Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for your important leadership on this committee and to the ranking member. It's been a pleasure for me to work cooperatively in a bipartisan way. I rise in strong support of the conference…
Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman for your important leadership on this committee and to the ranking member. It's been a pleasure for me to work cooperatively in a bipartisan way.
I rise in strong support of the conference report which will make us safer by increasing the amount of risk-based homeland security grants, screening 100 percent of maritime and aviation cargo and improving intelligence collection and information-sharing capabilities.
I would also like to highlight the title on interoperability grants which completes the three-pronged interoperability proposal I put forward following September 11.
The dedicated grant program will significantly enhance the ability of public safety agencies to plan, build, and maintain communications networks as they will no longer have to make impossible decisions such as whether to purchase personal protective equipment or radios. It will ensure that first responders will have more advance resources than those used by Paul Revere.
This bill is a great victory for first responders.
I rise in strong support of the conference report, which implements many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, actions that should have been taken years ago.
As a member of the Homeland Security Committee and the conference committee that resolved differences with the Senate, I know that many of us put a great deal of work into creating this legislation. I would like to thank Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King for their tireless work. I would also like to thank our leadership for making this the House's top priority.
I would like to briefly outline a few of the many reasons why this bill makes our country safer. First, it mandates 100 percent scanning of all maritime cargo before it enters the U.S. The current system of scanning only some cargo when it has already entered the U.S. is inadequate. AI Qaeda and other terrorist organizations must be prevented from using a maritime cargo container to conceal a nuclear weapon.
Many have stringently opposed this provision and have stated that they will not support the conference report because of the perceived impact on business. I would respond to this argument by stating the job of Congress is to protect the American people, not stand in the way of commonsense security measures to make it easier for the business community to ship containers. The cost to scan each container is minimal compared to the cost of value of goods shipped in each container. And the cost is nothing compared to the consequence of what would happen if terrorists were able to detonate a nuclear weapon in the U.S.
Second, the bill greatly enhances aviation security efforts. Today, a great deal of cargo is placed on commercial aircraft without being screened. The bill closes this security loophole. It also authorizes $450 million per year for in-line explosive detection systems and provides a process for passengers who have been misidentified and placed on the ``no-fly'' or ``selectee'' lists to clear their names.
Third, it augments intelligence collection and information sharing. The bill properly organizes intelligence gathering agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, to enable them to better communicate potential threats with local first responders. One of the best ways to prevent an attack is to increase our intelligence gathering capabilities. This bill will help to provide assistance to State and local fusion centers and counter-terrorism officials. The excellent work of the New York Police Department's counter-terrorism division to detect and prevent potential terrorist plots exemplifies what can be accomplished by local law enforcement agencies.
Fourth, the bill advances our efforts to identify and protect critical infrastructure, one of the fundamental purposes of the Department of Homeland Security. The conference report includes provisions I proposed to review and update the National Asset Database and the subset National At-Risk Database. It also requires the Department to conduct annual critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments.
These are only four of the many examples of how the bill makes our country more secure. I would like to detail two particular provisions which have been two of my highest priorities since the September 11 attacks--interoperability grants and the first responder funding formula for homeland security grants.
Title III of the conference report completes the three-pronged interoperability proposal I first put forward following September 11. The Department of Homeland Security now has an office that coordinates first responder emergency communications efforts. It is in the process of implementing a national communications strategy, and this bill creates an interoperability grant program.
Communications problems have plagued first responders in every major emergency in the last 15 years. We witnessed this 12 years ago in Oklahoma City. It resurfaced at Columbine in 1999. It slowed our response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. On September 11, it proved to be a deadly problem.
Of the 58 firefighters who escaped the North Tower of the World Trade Center and gave oral histories to the Fire Department of New York, only three heard radio warnings that the North Tower was in danger of collapse. We will never know how many of the 343 firefighters who died that day while heroically rescuing thousands of workers were in the North Tower. Nor will we know how many of these lives would have been spared if they had had effective, interoperable communications equipment to receive the evacuation order.
The provisions in the emergency communications grant title are long overdue. More than 10 years ago, the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee stated that, ``unless immediate measures are taken to promote interoperability, public safety agencies will not be able to adequately discharge their obligation to protect life and property in a safe, efficient, and cost effective manner.''
The 9/11 Commission included interoperability as one of its recommendations and the Public Discourse Project found that the Federal Government had made minimal progress on this priority. This legislation finally responds to the widely acknowledged vulnerabilities posed by poor communications capabilities.
A dedicated grant program, which I first proposed following September 11, will significantly enhance the ability of public safety agencies to plan, build, and maintain communications networks as they will no longer have to make impossible decisions such as whether to purchase personal protective equipment or radios.
This bill will not solve all of our interoperability problems. However, it will help to ensure that in the next emergency, our first responders are not left to the same strategies used by Paul Revere in 1775, which was sadly the case during Katrina just 2 years ago. This is a great victory for first responders.
A second item which I have been fighting for years to improve is the first responder funding formula. Title I of the conference report increases the percentage of DHS grants that are allocated on the basis of risk. For far too long the Department has awarded 40 percent of formula grants to State governments without any consideration of risk. The conference report will eventually lower this amount to 18.52 percent in 5 years.
On four occasions, the House passed legislation to increase the amount of risk-based
funding, including an amendment that I added to the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization bill. The compromise we are considering today, while far from perfect, is the product of several years of negotiations between the two chambers. Even with the conference report, I will continue my efforts to improve the manner in which grants are awarded.
As the old saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. After September 11, we experienced the cost of not being adequately prepared--the loss of almost 3,000 lives and tremendous economic impact. We must distribute homeland security funding on the basis of risk now so that areas most at risk have the resources to prevent and effectively respond to any potential attacks.
Attacks against New York, Madrid, London, and Mumbai illustrate that terrorists target the areas in which they can inflict the most damage. The Federal Government's efforts to prepare and respond to terrorism should reflect this reality. In addition, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to allocate resources to the areas most vulnerable to any type of emergency situation. We cannot afford to use homeland security funding as a type of revenue sharing.
This was one of the most prevalent recommendations from the 9/11 Commission. In 2005, the Commission gave the Federal Government an ``F'' for failing to allocate funding where it is needed. Had the provisions in the conference report been implemented prior to the date the report card was issued, this grade would have been better.
Regardless of the amount of the percentage of risk-based funds, the Department must do a better job calculating risk. In the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program allocation process, the Department made many decisions that resulted in awarding what were supposed to be risk-based funds to areas that do not face a high threat of being attacked. I plan on introducing legislation that would improve the manner in which DHS calculates risk and awards funds, strengthening the first responder funding formula provisions in this conference report.
In addition, I am disappointed that the conference report dropped the provisions that would have provided collective bargaining and other worker protections for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). These provisions were included in both the House and Senate versions of the bill but were dropped from the conference report due to the President's misguided veto threat.
Transportation Security Officers are on the front lines protecting our airports and airplanes. They should be given the basic worker protections enjoyed by other DHS personnel. They perform a crucial and often grueling job that requires training, experience, and patience. We need workers who have mastered the job and will make a career of helping to protect the flying public and our skies.
That is why I am introducing stand-alone legislation today to provide the 42,000 screeners with basic worker protections. This would replace the increasing turnover and dissatisfaction with professionalism and a career path our screeners will pursue long-term. Highly trained and seasoned TSOs are part of our smart, comprehensive, and cost-effective efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and protect America's transportation system.
In its July 2004 report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that we are safer than we were prior to September 11, 2001, but we are not safe. The same is true today. While we will never be able to eliminate all threats or vulnerabilities, the implementation of this conference report is a substantial step forward.