Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to encourage opposition to the nomination of Jeff Sessions to the Attorney General's Office by this President-elect.

We have been asked and we are constantly asked: Are you saying he is a racist? He defined himself. He defined himself long ago when he was denied a Federal judgeship in 1986 after having been appointed by Ronald Reagan. He was denied because his colleagues said they heard him use the N-word.

Also, it was very well documented that after two of the members of the KKK killed an African American man, he said: Oh, I thought the KKK was okay until I learned they smoked marijuana. This is the same man that said, again, that the NAACP and the SCLC were un-American, that they were communist inspired, and it goes on and on and on. And it is not whether or not we are calling him or we think of him as a racist; he defined himself in that manner. He was denied the appointment to the Federal judgeship, including by Republicans who voted against him.

So here we have a man who is going to be considered for the Attorney General's Office where we have the Civil Rights Division. Should we be worried about that? You bet your bottom dollar we should be worried about that. Not only has he defined himself as a racist, but this is a throwback. This is a man who is a setback. This is a man who does not agree with his colleagues on criminal justice reform. This is a man who loves mandatory minimum sentences. This is a man who does not want the Justice Department to work with local police departments who are in trouble, like what happened in Ferguson. This is a man who is against voting rights. This is a man who has shown himself to be against women. This is a man who does not support the LGBT community. Why would we want him to have this very important, prestigious position as the Attorney General overseeing civil rights? I don't think so.

I advise everybody who is listening and all of our colleagues to support him not being appointed to that position and to get the word over to the Senators that they should not support him, they should not vote for him.

Mr. President, I do not wish to debate. I wish to ask: Is there one United States Senator who will join me in this letter of objection?

I thank the gentlewoman for the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to support H.R. 720, the Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015. I would like to thank Congressman John Katko, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security of the House Committee on Homeland Security, for reintroducing this bill. I was proud to join him as an original cosponsor.

I would like to thank Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul, Ranking Member Bennie Thompson, and our Subcommittee Ranking Member Kathleen Rice for supporting this bill and bringing it to the floor for a vote.

Mr. Speaker, this bipartisan bill was originally introduced last year in response to the horrific November 1, 2013, shooting incident at Los Angeles International Airport in my congressional district.

This bill is named in honor of Gerardo Hernandez, the Transportation Security officer who was killed in the line of duty on that tragic day. As we debate this bill, we offer our deepest condolences to the family of Gerardo Hernandez, and we honor all of the TSOs, police officers, and other first responders who risked their lives to stabilize the situation and protect the public during that terrible incident.

Following the LAX shooting incident, Congress conducted several hearings on the incident, including a field hearing in my district on March 28, 2014. These hearings revealed serious security lapses which interfered with response efforts, such as emergency phones and panic buttons that did not work properly, problems in coordination between various police and fire departments, and incompatible radio systems. These security failures are unacceptable.

The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act requires the Department of Homeland Security to conduct outreach to airports to verify that they have working plans to respond to security incidents, including active shooter incidents, acts of terrorism, and incidents that target passenger screening checkpoints like the one where Officer Hernandez was killed.

It is imperative that major airports like LAX have state-of-the-art emergency response systems. The safety and security of our Nation's airports, and of all of the workers and travelers who pass through them, is of paramount importance. I urge my colleagues to support this bill and send it to the President's desk.

Thank you so very much.

John Garamendi, I would like to thank you not only for allotting me this time this evening, but I would like to thank you for your commitment to educating on this issue and to helping our colleagues to understand that we must focus on this issue and that we must do more to support research. You are indeed a leader. This certainly is not the first time that you have organized one of these evening meetings on this, and I thank you for the work that you are doing.

Mr. Speaker, as cochair of the Congressional Task Force on Alzheimer's Disease, I know how devastating this disease can be for patients, families, and caregivers. The task force works on a bipartisan basis to increase awareness of Alzheimer's, strengthen the Federal response to the disease, and provide assistance to Alzheimer's patients and their caregivers. I am proud to lead the task force, along with my returning cochair, Congressman Chris Smith, and incoming cochairs Michael Burgess and Chaka Fattah.

Alzheimer's is a tragic disease affecting millions of Americans, and it has reached crisis proportions. There is no effective treatment, no means of prevention, nor even a method for slowing the progression of the disease. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 5 million Americans are living with Alzheimer's disease as of 2013. This number is expected to almost triple to 14 million by the year 2050.

The cost associated with Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia are also growing at an unsustainable rate. A recent RAND study of adults ages 70 years and older found that the total economic cost of dementia in 2010 was estimated to be $109 billion for direct care alone. That is higher than the cost of both heart disease and cancer. Furthermore, when the cost of informal care is included, the total cost rises to between $159 billion and $215 billion.

We must act now to change the trajectory of this disease. The bipartisan-supported National Plan to Address Alzheimer's Disease calls for a cure or an effective treatment for Alzheimer's by the year 2025. Reaching this goal will require a significant increase in Federal funding for Alzheimer's research.

Last December, I joined together with task force cochair Congressman Chris Smith to call for a $200 million increase in funding for Alzheimer's research in the President's budget for fiscal year 2016. However, while the President's budget did recognize the importance of Alzheimer's research, it only increased funding by $51 million. This year, I plan to work with my colleagues on the task force to make certain Congress appropriates robust funding for Alzheimer's research to meet the urgent need.

I also plan to reintroduce three bills to expand the available resources for Alzheimer's research and assist patients, families, and caregivers.

First, I will reintroduce the Alzheimer's Caregiver Support Act. This bill will authorize grants to public and nonprofit organizations to expand training and support services for families and caregivers of Alzheimer's patients. With the majority of Alzheimer's patients living at home under the care of family and friends, it is important that we ensure these caregivers have access to the training and resources needed to provide proper care.

Second, I will reintroduce legislation to reauthorize and improve the Missing Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert Program, a small but effective Department of Justice program that helps local communities and law enforcement agencies quickly identify persons with Alzheimer's disease who wander away from their homes and safely reunite them with their families. This program is very valuable. It is a valuable resource for first responders. More importantly, it protects vulnerable Alzheimer's patients and brings peace of mind to their families.

Several years ago, I offered an amendment to continue funding for this program, which cost only $1 million for the year. The following year, I called for, and received, a doubling of the funding for this important program.

Since then, I have made sure this program gets funding every year. I am not happy with the amount of the funding. We need to do more, and we have to fight more beyond 2015 into the 2016 budget to make sure that we get more money because it is desperately needed.

Finally, I will reintroduce the legislation to require the U.S. Postal Service to issue and sell a semi-postal stamp, with the proceeds helping to fund Alzheimer's research at the National Institutes of Health. This would encourage concerned individuals to get involved and contribute to Alzheimer's research efforts, just as many have done in the case of the popular and successful Breast Cancer Research semi- postal stamp.

Our Nation is at a critical crossroads. The situation requires decisive action to search for a cure and protect the millions of Americans currently living with Alzheimer's disease. Together, we must take every possible action to improve treatments for Alzheimer's patients, support caregivers, and invest in research to find a cure for this dreadful disease.

Once again, I want to thank John Garamendi, my colleague from California, whom I have worked with for many, many years, for again organizing yet another night Special Order.

Let's do it.

Well, thank you so very, very much, Mr. Garamendi, again, for your leadership and for affording our Members the opportunity to have shared their experiences because all of what we learn as we serve as caregivers who happen to be relatives and friends, that information is going to be very valuable to our researchers. Because of you, we are going to be able to get those stories out. Thank you so very much.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time that has been allotted to me. Thank you very much, Mr. Cummings.

I rise to oppose H.R. 50, an anticonsumer deregulatory bill that would stop rulemaking by our Nation's financial overseers dead in its tracks. In 2008, we witnessed the worst financial crisis since 1929, which halted lending to small businesses, left millions without a home, and pushed countless Americans into personal bankruptcy and ruin, after which my colleagues and I in Congress worked diligently to put in place serious and comprehensive safeguards to prevent another collapse.

Nevertheless, today House Republicans are suffering from selective amnesia when they push this legislation to undo financial reform. Indeed, this bill, H.R. 50, places significant administrative hurdles on our regulators, like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Certain provisions require our regulators, who are tasked with protecting consumers and investors, to conduct onerous, industry- friendly, cost-benefit analysis and to submit their rules for review to the Office of Management and Budget. This hurts their ability to act independently and in the best interests of the public.

In addition, this bill would arm special interests with a time-tested weapon to delay and kill reform, the opportunity to challenge our cash- strapped regulators in court on every rule. But this is the ultimate point of the bill: to make regulating everything from securities, fraud, payday loans, credit cards, insider trading, and derivatives that much harder.

Most concerning is that Republicans want to pay for the cost of their new burdens by depriving the one regulator charged with protecting our Nation's

consumers of tens of millions of dollars.

Mr. Chairman, this is just the latest in a never-ending effort to unravel the important protections for consumers and taxpayers this Congress put in place following the worst crisis in a generation.

With our economy still recovering from the $14 trillion financial crisis, with families in my own district and probably yours still struggling with foreclosure and unsure how they will be able to make ends meet in retirement, we simply cannot undermine fundamental reforms or the agencies enforcing them.

Mr. Speaker, I submit my vote preference for Speaker of the House. I was unavoidably detained at the time of voting. However, had I been present in person, I would have cast my vote in support of Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi for Speaker of the House.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert my statement in the Record that the House should vote for bigger paychecks and better infrastructure instead of constantly attacking women's access to health care.

Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, if at first you don't succeed, try, try again. Usually, we tell that saying to children to encourage them to achieve greater things, but it seems that when it comes to Congress, it is what Wall Street keeps telling House Republicans.

Mr. Speaker, Republicans thought they could sneak this bill by last week through a fast-track process on the House floor, a process with limited debate and no opportunity for amendments. They thought they could ram through this gift to a handful of the biggest Wall Street banks on just the 2nd day of this new Congress right after we had reconvened.

Well, the American people were watching, and the Democrats here in the House told them ``no.'' The Republican bill failed. Now, here they are; they are at it again. Now, H.R. 37 is back on the floor again, without the opportunity to amend it and with limited debate.

The only difference is that Republicans have reduced how many votes are needed to guarantee passage. That's right. Rather than fix the bill to win broad support, Republicans just changed the rule to make sure the tainted bill passes.

And what does this bill do? Well, for one, it takes a part of Wall Street reform's Volcker rule and delays it for yet another 2 years. Remember that the Volcker rule is the part of Dodd-Frank that stops government-supported banks from gambling with bank depositors' money. And this extra 2-year delay comes on top of a 3-year delay that our regulators carefully crafted to ease the megabanks' transition.

This particular part of the law that Republicans want to see delayed applies to what are known as collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs. CLOs are bundles of leveraged loans, loans often issued by private equity firms to facilitate corporate buyouts that can harm American jobs. The loans are sliced and diced into packages and sold off to investors, including banks that hold customers' deposits. The packages often also contain credit default swaps or other derivatives that can make the position even riskier.

Somehow, Wall Street bankers--the supposedly smartest people in the room--can't seem to comply with a law passed in 2010 by--that's right-- 2017. Seven long years isn't enough. The Republicans and the banks want nearly a decade.

In addition to that, the Republican bill wouldn't just let the banks hold on to these CLOs. The bill would let the banks accumulate new CLOs also. That's right. The banks could actively trade in and out of these investments, unlike the rules carefully crafted by the Federal Reserve.

We saw the Republican playbook at the end of last year with the so- called swaps push-out rule. They hope they can jam these bills through Congress by attaching them to must-pass legislation. And most of all, they hope these issues are way too complicated or too technical for the American people to understand or care about. But the American people really do understand. They remember how our economy was nearly brought to its knees in 2008, and they recognize that we can't let Wall Street slowly chip away at reforms designed to prevent that kind of large- scale financial crisis from happening again.

And President Obama gets it, too. That is why the White House said he would veto this legislation if it got to his desk. And so one cannot help but wonder why are we here on the floor after 8 o'clock in the evening with an attempt to push through something that was jammed into a package of bills? Many of those bills had been heard either in committee or on the floor, but one portion of this bill had not. And so is this simply an attempt to ram down one segment that they fear real debate on, ram it down the throats of the Members of this Legislature and the citizens of this country, hiding it in this package, hoping that we won't get it?

What is worse is that this legislation has been brought to the floor without regard for any regular order. The nine new members on the Financial Services Committee will not get a chance to hear testimony on it at all. And in just the 2nd week of their term, 52 new Members of the House are expected to vote on it, having complicated deregulation shoved down their throats. Democrats offered 13 amendments, one of them bipartisan, but none of these amendments will be considered or debated. Why? Because my colleagues on the other side are not interested in legislation but, rather, in political theater.

We cannot let this casual disregard for the legislative process stand. We want to see reforms sensibly implemented. We want to work with regulators to get the rules right, and we want our largest banks to stop gambling and go back to facilitating growth in the real economy. But that is difficult to do when my Republican counterparts continue pushing legislation that masquerades as technical fixes but really makes substantive changes to the Dodd-Frank reform law. And then they package completely reckless legislation with other provisions that are either necessary or sensible.

Democrats know better, President Obama knows better, and the American people know better. So I would urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch).

I yield the gentleman an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

There are so many inaccuracies in some of the testimony that I am hearing from the opposite side of the aisle that I don't know where to start to try to clear up some of the points that they are attempting to make.

First of all, let me start with this business about how community banks are going to be hurt. This is simply an attempt to hide behind community banks and scare the Members of this body into believing that if they don't support this bill, that somehow their community banks are going to suffer.

The FDIC said that 95 percent of CLOs owned by banks are owned by those with more than $50 billion in assets, with the preponderance owned by Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo.

Specifically, JPMorgan Chase has $33.5 billion worth of CLOs; Wells Fargo has $24.1 billion worth of CLOs; and Citi has $4.7 billion worth of CLOs.

So what are we talking about when we use this kind of messaging to claim that somehow we are going to hurt these small banks? That is absolutely not true. And I want to tell you, the community banks have not been in the background putting out tremendous sums of money on this lobbying effort. According to The New York Times:

The current efforts to undermine Dodd-Frank have been

textbook lobbying. In the first three quarters of last year,

the securities and investment industry spent nearly $74

million on lobbying on 704 registered lobbyists.

So get this picture. We keep seeing attempts by any means necessary from the opposite side of the aisle to push controversial legislation into packaged bills, some of those bills having been supported either in committee or on the floor. It is not enough that they lost when they put this on the suspension calendar. They have come back with a rule that does not allow for any debate, and they are determined to win this by majority vote, even in the face of a veto. Who are they trying to protect?

If it is true that 95 percent of the CLOs owned by banks are owned by those with more than $50 billion in assets, and I told you who has a preponderance, then that is who is being protected. It is the biggest banks in America--Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. That is who is being protected. This money I am talking about, $74 million on lobbying 704 lobbyists, these are the big banks spending the money lobbying on this legislation.

And so this business about protecting Main Street, about protecting the small businesses, simply attempts to misguide and mislead, knowing that most folks really don't understand the CLO market, that this legislation, along with many other pieces of legislation, are complicated. Dodd-Frank is an attempt to reform what had gone terribly wrong in this country. We have seen attempt after attempt, probably more than 100 attempts in the Financial Services Committee, to try and undermine Dodd-Frank, to get rid of Dodd-Frank, to break it up piece by piece, and again by any means necessary.

And so if you can answer why all these attempts, why all of this money is being spent, why we're protecting just these three big banks in America, then you can see that this is not about Main Street, this is not about small businesses. This is now about relationships between too many Members of this House and of this Congress with the biggest banks in America, who are determined to destroy Dodd-Frank. And they have tried all of these tactics and they have tried somehow to make people believe that we don't care about this fire sale that we are going to cause the big banks.

Well, let me just say this. No, I don't worry about causing a fire sale of the big banks. I am not here to protect the big banks. I am truly here to protect Main Street and small business entrepreneurs and business people in this country.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to talk further about title VIII and how it does not benefit small businesses. CLOs comprised only of actual loans are exempt from the Volcker rule entirely. We are only talking about CLOs that contain other instruments like credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, commercial paper-backed securities, et cetera.

The Volcker rule will have a minimum impact on the CLO market. Nothing in the rule says that other buyers of CLOs need to stop their purchases. Nonbanks like hedge funds or insurance companies can continue to purchase or trade CLOs. The restriction only affects banks, big banks, which have tremendous access to taxpayer subsidies through the FDIC and the Federal Reserve borrowing window.

Various Wall Street research analysts have said that the market ``shrugged off'' the Volcker rule and that the industry can do just fine moving forward. In fact, 2014 saw record issuances for new, Volcker-compliant CLOs.

Banks will have 5 years, including 3 years worth of extensions, to comply with this provision. The Republicans now want to give them 7 years. Our position is this: enough is enough. Eventually the Volcker rule has to become operational or else Dodd-Frank becomes meaningless.

These CLOs are typically leverage loans. It should buy private equity firms to facilitate corporate buyouts of

large companies. This is more about facilitating private equity than helping Main Street businesses.

For example, leverage buyouts are when a private equity firm pays for a controlling interest in a company by taking out a loan against that company, saddling the company with debt. The aim is to reduce costs, often by firing workers and slashing employee pay and benefits in order to quickly resell the leaner company for a profit. So this isn't about job creation; this is about job destruction.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Despite what my colleagues on the opposite side of the aisle have said, this package of bills does not simply constitute a technical set of changes to Dodd-Frank or to our securities laws. In fact, these changes are substantive and the package is widely opposed.

My friends on the opposite side of the aisle keep talking about they are protecting Main Street, but let me recite for you what Main Street is saying about this bill. Let me read for you some highlights of the opposition letters we have received in addition to opposition from President Obama, Secretary Lew, and former Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker himself.

Main Street is represented by, number one, Americans for Financial Reform. Americans for Financial Reform says that H.R. 37 ``includes numerous changes that could have significant negative impacts on regulators' ability to police the financial markets, so that they function safely and transparently.''

They go on to oppose title VII of this bill, citing a Wall Street Journal article outlining how regulators are increasingly warning banks about the looser underwriting standard for leverage loans.

Further, representing Main Street, the AFL-CIO says of H.R. 37, that they oppose the bill because it ``would loosen key Dodd-Frank protections wisely put in place after the 2008 financial collapse.''

The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights notes about H.R. 37: ``One lesson of the financial crisis is that deregulation in areas that appear technical and arcane can have significant impacts on the financial system and, thus, on the well-being of ordinary families, particularly in the communities we represent.''

Finally, Public Citizen noted about H.R. 37 that we should not provide more CLO relief because ``the largest banks dominate ownership,'' as I demonstrated a moment ago, ``of CLOs.''

Mr. Speaker, I think we should heed the warning of Main Street, the warning of these groups who truly represent Main Street.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

There has been a lot of talk about bipartisan support or lack of. There have been a lot of talks about how the Republicans have been able to get Democratic votes and that, somehow, we should be happy, we should be satisfied, and that they really don't understand why it is that we are opposing not only the bill, but the tactics that have been used in several attempts to pass legislation with controversial bills tucked into the big package.

Let me give you a summary of amendments that Republicans refuse to consider as we have attempted to work with them.

Mr. Ellison and Mr. Issa offered a bipartisan amendment to strike title VII of the bill, so that all public companies will have to report their financial statements in a computer-readable format. Mr. Sherman and Ms. Kuster both offered amendments striking the CLO title.

In a similar vein, because Republicans refuse to hold debate on the CLO title, Mr. Kildee and Mr. Capuano offered an amendment to require the regulators to first determine that such a delay was, indeed, in the public interest.

Mr. Lynch also proposed to revise the delay from 2019 to a date we previously considered and approved in the House, 2017. This revised date is one that we had thoroughly considered in the House. We never considered in the House an extension for 2 more years to 2019.

In an effort to prevent the spread of systemic threats, Mr. Lynch proposed that an affiliate of a financial institution, whose failure could pose a systemic risk to our economy, should be required to clear its derivatives.

Mr. Lynch raised a concern that companies, like GE Capital, might be able to take large bets in one part of their company, but receive relief from rules intended to mitigate those risks in another. Mr. Lynch also offered three amendments on title XI, all intended to ensure that employees understand their compensation.

Elsewhere in the bill, Mr. Capuano offered an amendment to title X, requiring companies to disclose political campaign contributions. In the same title, Mr. Ellison required the SEC to finalize its Dodd-Frank rules related to executive compensation data within 60 days.

Mr. Grijalva proposed an amendment to restore the swaps push-out provision that Republicans eliminated by attaching it to the CR/Omnibus last month. Mr. Ellison and Mr. Grijalva also proposed a substitute amendment to focus this Congress on something that would help our economy, ending budget sequestration.

Finally, I propose that we find a way to pay for part of the budget of the cash-strapped SEC by imposing a user fee on investment advisers. This is a commonsense proposal that has been supported by investment advisers, investment advocates, former Republican Chairman Spencer Bachus, SEC Chair White, and the State securities regulators.

Despite the fact that the SEC can only examine an adviser on average once a decade, our committee didn't even consider this issue last Congress.

That is an effort, Mr. Speaker and Members, to show that we have attempted to work with the opposite side of the aisle. We have attempted to offer commonsense amendments that have been absolutely rejected without any consideration being given to them.

We find ourselves here on the floor at 9 this evening, attempting to debate a bill that is going nowhere, that has been issued by the President, a veto message. We are here debating again about whether or not we are putting our taxpayers and Main Street and our small businesses at risk, going back to some of the same tactics, some of the same ways that were used by the banks that brought us to the point of a recession, almost a depression.

Somehow in this short period of time, we have forgotten what happened in 2008, we have forgotten about how many businesses were destroyed, small businesses were destroyed, we have forgotten how many elderly folks lost money in their 401(k)'s, we have forgotten how many homes were foreclosed on, we have forgotten about how we brought this country to the brink of a disaster.

And so let me just say that Dodd-Frank is an attempt for reform. And it is not even a tough reform. As a matter of fact, many of us consider it rather mild. But we have on this side of the aisle been fighting day in and day out in our committee to try and just see the implementation of Dodd-Frank rather than the destruction of an attempt to reform an industry that caused great harm to this society.

And so with that, Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Chair, I have come to the floor today to stop Republican efforts to give Wall Street banks a multibillion dollar gift this Christmas.

Under the cover of must-pass legislation, big bank lobbyists are hoping that Congress will allow Wall Street to once again gamble with taxpayer money by reversing a provision that prohibits banks from using taxpayer-insured funds--bank deposits--to engage in risky derivatives trading activity.

In fact, The New York Times reported that Citigroup, a bank that stands to directly benefit to the tune of billions of dollars, authored this provision. Big banks want to use their cheap funds provided by the taxpayer backstop to undercut their competition in a ``heads I win, tails the taxpayer loses'' scenario.

We know why Republicans want it. The spending bill also quietly allows individuals such as the big banks to contribute millions more to their own reelections. This provision must be stopped. Enough is enough.

This puts taxpayers at risk. This puts consumers at risk. This provision directly weakens a provision intended to prevent future bailouts of Wall Street. The Obama administration said this provision could be disruptive and harmful. Former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair said the provision takes reform in the wrong direction.

It is also strongly opposed by consumer, labor, and civil rights groups, and former chairman Barney Frank, who puts the Frank in Dodd- Frank, called it a frightening precedent. So I agree, and I am urging a ``no'' vote.

I just heard the gentleman say this is bipartisan and this is bicameral. It is neither. As a matter of fact, Democrats are not going to join in putting this bill out.

We understand that our constituents, our workers, our people out there, our consumers know that we bailed out the big banks, and they know that we would be putting them at risk one more time to bail them out if we allowed them to do this risky derivatives trading.

Dodd-Frank said you need to push out your trading activities and put them in affiliates or subsidiaries. Don't try and use the people's backstop, FDIC protection, to do this risky trading with.

If you think the American public is going to stand for a bailout of the biggest banks in America one more time, you are wrong. This bill is going nowhere because we have enough people, I believe, that are going to stand up and fight on this issue and other issues in the bill.

As the ranking member of the Financial Services Committee, I am just focusing on this one bad part of the bill because it is so outrageous.

I ask for a ``no'' vote on the rule, I ask for a ``no'' vote on the bill.

Mr. Speaker and Members, we are poised to vote on legislation to fund government. Nobody wants to shut down our government. Everybody here wants to have an answer, and we could have an answer. All the opposite side has to do is to stop supporting a bill that would allow the biggest banks in America to rip off the people one more time.

We bailed out the richest banks in America with the people's money. The people do not want that anymore, and so this provision that is in the bill that would allow them to basically put us all at risk because they want to trade these derivatives and be protected with our FDIC cannot go on.

So there are a lot of things in this bill that are unacceptable. I am the ranking member of the Financial Services Committee and I worked on Dodd-Frank. They are trying to undermine Dodd-Frank. They have been trying to get rid of Dodd-Frank piece by piece. We have to fight it every day.

I am not going to let the people down. Democrats are not going to let the people down. We are not going to vote for anything that is going to give the store to the biggest banks in America one more time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today to shine a light on what has happened in the development of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act. I rise today to talk about the fact that the chairman of our committee, of the Financial Services Committee, did not want, at one point, to reauthorize terrorism risk insurance at all, so he strung out the possibility of negotiations for months.

He had decided that he was not going to reauthorize terrorism insurance, and he will tell you that he offered to negotiate with me. The only thing that I ever remember about a conversation that we had was that my chairman said: I will only negotiate this once--starting out in bad faith.

Time went on, and at some point in time, somebody convinced him that to reauthorize the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program was an honorable thing to do, that it was an American thing to do, that it was an important thing to do. This program had been passed and signed on by the President of the United States after 9/11.

The insurance companies, which insure risk, basically said they cannot model terrorism acts. After 9/11, it was decided that we would mandate that they insure but that we would provide a backstop, that we would provide a backstop to ensure that we could rebuild our communities, that we could rebuild these huge venues--these important places in our lives--in the case of a terrorism attack.

When Mr. Hensarling finally decided that he would negotiate, he ended up in negotiations with Mr. Schumer. Mr. Schumer and the Democrats basically conceded and gave in on a lot of things. We supported, originally, the Senate bill. We thought the Senate bill was a fine bill that reauthorized terrorism risk for 7 years; and, of course, it had in it the backstop after $100 million was spent by the industry, and it basically did everything that we wanted it to have done just as it had started out to do.

Mr. Hensarling came along, and he decided that he wanted to reduce the time of the reauthorization. I don't know what he started out with, but we ended up with 6 years instead of 7 years. We gave in.

I remember that he wanted bifurcation in the bill. He wanted to distinguish between what kind of terrorist attack, how much it was worth, and whether some of it was worse than others. He talked about bifurcating in ways that you would distinguish between radiological, biological, chemical, and others. We negotiated and negotiated, and, finally, we got that out of Mr. Hensarling's mind about bifurcation.

Then the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling) said that we needed to reduce our backstop. And instead of backstopping after $100 million, first he talked about $500 million, secondly he talked about $250 million, and finally we got him down to $200 million. And it is over a 5-year period of time. So we said, okay. We negotiated in good faith. We will go along with the changes. We are willing to concede that you have some different thoughts, and that is okay. Let's come together in a bipartisan way and support the reauthorization of terrorism risk insurance.

I was informed later on that my chairman came back to the table with any number of things that had nothing to do with terrorism risk insurance but had more to do with Dodd-Frank because, unfortunately, my chairman and too many Members on the opposite side of the aisle are intent on dismantling Dodd-Frank in any and every way that they possibly can.

And finally, in those negotiations--the way it has been explained to me--they agreed that they would allow him to add just one aspect of the Dodd-Frank bill that had passed this House, to talk about how agriculture and some other industries could lock in some prices so that they could look forward to what a price would be on those commodities, et cetera, that they would have to purchase.

This had nothing to do with terrorism insurance. So I am not saying to the Members that you shouldn't vote for this bill. What I am pointing out is that this is just another attempt

for the chairman to indicate in every way that he possibly can and take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself to get a little something in about Dodd-Frank.

What I worry about is not so much what he has put into TRIA; I worry about what is going into the omnibus bill. I worry about the fact that, in addition to this, there is an attempt--if it has not already been done--to place into the omnibus bill a repeal of part of Dodd-Frank that would prevent the biggest banks in America from taking advantage of our consumers by using their hard-earned money to do risky derivatives trading, which should be pushed out into their subsidiaries and not have the FDIC in any way protect them in doing this.

So what I say is this. We should know and we should understand exactly how the process works. We should know and understand what is being done and why it is being done. If, in fact, there is so much care and concern about TRIA reauthorization, we should have a clean bill with nothing else in it. If we want to debate Dodd-Frank--what we don't like about it, what we like about it--let's do it straight up. Let's not slip it in at the eleventh hour at a time when our backs are up against the wall, at a time when we are closing down this session. And that is what I am opposed to.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to correct the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. McHenry) who is inviting us to come on over.

We have been inviting them, from day one, to come up with a terrorism risk insurance bill reauthorization. So we have been inviting them to come on over. We have had Members on the opposite side of the aisle who have been pleading with them to come over. We have always had 100 percent support on the Democratic side for the reauthorization of terrorism risk insurance, and the Republicans have basically held us up and only negotiated at the last minute. Don't invite us to come over. They can come on over with us.

I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney).

(Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. David Scott).

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman and Members, a special appreciation to Mr. King who has worked very, very hard on both sides of the aisle to try and make sure that we did not abandon our citizens in this country and leave them at risk in case of a terrorist attack.

As I said before, Mr. Speaker, my chairman held us up for a long time and would not negotiate. He finally came around, but this is typical. He mentioned the flood insurance bill. We never could get him to negotiate on that, and so we had to bypass him to make sure that we didn't put our homeowners at risk. As he mentioned the Ex-Im bill, he has only supported extension of that for a short period of time.

When it comes to helping our citizens and the least of them, it seems as if my chairmen have problems with providing for the average citizen on Main Street, but no problems when we talk about how we can enhance the ability of the biggest banks in America and others to get richer and richer. I thought it would be worthwhile to shed some light on those comments that he made about Ex-Im and about flood and now about

Mr. Chairman, as I said to you when I first got up, I said to you I wanted to shine light on the bill.

And I have done that.

Before I finish my remarks on this bill, I will tell you what my position is.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Velazquez).

(Ms. VELAZQUEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks).

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

I reserve the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman and Members, I am pleased that I had an opportunity to be on the floor today managing this legislation on behalf of my caucus. I am pleased that I was able to shine some light and create some transparency on what has transpired over a long period of time. I am sorry that it had to take this long. I am sorry that my chairman at first refused to support reauthorization. He finally came around and that is good. The negotiations took place and there was a compromise. That compromise is not everything certainly that we would have wanted, but at least it is a compromise that will allow terrorism risk insurance program reauthorization. That is extremely important for all of the reasons that you have heard on the floor here today.

I want to say to my friends on the opposite side of the aisle--some of whom I talked with when it was unclear what the chairman was going to do--I am so pleased that we have been able to relieve your anxiety about what was going to happen. I know that many of you early on were in support of the reauthorization of the terrorism risk insurance program just as it had been framed in the Senate.

So now we are at the point where we have flushed out the fact that this terrorism risk insurance program reauthorization is needed, that businesses and our citizens deserve it, and they should have it. We have also flushed out that adding to this legislation a Dodd-Frank concern was not necessary. It is this kind of interference with the process that oftentimes causes confusion. We would hope that this kind of legislating would not continue.

Let's take up these issues in a way that they are clear, that they can be debated, that we can hear from both sides of the aisle, we can hear the pros and cons, without having to drag it out until the last moment when we feel that you have the opposition up against a wall and they have no choice but to accept whatever you have done because you have a legitimate issue that is before us, even when that issue is attached to something that has nothing to do with that main issue.

Having said that, I am going to move on because we still have work to do as we move toward trying to make sure that we do not shut down this government, that we have the omnibus bill to fund the government and to keep it operating. I am going to move on to deal with the fact that just as this was inserted, the end user provision was inserted in this bill.

In the omnibus bill, we have an even more difficult situation to try and resolve. As a matter of fact, we know that our citizens are at great risk because there is an attempt to repeal an important part of the Dodd-Frank legislation. There is an attempt to make sure that somehow the biggest banks in America have an opportunity to use the taxpayers' dollars to do risky trading and put the taxpayers at risk one more time of having to bail out these institutions that have used the taxpayers' money that was protected by FDIC, have used their money to do this risky trading.

We simply ask in Dodd-Frank for some of these trades, for some of these derivatives trading ideas, not to be placed in such a fashion that they would cause us to have to say to our consumers and our taxpayers, once again, we are going to have to bail out some big bank because they have failed. We need to protect our consumers, we need to protect our taxpayers. All they have to do is push out, push out these derivatives into their subsidies where they don't have the taxpayers' protection.

So I am going to be working on that. I am going to stand here today and say to my chairman, I am going to ask for an ``aye'' vote on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, and I am going to vote for it. Will you work with me to pay attention to the omnibus bill and help me to negotiate tonight to get out of that bill the risky trading that is now being put back in the bill, the same bill that came through our committee, that was written by Citicorp, that would allow this to happen? Will you work with me to try and prevent this from happening and prevent another bailout of the biggest banks in America with taxpayers' dollars? I am going to support TRIA. Will the gentleman support me getting rid of that in the omnibus bill?

I yield to the gentleman from Texas for the answer.

The gentleman knows that he was involved in the negotiation for placing that in the omnibus bill. I have raised a question with you, even though you are saying you had nothing to do with----

Reclaiming my time, I simply asked the gentleman if he would join me in helping, whether he was part of the negotiations or not, as the chair of the Financial Services Committee, where this is one of the biggest issues that we have been confronted with. I know that you care enough about the consumers that you would not want them to have to bail out another AIG, another big bank. I know that you don't want that. I am simply saying that I am going to support the reauthorization of terrorism risk insurance. Will the gentleman support helping to get rid of that risky derivative trading opportunity that has been placed into the omnibus bill by your side of the aisle?

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from California, Congressman John Garamendi, for the time, and I congratulate him for organizing this evening's Special Order Hour on Alzheimer's Disease.

As the Co-Chair of the Congressional Task Force on Alzheimer's Disease, I know how devastating this disease can be on patients, families, and caregivers. The Task Force works on a bipartisan basis to increase awareness of Alzheimer's, strengthen the federal commitment to improving the lives of those affected by the disease, and assist the caregivers who provide their needed support.

Alzheimer's disease in the U.S. is at crisis proportions. As our population ages, the number of persons affected by this brain disorder are expected to triple by 2050. The costs associated with Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia are also growing at an unsustainable rate. A recent RAND study of adults ages 70 and older found that the total economic cost of dementia in 2010 was estimated to be $109 billion for direct care alone. That is higher than the cost of both heart disease and cancer. Furthermore, the economic cost of dementia rises to $159 billion to $215 billion when the cost of informal care is included.

In the U.S., someone develops Alzheimer's every 67 seconds. According to recent data, women have a 1 in 6 estimated lifetime risk of developing the disease at age 65, while the risk for men is nearly 1 in 11. The Alzheimer's Association estimates as many as 16 million Americans over age 65 could suffer from Alzheimer's by 2050. It is now the fifth leading cause of death in my home state of California.

Alzheimer's has a devastating impact upon families. Right now nearly 15 million people, mostly family members, provide unpaid care for individuals with Alzheimer's or dementia, a market value of more than $220.2 billion. In California alone, about 1.5 million unpaid caregivers grapple with the tremendous challenges of Alzheimer's disease or dementia every day. Caregivers include spouses, children, and even grandchildren. As compared to caregivers for other diseases, Alzheimer's caregivers disproportionately report being forced to miss work, reduce work hours, quit their jobs, or change jobs due to caregiving demands. They are more likely to experience financial hardship, report health difficulties, experience emotional stress and suffer from sleep disturbance.

The bipartisan supported National Plan to Address Alzheimer's Disease calls for a cure or an effective treatment for Alzheimer's by 2025. In an effort to meet this goal, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education approved a budget for fiscal year 2015 that calls for an additional $100 million in funding for the National Institute on Aging (NIA) to expand Alzheimer's disease research. NIA, along with other institutes at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are supporting a number of promising Alzheimer's disease research projects, including cutting-edge ``prevention'' trials that are studying whether or not the disease can be prevented or slowed substantially by administering treatments earlier in the disease process.

I am urging the leaders of the House Appropriations Committee to include at least the additional $100 million for the NIA in the final budget package for FY 2015. This modest increase in Alzheimer's research funding will provide vital resources to support meritorious Alzheimer's disease research projects. This action will also demonstrate further resolve in support of our national priority of eradicating this insidious brain disorder.

The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education also included language directing NIH to submit a professional judgment budget for Alzheimer's disease research. As a cosponsor of the Alzheimer's Accountability Act (H.R. 4351), I believe that unfiltered information specifying the resources necessary to meet the goals and objectives laid out in the National Plan would provide Congress with a valuable tool for setting research and service priorities.

I also plan to urge the President to include robust funding for Alzheimer's research and caregiver support services in his fiscal year 2016 budget, which the President will be submitting to Congress early next year. Increased funding for Alzheimer's programs will allow us to meet these challenges head on and enhance our chances of meeting the goals articulated in the National Plan.

As we continue to search for a cure, our nation is at a critical crossroads that requires decisive action to assure the safety and welfare of the millions of Americans with Alzheimer's disease and dementia. Together, let us commit to take every possible action to improve treatments for Alzheimer's patients, support caregivers, and invest in research to find a cure for this disease.

Once again, I thank my colleague from California for organizing tonight's Special Order.

Mr. Speaker, I would first like to thank Congresswoman Moore, as well as Congresswoman Fudge, for their efforts to craft the text of this bill which represents a dramatic improvement from a similar bill that was considered in the Financial Services Committee 18 months ago.

At that time, Commodity Futures Trading Commission--that is, the CFTC--Chairman Gary Gensler warned that providing such a broad interaffiliate exemption from the requirement to clear derivatives could harm its efforts to regulate the market.

Since that time, however, the authors of this legislation have significantly tailored the language, incorporating several technical edits provided by the CFTC, and the measure now only extends the interaffiliate exemption to instances when the commercial risk of an exempt end user is being hedged or mitigated.

Last week, the CFTC provided the same tailored relief that this bill would provide. I submit for the Record the CFTC's no-action letter.

U.S. Commodity Futures

Trading Commission,

Washington, DC, November 26, 2014.

Re No-Action Relief from the Clearing Requirement for Swaps

Entered into by Eligible Treasury Affiliates

The purpose of this letter is to amend the no-action relief

previously granted by the Division of Clearing and Risk

(``Division'') of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

(``Commission'') under No-Action Letter 13-22 to address

certain challenges faced by treasury affiliates in

undertaking hedging activities on behalf of non-financial

affiliates within a corporate group. Those challenges

pertained to certain conditions in the prior relief. The

Division in this letter is altering some of those conditions

to enable additional market participants to avail themselves

of the treasury affiliate relief originally set forth in No

Action Letter 13-22.

Treasury Affiliate Exemption from Clearing

On June 4, 2013, the Division granted no-action relief from

the clearing requirement under section 2(h)(1) of the

Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') and part 50 of the

Commission's regulations, for swaps entered into

by certain affiliates acting on behalf of non-financial

affiliates within a corporate group for the purpose of

hedging or mitigating commercial risk (hereinafter referred

to as ``treasury affiliates'').

No-Action Letter 13-22 was issued based on the Division's

understanding that treasury affiliates were undertaking

hedging activities on behalf of non-financial affiliates that

were eligible to elect the end-user exception from clearing,

but were themselves ineligible to elect the exception. As

discussed further below, because treasury affiliates can act

in a wider capacity as treasury centers that provide

financial services for all or most of the affiliates within a

corporate group, including daily cash management, debt

administration, and risk hedging and mitigation, treasury

affiliates met the definition of ``financial entity'' under

section 2(h)(7)(C)(i)(VIII) of the CEA and thus could not

elect the end-user exception. As a result, the Division

granted treasury affiliates relief to continue entering into

non-cleared swaps on behalf of the non-financial affiliates,

subject to specific conditions and requirements.

The Division has since learned that there are treasury

affiliates precluded from electing the relief in No-Action

Letter 13-22 because they do not meet certain conditions

contained in the letter. As discussed below, based on input

from market participants, the Division is hereby issuing this

letter to amend some of the conditions and requirements

contained in No-Action Letter 13-22 to allow additional

treasury affiliates to rely on the relief from clearing.

Applicable Regulatory Requirements

Under section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA, it is unlawful for any

person to engage in a swap unless that person submits such

swap for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization

(``DCO'') that is registered under the CEA or exempt from

registration if the swap is required to be cleared. On

November 29, 2012, the Commission adopted its first clearing

requirement determination, requiring that swaps meeting

certain specifications within four classes of interest rate

swaps and two classes of credit default swaps be cleared.

Pursuant to section 2(h)(7) of the CEA and Sec. 50.50 of

the Commission's regulations, a counterparty to a swap that

is subject to the clearing requirement may elect the end-user

exception from required clearing provided that such

counterparty is not a financial entity, as defined in section

2(h)(7)(C) of the CEA, and otherwise meets the requirements

of Sec. 50.50 of the Commission's regulations. Thus, the end-

user exception from required clearing may be elected for

swaps that are entered into between two non-financial

entities, or between a non-financial entity and a financial

entity, for swaps that hedge or mitigate commercial risk.

As noted above, the Division granted relief from required

clearing for treasury affiliates of non-financial companies

that fall within the definition of ``financial entity'' under

section 2(h)(7)(C)(i)(VIII) of the CEA when acting on behalf

of affiliates that otherwise would be eligible to elect the

end-user exception from required clearing.''As such, No-

Action Letter 13-22 effectively allowed treasury affiliates,

subject to certain additional requirements and conditions, to

take advantage of the end-user exception from clearing that

its non-financial affiliates in the corporate group would

otherwise have been eligible to elect had they entered into

the transactions directly.

Summary of Relief

Since the Division issued No-Action Letter 13-22, market

participants have highlighted several requirements and

conditions that make use of the relief granted thereunder

impractical for many treasury affiliates. As discussed below,

the Division is therefore amending the following requirements

and conditions.

i. The requirement that the ultimate parent of a treasury

affiliate identify all wholly- and majority-owned affiliates

and ensure a majority qualify for the end-user exception.

Market participants have expressed concerns about the

second condition for eligible treasury affiliate status in

No-Action Letter 13-22. The second condition requires that

the ultimate parent of a treasury affiliate identify all

wholly- and majority-owned affiliates within the corporate

group and ensure that a majority qualify for the end-user

exception.

Market participants have noted the ratio of the absolute

number of financial entities to nonfinancial entities does

not necessarily provide meaning-fill information about the

corporate family as a whole, and adds on-going surveillance

responsibilities and expenses for the corporate family. The

Division agrees and has removed the requirement accordingly

in the revised relief set forth herein.

ii. The requirement that the treasury affiliate is not

itself or is not affiliated with a systemically important

nonbank financial company.

Market participants have also expressed concerns about the

fourth condition for eligible treasury affiliate status in

No-Action Letter 13-22. The fourth condition prohibits the

treasury affiliate from being, or being affiliated with, a

nonbank financial company that has been designated as

systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight

Council. As explained above, section 2(h)(7)(D) of the CEA

permits affiliates acting as an agent and on behalf of

entities eligible for the end-user exception to elect the

end-user exception themselves, unless the affiliate is one of

seven enumerated types of entities listed in section

2(h)(7)(D)(ii). Among others, these prohibited entities

include swap dealers, commodity pools, and bank holding

companies with over $50 billion in consolidated assets.

Market participants have pointed out that the fourth

condition for eligible treasury affiliate status provides a

list of entities that generally tracks the list in section

2(h)(7)(D)(ii), except for the addition of systemically

important nonbank financial companies. The Division believes

that additional restrictions relating to systemically

important nonbank financial companies are appropriate. As a

result, the Division is maintaining the requirement that the

treasury affiliate itself cannot be a systemically important

nonbank financial company. However, the Division

also recognizes that certain corporate families with

significant non-financial operations are precluded from

using the existing relief because of the affiliation with

a systemically important nonbank financial company,

regardless of the degree to which the operations of the

financial and non-financial entities are conducted

separately.

The Division believes restricting the treasury affiliate

from (i) entering into transactions with, or on behalf of, a

systemically important nonbank financial company and (ii)

providing any services, financial or otherwise, to such a

designated entity, provides sufficient protection from the

risks of systemically important affiliate, while allowing the

treasury affiliate to provide the necessary support to its

related operating entities. The Division is amending the

conditions relating to systemically important nonbank

financial companies accordingly.

iii. The requirement that treasury affiliates act only on

behalf of certain types of related affiliates.

Market participants have indicated that the definition of

``related affiliates'' under No-Action Letter 13-22

unnecessarily excludes certain entities that perform a cash

pooling function for a corporate family that includes a

financial entity. The definition of related affiliate

currently includes either: (i) a non-financial entity that

is, or is directly or indirectly wholly- or majority-owned

by, the ultimate parent; or (ii) a person that is another

eligible treasury affiliate for an entity described in (i).

Market participants claim that the limitation is

unnecessary, highlighting that the third General Condition to

the Swap Activity already precludes an eligible treasury

affiliate from entering into swaps with, and on behalf of,

its financial affiliates. The Division agrees the definition

is problematic because the collection and disbursement of

cash within the corporate family is a core function of a

treasury affiliate. Given the existing restrictions on swap

activity by the eligible treasury affiliate with or on behalf

of a financial affiliate, the Division has amended the

related affiliate definition to allow entities that provide

financial services on behalf of a financial entity to

nonetheless qualify as an eligible treasury affiliate.

iv. The requirement that treasury affiliates transfer the

risk of related affiliates through the use of swaps.

Market participants have expressed concern with the first

General Condition to Swap Activity in No-Action Letter 13-22.

The condition requires the eligible treasury affiliate enter

into the exempted swap for the sole purpose of hedging or

mitigating the commercial risk of one or more related

affiliates that was transferred to the eligible treasury

affiliate by operation of one or more swaps with such related

affiliates.

According to market participants, there are a number of

ways for commercial risk to be transferred between

affiliates, and that the risk that a treasury affiliate may

have been seeking to hedge or mitigate would not necessarily

be transferred from the operating affiliate to the treasury

affiliate by way of a swap transaction as required by No-

Action Letter 13-22. The method by which the risk is

transferred can be dependent on the type of risk being

hedged. For example, it may be more common for foreign

exchange risk to be transferred between affiliates through

the use of book-entry transfers, as opposed to interest rate

risk, where the use of back-to-back swaps may be more

prevalent. The Division agrees that this limitation is

unnecessarily strict and is revising the condition

accordingly. However, as the transfer of risk from the

related affiliate to the treasury affiliate will no longer be

evinced by back-to-back swaps, the Division will require that

the treasury affiliate be able to identify the related

affiliate or affiliates on whose behalf the swap was entered

into by the treasury affiliate.

v. The requirement that treasury affiliates do not enter

into swaps other than for hedging or mitigating the

commercial risk of one or more related affiliates.

Market participants have questioned whether an eligible

treasury affiliate would lose its status if the entity

entered into hedging transactions that were mitigating a

commercial risk of the treasury affiliate itself. The second

General Condition to the Swap Activity states that the

eligible treasury affiliate cannot enter into swaps with

related affiliates or unaffiliated counterparties other than

for the purposes of hedging or mitigating the commercial risk

of one or more related affiliates.

The Division agrees that a treasury affiliate should not

lose its status as an eligible treasury affiliate simply

because it entered into a hedging transaction on its own

behalf.

The Division is therefore amending the language in the second

condition to allow an eligible treasury affiliate to enter

into its own hedging transactions. However, the Division

notes that such transactions entered into by the eligible

treasury affiliate on its own behalf would not be ``exempted

swaps'' as defined below, and may be required to be cleared

if subject to the Commission's clearing requirement and no

other exception or exemption to clearing applied. Further,

the Division notes that treasury affiliates entering into any

speculative transaction, on its own behalf or otherwise,

would not be consistent with this condition.

vi. The requirement that related affiliates entering into

swaps with the treasury affiliate, or the treasury affiliate

itself, may not enter into swaps with or on behalf of any

affiliate that is a financial entity.

Market participants have expressed confusion as to whether

a related affiliate can enter into transactions with multiple

eligible treasury affiliates under the third General

Condition to the Swap Activity in No-Action Letter 13-22. The

third condition states that neither any related affiliate

that enters into swaps with the eligible treasury affiliate

nor the eligible treasury affiliate, may enter into swaps

with or on behalf of any affiliate that is a financial entity

(a ``financial affiliate''), or otherwise assumes, nets,

combines, or consolidates the risk of swaps entered into by

any financial affiliate.

After conversations with CFTC Chairman Massad and following this action by the regulator, I felt comfortable having H.R. 5471 be considered under a suspension of the House rules.

Now, I have heard from several companies that, while the CFTC's actions are welcome, they still need the legal certainty that only H.R. 5471 could provide.

On the other side, of course, I have heard concerns that if we pass this bill we may be binding the CFTC's hands to deal with a problem that could arise in the future.

I believe that people on both sides of this issue are working in good faith and want to help rebuild our economy. Again, I applaud Congresswoman Moore's efforts to improve this bill.

Mr. Speaker, this bill will provide an important and long overdue reauthorization of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act, or NAHASDA.

Through NAHASDA, the Federal Government provides housing assistance to Native Americans and Native Hawaiians, two groups that not only experience some of the poorest housing conditions in the Nation, but also face unique barriers to housing due to the legal status of tribal lands.

Through block grants and loan guarantees, NAHASDA ensures Federal assistance is tailored to address their needs while respecting their right to self-determination. I am encouraged that my Republican colleagues have finally agreed to include a provision to reauthorize Native Hawaiian programs.

As a supporter of the reauthorization of NAHASDA, I did not object to the bill before us today moving forward under suspension; however, this is one of those times, while you understand very well why reauthorization is necessary, I must go on record to continue to support a fight and a struggle that I have been involved in with some of my colleagues for many years.

The bill will do nothing to protect the Cherokee Freedmen-- descendants of former African American slaves of the Cherokee--who are facing possible expulsion by the Cherokee Nation.

The ancestors of the Freedmen marched with the Cherokee on the Trail of Tears; yet, today, their tragic history continues as the Freedmen face ongoing discrimination from the tribe that they call their own.

For the past several years, under the leadership of former Members, including former Congresswoman Carolyn Kilpatrick and former Congressman Mel Watt, the Congressional Black Caucus has stood up for the rights of the Cherokee Freedmen.

I attempted to deal with this issue by way of an amendment, but the Republicans again refused to offer protections for the Cherokee Freedmen in this legislation. During the committee markup, my amendment was rejected, which would have made NAHASDA funding to the Cherokee contingent on full recognition of the Freedmen as citizens of the Cherokee Nation. It causes me great pain to not be able to support the continued silence on this issue.

Furthermore, there is one other issue that I have to be concerned about. This bill would seriously undercut the central goal of providing affordable housing for low-income Native Americans. It would waive a low-standing tenet of affordable housing known as the ``Brooke rule,'' which states that the maximum rent paid by assisted households must be no more than 30 percent of their income. I have to be concerned about this because this is a rule that is throughout HUD. I do not wish to be part of opening up that door and then having to face that later on as we deal with public housing and assisted housing. This bill strips away this basic safeguard, making low-income Native Americans vulnerable to unlimited increases in rent without any kind of hardship exemptions in place.

Lastly, this bill includes a new demonstration program that moves toward increased privatization and deregulation of tribal housing activities. I remain very concerned that this program could have negative impacts on low-income Native American households in participating tribes.

I would like to sincerely thank Ms. Moore, Mr. Heck, and Mr. Kildee for their efforts to reach a bipartisan agreement on this bill. I would like to thank Ms. Hanabusa and Ms. Gabbard for the work that they are doing. I won't support the reauthorization in its current form for all the reasons I have stated, but I thank all of those who have worked so hard to try and deal with the need for assistance for both the Hawaiians and the Native Americans in housing.