Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chair, this amendment's language is so wrong that it was resoundingly rejected in the Armed Services Committee by a voice vote. It is very basic and easy to understand as to why it was…
Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chair, this amendment's language is so wrong that it was resoundingly rejected in the Armed Services Committee by a voice vote. It is very basic and easy to understand as to why it was rejected.
This missile, and it relates to a missile upon which there is a nuclear warhead, was put on the ground in 1973. Richard Nixon was President of the United States. The year before these were put in the ground, in December of that year, was the last time we were on the Moon, in 1972. This was just at the end of the Apollo program. This is technology that is incredibly outdated.
If you think about the Apollo program and the Moon launch, you think, well, the next technology is the space shuttle. That launched in 1981, almost a decade after these were put in the ground. Even the space shuttle is retired, yet he wants to resurrect these.
This is as ridiculous as saying, ``We are going to go to the Moon again. Let's go to the museum and pull out the Apollo mooncrafts. Let's just jigger them up again and put them up into space.''
It is not going to work. This is absolutely irresponsible, but it is not really about just trying to extend this life, because this has been studied before. This would be a study of a restudy of a restudy of a restudy.
In addition, this is not only a study. This delays the program.
Everyone wonders why nuclear weapons cost so much. They cost so much because we delay and delay and delay. This will be another one of those that would just continue the prospects of our having a decaying of our nuclear deterrent and, in addition to that, increased costs as a result of increased delay.
I know Mr. Blumenauer has been a very strong advocate against nuclear weapons. I understand his interest in trying to prohibit and thwart our efforts to modernize nuclear weapons, but if you look at what our adversaries are doing, what China is doing, what Russia is doing, it is absolutely irresponsible to say that a Richard Nixon-era missile that is in the ground, that has been there since we were last on the Moon, should just be refurbished and put back in the ground and expect that we are going to be safe.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, we should turn to the experts when we talk about how long this can be extended. This amendment would try to take this Richard Nixon-era missile to 2050. General Hyten, who is the person who is charged with having expertise with this, came before us March 28, 2019. This year, he said all studies have been done. This cannot be extended.
The only reason this amendment is here is to try to delay doing what we need to do and what the experts say, which is not refurbish this missile but move forward with replacement.
Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Bishop).
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, we are blazing along on the timeline of nuclear weapons and missile development where we had a missile that was last placed in the ground in 1973 during Richard Nixon's second term, after he was elected to a second term. We now have a 1980 Jimmy Carter- era warhead.
The analogy of the B-52 doesn't apply to this technology. The B-52 is a plane that has been in continuous flight. We are not talking about a plane that has been put in a hangar since Jimmy Carter. These are items that we don't use.
Nuclear weapons are there as a deterrent to deter our adversaries. The only way we can deter our adversaries is to have them believe that any aggression against us would be matched with such overwhelming force that it would be at their great risk.
To the extent that we allow our nuclear deterrent to degrade, which we have with Nixon-era missiles and Carter-era weapons, we lessen our overall security. Now, this is--again, it sounds like just a study. It is not really a study. It is a study of a study of a restudy of a restudy. This has been studied so much, in fact, it is on a bipartisan basis that this W-84 warhead needs to be refurbished, needs to be redone.
Even the Obama administration had an analysis of all alternatives and concluded that the air-launched cruise missile and its warhead could not be sustained and had already experienced reduced survivability. Even the Obama administration said, Don't do this. They said, Move forward.
Now, once again, this is not about a study. This is about stopping the ongoing efforts of a program. This is about holding moneys back so that we don't modernize our nuclear weapons. Again, China is moving forward; Russia is moving forward. But here we are, on the floor of Congress, trying to stop our ability to match and meet those who might wish to do us harm.
This amendment needs to be defeated. This is an ancient 1980s Carter- era warhead. Even the Obama administration agrees it needs to be replaced. We should not jeopardize its funding. Every time we do this, every time we stop and say, Let's study this, our costs go up and our risks go higher and our security gets lower.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. Chairman, I understand that there are people who don't like nuclear weapons. I don't like nuclear weapons either, but I don't like nuclear weapons in the hands of other people. And, yes, there are those who say that we are in the middle of an arms race. But the reality is that we are sitting this one out. We are not in the arms race.
When we are debating on the House floor about a warhead from the Carter-era and a missile from the Nixon-era and we can't even talk about moving forward on funding, there is no race here. We are sitting this out. But our adversaries are racing, and I am concerned about what they are doing. That is why this is important that this be defeated.
But another aspect of this that is incredibly important is that this calls for an independent study. Independent: That is saying they don't trust the study that happened before. The study that happened before was the Obama administration. I think their answer was correct: We need to not study this and we need to move forward.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, this is very basic. You cannot have a treaty with yourself. You must have a treaty with someone else. If that other person steps out of the treaty, you no longer have a treaty.
Russia stepped out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The North Atlantic Council all came together and confirmed it. At the last NATO summit, every one of our allies confirmed it. The treaty is dead.
To have a treaty, now, where the other side has stepped out and it is only us that is left and say, by statute, we are going to shackle ourselves so that we are going to stay there has no reflection on reality.
Their violating the treaties aren't minor violations of the treaty. They have developed, tested, and deployed a weapon that violates the treaty. That means that they are once again deploying nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons for which we don't have a response.
Our response doesn't necessarily have to be go field one. We can continue diplomacy. But legislation is not diplomacy. By legislation, we are going to say that the United States shall forever, as long as the legislation stays in, be tied to a treaty that the person on the other side already left and deployed missiles that are pointed at our assets, our military people, our men and women in uniform, and our allies. This is folly.
Now, the Missile Defense Agency, by the way, issued a statement that says this affects our cooperation with Israel and our interceptor research with them.
Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
Madam Chair, this is an amendment that would strike section 1646 of the bill and replace it with a determination by the Secretary of Defense as to a certification of need.
Madam Chair, this provision is a unilateral nuclear disarmament provision.
Now, the chairman has said repeatedly this is not a unilateral nuclear disarmament, but let's break down those words.
It is unilateral because it only applies to us. There is no one else. It is nuclear because it applies to a nuclear weapon. And it is disarmament because it requires the pulling of a nuclear weapon that is scheduled for deployment.
What we currently have in this bill is a requirement that the W76-2, which is a low-yield nuclear weapon that is currently headed for our submarines, be pulled and not be deployed, a weapon that our Department of Defense has determined that we needed and, in fact, last year, on a bipartisan basis, was funded and approved for deployment.
But now we are going to reverse course because now Congress is going to decide, for unilateral nuclear disarmament, to reach out and start pulling back nuclear weapons that are there to defend us.
Let's talk just for a moment as to why we need this.
Russia has adopted a new nuclear doctrine that is called escalate to deescalate. They actually believe that the first use of nuclear weapons is something that can deescalate a fight as opposed to escalate it. They have deployed low-yield nuclear weapons, and they have even practiced scenarios where they use low-yield believing that, because we have, usually, larger yield, bigger weapons, that we would be less likely to respond.
In fact, the BBC did a documentary where they began a scenario of an attack by Russia against the United States where it is a low-yield nuke against one of our aircraft carriers, and the assumption being we wouldn't answer back with a very large nuke.
The problem here that we have is that this is a step to reduce our nuclear arsenal which is there for one reason and one reason only, and that is to deter our adversaries so that they never think of using nuclear weapons.
This provision would take this unilateral nuclear disarmament out. It would put back in the bill a provision that requires the Secretary of State to determine that it is needed, and we would instead look to their determination, not the random determination of Congress.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, this is unilateral nuclear disarmament because we get nothing from the other side. I mean, if you are against this nuclear weapon, put a provision in this bill that says I strongly encourage the United States to negotiate with Russia that we both get rid of these nuclear weapons.
I don't like nuclear weapons. I am just more concerned about the ones that are in the hands of the other guys than the ones that are in our hands.
Now, what is weird about this is that the determination by the chairman that we need to pull this weapon back after, again, bipartisan support for this weapon being deployed; is it because this weapon is dangerous? No.
Is it because our adversaries have it? Well, adversaries do have it.
Do we have it in other forms? Yes.
But yet, instead of those who are charged with our military policy deciding it, they want to decide it.
Now, again, this should be decided by treaty. We should require that the other side get rid of theirs if we are going to get rid of ours.
But the other aspect is, this is not just musings about Russia saying escalate to de-escalate. That is their nuclear weapons policy, and we have to be very concerned as to how that policy affects their calculus.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, how much time remains?
I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The provision that this amendment seeks to modify in the bill is a provision that Vladimir Putin would love. I can't imagine what it must be like when, in Moscow, they begin to tell Vladimir Putin that the United States Congress is looking to pass a law to limit our nuclear weapons arsenal; that we are going to look to pass a law to actually remove weapons that are scheduled for deployment; to remove weapons that Russia has; to remove weapons that are intended to change Russia's calculus, so that when they look to threaten our country, they know that we have the ability to respond to both proportionately.
And it is not a new weapon. There are other forms of low-yield nuclear weapons that we have. It is just this one that is being objected to.
By the way, the money has been spent. This weapon is on its way. This is not a destabilizing weapon. This is a weapon that keeps us safe.
Now, the concern with this, of course, once we begin unilateral nuclear disarmament--it is unilateral because we get nothing for it. Our other side is doing nothing. Nuclear because it is a weapon; disarmament because we are taking an armament out--is then when do we stop?
If Congress decides to do this, that we have the ability to just start pulling weapons, then is the nuclear triad at risk, Madam Chair?
Do we go pull our ICBMs?
Do we say that we shouldn't have this weapon or that weapon?
Shouldn't we be looking to those who actually have the expertise in understanding what our adversaries are doing; what our strategy is; what our nuclear weapons capabilities are and our adversaries' nuclear weapons capabilities; how those compare; what their procedures have been, and how they have been deploying?
All those should figure in to the expertise, not random decisions to pull nuclear weapons here on the Congressional floor.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.