $886 billion we are sending across the river to the Pentagon, we at least don't want that to fund U.S. troops, boots on the ground, in Ukraine, and there seems to be no guardrail that some in this body would not accept so as to stop our country from inadvertently stumbling into world war III.

Mr. Chair, I have amendments coming to stop security assistance, but this is the humblest of amendments seemingly to comport with what this body in a bipartisan way has expressed.

We do not want American servicemembers dying in Ukraine. That risks escalation and that risks accident. It always starts with just a few security advisers. That is how we got entangled in the Syrian civil war. We ought to be disentangling ourselves from Ukraine and embracing the good amendment from my colleague from Arizona.

Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Madam Chair, this Congress has authorized $115 billion to Ukraine. My amendment would ensure that this Defense appropriations bill sends no more.

Madam Chair, $115 billion is an astonishing amount of money, especially when you consider that our Nation sits atop a $33 trillion debt and we are facing $2 trillion in annual deficits. It is not as if the $115 billion has brought this conflict any closer to an end. In fact, the massacres and the killings and the death continue.

The next statement is so obvious I can't believe I have to say it out loud.

It does not make the United States of America stronger to borrow money from China to give it to Ukraine.

I hear a lot of the war hawks in this Congress stand up and say, well, we have to send a message to China by fighting for however long it takes at whatever cost in Ukraine. The message we are sending to China is that they are engaged in a leverage buyout of Russia and increasingly of our own country.

We have problems here in America with our own borders. Americans are watching as foreign flags are being erected in the middle of the Rio Grande River while our Nation is being invaded by tens of thousands of people every month. Yet, we go spend all this money on the border of another country.

I do not fear broken Russian tanks rolling through Europe. I fear Russia's nuclear weapons and the risk that we could be sleepwalking into a nuclear conflict that could end life as we know it on the planet, all for what? To live out some neoconservative dream in Ukraine? Give me a break.

Right now, a lot of this funding that we have sent for Ukraine has been inflationary. Fuel and food, these are the markets that have been affected globally because of this crisis and because of the money we are spending to extend the conflict.

At the beginning of this Congress, Speaker McCarthy said there is not going to be a blank check to Ukraine, but when we bring witnesses before us to ask them whether or not we are complying with our own laws regarding end-use monitoring of materiel, they cannot say we are even following our own laws.

Enough is enough. I am putting my countrymen first. I don't think we should send another nickel to Ukraine.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, indeed, this is a respectful policy dispute that we have over this matter, and I am grateful that we are taking up the Defense appropriations bill as a single subject bill to work through these things, and let the votes fall where they may, but it seems the full sum of the argument against my amendment is: Putin bad, which I concede.

As a matter of fact, Vladimir Putin has sanctioned me personally, so I don't have to be sold on that argument. He is a bad guy.

The question is whether after $115 billion, it is the $300 million in this bill that is going to really kick the door in. There has been no argument that that is the case, because of course that would not comport with logic and reason. When my colleagues say we cannot abandon the EU, that is like fingernails on a chalkboard to my fellow Americans who often feel like they are the ones who have been abandoned as we send $115 billion to Ukraine and ignore what is going on on our own border.

Madam Chair, we also ignore what is going on with a lot of our first responders.

In our country, there are police and firemen who do not know if their pension fund will be strong enough to support their benefits throughout their life. We do very little on that front, but we have underwritten the full pension of every civil servant and government employee in Ukraine.

Abandon them? I just don't think we should bankroll them, and that is why I would encourage the adoption of my amendment.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, the argument my colleague made is, well, we have always sent this $300 million. That may be true, but we used to send that $300 million when we weren't sending $100 billion in supplementals on top of that, so I don't think that argument really holds water.

When my colleague says: Well, we can do both. We can secure Ukraine's border and we can secure our border; my argument would be: Can we at least secure our own border first? How about that? How about prioritizing our own people first before we start going and engaging in misadventures throughout Europe.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, the United States of America is not the world's piggy bank, and we are not the world's policeman.

I applaud all of the enthusiasm in Ukraine. I am rooting for them, but enthusiasm in this country is waning to continue to support all of that effort abroad.

We want to secure our border. We want to see enthusiasm with our Border Patrol. We do not support continued inflationary, escalatory, dangerous spending in this war on Ukraine.

Madam Chair, I appreciate the House's indulgence for considering my amendment. I would encourage its adoption, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

Madam Chair, this is an amendment to prohibit the transfer of cluster munitions pursuant to this legislation.

Madam Chair, I yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Jacobs), a member of the Armed Services Committee, someone who has led this Congress to try to stop the transfer of cluster munitions.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I would observe that we cannot have a goal of creating parity with the Ukrainian military and the Russian military. If that is the case, why not send nuclear weapons?

These cluster bombs are indiscriminate. They have killed tens of thousands of people. You just heard my colleague say that when this is all done we will be right back here on the floor appropriating money to demine the cluster munitions that we are now sending, which seems ludicrous to me.

Madam Chair, I yield to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. McCollum), the distinguished ranking member, for her thoughts on the matter.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I appreciate the bipartisan support for this amendment. I thank Mr. Massie of Kentucky and Mr. McGovern of Massachusetts on the Rules Committee for having made this amendment in order.

I look forward to us working together to ensure that we have humane policies when it comes to our munitions.

Just to respond to the argument that there is somehow a Taiwan nexus here, I have studied the war games and the plans around Taiwan pretty extensively, and I have seen no scenario in which we believe that the appropriate utilization of munitions in Taiwan is going to require cluster munitions. It is largely going to be torpedoes, sea mining.

We are still demining the cluster munitions in Laos. We can make a wiser choice now and one certainly that doesn't put any of our allies in jeopardy.

Madam Chair, I encourage adoption of this bipartisan amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, the gentleman is right, you are your record, and our record in this country right now is $33 trillion in debt, facing $2 trillion annual deficits. We are in so much debt, we are driving up deficits so fast, we are devaluing American money so rapidly that in America today, you can't even bribe Democratic Senators with cash alone. You need to bring gold bars to get the job done just so that the bribes hold value.

My friends, I am extremely in favor of this rule because this rule moves us onto single-subject spending bills, and this is the only way to liberate this House and this country from the scourge of governing by continuing resolution and omnibus legislation.

It is an insult to our governing authority to have the Senate lash Ukraine funding to the reauthorization of the FAA, and, by the way, every other thing in government. The American people know that in our State legislatures throughout this land there is a maturity and a seriousness to set a top line, balanced budget number and then appropriate to each of the agencies in government independently. The fact that we don't do that is not a bug of the system. It is a feature of the system.

The one thing I agree with my Democratic colleagues on is for the last 8 months, this House has been poorly led. We own that, and we have to do something about it. My Democratic colleagues will have an opportunity to do something about that, too, and we will see if they bail out our failed Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I am not voting for a continuing resolution. I am not voting to continue the failure and the waste and the corruption and the election interference, and in some cases, the efforts that could lead this country into world war III.

I oppose the CR authored by my friend and colleague from Florida, Byron Donalds. The Donalds CR continues the Ukraine policy negotiated by Speaker Pelosi and Mitch McConnell in the omnibus that conservatives were against.

The Donalds CR is a permission slip for Jack Smith to continue his election interference as they are trying to gag the former President of the United States and the leading contender for the Republican nomination.

The Donalds CR abandons the principle that it is only a review of single-subject spending bills that will save this country and allow us to tweeze through these programs and force these agencies to stand up and defend their budget.

I say to my friends that we are approaching the days where we are facing a $2 trillion annual deficits atop a $33 trillion debt. This is unsustainable.

To just continue things with some facial 8 percent cut over 30 days that will lead to no programmatic reform is an insult to the principles we fought for in January.

Madam Speaker, on this very floor in January, the whole world witnessed a historic contest for House Speaker.

I rise today to serve notice: Mr. Speaker, you are out of compliance with the agreement that allowed you to assume this role. The path forward for the House of Representatives is to either bring you into immediate, total compliance or remove you pursuant to a motion to vacate the chair.

We have had no vote on term limits or on balanced budgets, as the agreement demanded and required. There has been no full release of the January 6 tapes, as you promised. There has been insufficient accountability for the Biden crime family. Instead of cutting spending to raise the debt limit, you relied on budgetary gimmicks and rescissions so that you ultimately ended up serving as the valet to underwrite Biden's debt and expand his spending agenda.

Mr. Speaker, you boasted in January that we would use the power of the subpoena and the power of the purse, but here we are 8 months later, and we haven't even sent the first subpoena to Hunter Biden. That is how you know that the rushed and somewhat rattled performance you just saw from the Speaker isn't real.

At this point during Democrat control over the House of Representatives, they had already brought in Don Jr. three times, and we haven't even sent the first subpoena to Hunter Biden. Power of the subpoena.

Power of the purse. The only thing the 118th Congress is known for at this point is electing Kevin McCarthy Speaker and underwriting Biden's debt. Unfortunately, there is only one of those things we can remediate at this time. Power of the purse.

Our leadership right now is asking us to vote for a continuing resolution. A vote for a continuing resolution is a vote to continue the Green New Deal and inflationary spending. In the most troubling of fashions, a vote for a continuing resolution is a vote to continue the election interference of Jack Smith.

Mr. Speaker, we told you how to use the power of the purse: individual, single-subject spending bills that would allow us to have specific review, programmatic analysis, and that would allow us to zero out the salaries of the bureaucrats who have broken bad, targeted President Trump, or cut sweetheart deals for Hunter Biden.

September 30 is rapidly approaching, and you have not put us in a position to succeed. There is no way to pass all the individual appropriations bills now, and it is not like we didn't know when September 30 was going to show up on the calendar. I must be better, you must be better, and this House must be better, for it is the last best hope for tens of millions of Republicans.

We demand real oversight against this weaponized government. Just look at the bribery. If tens of millions of dollars flowing from foreign corrupt people into the bank accounts of the Biden family wasn't enough for actual impeachment, why were we even looking? Joe Biden deserves impeachment for converting the Vice-Presidency into an ATM machine for virtually his entire family. We all see it. We all know it.

Moments ago, Speaker McCarthy endorsed an impeachment inquiry. This is a baby step following weeks of pressure from House conservatives to do more. We must move faster.

Now, I will concede that the votes I have called for will likely fail--term limits, balanced budgets, maybe even impeachment. I am prepared for that eventuality. At least if we take votes, the American people get to see who is fighting for them and who is willing to tolerate more corruption and business as usual.

Mr. Speaker, dust off our written January agreement. You have a copy. Reflect on the spirit of that agreement and build on the start that we had moments ago and begin to comply:

No continuing resolutions; individual spending bills or bust.

Votes on balanced budgets and term limits.

Subpoenas for Hunter Biden and the members of the Biden family who have been grifting off this country and the impeachment for Joe Biden that he so richly deserves.

Do these things or face a motion to vacate the chair.

Let me alert the country, a motion to vacate might not pass at first, but it might before the 15th vote. If Democrats bail out McCarthy, as they may do, then I will lead the resistance to this uniparty and the Biden-McCarthy-Jeffries government that they are attempting to build.

I know that Washington isn't a town where people are known for keeping their word. Well, Speaker McCarthy, I am here to hold you to yours.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize Mr. Lannie Corbin, the City Manager for the City of Niceville, Okaloosa County, Florida. On July 31, 2023, Mr. Corbin will be retiring after more than 52 years of service to the City of Niceville. A native of Northwest Florida, Mr. Corbin began his civic service as City Clerk in August 1971. He was then appointed City Manager/City Clerk in 1972, a position he has held since. Mr. Corbin is the longest-serving city manager in the history of the State of Florida.

During his tenure, Mr. Corbin has been instrumental in improving the quality of life in Niceville and the surrounding area. One of his many great accomplishments includes negotiating with local landowners to cede a portion of their land to the city, enabling the city to more than double its size. This led to Nicevilles population growing from 4,300 residents in 1972 to over 16,000 today.

Lannie Corbin helped bring increased-quality-of-life projects to Niceville, such as the Turkey Creek Nature Trail, Lions Park, the Niceville Senior Center, the Twin Oaks Multi-use Sports Complex, the Children's and Spray Parks, and multiple city parks, such as Meigs and Rocky Runway Commons. He also brought a new complex to the city to house its administrative offices, the police headquarters, community center, and the Children's Park.

One of his greatest achievements was the establishment of Niceville's first public library. This led him to champion the first-ever cooperative effort in Okaloosa County by forming the Okaloosa County Library Cooperative, uniting 6 cities with the county, enabling them to increase the resources available to all the residents of our county.

I, along with all of Northwest Florida, thank Niceville City Manager Corbin for his dedication to public service and commitment to improving the quality of life in the city for all its residents and visitors. His lifelong service exemplifies the very best of Northwest Florida.

On behalf of the United States House of Representatives, I am privileged to recognize City Manager Lannie Corbin on the occasion of his retirement. I thank him for his service and offer my best wishes to him and to his family.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I brought a war powers resolution to the floor this Congress to get U.S. troops out of Syria, arguing that the United States, being excessively entangled in a great power competition in Syria wasn't making life better for Syrians, it wasn't playing out to our benefit in the sphere of great power competition, and that it left U.S. servicemembers and contractors as sitting ducks.

Following that vote, which I lost overwhelmingly in a bipartisan fashion, sadly, there were casualties; there was the death of an American, because we have now become the neighborhood crime watch of certain areas in Syria where there are oil rigs. That is what it is all about.

I now come to the floor with this resolution to repeal a 2004 emergency vis-a-vis Syria. Now, it is supposed to be voted on by Congress every 6 months thereafter, but we have been derelict in our duty in doing so.

I am glad that today we are bringing forward a number of these emergency resolutions that have been dormant slush funds, spending untold sums of money with no transparency as to how much is going into the Syrian emergency.

How about this rule for how the House thinks about emergencies: Nothing is allowed to be an emergency for 20 years. If it were really an emergency, there probably would have been some cataclysmic event of Biblical proportion before the 20 years. If it is still an emergency 20 years later, it is a chronic condition, and the United States cannot be the world's policeman and we cannot be the world's piggy bank.

Now, if the principal argument against my resolution is that my resolution is soft on Assad, well, the logic that undergirds that is that somehow the 2004 resolution was this great anti-Assad tool that we must have, that we must maintain, to beat Assad.

Look around, Mr. Speaker. Assad has never been stronger. So if this 2004 resolution was Assad kryptonite, it has been the worst Assad kryptonite you can ever imagine. It has malfunctioned.

I think we ought to repeal this emergency. We have sought transparency to see how much money has been going pursuant to it. We don't know the answer to that question.

To the extent that there are sanctions that we still want to maintain, whether there are the other national emergencies that exist targeted at terrorism generally, at Russia, at Iran, we have the Magnitsky Act and there are all kinds of other authorities for the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, even the DOD weighs in, and the State Department, regarding sanctions regimes.

This is not a vote to lift sanctions and then hope for the best with some pretty gnarly Syrians. In fact, it is us standing up to do our job, and that is what we should do in repealing this 2004 resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would point out, Mr. Speaker, to the gentleman that if he is looking for a more effective way to insult the President of Israel, he need look no further than the remarks of some of his own colleagues in the recent days, which I would deem far more insulting than this policy debate about how to have an effective sanctions regime.

No one here is arguing for sanctions relief vis-a-vis these individuals. What we are saying is that the National Emergencies Act is a very ineffective, inefficient way to administer a sanctions regime. We do have specific authorities with the Magnitsky Act, with the National Emergencies Act vis-a-vis counterterrorism. Treasury has these authorities. State has these authorities. Most importantly, Congress has the authority to impose sanctions.

If you believe that there are people who should be the subject of sanctions by the United States Government, we are the board of directors of the most powerful country on the planet Earth. We can introduce those bills, vote for them, and we can fulfill our constitutional authority.

What I am asking the Congress to do is to repeal a 2004 emergency vis-a-vis Syria when Syria doesn't look anything like it did in 2004.

Mr. Speaker, if you vote to allow this national emergency to continue, what you are doing is gaslighting unaccountable spending by the Biden administration because they never have to make the requisite report regarding the outlays on these matters. The money just moves around, and we never quite see the efficacy of it.

We are all strong supporters of Israel on this side of the aisle, certainly, and I would observe that U.S. policy in Syria has not particularly helped Israel. As a matter of fact, when you had terrorist groups setting up camps in Syria, directed at Israel, you know what the Israelis did? They took them out. They blew them up. That sent a message to Iran, the balance of power was restored, and it did not involve the United States of America becoming the block captain of Syria or anywhere else in the Middle East. If we want to do that, it should be through a war powers

resolution with Congress affirmatively voting to do it, not just having rolling national emergencies.

When the law contemplates a requisite obligation for us to vote to reauthorize these things, we never do it. We don't do our job, then the money goes out the door, and we don't see a safer Israel, a safer Middle East, or a safer Syria. All we see is an empowered Assad. If this is the great tool we had against Assad, we had better be thinking of some different ones, because it hasn't exactly worked out as the proponents of this national emergency would seemingly indicate.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is quite similar to the prior one, but it wouldn't just strip the cash out of the bill; it would not require further security assistance to Ukraine.

I offer this amendment because the Biden administration is sleepwalking our great country into a world war. The American people did not sign up for this, and I believe Congress needs to have the solemnity to be able to stop this madness.

I miss the days when Democrats used to be anti-war. I listened with great interest as the ranking member, who I have great respect for, said the goal of this entire Ukraine-U.S. enterprise is to ensure that we are not going to war with Russia. That is a bit odd to hear, after several Democrats have taken to this floor and media outlets to suggest we are at war with Russia.

It was, in fact, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) who came to this floor and said we are at war with Russia. It was the gentleman from Massachusetts who just spoke on the prior amendment, who said, functionally, the same thing.

I do not want to go to war with Russia, and I don't think the American people do either. That does not make anyone pro-Putin.

I would similarly observe that part of the funding assistance that we are providing to Ukraine has nothing to do the with the military. In this country we have cops, we have firemen, we have teachers who wonder whether or not their pension fund is going to be sufficient to cover their life for the service that they have given.

While that is a question in our country, it is no question in Ukraine because the American taxpayer is underwriting all of the pensions for every single government official in Ukraine, and we don't do that for the people who put out our fires and protect our streets.

Similarly, how can we continue to just send all this money when there is a lack of accountability?

The Pentagon has to fess up that they have multibillion-dollar accounting errors in this space.

When we had the inspector general before our House Armed Services Committee, he could not testify that our country had followed our own requirements and our own laws regarding the end-use monitoring of equipment that we are sending into a combat zone.

We have unfunded needs in our own military, and I support the NDAA. I am grateful that we have done a lot of work but, even with this NDAA, in America there will be hangars that are rusting out. In America there will be platforms that need upgrades, and they will go wanting while Ukraine seems to have an unlimited amount of support in this Congress that is unwarranted.

Forty percent of our training aircraft can't even fly in this country because we don't have sufficient parts to be able to get it to them.

This war will end any time those folks in Europe want it to. But they keep buying the Russian gas, and they keep expecting all of us in America to subsidize Europe's defense while they provide some massive social welfare state. I am not for it, and that is why I would encourage my colleagues to vote for my amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss when my colleague asks without any response from the United States. It has already been $115 billion that we have authorized. One hell of a response, I would say.

But there has to be some point in time where we put our country ahead of Ukraine, and that is what this amendment does.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, they accuse this amendment of being born of weakness. Guess what, Mr. Chair? It does not make America stronger to borrow money from China to give to Ukraine.

Do you know who we are appeasing? China. As we engage in this endeavor, China is doing a leveraged buyout of Russia. We see that in Eastern Russia. We see that in the Russian assets in China.

We are actually helping China weaken ourselves all to figure out which guy in a sweat suit gets to run Crimea, and

that doesn't seem like America's interest to me.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, may I inquire as to the time remaining.

Mr. Chair, the funds sent to Ukraine represent a major investment in war, not national defense or building infrastructure to deter conflict. This is the active engagement in the killing of sons, daughters, husbands, and wives abroad. We shouldn't be funding these actions until the defense of our country can be reflected with some sort of tangible connection.

The money to Ukraine does not fulfill this objective.

There must be a threshold for funding a proxy war. How much will it take to win? What is the return? When will it end?

The Biden administration does not have answers to these questions, and until they do, we should stop sending money to these misadventures.

The United States of America is not the world's police force, and we are not the world's piggy bank, but they would have us become the block captains of Kyiv.

My amendment is going to lose overwhelmingly when it is put up for a vote, but the American people will see who wants to represent them and who wants to represent Crimea.

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Chair, it is worth acknowledging the great bipartisan work on this issue with my colleague, Ms. Jacobs, and my colleague, Mr. McGovern, who have been speaking on these issues with clarity for some time.

The opponents of the amendment made the principal argument that we have to do anything for Ukraine to win the war. Why not just send the nukes? If the standard is we will do anything for Ukraine to win, then send them tactical nuclear weapons.

Of course, we are not going to do that, which means there has to be a line somewhere. I would hope that we could draw that line somewhere on the humane side of the cluster bomb question.

These bombs are indiscriminate. For goodness' sake, we are still cleaning up cluster bombs in Laos because civilians are being killed.

When my colleagues say, well, civilians won't be killed, tell that to the people in the places where cluster munitions have been deployed, and people are still being killed because that is, in fact, the case.

It is also an argument that has been made that Ukrainians are only going to use this in their own country. How depraved to use these bombs in your own country? That is not a reason to vote against the amendment. It is the reason to vote for it.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Chair, there is a time in every debate where everything has been said but not yet by everyone and that may be where we are in the DEI debate. But what I bring to the House now is the most fulsome amendment to completely remove DEI from the DOD.

Even if my amendment doesn't pass, I want my colleagues to know that this NDAA, in the base bill, takes a meat cleaver to DEI. The amendments that we have adopted in the last round of voting have certainly ensured that DEI, regardless of the passage or not of my amendment, will not be a principal feature of our military service if this bill becomes law, and that would be a great thing for our military.

That said, it is important to note that in the name of DEI our military has done some pretty strange things. Secretary Austin, in his first act, ordered a 24-hour stand-down so that everyone could reflect on their extremism.

The reality is even majority-minority units in the military found this divisive. They complained to my office and certainly it did not create a more lethal force.

Also, in the name of DEI, we have hired some rather strange people in the government. There is one DEI officer named Kelisa Wing and she actually, if you can believe this, worked in the DEI's Department at DoDEA, the education system within DOD. She put out the following inclusive tweet:

``I'm so exhausted at these white folx in these PD [professional development] sessions this lady actually had the CAUdaacity to say that black people can be racist too . . . I had to stop the session and give Karen the BUSINESS . . . ''

This was the person that we had hired to create a more inclusive environment, and I think it is indicative of the inherently divisive culture that has permeated radical racial ideology. My amendment gives us the opportunity to pull it up by the root, and I hope my colleagues support it.

I would add this final point before yielding back. We have standards in the military that allow the military to expel racists and white supremacists completely in the absence of DEI programs. We have had those standards in the military for quite some time.

So even if my amendment were to become law, I don't want anyone in the body to think that we would be stuck with people in the military that didn't meet longstanding preexisting standards of personal conduct.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, excuse me. I demand a ruling on my point of order.

Excuse me. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

No, Mr. Chairman, I made a point of order. You have to rule on the point of order.

The gentleman has an obligation to address the Chair, not other Members. He did not do that. He was out of order, violating the decorum of the House.

Parliamentary inquiry then. I seek recognition to make a parliamentary inquiry.

What is the parliamentary mechanism that requires an individual to address the Chair because if it is not that, we can address each other, let's do that for the rest of the debate.

I want to be recognized for a parliamentary inquiry.

I am not recognized for a parliamentary inquiry? I am not recognized for a parliamentary inquiry?

I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Parliamentary inquiry.

Will the Chair--will the Chair encourage Members to address the Chair and rather than one another?

Very well. I seek recognition.

Mr. Chairman, the childish antics that we just observed indicate that we have got a lot of work to do both in this House and the military, not to have radical, racial ideology governing our discourse and governing the policy choices that we make in these bills.

The policy choice that my amendment seeks to make ensures that we do not have the cancer of DEI harming our military.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Luna).

Mr. Chairman, I reserve and I thank the Chair for that acknowledgement.

Mr. Chair, I can answer the gentlewoman's question. If her question is, when will we stop debating DEI, the answer is when we get rid of DEI in the military. We will be here fighting this fight each and every day because what fashions itself as an inclusive ideology is, in fact, inherently divisive and harmful.

I acknowledge that we have many minorities that serve in our military, and we are so grateful for their patriotism, but it is the very minority groups, it is the very minority servicemembers in my district, who come and complain about these initiatives.

This isn't an affront to our servicemembers. It is something we are doing for our servicemembers.

Do you know what they really complain about? A lot of this DEI training takes away from their jumps, their live fire time, their time in the cockpit.

We need to spend more time ensuring that we can protect the homeland and less time on pronoun training and the rest of this nonsense.

Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Chair, I thank the chairman and the ranking member for their model of good work and focus on our military.

I would speak now to any House conservatives who have apprehension about voting for the NDAA.

If you vote against this NDAA or the rule authorizing it, you are voting to continue critical race theory in our military.

If you vote against the NDAA, you are voting for the continued embrace of DEI in the military.

If you vote against the NDAA, you are voting to keep the chief diversity officer at the Department of Defense, and you are voting to continue some of the strangest radical gender ideology that we have observed, whether it is the trans ambassadors or the drag shows intended for children that have been held on military bases.

This NDAA showcases a bold embrace of the technologies the United States will need to hold the high ground, whether that is hypersonics, whether that is AI. This NDAA moves us away from older legacy systems that have been protected by political patronage and instead ensures that we are making the investments to vanquish every foe every time it is absolutely necessary to preserve America's interest.

So if you don't want your children and grandchildren one day having to speak Mandarin as some purple-haired, genderless ideologue at the Department of the Defense raises the white flag of surrender, I would suggest voting for this bill.

Mr. Chair, I am grateful for all who have made that decision.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend Deputy William Hollingsworth for his selfless and heroic acts on Friday, June 16, 2023. Deputy Hollingsworth was helping stranded drivers amid the rapidly rising water early that Friday morning when he saw a motorist disappear beneath Highway 98. Deputy Hollingsworth rushed toward the motorist to provide aid without regard for his safety. He and the motorist were then swept into a flooded storm drain and traveled nearly 100 feet under the four-lane highway. Despite this traumatic turn of events, Deputy Hollingsworth emerged on the other side, spotted the motorist, and continued to wade toward him to continue his rescue attempt. His courageous actions cannot be overstated.

I, along with the entire Northwest Florida community, thank Deputy Hollingsworth for his devotion to duty and commitment to excellence. His valiant actions exemplify the very best of Northwest Florida's law enforcement. I

am proud to have him serving in Florida's First Congressional District.

On behalf of the United States House of Representatives, I am privileged to recognize Deputy William Hollingsworth for his unwavering commitment to upholding the values of our local law enforcement agencies. I thank him for his service and offer my warmest regards and best wishes to him and his family.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise to recognize the outstanding military service of Major General (MG) Trevor J. Bredenkamp of Niceville, Florida, for his tenure as Chief, Legislative Liaison (CLL) from June 9, 2021 to June 8, 2023. He has demonstrated a devotion to America by honorably representing the United States Army and bringing credit to Florida's First District while assigned to Capitol Hill. The job of CLL is a critical one as he is charged with effectively and efficiently bridging two branches of government as an advocate of the United States Army to Congress.

In 1992, MG Bredenkamp received his commission from the United States Military Academy at West Point, graduating with a Bachelor of Science in Automotive Engineering.

MG Bredenkamp's previous command assignments include the United Nations Comand/Eighth Army Honor Guard Company; A Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg North Carolina and deployed as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; Deputy Commander, 3rd Brigade Combat Team,

82nd Airborne Division; Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division; Deputy Commander-Support, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Commander of Train, Advise, Assist Command- South and Kandahar Airfield while deployed as part of OPERATION FREEDOM's SENTINEL.

His previous staff and special assignments include Platoon Leader, Scout Platoon Leader, and Battalion S-1 in the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division; Platoon/Company/ Battalion Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center; C3 Training Officer, 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg and deployed as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; Operations Officer, 2nd Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment; Operations Officer, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg and deployed as part of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM; Aide-de-Camp to the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command and subsequently the Commander, International Security Assistance Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Deputy Director, Soldier for Life, Executive Officer to the Secretary of the Army; and the Chief, Programs Division, Office of the Chief, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Army.

MG Bredenkamp's awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, four Legions of Merit, four Bronze Stars, six Meritorious Service Medals, five Army Commendations, and five Army Achievement Medals. He is authorized to wear the Combat Infantrymen Badge, the Combat Action Badge, the Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Pathfinder Badge, Ranger Tab, and the Army Staff Identification Badge.

He holds a Master of Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Master of National Security and Strategic Studies from the National War College. He has been happily married to MG Michele Bredenkamp for more than 26 years, and they are proud parents of two children.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following proclamation.

Whereas: The Blue Angels were formed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, on April 24, 1946, to raise the public's interest in naval aviation and boost Navy Morale.

Whereas: The Blue Angels are recognized as the second-oldest formal aerobatic team in the world.

Whereas: The 2023 season marks the 77th anniversary of this impressive outfit.

Whereas: The United States Navy Blue Angels have called Pensacola home since 1955, practicing daring and awe-inspiring maneuvers from the cockpits of F/A-18 Super Hornets in the skies above the city.

Whereas: The mission of the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron is to showcase the pride and professionalism of the United States Navy and Marine Corps by inspiring a culture of excellence and service to the country through flight demonstrations and community outreach.

Whereas: An estimated 11 million spectators view the squadron during air shows each year.

Whereas: The 2023 season marks the first in which the Blue Angels welcome their first female demonstration pilot, Lieutenant Amanda Lee, to the left-wing Number 3 position. Now, therefore, be it

Resolved: On this occasion of their 77th, birthday, the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron, the Blue Angels, are recognized for their contribution to Northwest Florida, as they have distinguished themselves as ambassadors for the Cradle of Naval Aviation by inspiring and entertaining millions of Americans each year. It is an honor to have them call Florida's First District home. Bravo Zulu and Happy Birthday, Blue Angels.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Meeks, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a great patriot such as Mr. James of Michigan.

I welcome the American people to the second part in a legislative series we are conducting about all of the places on the planet Earth where Congress still believes that 9/11 justifies current U.S. troop presence in 2023.

The first in that series was Syria. I came to this floor, only got about 103 votes, but I made the argument that our troops were essentially sitting ducks, guarding oil extraction operations where their presence was known and where their location was easily identifiable. I called for a withdrawal. That withdrawal was defeated. Then what happened is precisely what I predicted, more U.S. casualties from Iranian drones, exactly what I said would occur. It is with no joy I say that.

I know all of us would take any policy decision we could to reduce U.S. casualties, and I think this debate will present an excellent opportunity to reflect on Somalia in that light.

There are currently 900 U.S. troops in Somalia, give or take, and this resolution would bring them home.

Somalia is a country of 17 million who have been tortured at times by Al-Shabaab, a group of roughly 7,000 hardened fighters and even more sympathizers. But to logically believe any of the arguments that my colleagues are making, you have to believe that 900 U.S. troops is what is going to save a country of 17 million from a hardened group of 7,000. I think that strains not only logic but understanding of the history of Somalia, a country that has oscillated between failed state and just absolute coup revolution over and over again, civil war, and sectarian violence.

The future of Somalia must be determined by Somalia. To the extent that foreign influences could be helpful, I would argue that the African Union is far better positioned to build a stronger sense of national identity and national unity among clans that have been warring in Somalia for generations than U.S. troops. I have yet to see the evidence that U.S. troops are the essential element to fusing relationships among warring African warlords, clans, and tribes.

Now, the British controlled Somalia, and in nearly half a century since, we have seen a constant state of despair.

So what is the end state for our military presence in Somalia?

Are we going to be the block captain of Mogadishu, presumably forever, until we beat the last sympathy for Al-Shabaab out of the last heart of the last Somali?

That was the argument with Syria and ISIS; we have to stay in Syria because there are still people who believe the ISIS ideology.

Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the U.S. military is not an effective capability to deploy to defeat an ideology. We are not able to permanently stabilize countries by having a presence that can at times be the very basis for the terrorism recruitment that we seem to work against.

There is also an opportunity cost to being in Somalia that I would like to share with the body. I represent constituents who are part of these missions, these train, equip, and advise missions throughout Africa. Increasingly, they are having to enter the INDOPACOM to get analysis and research on the best communication skills, tactical skills and strategic skills that would be necessary if conflict were to erupt in the INDOPACOM theater.

What I have observed firsthand is that at times, some of our best and brightest are having to go split squad, where some are wandering about Africa on train-and-equip missions. Then there is less of a focused capability in places where I think America must hold the high ground to ensure the enduring success of our Nation.

My colleague from the other side of the aisle made mention of the training that America does in Africa and how critical it is. The problem is, far too often, we are training the next generation of coup leaders. We haven't figured that out yet. I got to ask the question of the leader of AFRICOM: Why so many people who are leading coups in Africa were trained by Americans? He was unable to identity even current leaders of African countries, that they were trained by Americans or that they participated in coups.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from The Intercept: ``AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We share `core values' with coup leaders.''

[From The Intercept, April 10, 2023]

Africom Chief to Congress: We Share ``Core Values'' With Coup Leaders

(By Nick Turse)

In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire last month, 1,300 U.S., NATO,

and African troops met for tactical and mock raids as part of

Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special

Operations Command Africa, or SOCAFRICA. Among the countries

participating was Burkina Faso, which has been restricted

from receiving substantial U.S. security aid since an officer

trained by Americans at previous Flintlock exercises

overthrew his democratically elected government in a coup

last year.

U.S. military officials have spent the last month trying to

explain this curious state of affairs to Congress and the

press. Flintlock provides a ``critical training opportunity''

for special operations forces from the U.S. and Africa and a

chance to ``exchange best practices,'' Rear Adm. Milton

``Jamie'' Sands, the chief of SOCAFRICA, told The Intercept

and other reporters on a conference call last month. He

didn't mention that, by the Pentagon's own assessments,

militant Islamist attacks in the Sahel have spiked and

security has plummeted across West Africa since SOCAFRICA

began Flintlock trainings in 2005. ``The Sahel now accounts

for 40 percent of all violent activity by militant Islamist

groups in Africa, more than any other region in Africa,''

reads a recent report: by the Defense Department's Africa

Center for Strategic Studies.

The four-star general in charge of U.S. Africa Command, or

AFRICOM, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee

that only a small percentage of U.S.-trained officers

overthrow their governments--while admitting he didn't know

the exact number. This prompted farright Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-

Fla., to ask, ``Why should U.S. taxpayers be paying to train

people who then lead coups in Africa?''

Flintlock attendees have conducted at least five coups in

the last eight years. Since 2008, in fact, U.S.-trained

officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in

at least eight) across five West African countries, including

Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times),

Mauritania, and the Gambia.

Before he toppled Burkina Faso's democratically elected

president in 2022, for example, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo

Damiba attended Flintlock exercises in 2010 and 2020,

according to AFRICOM. A fellow Flintlock 2010 attendee, Gen.

Gilbert Diendere, overthrew the government of Burkina Faso in

2015.

Just a year after he attended Flintlock 2019, Col. Assimi

Goita headed the junta that overthrew Mali's government.

After staging that coup, Goita stepped down and took the job

of vice president in a transitional government tasked with

returning Mali to civilian rule. But nine months later, he

seized power for a second time.

Another alum of Flintlock 2019, Col. Mamady Doumbouya,

served as a Guinean unit commander during the exercise,

according to AFRICOM. In 2021, members of Doumbouya's unit

took time out from being trained in small unit tactics and

the law of armed conflict by Green Berets to storm the

presidential palace and depose their country's 83-year-old

president, Alpha Conde. Doumbouya soon declared himself

Guinea's new leader. The U.S. ended the training and

distanced itself from the coup.

``Core values is what we start off with,'' Gen. Michael

Langley, the AFRICOM chief, told the House Armed Services

Committee last month.

``Do we share those values with Col. Doumbouya?'' asked

Gaetz.

Mr. Speaker, in this piece, it highlights five countries-- Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia--where the very people who led the coups were the very people who received this training from the United States.

I would note that any comparison here to Afghanistan is sorely misplaced. This legislation provides one year to remove 900 people. That is far different than unwinding the double helix that was our multidecade engagement with Afghanistan.

I agree with the sentiment that my colleague Mr. James stated, that our friends must trust us and our enemies must fear us. But what I have observed, after 20 years of American war in the Middle East and in North Africa, is that our enemies often mock us when we try to be the world's policeman and the world's piggy bank. That should not be the goal of our country. We should not be engaged in nation-building in Somalia, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

These 900 U.S. troops have no end state. They are engaging in largely police force operations. I suggest they should come home, and a vote for this resolution would do that.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I can assure the gentleman from New York that we will have a more fulsome discussion regarding the continent of Africa because the next in our legislative series may very well be Niger. We will have that opportunity, as well.

To my colleague from Minnesota, I think she really hits the nail on the head that the partnerships between the existing government in Somalia and the clans that exist throughout the country is the essential glue to resist the violence and destabilization that we see from Al-Shabaab.

It is my belief that the government's entrees to those groups to get them to not side with Al-Shabaab are not facilitated by extensive U.S. presence. I just don't believe that to get one group of Somalis to stop killing another group of Somalis that the essential ingredient is us.

It may be other African influencers to a positive extent, but there is great wisdom in what the gentlewoman shared regarding the utility of those partnerships and relationships.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, if what it takes to protect the 17 million people in Somalia is 900 U.S. troops forever, then I don't have high hopes for them. I have far more confidence in the strategy that Congresswoman Omar laid out, which was the Somali Government working to create some sense of national identity among Somali clans, and no one has made a compelling argument that we are essential to that process.

I take some exception to my colleague from Texas calling this a get- out-quick resolution. It gives us a year. Can't we move 900 people in a year?

My colleague from Georgia argued that Somali troop presence was essential to keep America safe. Let me be clear: I fear China and some crazy Russian general with nuclear codes far more than I fear Somali warlords fighting over who controls aid streams.

It is not just my opinion. It is the opinion of our military leaders at AFRICOM. It was Brigadier General Bailey who said recently:

What we have seen is not necessarily holding land or

territory. It is more extortion, closer to an organized crime

organization.

That was on February 27, 2023, on ``Nightly News with Lester Holt.''

Even General Bailey doesn't view this as a way to get land, seize land, and keep it away from Al-Shabaab. He is saying that they are not really holding land. They are just engaged in low-level thuggery, and it seems unworthy of a sustained U.S. troop presence.

Let's make clear that while the debate was elegant and compelling about the need to engage Africa, the vote on this resolution is whether 900 U.S. troops should stay in Somalia or come home.

Those who vote against my resolution are functionally taking the position that the 2001 AUMF, which was voted on when 89 percent of us who are currently in the House were not even here to vote on it and which was voted on before Al-Shabaab even existed, has become a global permission slip for U.S. interventionism everywhere.

Al-Shabaab had nothing to do with 9/11. The fact that they have co- branded with al-Qaida is not indicative of any interoperability.

Mr. Speaker, as we are evaluating whether or not we have to keep 900 troops in Somalia for the safety and security of Americans, the principal goal of Al-Shabaab is to rule greater Somalia under sharia law and overthrow the government.

That is not my opinion. That is a February 2023 Congressional Research Service conclusion. That very same CRS report indicates that Al-Shabaab does not have the capability to attack the United States.

I guess it is easy to stand up and say that we should be the police force everywhere because anywhere some bad person could harbor the desire to kill us, but the best research we have says that that is not in line with their existing capabilities.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the February 2023 Congressional Research Service report.

[From Congressional Research Service, updated Feb. 14, 2023]

Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab (Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin

Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist

group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2022 labeled

``the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al Qaeda affiliate

in the world today.'' AFRICOM reports that the group poses

the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and interests in East

Africa, and is a threat to the United States.

background

Al Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s amidst a vacuum of

state authority in Somalia. It evolved out of a militant wing

of the

federation of Islamic Courts that took control of Mogadishu

and much of southern Somalia in 2006. When Ethiopia, which

backed Somalia's nascent transitional government, intervened

militarily--with U.S. support--to oust the Courts, Al Shabaab

used historical anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis to

draw recruits and support, including among the diaspora in

the United States.

Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including

the capital, from the late 2000s until African Union (AU)

forces gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011-2012

and reclaimed some territory from the group. Shabaab has

nevertheless retained control over parts of the country,

despite international recognition of Somalia's federal

government in 2012 and a range of multilateral efforts to

degrade its capacity. The group also maintains influence and

the ability to conduct attacks in government-held areas.

relationship with al qaeda

Some of Al Shabaab's founding members trained with Al Qaeda

(AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East Africa,

including Fazul Mohammed--the late mastermind of the U.S.

embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania--have been associated

with the group. After expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda

in Al Shabaab's early years, the groups announced a formal

affiliation in 2012.

While Al Shabaab's leaders appear to broadly share Al

Qaeda's transnational agenda, the group operates

independently. Among other AQ affiliates, the group maintains

ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with

which it runs a smuggling network.

In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for a shift in

allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership

rejected the proposal and launched a deadly crackdown against

IS supporters. A small IS faction in northern Somalia

survived the purge. Al Shabaab remains the dominant group and

appears to view the IS cell as a rival.

the threat

Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the

Somali government, AU forces, and foreign targets in Somalia.

Per UN data, 2022 was its deadliest year since 2017, when a

truck bomb in Mogadishu killed over 500 people (Al Shabaab's

deadliest single attack to date).

While the group has focused primarily on Somalia, it is

also threatens the countries participating in the African

Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, previously known as

AMISOM) and has conducted attacks in neighboring countries

and Uganda. Al Shabaab has been most active in Kenya, which

launched a military operation in Somalia against the group in

2011 (Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012). The group has killed

hundreds of Kenyans, many through hit-and-run attacks near

the Somali border. Its 2015 assault on a university in

northeast Kenya, which killed at least 147 people, was the

deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since Al Qaeda's 1998

bombing of the U.S. embassy.

Al Shabaab's July 2022 incursion into Ethiopia is its

largest operation outside Somalia to date, reportedly

involving some 2,000 Al Shabaab fighters. UN experts estimate

that as many as 1,000 fighters remain in Ethiopia, giving it

a foothold, despite Ethiopian claims of routing the group.

Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in the

region and called for attacks against the United States.

Attacks on international targets in Kenya's capital--the 2013

Westgate Mall siege and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel assault--

raised the group's international profile. Over 50 U.S.

citizens were reportedly in the Westgate mall when the attack

started--all escaped but six were injured. In 2020, Al

Shabaab killed a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors during

a raid on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military facility used

by the U.S. military near the Somali border.

The group has not claimed any attacks in the United States.

It has, however, encouraged lone-wolf attacks in its

propaganda, and in 2015, it produced a video identifying

shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential

targets. In 2019, a Kenyan national was arrested in the

Philippines and later extradited to the United States on

charges of conspiring to hijack an aircraft on behalf of Al

Shabaab to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States.

objectives

Al Shabaab rejects democracy, broadly ascribing to a vision

of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Djibouti, Kenya,

Ethiopia, and Somalia in an Islamic state under its version

of Sharia law. It characterizes the Somali government as an

illegitimate apostate authority that is beholden to foreign

powers. Al Shabaab leaders have repeatedly expressed their

commitment to global jihad. They justify attacks outside

Somalia as retaliation against countries conducting military

operations in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses

against Muslims. Al Shabaab described the Manda Bay and

DusitD2 attacks in Kenya as consistent with Al Qaeda

directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, and referred

to the airfield as one of the ``launch pads for the American

crusade against Islam in the region.'' Al Shabaab activities

in Kenya more broadly appear focused on sowing internal

dissent and fomenting an insurgency. Its fighters have

specifically targeted non-Muslims in some attacks there.

leadership

Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has led

Al Shabaab since 2014. He succeeded Ahmed Abdi Godane, who

was killed in a U.S. airstrike that the Obama Administration

described as responding to an ``imminent threat,'' citing

Godane's oversight of ``plots targeting Westerners, including

U.S. persons in East Africa.'' Godane's predecessor was

killed in a U.S. strike in 2008.

Al Shabaab faced infighting under Godane, who consolidated

power by assassinating rivals, reportedly including American

jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013. Some prominent commanders left

the group or surrendered to Somali authorities in exchange

for amnesty during that time. Former deputy leader Mukhtar

Robow defected, and later ran for state office, drawing on

support from his clan. He was detained during his 2018

campaign and held without charge until 2022. He was released

by Somalia's new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and

appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. In his new role,

Robow is tasked with countering Al Shabaab's extremist

ideology.

area of operations and capabilities

AMISOM and neighboring militaries pushed Al Shabaab from

Mogadishu and other urban centers and ports between 2011 and

2014. Al Shabaab 's control oflarge areas of south and

central Somalia, however, remained largely unchanged from

2015, when AMISOM's major offensive operations ceased, until

2022, when the Somali government launched a new offensive in

coordination with local militias and a grassroots uprising.

Al Shabaab has since lost significant territory in central

Somalia, but it continues to conduct reprisal attacks there.

While Al Shabaab's loss of Mogadishu and other port cities

initially restricted its revenue, the group has developed an

extensive taxation system covering all aspects of the Somali

economy, per UN and other reporting. Al Shabaab extorts

businesses even in government areas. It generates between $50

and $100 million annually, according to UN monitors, and uses

at least 25 percent on military purchases; Al Shabaab also

supports Al Qaeda directly with its tax proceeds.

UN monitors report that Al Shabaab is estimated to have

7,000-12,000 fighters. The group capitalizes on grievances

and distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills

local governance roles, providing basic services and

resolving disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters,

including children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda tools

to spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya,

reportedly its largest source of foreign fighters, Al Shabaab

plays on narratives of collective punishment by the Kenyan

government against Muslims, among other themes. Kenyan

nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2 attack.

Despite territorial losses, Al Shabaab maintains the

ability to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu and other

areas beyond its control, including through complex vehicle-

borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In 2016, an Al

Shabaab suicide bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a bomb

concealed in a laptop computer. (It did not destroy the

plane.) Advances in Al Shabaab's explosives-making capacity

led the UN Security Council to ban the transfer of explosive

precursors to Somalia in 2019.

u.s. responses

The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist

Organization (FTO) in 2008 and has designated over two dozen

related persons for sanctions, either under Executive Order

(E.O.) 13536 (on Somalia) or as under E.O. 13224 (on

terrorism). Among those designated are several Kenyan clerics

implicated in fundraising and recruiting for the group and

members of its smuggling and weapons trafficking network in

Yemen. The United States has prosecuted several U.S. citizens

for fundraising on Al Shabaab's behalf.

The United States provides security assistance to AU and

Somali forces, and has supported counter-radicalization

programs in the region. In addition to airstrikes, U.S.

forces have engaged in ``advise, assist, and accompany''

missions with Somali and AU forces since 2016.

In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al

Shabaab an ``associated force'' of Al Qaeda in the context of

the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L.

107-40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until 2015,

when President Obama broadened the justification for U.S.

military action in the country--previously ``to counter Al

Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab''--to cover

support for AU, Somali, and U.S. forces operating there. The

tempo of airstrikes rose. President Trump changed the rules

of engagement for U.S. operations in Somalia in 2017,

authorizing offensive airstrikes and designating parts of the

country as an ``area of active hostilities.'' Airstrikes have

continued, after a brief pause, under President Biden:

AFRICOM conducted over a dozen airstrikes in Somalia in 2022,

citing most as ``collective self-defense,'' in support of the

Somali army.

In late 2019, three months before the Manda Bay attack, Al

Shabaab launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield used

by the U.S. military in central Somalia--it was the largest

attack on U.S. forces in the country in nearly thirty years.

No U.S. or Somali forces were killed. Trump ordered the

withdrawal of U.S. forces--then estimated at 700--from

Somalia at the end of his term; Biden authorized the

redeployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in May 2022.

outlook

After over 15 years of counterinsurgency operations against

it, Al Shabaab still poses a serious threat in Somalia and

East Africa, despite the ongoing deployment of 18,000 AU

troops. Airstrikes have eliminated some ``high-value''

targets and supported partner operations, but Al Shabaab

maintains the capacity to conduct complex, asymmetric attacks

in Somalia and assaults in neighboring countries.

Over the past decade, political infighting and corruption

have hampered the Somali government's ability to extend state

authority. Donor fatigue and frustration has reduced support

for the AU mission, which is due to withdraw by the end of

2024. The ``total war'' Somalia's new government launched

against Al Shabaab in 2022 could be a turning point, but

Somalia has struggled to ``clear and hold'' when AU forces

have managed to gain ground in the past. For more, see CRS In

Focus IF10155, Somalia.

Moreover, Mr. Speaker, we are seeing the government in Somalia achieve gains in large part because of local discontent with Al-Shabaab.

Because of climate change, we are not seeing the same amount of agricultural and livestock opportunities for people in Somalia, so many of the groups that were paying extortion money to Al-Shabaab are not able to pay it anymore because a lot of the land is dried up. That resulted in Al-Shabaab being incredibly brutal to those local clans and tribes. They poisoned the water, killed family members, and publicly executed people. Then what happened was a lot of those local tribes pushed back and said they would rather align with the government.

That is not a victory delivered at the end of a U.S. missile or weapon. That is a victory that is occurring as a consequence of the conditions in Somalia and the choices that Somalis are making.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the ACLED piece that details how the government is making gains in ground and Al-Shabaab is losing them. It is titled: ``Somalia: Counterinsurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist.''

[From ACLED, Apr. 21, 2023]

Somalia: Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase

Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist

somalia at a glance: 18 march-14 april 2023

Vital Trends

ACLED records more than 180 political violence events and

over 420 reported fatalities from 18 March to 14 April 2023.

Most political violence centered in Banadir region, where al-

Shabaab launched attacks targeting Somali security forces and

civilians.

Middle Shabelle region had the highest number of reported

fatalities, with over 120 recorded during the reporting

period. Sool region followed, with more than 80 reported

fatalities. Violence involving al-Shabaab was linked to over

74 percent of total fatalities. Clashes between Sool, Sanaag,

and Cayn (SSC) militia and Somaliland security forces around

Laascaanood town resulted in most of the remaining

fatalities.

The most common event type was battles, with over 100

events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with nearly

60 events. Over 46 percent of explosion/remote violence

events occurred in Banadir region, a nearly 70 percent

increase compared to the previous four weeks.

Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as al-

Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced the second phase

of the military offensive against al-Shabaab at the end of

March. The new phase reportedly aims to flush out al-Shabaab

from the remaining parts of the country under its control,

following the first phase that began in August 2022. While

the operation initially focused on central Somalia, starting

in Hirshabelle and then expanding to Galmudug state, the

second phase aims to expand to southern regions--Southwest

and Jubaland states.

In the first phase, the government sought support from clan

militias from the Hawiye clan, and regained substantial

territory from al-Shabaab. Subsequently, clan militias have

played a vital role in the government-led operation. Since

August 2022, these groups have been involved in more than 155

political violence events against al-Shabaab. Additionally,

they have supported security forces in nearly 60 percent of

events where government forces have regained territory from

al-Shabaab. During the first phase of the offensive against

al-Shabaab, Somali security forces regained control of over

215 locations previously under al-Shabaab's control, mostly

in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. However, Somali security

forces, who failed to fully drive out al-Shabaab militants

from both states, still lack the military capacity to hold

newly liberated areas. Al-Shabaab, in turn, took advantage of

this weakness to maintain bases and launch complex attacks

against government troops. In particular, they regained lost

territories in Hirshabelle as the government expanded the

offensive to Galmudug state.

As the federal government anticipates a lack of support

from clans in the south for the second phase of operations,

it is seeking more support from neighboring states who are

already present in Somalia under the African Union Transition

Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)--possibly indicating a plan to

scale down the role of clan militias in the operation.

Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have reportedly promised over

30,000 soldiers to support the offensive in the coming

months. This situation update analyzes the activities of al-

Shabaab and the security forces during the second phase of

the offensive and assesses the risk that political

differences between the federal government and some of member

states, like Jubaland and Puntland, may undermine the

operations.

Al-Shabaab Aims for Hirshabelle While Continuing Attacks in

Banadir

After the counter-insurgency operation against al-Shabaab

expanded to Galmudug state in early 2023, Hirshabelle state

became a vulnerable target for al-Shabaab attacks. These

vulnerabilities have forced Somali security forces to stay

focused on Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions in the second

phase of the offensive rather than expanding to Jubaland and

Southwest states. From 18 March to 14 April, ACLED records 19

political violence events involving al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle

state, resulting in at least 145 reported fatalities (see map

below). Over 68 percent of these incidents were remote

violence events, which record an increase of 30 percent

compared to the previous four weeks.

In Middle Shabelle region, al-Shabaab launched several

attacks in Adan Yabaal district--in most instances using

explosives. On 25 March, al-Shabaab detonated three under-

vehicle IEDs (UVIED), targeting security forces and Abgal

clan militias at a base in Run-nirgod village. The explosion

and heavy gunfire exchange that followed resulted in over 50

reported fatalities. A few days earlier, on 20 March, another

al-Shabaab attack at a base in Daarul-

Naciim village reportedly killed at least 55 people from

both sides. The attacks came before the visit of the Somali

President on 26 March to Adan Yabaal town, where he announced

the launch of the second phase of the offensive against al-

Shabaab. The same day, a high-level Ethiopian delegation that

included the head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and

senior government officials arrived in the capital of Hiiraan

region, Belet Weyne town, to help Somali forces plan the next

phase. Ethiopian troops have been fighting Islamist militants

in Somalia since 2006 independently, and as part of the AU

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since January 2014. AMISOM was

eventually replaced by ATMIS in 2022.

Meanwhile, security forces continued offensive operations

in Hiiraan to avert al-Shabaab attacks. The government

deployed troops from Mogadishu to the region, traveling along

the main supply route that connects Mogadishu to Hiiraan. On

25 March, security forces captured Jibiley village in

Jalalaqsi district and Quracley village in Bulo Burto

district from al-Shabaab. While militants peacefully vacated

those villages, they continued to launch attacks on security

forces and clan militias' new bases near Belet Weyne town. On

29 March, an al-Shabaab suicide vehicle-borne IED attack

targeted security forces and Hawadle clan militias at a base-

in Baardheere village, followed by clashes.

Further, al-Shabaab continued measures to end the alliance

between government forces and the Hawadle sub-clan in the

second phase of the offensive. The Hawadle sub-clan of the

Hawiye clan is the largest and most prominent sub-clan in

Hiiraan. There are four main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Darod,

Dir, and Rahanweyn, with each having several sub-clans and

those sub-divisions, some supporting al-Shabaab, and others

supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab. Since

al-Shabaab controls several remote villages in Hiiraan and

other regions, sub-clans consider it necessary to reach an

agreement with al-Shabaab for their safety, and in return for

their support or neutrality, al-Sahabab offers them peace

deals. On 5 April, al-Shabaab claimed to have signed an

agreement with Hawadle Galible Hassan Agoon sub-clan in Buqda

Caqable village, Bula Burto district. The agreement

stipulates that the sub-clan would not be part of the ongoing

offensive in Hiiraan region. Similar agreements were

reportedly signed between al-Shabaab and at least seven other

sub-divisions of the Hawadle sub-clan in Buqda Caqable

village this year. Al-Shabaab also reached an agreement with

clan elders from Habar Gedir Salebaan sub-clan in Xarardheere

town, Mudug region, in December 2022.

Meanwhile, al-Shabaab continues its efforts to destabilize

the government operation by launching attacks in urban towns.

The capital Mogadishu records the highest number of al-

Shabaab attacks compared to other urban areas in Somalia,

with 49 political violence events and at least 21 reported

fatalities. Al-Shabaab's use of explosions and remote

violence increased in the capital by over 87 percent during

the reporting period compared to the same time period prior;

the group's use of grenades, in particular, increased more

than four-fold.

On 5 April, al-Shabaab carried out coordinated hand grenade

attacks in all 17 districts

of Mogadishu. The grenade attacks targeted security force

checkpoints, the house of the mayor of Mogadishu and governor

of Banadir, the house of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali

Khaire, and the house of a federal senator. Further, the

militants launched mortar shells targeting the presidential

palace, with some striking the house of the petroleum

minister, reportedly killing a security officer.

Political Differences Undermine the Offensive

As part of the second phase of the offensive, the federal

government plans to expand the offensive to Jubaland and

Southwest states in southern Somalia. Political differences

due to power-sharing disputes in Jubaland and Puntland,

however, undermine the operation.

Amid an ongoing dispute with the Jubaland administration

based in Kismayo, Gedo region politicians and government

officials unilaterally announced the recruitment and

mobilization of local clan militias to participate in the

military operation against al-Shabaab in the region. On the

other hand, Jubaland State Minister of Security Yusuf Hussein

Dhuumal reportedly rejected such plans to involve local clan

militias. The most prominent sub-clan in Gedo region is the

Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, which opposes Jubaland

President Ahmed Mohamed Islam--also known as `Madobe'--from

the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clan. Marehan and Ogaden

sub-clans have been fighting over the control of Kismayo

since the 1990s. The current dispute between Gedo

politicians, who are mostly from the Marehan sub-clan, and

the Madobe administration escalated in 2020 when a leadership

dispute led to the federal government's decision to deploy

troops in the region. Jubaland administration fears that

arming Marehan clan militias in Gedo would trip the balance

of power in favor of the Marehan sub-clan. Nevertheless,

Jubaland security forces continued conducting military

operations against al-Shabaab despite the lack of support

from local communities. Further, on 3 April, Ethiopian

security forces deployed troops in Doolow town, Gedo region,

as part of Ethiopia's commitment to increase its military

presence in Somalia during the second phase of the counter-

insurgency operation.

Political differences between the Puntland administration

and the federal government have also complicated plans for

the counter-insurgency operation. In mid-March, the federal

government and member states held a national consultative

council meeting in Baidoa town to discuss the fight against

al-Shabaab and to foster cooperation between the federal and

member state governments. Puntland state president did not

attend the meeting citing political differences with the

federal government, including the appointment of the new

special envoy for Somaliland affairs. On 9 January, Puntland

state suspended cooperation with the federal government after

skipping the signing of two outcomes of a national

consultative council meeting held in Mogadishu in late

December. Although al-Shabaab activity decreased in Puntland

during the reporting period compared to the previous four

weeks, fighting between al-Shabaab and IS militants led to

the reported deaths of at least 40 al-Shabaab militants,

including senior members. The fighting erupted after several

al-Shabaab militants moved to the mountainous Bari region,

likely fleeing from the government's offensive.

Different administrations in Somalia have adopted distinct

approaches to the fight against al-Shabaab, often deeply tied

to the clan affiliations of Somali leaders. The previous

government--in power from 2017 to 2022--focused on foreign

policy, rebuilding security forces, and leading

reconciliation between clans. Meanwhile, the current

administration has enlisted support, first from clan militias

and now from neighboring countries, in an intensive offensive

to flush out al-Shabaab militants. President Hassan Sheikh

Mohamud is from the Hawiye clan that has sub-clans supporting

the government operation against al-Shabaab, including

Hawadle and Abgal in Hirshabelle and Habar Gedir in Galmudug.

Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as

`Farmajo,' who is from the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod

clan, failed to get support from the Majerteen sub-clan in

Puntland, and Ogaden sub-clan in Jubaland, with the latter

intensifying the dispute between Gedo and Kismayo

administration.

The progress made through the government operation has put

Somalia in a more positive position compared to the last six

years. These efforts could help the country recover the

decades-long political and security instability, but only if

effectively managed through power sharing, reconciliation,

and integration of clan militias into security forces.

Nonetheless, the greater role of forces from neighboring

countries in the offensive might lead to a divide between

clan militias and government forces, and claims of a `foreign

invasion' may be used by al-Shabaab in its propaganda in

order to recruit fighters. Consequently, military support

from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya might not be a solution

but rather a setback in the fight against al-Shabaab. The

regional countries are already present in Somalia under

ATMIS, although they have not participated in the ongoing

offensive due to funding issues and have only offered

logistical support and medical evacuation. The Abgal, Habar

Gedir, and Hawadle clan militias have played an important

role in the security forces' success since August 2022, and

scaling down their involvement will likely undermine the

government's efforts to defeat al-Shabaab. For the government

to claim ownership of the offensive, integrating clan

militias into security forces should be considered a

priority.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills).

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to my remaining time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

In response to the argument of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. James), who says that our withdrawals must be event based rather than time based, I would ask: What events are we waiting for in Somalia exactly?

Are we waiting for a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge there?

Are we waiting for the sectarian violence that has dominated to automatically just dissolve into the sands?

Are we waiting for some other foreign power?

I would suggest that in many of these places what we are actually waiting for is for these countries to take care of themselves and to demonstrate their own capabilities because the only way you form a nation is if your own fellow countrymen fight for and win that peace. That is how you develop national heroes, like those we see throughout this great Capitol. That is what a nation makes.

A nation is not a bunch of Europeans drawing lines in Africa and then saying this is what is what. We did that after World War II, and it is why Africa has been in some degree of turmoil since. I continue to present to the body that the government in Somalia is actually on the upswing. They are gaining territory. They are unifying people, and it is not as a consequence of U.S. presence.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from the International Crisis Group, ``Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive against Al- Shabaab,'' and it is from 21 March 2023.

[From International Crisis Group, Mar. 21, 2023]

Gains in Somalia's Offensive Against Al-Shabaab

What's new? The Somali government has gained ground in its

war with the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in

central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu's

leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form

alliances with clan militias.

Why does it matter? The joint campaign has dislodged

militants from a swathe of territory in the centre of the

country, reestablishing the government's presence in regions

that Al-Shabaab had controlled for a decade or more. Troops

are now planning to move into the insurgency's southern

bastions.

What should be done? Mogadishu must consolidate its gains

in central Somalia as it goes on the offensive elsewhere. It

should establish holding forces, work for communal

reconciliation and, to the greatest degree possible, meet

local expectations around service delivery.

Overview

Starting in August 2022, the Somali government launched a

fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, capitalising on mounting

discontent with the Islamist insurgency, particularly among

the politically dominant Hawiye clan. The operation has

yielded the most comprehensive territorial gains since the

mid-2010s, as soldiers fighting alongside clan militias

dislodge Al-Shabaab militants from significant parts of

central Somalia. Emboldened by clan backing and foreign

support, Mogadishu now aims to send soldiers into Al-

Shabaab's southern strongholds. As it proceeds, it should

bear in mind the need to consolidate its hold on places it

has recaptured from the insurgency. The government should

assign holding forces to provide security in recovered areas,

support local reconciliation efforts and step up service

delivery, while carefully managing residents' expectations.

If it does not take these measures, it may give Al-Shabaab,

which has proven resilient, a chance to rebound.

The government's push marks a breakthrough in a war that

has raged for more than fifteen years. Historically,

overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in

urban locales, while Al-Shabaab secured a firm foothold in

rural areas. International forces, in particular the African

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)--which was rebranded as the

African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022--

, have led the fight with Al-Shabaab. In contrast, the new

offensive is spearheaded by the Somali military, in

conjunction with local clans.

A unique set of circumstances aided the government advance.

Al-Shabaab overplayed its hand, antagonising clans in central

Somalia. Demands that young male children join their ranks

spurred local clans to take up arms alongside the Somali

military. The insurgents' taxation of communities under their

control hardly helped, as the country suffers impoverishment

and food insecurity amid a record drought. Furthermore,

terrorist attacks in the capital and along Somalia's borders

appear to have prodded Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

to take a tougher line against the group.

The government now plans to continue the offensive in

southern Somalia, even though it has not fully consolidated

its hold in the centre. Southern Somalia presents a different

set of challenges--for one thing, clans in the south have not

shown the same discontent with the Islamist movement that

prevails in the centre. But even as its plans advance to meet

a new set of challenges, the government should not lose sight

of needs in the centre, as otherwise these areas could slip

back into Al-Shabaab's hands. Before it launches major new

attacks, it should make sure it has adequate holding forces

in recovered areas. It should also conduct reconciliation

efforts and improve basic services of which residents have

long been deprived. For cash-strapped Mogadishu, that could

prove difficult, and international donors will need to step

in to provide support.

Even if the government is successful in holding down

central Somalia and reclaiming territory in the south, Al-

Shabaab will probably survive. The group is playing the long

game, exploiting government weaknesses wherever it can. The

government should thus keep open the possibility of

negotiations as a means of winding down the war for good, as

Crisis Group has argued in the past. The government's recent

wins on the battlefield will, if sustained, strengthen its

position if it indeed decides to engage in talks.

From Local Anger to ``All-out War''

The Birth of an Offensive

The Somali government's move to wrest back control from Al-

Shabaab in parts of central Somalia is unusual in that the

military has joined forces with clan militias. The offensive

derives its strength from mounting local frustration with Al-

Shabaab's persistent, onerous demands for money and recruits,

as well as the group's violent measures of collective

punishment for non-compliance. Several sub-clans in central

Somalia have resisted the militants previously, but later cut

deals with them to forge a form of coexistence, finding the

cost of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. Still, overall, the

government has made headway.

The insurgents themselves contributed to these dynamics. In

recent years, Al-Shabaab has extended its influence by taking

advantage of political infighting in Mogadishu, which

diverted the attention of Somali elites from the task of

counter-insurgency. As politicians in the capital squabbled,

sub-clans in central Somalia grew increasingly weary of Al-

Shabaab's tactics. The Haber Gedir/Salebaan sub-clan is a

case in point. People from this sub-clan, part of the wider

Hawiye clan family, of which Somali President Hassan Sheikh

Mohamud is a member, live in and around the town of Baxdo,

situated in the central region of Galgaduud (Galmudug state).

They tolerated Al-Shabaab's presence in their area, for the

most part, until 2019, when its commanders ordered families

to provide young men to be enrolled as fighters. An

influential community member told Crisis Group that this

directive proved too much to stomach. Baxdo is a town with

strong Sufi roots; the community perceived Al-Shabaab's

demand as a ploy to inculcate the Salafi-jihadist doctrine in

the younger generation.

The Salebaan's refusal to comply with this de facto draft

triggered a spiral of retaliation, starting with insurgents

confiscating livestock and abducting elders. It culminated in

Al-Shabaab assaulting Baxdo on 17 June 2022, which proved to

be a tactical misstep: a militia from the sub-clan inflicted

heavy casualties among the invading militants, killing an

estimated 70 of them. Still, even after its defeat, Al-

Shabaab carried out raids on smaller and less protected

villages nearby in revenge.

Around the same time, in the eastern part of Hiraan region

(Hirshabelle state) west of Galgaduud, the Hawiye/Hawadle

sub-clan's historically uneasy relationship with Al-Shabaab

became outright hostile. The roots of the Hawadle's

aggravation can be traced to 2021, when the militants took

control of the road connecting Hiraan's capital Beledweyne to

the Galgaduud region. Al-Shabaab had already blocked a

southern route linking Beledweyne to Mogadishu, impeding the

flow of vital supplies to a part of Somalia that has suffered

severe drought for years. Now its checkpoint on the road

headed east choked off the area, in effect. Local

anger rose, becoming even more pronounced in May 2022, when

the militants killed a Hawadle elder in Beledweyne,

reportedly for having participated in government elections.

The community in Hiraan mobilised to push back against the

group, emboldened at a crucial moment by Ethiopian military

support. Al-Shabaab has long viewed Ethiopia, which invaded

Somalia in 2006 to overthrow its precursor group, the Islamic

Courts Union, as a major adversary; the insurgents have

attempted to infiltrate the country in the past, mostly to no

avail. In July 2022, however, the group launched an

unprecedented incursion into Ethiopia's Somali region.

Alarmed, Addis Ababa beefed up the deployment in the buffer

zone it maintains between its border with Somalia and areas

where Al-Shabaab is active. Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab

positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early

August, while the head of the Ethiopian Army's Somali Command

Post, General Tesfaye Ayalew, visited Beledweyne.

Interlocutors on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border

confirmed to Crisis Group that Addis Ababa gave military

supplies to local Hawadle at this time, coordinating with

regional officials.

Al-Shabaab responded to the mobilisation by unleashing a

wave of repression upon the sub-clan, which generated still

more resentment. In early August, Al-Shabaab torched Hawadle

villages in Hiraan's Mahas district, destroying wells. Weeks

later, on 2 September, militants ambushed a convoy bringing

food to the area, killing numerous civilians, including women

and children. More clan members joined the militias as a

result.

Another Al-Shabaab attack, this time in Mogadishu, provoked

a strong reaction from the national government. On 20 August

2022, Al-Shabaab stormed the well-known Hayat Hotel in the

Somali capital--a common meeting place for government

officials--putting the premises under siege for 30 hours

before security forces could dislodge them. The operation--

which led to the death of more than twenty people--may have

been an attempt to intimidate President Mohamud, who had been

elected to a second nonconsecutive term that May, out of

taking an aggressive posture toward the group.

If so, Al-Shabaab's leadership miscalculated. While Mohamud

had struck a somewhat conciliatory tone when he first

returned to office--repeatedly talking about the need for

``different security strategies and tough negotiations'' with

Al-Shabaab--his stance changed dramatically after critics

accused him of mounting a confused, ineffective response to

the siege. He proceeded to declare an ``all-out war'' on Al-

Shabaab that combines military pressure with efforts to rein

in the group's extortion rackets in and around Mogadishu. He

also committed to undercutting the group's Salafi-jihadist

ideology. Previous attempts to combat Al-Shabaab had failed,

he claimed, because they tried to contain rather than

eradicate the group.

The government deployed armed forces to Hiraan that worked

in concert with Hawadle forces to flush militants out of

villages and towns in August. The initial focus was on

securing the main road from Mogadishu to Beledweyne and a

triangular patch of territory between Beledweyne, Mahas and

Bulo Burte. By October, the army and militias had freed much

of Hiraan east of the Shabelle River from Al-Shabaab's

physical control.

Expansion in Central Somalia

The government was eager to replicate the success in

eastern Hiraan, based on the template the Somali army and

clan militias had used there. It encouraged other clans in

central Somalia to mobilise volunteer fighters, or macawisley

(``those who wear the macawis'', a Somali sarong), relying on

prominent personalities to rally their clansmen. Somali

soldiers, particularly special forces units, still lead the

fight with Al-Shabaab, but Mogadishu has provided the clan

militias with logistical support such as ammunition, food and

medical evacuations. The macawisley participate in joint

operations, giving government forces backup from fighters who

know the terrain better. They also provide a crucial link to

the local population, sparing the government from going it

alone or trying to mobilise community support after the fact.

The clan participation also reinforces the narrative that

sections of Somali society are turning against Al-Shabaab,

Foreign partners have also bolstered the campaign against

Al-Shabaab. U.S. airstrikes are helping the Danab, a special

unit of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. as a

quick strike force, recapture territory from the insurgents

in the regions of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud and

Mudug. The U.S. has also donated military assistance, with

its ambassador for Somalia praising the war effort as

``historic''. Turkiye has carried out drone strikes in Lower

and Middle Shabelle, further boosting the government's

firepower. Meanwhile, ATMIS has stayed out of direct combat

thus far,

The combined efforts of the Somali army, clan militias and

international partners have led Al-Shabaab's footprint in

central Somalia to contract. The government seized the

insurgency's regional centre of operations at Adan Yabaal in

Middle Shabelle in December 2022. The next month, it captured

the strategic towns of Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere in

Galgaduud--although militants remain on the outskirts. The

military is likely planning to uproot Al-Shabaab from its

remaining strongholds in the southern Galgaduud districts of

Ceel Buur and Galhareeri. If successful, its campaign would

essentially dislodge the militants from a swathe of territory

east of the Shabelle River.

The playbook from eastern Hiraan has not worked smoothly

everywhere, however. While clans in that region rose up

spontaneously against Al-Shabaab, in other areas the

government had to coax clans to join forces. Military efforts

in Middle Shabelle struggled to get off the ground and were

side-tracked by clashes between two sub-clans in the Adale

district in November. In western Galgaduud, overly

enthusiastic pro-government forces marched on the town of

Wabxo in early November, only to pull out days later in the

face of stiff resistance from Al-Shabaab. They could not hold

the area without support from Somali special forces.

Other advances have also stalled. The army had to stop

south of Qaayib, in Galgaduud, amid Al-Shabaab outreach to

sub-clans to counter government mobilisation. Government

efforts to rally clans in Xarardheere, in the Mudug region,

floundered because of sub-clan frictions and perceptions that

the government had previously failed to support them in

fighting the insurgents. The military ultimately moved to

capture Xarardheere with limited clan militia participation.

Moreover, a string of recent incidents shows that Al-

Shabaab can still inflict severe damage in areas it has lost,

even if it is not reoccupying them. In January alone, the

insurgents deployed at least twelve suicide car bombs in

central Somalia towns, in some cases causing heavy

casualties. A 20 January attack in Galcad (Galmudug state)

was particularly damaging, with Danab forces taking

significant losses, including of a deputy commander. That

incident spurred an internal reconsideration of strategy,

with the offensive in central Somalia slowing in the ensuing

weeks. Additionally, Al-Shabaab militants continue to cross

from west of the Shabelle River to attack macawisley

positions in smaller settlements in Hiraan. The infiltration

raises concerns about the government's ability to hold the

territory it recaptures, especially as it takes over more

areas. It also demonstrates the peril of measuring success in

fighting Al-Shabaab solely with the yardstick of territorial

control.

Still, the government has advantages in its current

offensive, when compared to previous campaigns. For one

thing, the military's collaboration with clan militias is

strengthening ties with local communities, while allowing for

greater government penetration of rural areas. Previous

offensives typically focused on securing cities,

inadvertently deepening the rural-urban divide that has

played to Al-Shabaab's strengths as a mobile organisation

reliant on local communities for recruitment and financing.

Secondly, today's campaign is Somali-led, unlike those from

2011 to 2015, when the government's forces played a secondary

role to what is now ATMIS. This time around, ATMIS has stayed

in the background, essentially serving as the holding force

for urban locales while Somali soldiers venture into less

densely populated areas.

There is also evidence that both the federal government and

the clans are committed to sustaining their momentum. The

current government in Mogadishu has arguably staked its

reputation on defeating Al-Shabaab. Moreover, several of the

operations to date have involved cross-clan collaboration,

demonstrating an unusually high degree of consensus among

those fighting the insurgents in central Somalia.

Progress, however, should not be chalked up exclusively to

Mogadishu or local mobilisation, but rather to the

combination of the two. The campaign has been most successful

where community resistance to Al-Shabaab is strongest, and

the government can be a force multiplier, as in eastern

Hiraan. In cases where local engagement is less apparent, the

government has struggled to advance. In this sense, the

offensive might be characterised as a series of wars between

clans and Al-Shabaab, with the government backing the former.

Al-Shabaab Adjusts to the Pressure

Al-Shabaab has suffered important losses in central

Somalia, but it continues to put up significant resistance,

showing the value it places on the region. An intelligence

source told Crisis Group that the insurgency is likely to

reinforce its fighters in central Somalia with personnel now

stationed in the south, likely sending the wounded south to

recuperate. Somali government officials say militants have

defected, but not in significant numbers. Meanwhile, Al-

Shabaab has sought to increase pressure on the government

with large-scale attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, in

addition to making regular incursions into areas the

government has seized.

Al-Shabaab's flexibility suggests that the organisation is

more likely to adapt to the government campaign than be

defeated by it. For example, the group already appears to be

changing its approach to the population in central Somalia,

realising its coercive model for securing obedience has

backfired. It has started offering more carrots than sticks,

emphasising the need to promulgate the public good (maslaha)

in its rhetoric, rather than exhorting communities to seek

forgiveness (tauba) for having antagonised the group. This

approach has borne fruit: in late December, in a setback for

Mogadishu, a group of Salebaan elders in Galmudug reached a

fresh agreement with Al-Shabaab

to avoid confrontation, withdrawing support for the

government in return for the release of hostages and seized

property.

The federal government's collaboration with the macawisley

likely prompted Al-Shabaab's shift in tone. In the past, the

group has been more willing to offer concessions to clans

when it feels weak, only to roll them back later when it is

in a stronger position. It remains to be seen if it will

renege on its commitments this time, but Al-Shabaab likely

realised it needed to change tack in order to maintain

community relations.

Al-Shabaab has a track record of turning to guerrilla

warfare when it is on the back foot and it has resorted to

these tactics of late. Thus far, Somali forces have fought

few major battles with the insurgents. The group prefers to

preserve its strength, withdrawing from towns before the

army's advance in favour of conducting hit-and-run attacks on

recovered areas afterward. Sustained military pressure could

certainly erode the group's capacity to act as a de facto

authority in central Somalia. But Al-Shabaab's ability to

exploit government weaknesses leads some observers to believe

that the military cannot expect to quash the insurgency, even

if it maintains a united front with the clan militias.

Mr. Speaker, we must continue to bring to this floor areas in the world where U.S. troops are present where there is no clear end game, where there is not an end state that is clearly achievable.

What our generation has learned as a consequence of observing the great patriotism expressed by many of my colleagues who participated in this debate today is that we don't have the ability to beat an ideology out of anyone. We don't have the ability to go into these places that oftentimes have been riddled with bloodshed and violence and somehow convince them that a democracy or a parliamentary system is more beneficial than the greed that has been driving them for far too long.

That is the story of the Middle East. That is the story of North Africa. If my constituents have to go to Somalia and Syria, then I think everyone here should have to vote one way or the other, and I don't expect to win that vote, but I was expecting probably during this discussion to maybe hear a little bit more about what it is that we expect these people to do in Somalia to ultimately get them out.

What we have heard is some version of the argument that we have got to fight them over there so we don't fight them over here, even though all the evidence in the Record suggests that they don't have the capability to even strike us here, and that the harboring of terrorism that seems to justify the 2001 AUMF permission slip for American intervention in no way relates to the activities, capabilities, goals, ambitions of this particular group.

What this group wants to do is they want to be able to overthrow the government in Somalia and orient greater Somalia under their sharia law, and they are losing in that fight.

What we see online and what many of us have received in briefings in Congress is that when U.S. troops are present, that serves as a propaganda vehicle for a lot of these groups to be able to go out and recruit and add folks to their ranks, and that is certainly not what we want to see.

If the African Union had a greater role, if the African Union stepped up and worked to fill that vacuum with greater credibility with particular partners and particular localized clans, then that might achieve this objective in the absence of the death, the danger, and the deployment that has had our military spread far too thin for far too long.

Mr. Speaker, I heard in my colleague's opening that we have to reject the siren song of isolationism. I would observe that globalism is no lullaby. It is often soaked in blood and mired in civil war and violence, resulting in worse conditions than we found ourselves in.

There are 17 million Somalis. I am rooting for them. I hope that when my life ends, Somalia isn't synonymous with famine and failed states and civil wars and coups. I really hope that. However, we must also exercise sufficient humility in this body to understand the capabilities of persuasion for a relatively small batch of American troops given the problem set.

I return to the argument that I made earlier in this discussion. There is an opportunity cost to this in people. There are specific units that call my district home that are having to split between AFRICOM and INDOPACOM when the reality is whether or not our children are speaking Mandarin, our grandchildren are being dominated by the Chinese Communist Party is not going to be the result of who wins the battle of Mogadishu. It is going to be the result of who holds the high ground against our true pacing adversaries. Becoming the neighborhood block captain of Somalia is certainly not the behavior of a serious country engaged in various serious challenges against serious adversaries.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I certainly thank the leadership for permitting me such time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to honor the Pace High School Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps with the following proclamation.

Whereas: Pace High School Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (Pace NJROTC) was established in 1993 at Pace High School, Pace, Florida.

Whereas: Pace NJROTC has previously distinguished itself as NJROTC Nationals Academic, Athletic & Drill Champions in competition in both 2021 and 2022.

Whereas: The NJROTC Nationals Academic, Athletic & Drill Championships remain the most comprehensive test of overall JROTC training and performance in existence today, hosting the top-25 out of over 600 NJROTC Units in the Nation.

Whereas: Under the supervision of Commander Patrick Vegeler (USN, Retired) and First Sergeant John Baker (USMC, Retired) and leadership of Cadet Commander Sadie Resmondo and her Battalion Staff, Pace NJROTC returned to the NJROTC National Academic, Athletic & Drill Championships for the seventh consecutive year.

Whereas: On Friday, March 31, 2023, and Saturday, April 1, 2023, Pace High School competed representing Area 8 in the 2023 NJROTC National Academic, Athletic & Drill Championships at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Pensacola, Florida.

Whereas: Pace NJROTC placed 1st in Personnel Inspection; 1st in Unarmed Basic Drill; 2nd in Academics; 3rd in Color Guard Drill; 4th in Unarmed Exhibition Drill; 4th in Curl-ups Team Overall; 5th in Push-ups Team Overall; and 1st in Unit Overall.

Whereas: In the face of stiff competition, Pace NJROTC came away victorious and successfully defended their title for the third consecutive National Championship.

Now, therefore, be it resolved: That Pace High School Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps has brought pride to Northwest Florida, and we applaud their dedication, determination, and patriotism while distinguishing themselves as exemplary students, remarkable athletes, and inspiring citizens upon the occasion of their third consecutive victory at the NJROTC National Championship. Their achievements have brought great pride and recognition to all of Florida's First District, the State of Florida, and the United States of America. Go Patriots.