Madam Speaker, the following 1984 speech by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger provides an important perspective on the use of military force in Iraq. The Uses of Military Power'' (By Caspar W. Weinberger) Thank you for inviting…
Madam Speaker, the following 1984 speech by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger provides an important perspective on the use of military force in Iraq.
The Uses of Military Power''
(By Caspar W. Weinberger)
Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the members
of the National Press Club, a group most important to our
national security. I say that because a major point I intend
to make in my remarks today is that the single most critical
element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of
support and agreement for our basic purposes. Policies formed
without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will
never work. And you help to build that understanding among
our citizens.
Of all the many policies our citizens deserve and need to
understand, none is so important as those related to our
topic today the uses of military power. Deterrence will work
only if the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping
the peace, . . . and only from a well-informed public can we
expect to have that national will and commitment.
So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps the most
important question concerning keeping the peace. Under what
circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such
as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military
force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out
our national policy?
National power has many components, some tangible, like
economic wealth, technical pre-eminence. Other components are
intangible such as moral force, or strong national will.
Military forces, when they are
strong and ready and modern, are a credible and tangible
addition to a nation's power. When both the intangible
national will and those forces are forged into one
instrument, national power becomes effective.
In today's world, the line between peace and war is less
clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George
Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new
democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then lay 2-
3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was
protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear
age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of
the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid
conflict, while maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has
always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war
comes. Yet, so blurred have the lines become between open
conflict and half-hidden hostile acts that we cannot
confidently predict where, or when, or how, or from what
direction aggression may arrive. We must be prepared, at any
moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated
terrorist acts, to guerrilla action, to full-scale military
confrontation.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, said
that it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent
and variety of the means, which may be necessary to satisfy
them. If it was true then, how much more true it is today,
when we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such
serious indirect challenges to the peace as proxy wars and
individual terrorist action. And how much more important is
it now, considering the consequences of failing to deter
conflict at the lowest level possible. While the use of
military force to defend territory has never been questioned
when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival
threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral
aggressive use of force to invade, conquer or subjugate other
nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable
remains unresolved for the host of other situations which
fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive use
of force.
We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern
paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace--the gray
area conflicts--are precisely the most difficult challenges
to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and
nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response must
be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force
is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to
apply the resources needed.
Because we face a spectrum of threats from covert
aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation,
to use of brute force, choosing the appropriate level of our
response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just
any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ
some degree of force has been made, and the purpose
clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to
carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the
purpose has been achieved. That, too, has been difficult to
accomplish.
The issue of which branch of government has authority to
define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now
being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress
demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making
of foreign policy and in the decision-making process for the
employment of military forces abroad than had been thought
appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality
of decision-making authority in the Executive branch has been
compromised by the Legislative branch to an extent that
actively interferes with that process. At the same time,
there has not been a corresponding acceptance of
responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions
concerning the employment of military forces.
Yet the outcome of decisions on whether and when and to
what degree to use combat forces abroad has never been more
important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or
settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as
a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of
such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to
ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of
possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to
global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict
in its early stages, to contain and control it but to do that
our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner, and
be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged,
because many of those difficult decisions must be made
extremely quickly.
Some on the national scene think they can always avoid
making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of
whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid
grappling with a complex issue because, despite clever
rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact
advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While
they may maintain in principle that military force has a role
in foreign policy, they are never willing to name the
circumstance or the place where it would apply.
On the other side, some theorists argue that military force
can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these
proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in
limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are
American forces of any size present they will somehow solve
the problem.
Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or
satisfactory solutions. The first undue reserve would lead us
ultimately to withdraw from international events that require
free nations to defend their interests from the aggressive
use of force. We would be abdicating our responsibilities as
the leader of the free world responsibilities more or less
thrust upon us in the aftermath of World War II war
incidentally that isolationism did nothing to deter. These
are responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the
Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked
throughout the world. In an international system based on
mutual interdependence among nations, and alliances
between friends, stark isolationism quickly would lead to
a far more dangerous situation for the United States: we
would be without allies and faced by many hostile or
indifferent nations.
The second alternative employing our forces almost
indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our
diplomatic efforts would surely plunge us headlong into the
sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam
war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed
our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric
of our society, endangering the single most critical element
of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and
agreement for our basic purposes.
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we
hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops,
who would have an understandable opposition to being used in
every sense of the word casually and without intent to
support them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their
morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must win.
And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership,
recruitment would fall off and I fear an end to the all-
volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a
draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so
wracked the country in the '60s.
We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform
throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working
spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have
fought so hard to regain?
In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's
military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have
entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war
are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less
clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our
enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the
principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.
Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free
nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars,
involving every aspect of our society. All our means of
production, all our resources were devoted to winning. Our
policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of
our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the
unconditional surrender of our enemies. . . . The only
acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our
freedom.
But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we
encountered a more subtle form of warfare warfare in which,
more often than not, the face of the enemy was masked.
Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by
proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from
afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of ``national
liberation,'' but far more frequently ideology or religion
provided the spark to the tinder.
Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open
society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use
alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt
our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow
such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit
ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda
campaigns to achieve their ends.
They realize that if they can divide our national will at
home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad.
So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to
intimidate western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to
adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile
they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in
their countries, because public opinion there is simply
prohibited and does not exist.
Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity.
It is true that until democratic nations have the support of
the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a
conflict. But when they do have that support they cannot be
defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling
message to friend and foe alike by the vote of their
citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by
re-electing a strong Chief Executive. They know that
President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for
his actions and is able to lead us through these complex
times by insisting that we regain both our military and our
economic strength.
In today's world where minutes count, such decisive
leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of
whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill defined, we
must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and
conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of
the United States and our allies. . . . And then responding
appropriately.
Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on
our territory, and our
response may not necessarily require the immediate or direct
defense of our homeland. But when our vital national
interests and those of our allies are at stake, we cannot
ignore our safety, or forsake our allies.
At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot
assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have
learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and
blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our
responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and
should offer substantial amounts of economic and military
assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them
maintain forces to deter attacks against them usually we
cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.
We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a
matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume
for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend
their territory without their strong invitation when our
freedom is not threatened.
On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the
United States has seen the need to join forces with other
nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with
negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus
enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities
safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict
for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years both
to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping
mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for
combat they were armed only for their self-defense. Their
mission required them to be and to be recognized as
peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they
were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring
nations, their peacekeeping mission could not be realized,
then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the
number and arms of our troops in short to equip them for
combat, . . . or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when we
faced just such a choice, because the warring nations did not
enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the President
properly withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping.
In those cases where our national interests require us to
commit combat force we must never let there be doubt of our
resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be
committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient
numbers and we must support them, as effectively and
resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops
to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning.
Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital
interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national
resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win
the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just
that.
Just as clearly, there are other situations where United
States combat forces should not be used. I believe the
postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I
have developed six major tests to be applied when we are
weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me now
share them with you:
First, the United States should not commit forces to combat
overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is
deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
That emphatically does not mean that we should declare
beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular
area is outside our strategic perimeter.
Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops
into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and
with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to
commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our
objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if
the particular situation requires only limited force to win
our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces
sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and
remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then could
perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.
Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas,
we should have clearly defined political and military
objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can
accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should
have and send the forces needed to do just that. As
Clausewitz wrote, ``no one starts a war or rather, no one in
his senses ought to do so without first being clear in his
mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he
intends to conduct it.''
War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but
the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent
strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat
mission has become necessary for our vital national
interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job and
not assign a combat mission to a force configured for
peacekeeping.
Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the
forces we have committed their size, composition and
disposition must be continually reassessed and adjusted if
necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during
the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must
our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a
beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this
conflict in our national interest?'' ``Does our national
interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?'' If the
answers are ``yes,'' then we must win. If the answers are
``no,'' then we should not be in combat.
Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there
must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of
the American people and their elected representatives in
Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are
candid in making clear the threats we face; the support
cannot be sustained without continuing and close
consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at
home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in
the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win,
but just to be there.
Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be
a last resort.
I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding
whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the
months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost
in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to
combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of
our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must
have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and
understood and supported by the widest possible number of our
citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival
as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our
responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted
enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to
apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that
may be required later. We must never forget those
isolationists in Europe who shrugged that ``Danzig is not
worth a war,'' and ``why should we fight to keep the
Rhineland demilitarized?''
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased
negatively for a purpose they are intended to sound a note of
caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to
combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk
their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not
only prudent, it is morally required.
In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude
that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should
interpret what I am saying here today as an abdication of
America's responsibilities either to its own citizens or to
its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal
that this country, or this Administration, is unwilling to
commit forces to combat overseas.
We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital
interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready
to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those
interests. Let no one entertain any illusions if our vital
interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are
resolved that if we must fight, we must win.
So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have
learned from the past, they also can and should be applied to
the future. For example, the problems confronting us in
Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more
extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this
hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize.
If this happens we will clearly need more economic and
military assistance and training to help those who want
democracy.
The President will not allow our military forces to creep
or be drawn gradually into a combat role in Central America
or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is
designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement.
This means we will need sustained Congressional support to
back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today can,
if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist
incremental approach, which almost always means the use of
insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being
drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where it is not
vital to our national interest to fight.
But policies and principles such as these require decisive
leadership in both the Executive and Legislative branches of
government and they also require strong and sustained public
support. Most of all, these policies require national unity
of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the
policies and leadership to gain that public support and
unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the
strength of character to protect peace with freedom.
In summary, we should all remember these are the policies
indeed the only policies that can preserve for ourselves, our
friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.
I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and
other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs
around the world. We can enable our friends in Central
America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to
nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed
by the unfolding complexity of the 1980s.
We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this
century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured by
firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will
enable all of us ourselves at home, and our friends abroad to
achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and materially,
far higher than man has even dared to dream.