Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I want to first thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the ranking member, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), for the bipartisan way they approached this very critical war supplemental. We understood the urgency of getting this bill passed and getting the money out to the region, and it truly has been a privilege for me as a ranking member on one of the subcommittees working with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey). I thank them for their leadership.

I am pleased in the bill in addition to the money for humanitarian aid and reconstruction, there is over $7 billion for our critical allies in the region, and I think this is very important because they are in a hot spot, and they are very important, and I think it is important that we acknowledge their role and assistance to us.

I just want to make one point as we close out the debate. I certainly preferred the House-passed language on Iraq relief and reconstruction to what we decided on yesterday. However, as the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) stated, there was some compromise and I am very pleased that the role of the Congress and the oversight function of the Congress was finally acknowledged in giving us 5 days to review so many of the provisions that were included in the bill.

I felt that the House language stated more clearly that carrying out United States foreign policy is primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of State, not OMB or any other agency. That said, prosecuting the war and managing its aftermath is serious business, and the White House was explicit that it wanted the President to have flexibility in carrying out both of these important functions.

In the end, I think we did provide that flexibility to the administration. That is why at one point in the debate yesterday it really seemed nonsensical to me that the ultimate sticking point on this language was over the mere mention of the Foreign Assistance Act, the skeleton of the United States foreign assistance programs. This set of laws which has been developed and fine-tuned by Congress in consultation with various administrations since the 1960s provides the basic framework to carry out foreign aid, including relief and reconstruction. It has governed every United States relief and reconstruction effort in recent years, and the assertion that it hemmed in the President did not make any sense to me. We all acknowledge that the President is the Commander in Chief and has the ultimate authority and responsibility.

Appropriating these funds pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act simply keeps the Secretary of State under the President, at the direction of the President, as the primary overseer of our foreign assistance program.

We have to ask, in conclusion, why the administration made such a big deal about this once they had gotten most of the concessions they wanted on the issue already. It makes no difference, frankly, one way or the other in terms of the President's ability to provide funding to any government agency he chooses. So I felt dropping the language would have been a pointed rebuke of the Secretary of State's important key role in foreign policy.

Let me conclude by saying thank you again. I think we are putting forth an excellent bill that is important to address the current situation today. I thank our chairman and our ranking member for their leadership on these issues.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill.

I would like to take a moment to address two different sections of the Supplemental--foreign assistance and support for first responders.

The Foreign Operations section provides $7.3 billion of the $7.5 billion requested. I think it is generally a good product, and I appreciate Chairman Kolbe's willingness to work with me on it.

As many of my colleagues know, I consider foreign aid to be an indispensable arm of our national security strategy. No place is this role more evident than in today's bill, which will help strengthen many of our allies in the coalition of the willing. I particularly support the funding for Israel, a key ally in the war on terrorism and a force for stability in the Middle East, as well as the assistance for Jordan, a country which has supported our cause at great risk to its own stability.

I am also pleased that this bill takes important steps to secure the role of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development in guiding spending for post-war relief and reconstruction. It has been clear to us for quite some time that the Department of Defense would like to take over the management of these funds. While the President requested that all Iraq relief and reconstruction dollars be provided in a form that would have allowed him to transfer them to any government agency with no Congressional input, this bill wisely allows the flexibility to use them only at USAID, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and HHS--the four main agency implementers of our foreign assistance programs. The bill also makes clear the policy decisions regarding post-war relief and reconstruction should be made at the State Department--not anywhere else. Both of these provisions provide important precedents for similar situations that may arise in the future.

I do have a few concerns about the Foreign Operations section of the bill--primarily that

funding is provided for Colombia and the Philippines, despite the fact that they have no direct or indirect role in the conflict in Iraq. Congress has been admonished by the administration not to attach extraneous provisions to this bill, and I think these are two that could be better dealt with in the regular Fiscal Year 2004 process.

I strongly support the $700 million set-aside in the High-Risk Urban Areas category in the Office of Domestic Preparedness, an area of critical need. The administration requested $50 million for this purpose, an in the committee's mark on Tuesday the funding was raised to $700 million. This is excellent progress, but I still believe we must do more.

We have a responsibility to protect every American, wherever they live and wherever they serve this Nation around the globe.

But we know, based on experience and intelligence, that there are areas of higher risk than others in America. And it isn't always the most obvious places, like New York City, or Washington, DC, and the Pentagon.

It could be Orlando, where Disney World draws millions of visitors, or Fort Knox in Kentucky. It could be an attraction that symbolizes American culture like the Rock and Roll Hall of fame in Ohio, or a military installation like Quantico in Virginia.

Each of these places has political and cultural significance to our people and the world. We've seen that Al Qaeda has a diabolical sense of where to hit us--not only to take innocent life and destroy structures, but also to shake our confidence and our sense of America as a safe place.

For those reasons, there's an urgent need to provide funding for high-level risk areas, especially in urban centers. The administration, in its request, provided $50 million in funding for these needs. But $50 million isn't adequate. New York City spends that in 10 weeks alone--$5 million a week. The State of New York spends $7 million a week, mostly in New York City.

This funding is for needs nationally, and that's very important, but I want to mention just a few things that New York needs to do in order to protect the 11 million people who work in the city every day:

The city now has its own Counterterrorism Bureau in the police department that costs $200 million to run. Its one thousand officers are deployed in New York and around the world.

It's designing a communications system that will work from high-rise buildings to subways, that isn't reliant on a private carrier and has built-in redundancy so a failure at one point won't bring the whole communications systems to a halt. That will cost $120 million.

It needs $25 million to add HazMat units because the city isn't adequately prepared for a major chemical and/or biological incident.

It needs bigger and faster fireboats to help put out fires. For all of New York City's 575 miles of shoreline, there are 3 small fireboats. If, God forbid, there's an attack on a cruise ship, ferry, bridge or port, a large fireboat would be needed for rescue and fire control. A boat with large capacity is $15 million.

It also has immense training needs--among the 343 firefighters killed on September 11th were many of the department's most highly trained officers, who had accrued 4,400 years of collective experience and training. To recruit and train new firefighters will cost about $40 million.

And that's just New York--unfortunately, cities nationwide are forced to carry out similar costly measures to ensure their security. The U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that cities are spending about $70 million a week, on top of their law enforcement budget, to deal with the increased threat level and security costs due to the war.

I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for working hard to address these important needs, and to fund the High Risk Urban Areas category at $700 million.

We still need to do more. As a fire commissioner in my district said, referring to the color code alert system, ``we cannot go to color orange without seeing some color green.''

I hope we can work together through conference with the Senate, to help all our local areas--urban and rural--become as prepared as possible for any terrorist attack.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

There is no question that Turkey's initial refusal to allow the use of its territory had made prosecution of the war more difficult for us.

While I would characterize the vote of the Turkish Parliament as unfortunate and misguided, it happened. Sometimes we find the result of democratic deliberations inconvenient, but this was, in fact, the result. Despite that vote, the administration has requested $1 billion for Turkey. The justification, as presented by administration officials, is primarily economic. Turkey is in dire straits at the moment.

This is partly due to the war, and partly due to past economic policies. But regardless of the reason, the Turkish economy is teetering. They owe the IMF over $17 billion at the moment, and are financing most of their cash needs in short-term, high-interest debt. They have started down the path of economic reform, but they have a long way to go.

Now that the war is on, and Turkey has finally agreed to allow the positioning of supplies for our troops on its soil, the worst thing we could do is send a signal that we do not support Turkey. The circumstances surrounding this request may not be ideal, but our men and women in uniform are well into a tough battle for the future of Iraq, and Turkey's continued cooperation will help them.

Economic collapse of Turkey, coupled with a further breach in United States-Turkish relations which would result from passage of this amendment, would be absolutely disastrous to the war effort--and the peace effort that will come after. Turkey remains one of the few stable, democratic countries in the region, surrounded by unstable, authoritarian states. As a moderate Muslim state, strategically situated at the gateway to the Middle East, we simply cannot allow it to fail.

I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment.

The additional funding requested for Colombia has no place in this bill. More importantly, it adds funding in support of a policy that is essentially flawed. President Uribe's election gave us some initial hope that he would engage all the disparate elements of the conflict with new ideas and a real commitment to bring lasting peace.

Unfortunately, what we have seen is an escalation of activity from guerilla organizations, increasing influence and control by paramilitary organizations, no reduction in coca cultivation, and a slippage in the commitment to prosecute human rights abuses.

I have no illusion about the complexity of the problems of Colombia, but I do not think we should be adding funds to expand our commitment there at this point. Make no mistake: we are headed toward the direct involvement of U.S. troops in that conflict. I regret the fact that there are U.S. hostages in FARC camps, and I support all efforts to rescue them, but this funding goes beyond that and expands the involvement of U.S. personnel on the ground.

If the policy were balanced and we had a real commitment on the part of the Colombian government to deal with all aspects of the problem-- including the rapidly expanding drug trafficking by paramilitary organizations--it might be different. Unfortunately we don't, and the influence of these organizations and their cooperation with the Colombian military increases daily. The Colombian military has succeeded in decreasing the control that rebel groups have enjoyed in certain parts of the country. But these successful military operations have been followed up by paramilitary units moving in to these same areas and taking control. This has occurred in the Buena Ventura port area on the Pacific Coast of Colombia, which is a primary drug transshipment port near the town of Cali. And we also have seen no action by the Colombians to arrest indicted members of the Paramilitaries.

Until we have a balanced policy with a real commitment by the Colombian government to deal with all aspects of the problem, our funding for eradication and military training only serves to inflame, not to stop, the conflict. I urge my colleagues to move funding away from these purposes, and instead invest it in homeland security--where it can make a positive difference in the lives of the American people.

Madam Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished ranking member from Texas, who has the same laryngitis I do, for yielding to me. I appreciate his leadership on this very important issue.

Madam Speaker, I rise to discuss my continued concerns about security at the Nation's commercial nuclear reactors. Since September 11, 2001, intelligence officials have amassed a critical body of evidence suggesting terrorists intend to strike our nuclear infrastructure. Plans of U.S. nuclear facilities discovered in al Qaeda caves during U.S. military operations in Afghanistan provided perhaps the earliest indication that terrorists had not just casually contemplated, but rather assiduously, studied the option of sabotaging a nuclear reactor.

In early March, fresh intelligence confirmed our worst fears: Terrorists continued to plot attacks against nuclear and other critical infrastructure. Recent reports of a terrorist plan to sabotage the Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Arizona were sufficiently serious that the National Guard was immediately deployed to secure the plant.

As disturbing as these revelations is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure to coherently address them. Indeed, the NRC, the agency responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the country's 103 commercial reactors, has shown a remarkable unwillingness to recognize post-September 11 terrorist threats.

The commission flatly denied petitions by citizen groups for reinforcement of the spent fuel pools at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, stating ``the possibility of a terrorist attack is speculative . . . and simply too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action.''

Over 18 months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the same old assumptions about the size, tactics, and weapons used by an attacking force, referred to as the Design Basis Threat, guides serious security policies.

The NRC continues to presume a terrorist force of no more than three individuals, with one passive insider who would relay information to the outside force, but not manipulate any controls or even attempt to incapacitate plant operators. The NRC further assumes that the attacking force would not utilize a vehicle larger than a Jeep to transport and detonate explosives. The Design Basis Threat is also built on the premise that sophisticated weaponry, including grenade launchers and shaped charges, is well beyond the reach of terrorists.

These flawed assumptions define the conditions for NRC-supervised force-on-force exams, in which security personnel must defend the reactors against mock terrorists. They also govern NRC standards with respect to the size, training, and capability of the guard force.

Our national response to nuclear terrorism must no longer be predicated on such hollow hopes.

More than the Design Basis Threat is in urgent need of revision. The NRC has not required reinforcement of the walls of nuclear reactors and spent fuel pools. Although these pools often contain several times the radioactive material of the reactor vessels themselves, they remain among the most lightly defended parts of the nuclear facilities.

Collision of a large aircraft into these pools, which are not designed to withstand such an impact, could result in release of radioactive material in as little as 1 hour. A recent report on the hazards of spent fuel pools written by a team of distinguished scientists concluded that the long-term land contamination consequences of a spent pool fuel fire could be significantly worse than those of Chernobyl.

Force-on-force drills in which plant personnel respond to a mock terrorist attack have not been administered at some facilities in over 8 years. The NRC has only recently resumed these drills, discontinued after September 11, 2001. Nuclear power plants' abysmal performances on these force-on-force drills, licensees have failed about half of all of the exams administered, causes me considerable consternation.

The NRC has never decommissioned or fined facilities failing the exam. At an August security drill at the Indian Point Energy Center in Buchanon, New York, which abuts my district, mock attackers were able to place simulated explosives at the spent fuel pools twice in 60 seconds or less. The NRC nevertheless ultimately passed Indian Point with high marks.

The absence of any sanctions for poor performance provides licensees with little incentive to improve security. The commission's decision to administer force-on-force drills triennially, while certainly an improvement, will be of limited effectiveness as long as violations go unpunished. Chronic turnover in security personnel at nuclear facilities, which can approach 70 to 100 percent for a 3\1/2\ year period, also makes more frequent exams essential.

The size and tactics employed by the mock enemy force is still based on the current flawed Design Basis Threat of three lightly armed terrorists and one passive insider. More frequent realistic exams, coupled with stiff penalties for poor performance, would dramatically improve the usefulness of these drills.

The absence of strong Federal training standards have left many guards wholly unprepared to fend off a terrorist attack. Tactics are commonly taught using painted clothespins and a flat surface rather than serious simulation models.

The testimony of guards in a report released by the Project on Government Oversight challenges industry assertions that personnel received 270 hours of pre-posting training, 90 hours of recurrent firearms training, and 30 hours per year of tactical instructions. Most guards interviewed engaged in firearms training only a few hours every year, and had no moving-target practice.

Such training is all the more necessary as many personnel have no prior military or law enforcement experience. Physical agility exams are notoriously lax and wholly inadequate to verify plant personnel could respond effectively to a coordinated attack by multiple professional terrorists. An internal report completed by Entergy, the plant's owners, in 2001 revealed that 4 out of 5 guards interviewed by Entergy lacked confidence in their ability to thwart a terrorist attack. The majority of guards also stated they feared retribution if they spoke up about security concerns and substandard hiring and training procedures. Struggling to fill vacancies, Entergy has hired personnel with little or no law enforcement or military background. Security-sensitive information, including guard performance on firearm drills, has not been protected in accordance with Federal regulations.

Astoundingly, the NRC never fined or even warned Entergy for these practices which violated Commission-approved security policies. Foster Zeh, a certified instructor at Indian Point and vocal critic of its security operations, has affirmed, with few exceptions the problems identified in the December 2002 report still exist today.

I worry that a similar system prevails at other nuclear reactors around the country. The NRC's policy of benign negligence should no longer stand.

Training and qualification standards for guards must be strengthened and an enforcement system with real teeth must be put in place. A comprehensive evaluation of present terrorist threats and of the new security policies needed to address them is long overdue.

Certainly the stakes are high. Studies on the impact of a successful attack on a nuclear facility detail public health and economic consequences almost too chilling to contemplate. A 1982 investigation commissioned by the NRC found that a meltdown at Indian Point, which lies within 50 miles of 21 million people, could lead to 123,000 short- and long-term deaths, over 300,000 injuries, and property damages conservatively estimated at over $1 trillion. Factoring the fourfold increase in property values in the New York metropolitan area since the study, the economic damages for our region could reach $2.3 trillion.

This administration's recent decision to restrict public access to millions of classified documents, including those potentially dealing with the safety of nuclear power plants, represents a step in the wrong direction. Covering NRC activities in a veil of secrecy would limit the public's ability to effectively critique the plan, thereby removing a critical check on the agency.

The Department of Energy, pursuing a similar strategy, has repeatedly refused to provide the Government Affairs Office with details on the Design Basis Threat, information the office requires to complete a report on physical security at DOE sites.

As terrorist threats increase across the globe, we must acknowledge the vulnerability of nuclear infrastructure and craft thoughtful, coherent responses. In this area we truly delay at our own peril.

And I want to thank the gentleman again, my friend the Congressman and the ranking member of our select committee, for arranging this time to share our views on this very important issue of homeland security. I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner).

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize Eve W. Paul, vice president and general counsel of Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Ms. Paul is retiring after 25 years of distinguished service to that indispensable and life-enhancing organization.

In her long career as an attorney, Ms. Paul has devoted herself to women's rights. She was on the board of the Stamford (Connecticut) League of Women Voters, and she was director and general counsel of the Connecticut Women's Bank.

Before coming to Planned Parenthood Federation, Ms. Paul served as a staff attorney with the Legal Aid Society, in its Family Court Branch, a post that reflected her life-long commitment to the welfare of women and children.

While serving Planned Parenthood, Ms. Paul headed the Legal Analysis Project. In that capacity she prepared a study of U.S. laws on family planning. She also has written extensively on reproductive health care issues,

including abortion, contraception, and minors' rights.

Throughout her career Ms. Paul has been an advocate for reproductive freedom, and has worked on a number of landmark cases that secured for women the fundamental human and civil right to make their own childbearing choices.

I am honored to congratulate Eve W. Paul on her retirement. Her work in the service of human rights has left the world a better place. We wish her well.