Floor Statements

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Parental Responsibility Obligations Met Through Immigration System Enforcement Act, or PROMISE Act. Sadly, there are many in our society who do not honor their child support obligations, and ultimately, it is the children who are hurt by such irresponsibility. Shockingly, many foreign nationals are able to benefit from our immigration laws notwithstanding their failure to live up to their child support obligations. As a matter of sound policy, our immigration laws should require those who wish to come into or remain in our country to comply with our moral and ethical standards. Let us be clear in our message. If you do not live up to your financial obligations to your own children, then you are not welcome in the United States.

I am introducing this legislation now because it is time to do something to protect many children who are economically disadvantaged or neglected. These children need clothes, food, and shelter--basic necessities of life. Moreover, when the deadbeat parents fail to meet their obligations to their own children, it is our society and our taxpayers who must pick up the cost. Of course, we will do what we have to for the children in our country, but we need to hold the parents responsible and impress upon them we will no

longer tolerate their irresponsible attitude toward their own children.

Specifically, this legislation amends the current Immigration and Nationality Act, section 212(a), to include failure to pay child support as a ground of inadmissibility. It will also amend section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act so that one who fails to pay child support is statutorily without good moral character. The legislation will cover not only orders from a court in the United States but also foreign courts with which our Federal or State governments have reciprocity agreements. As such, deadbeat parents cannot use the United States as a haven from child support enforcement by other governments.

In conclusion, we must be mindful that permission to enter the United States is a privilege and not a right. We will not grant this privilege to individuals who do not respect the law of our Nation, the laws of their home country, or their moral duty to provide for their children.

I ask for your support of the PROMISE Act.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Parental Responsibility Obligations Met Through Immigration System Enforcement Act, or PROMISE Act. Sadly, there are many in our society who do not honor their child support obligations, and ultimately, it is the children who are hurt by such irresponsibility. Shockingly, many foreign nationals are able to benefit from our immigration laws notwithstanding their failure to live up to their child support obligations. As a matter of sound policy, our immigration laws should require those who wish to come into or remain in our country to comply with our moral and ethical standards. Let us be clear in our message. If you do not live up to your financial obligations to your own children, then you are not welcome in the United States.

I am introducing this legislation now because it is time to do something to protect many children who are economically disadvantaged or neglected. These children need clothes, food, and shelter--basic necessities of life. Moreover, when the deadbeat parents fail to meet their obligations to their own children, it is our society and our taxpayers who must pick up the cost. Of course, we will do what we have to for the children in our country, but we need to hold the parents responsible and impress upon them we will no

longer tolerate their irresponsible attitude toward their own children.

Specifically, this legislation amends the current Immigration and Nationality Act, section 212(a), to include failure to pay child support as a ground of inadmissibility. It will also amend section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act so that one who fails to pay child support is statutorily without good moral character. The legislation will cover not only orders from a court in the United States but also foreign courts with which our Federal or State governments have reciprocity agreements. As such, deadbeat parents cannot use the United States as a haven from child support enforcement by other governments.

In conclusion, we must be mindful that permission to enter the United States is a privilege and not a right. We will not grant this privilege to individuals who do not respect the law of our Nation, the laws of their home country, or their moral duty to provide for their children.

I ask for your support of the PROMISE Act.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to encourage my Senate colleagues to support the Department of Labor's proposed changes to our nation's overtime regulations. The amendment being offered by my friend Senator Harkin to the 2004 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations bill would prohibit spending to implement the Department of Labor's proposed regulations and, thereby, cripple the Department in making these important changes. This is not a wise course of action and I wish to voice my support today for the Department's proposed regulations changes.

Before discussing the proposed regulations, I would like to take a moment to address current overtime rules. As you may know, there have been very few changes to the Fair Labor Standards Act's, FLSA, overtime provisions since the early 1970s.

Under these outdated rules, most workers are only guaranteed time- and-a-half overtime pay if they earn less than $155 per week. If they earn more than $155 per week, then employers have to use a number of complicated and confusing tests to decide if a particular worker's job is ``executive, administrative, or professional,'' and must also use complicated tests to determine if the worker's pay qualifies as a ``salary'' rather than an hourly wage.

Thus, if a job pays over $155 per week--$170 per week for ``professionals''--and the job is executive, administrative or professional, and the worker's pay fits the official definition of a ``salary,'' then that particular worker is not eligible for overtime. You can imagine the complexity and confusion that businesses have to deal with when they try to determine which workers have to be paid overtime and which do not.

The current rules mean that a restaurant manager or a factory shift supervisor who is paid a salary of $300 per week would be ineligible for overtime, since these kinds of work are generally considered executive or administrative.

I want to discuss the proposed rules in some detail, as I believe there is a great deal of misunderstanding about what they would do and why they are necessary. The Department of Labor's proposed regulations would raise the $155 per week test to $425 per week. That means that, as a general rule, anyone earning less than $425 per week would automatically be guaranteed to be eligible for overtime pay, regardless of what kind of work they do.

Therefore, the Department of Labor's proposed rules will guarantee overtime pay to both the restaurant manager and the shift supervisor I mentioned above. The proposed regulations will be

a boon to lower-income salaried workers. The Department of Labor estimates that its proposed rules will make 1.2 million more lower- income workers eligible for overtime pay. They also estimate that 20 percent of salaried employees earn $425 per week or less, roughly $21,000 per year.

The rules will also modernize the definition of ``executive, administrative, or professional'' work to reflect better the realities of today's workforce and to reduce the incomprehensible regulatory definitions that businesses have had to interpret for the last 20 years. That means that workers who earn more than $425 per week will find it easier to determine whether or not they qualify for overtime pay, and it will reduce the number of lawsuits over the ``gray areas'' in current overtime regulations.

Further, the Department of Labor also proposes to allow salaried employees' pay to be docked for full-day absences taken for disciplinary reasons, such as sexual harassment or workplace violence. Currently, only hourly workers' wages are subject to such discipline- related pay deductions.

And finally, the proposed rules state that workers who earn more than $65,000 per year will be ineligible for overtime pay if their job has at least some duties that are ``executive, administrative, or professional.'' Therefore, employers who have these kinds of highly compensated workers will find it easier to make them ineligible for overtime. The Department of Labor chose the $65,000 threshold because roughly 20 percent of salaried workers earn $65,000 or more per year. The Department chose to focus its energies on strengthening access to overtime for the most vulnerable workers, a group that is unlikely to include many workers whose salaries are in the top 20 percent.

I believe that the current overtime regulations are confusing and outdated. They have created a maze of uncertainty for business owners, who can be fined up to 3 years of back wages if they misinterpret the overtime eligibility rules. The Department of Labor's proposed rules will make over a million more lower-income workers eligible for overtime while also creating clearer overtime eligibility rules for all businesses to follow. The Department of Labor's rules would guarantee overtime pay to the bottom 20 percent of salaried workers--some of the most economically vulnerable people in our society--while at the same time giving employers more freedom over how they compensate the top 20 percent of salaried workers.

These rules are part of this administration's broader agenda for long-lasting, long-term wage growth. These clearer, simpler regulations will increase the efficiency and productivity of American businesses. And since higher productivity is the key to higher wages, I expect these regulations to help increase the typical American's standard of living.

I have received numerous letters from individuals and industry who support these regulatory efforts by the Department of Labor. I believe the Department has done an excellent job of researching the overtime issue and preparing regulations that meet the needs of American workers. I encourage all of my Senate colleagues to support these regulations and vote against any amendments that would weaken or impede these much-needed overtime regulation updates.

Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.

I ask for the yeas and nays.

Madam President, I rise today to express my unqualified support for the nomination of Steven Colloton to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and to urge my colleagues to confirm this fine nominee.

Mr. Colloton has excellent academic and professional qualifications for the Federal bench. A graduate of the prestigious Yale Law School, Mr. Colloton clerked for two distinguished judges, D.C. Circuit Judge Laurence H. Silberman and U.S. Supreme Court Justice William H. Rehnquist. Mr. Colloton then worked as an attorney with the White House's Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice for a year and then, eager to return to his Midwestern roots, accepted a position as an assistant U.S. attorney in the Northern District of Iowa.

Mr. Colloton has impressive courtroom experience. He has argued 18 cases in the Federal courts of appeals, and has briefed several other cases. He has tried approximately 13 criminal cases to verdict. In addition, as an assistant U.S. attorney, Mr. Colloton was in the courtroom regularly to argue motions or evidentiary matters. He oversees an office which includes 25 attorneys.

Twenty-seven past presidents of the Iowa State Bar have written of Mr. Colloton, ``[W]e submit that the exceptional quality of Mr. Colloton's experience, together with its relevance to this position, uniquely qualifies him to represent Iowa on the United States Court of Appeals.''

I could not agree more. Mr. Colloton has demonstrated his capacity to excel on the Federal court bench. He possesses the qualifications, the capacity, and the temperament a judge needs to serve on the Eighth Circuit.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

I compliment my colleague from New Jersey and am very proud of him for having cast those many votes.

I ask that my remarks be as in morning business.

Madam President, I rise today to speak on the unfortunate

withdrawal of the nomination of Miguel Estrada for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It is truly a sad record that the Senate, for the first time ever, has terminated a circuit court nomination by filibuster rather than by an up-or-down vote. It is particularly troubling that political tactics were used to destroy this extremely qualified nominee.

Let me state that a clear majority of this body supported this nomination, as has been demonstrated in the unprecedented seven cloture votes which have taken place. So it is regrettable that a minority of Senators followed their script of extraordinary obstructionism to prevent the Senate from concluding the debate on this nomination and proceeding to a final vote. It goes against all the honorable traditions of this body for Senators to rest behind a veil of procedural votes rather than taking a public stand on the merits of this outstanding nominee.

After all, all he or any of us wanted was an up-or-down vote, something we have always given every nominee who has come to the Senate floor and has been called up on the Senate floor.

While it is shameful that Miguel Estrada was subjugated to political whims, it is not entirely surprising. Opponents from the very outset, for their own ideological purposes, have been determined to defeat this nomination. Last fall, a Democratic staffer on the Judiciary Committee was quoted in the Nation magazine as saying:

Estrada is 40 and if he makes it to the circuit then he

will be Bush's first Supreme Court nominee. He could be on

the Supreme Court for 30 years and do a lot of damage. We

have to stop him now.

So it appears that the real reason for the filibuster against Miguel Estrada was the concern by opponents of a possible Justice Estrada on the U.S. Supreme Court.

An editorial appearing in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution said it best:

The fear with Owen and Estrada is that one or both will be

nominated to the United States Supreme Court should a vacancy

occur. Senate Democrats are determined to keep off the

circuit court bench any perceived conservative who has the

credentials to serve on the United States Supreme Court.

There is an additional factor not based on any substantive objection to his nomination. I believe some Senate Democrats do not want the current President, a Republican President, to appoint the first Hispanic as the U.S. Circuit Court Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit. Let me read from an editorial published by the Dallas Morning News addressing this point. On February 17, 2003, the News wrote:

Democrats haven't liked Mr. Estrada from the beginning.

Part of that is due to his ideology--which is decidedly not

Democratic.

But part of it also has to do with the fellow who nominated him. Democrats don't relish giving President Bush one more thing to brag about when he goes into Hispanic neighborhoods when he goes into his reelection campaign next year. They are even less interested in putting a conservative Republican in line to become the first Hispanic Justice on the Supreme Court.

In an effort to prevent Mr. Estrada's confirmation, his opponents resorted to a number of troubling tactics. During his hearing there were frequent attempts to inject political ideology into the judicial nomination process. This was most evident as related to questions about his views on Roe v. Wade, the apparent litmus test for many Senate Democrats.

In response to this concern, he offered cases he had taken on as an attorney to illustrate his commitment to following the law instead of imposing any political agenda. He also testified under oath that he would follow Roe and Casey if he were confirmed. But even his outstanding record and testimony before the committee was apparently not enough to satisfy those determined to destroy his nomination.

Opponents repeatedly raised red herring issues with two additional demands. One was that Mr. Estrada answer their questions, though the record is clear that his responses were complete. Mr. Estrada spent hours during a day-long hearing answering my Democratic colleagues' questions. He answered written questions submitted after the hearing, although only two, only two committee Democrats bothered to ask him written questions.

He gave answers to questions that were substantially similar to answers given by Clinton nominees who were confirmed. Yet my Democratic colleagues continue to complain that he had not answered their questions. Really, their complaint is that in answering their questions, Mr. Estrada did not say anything that gave them a reason to vote against him. Simply put, they were not really interested in his answers to their questions. They were interested only in defeating his nomination.

This is why every effort to make Mr. Estrada available to answer additional questions has gone virtually unacknowledged. Only one Democratic Senator met with Mr. Estrada and only one submitted written questions to Mr. Estrada after the floor debate on his nomination began.

Their second demand was the unreasonable request that the administration release confidential internal memoranda he authored at the Solicitor General's office. This issue has been fully debated. The short response is that never before has a Presidential administration released confidential appeal, certiorari and amicus recommendations on the scale that my Democratic colleagues sought from Mr. Estrada. They attempted a full-scale fishing expedition, pure and simple, and the Justice Department was right to oppose it.

Furthermore, this demand constituted a double standard for Miguel Estrada. The Judiciary Committee confirmed numerous Clinton circuit court nominees who, like Miguel Estrada, had no prior judicial experience. A number of these nominees had worked in the Justice Department or other branches of the Federal Government, but Senate Democrats made no demands for their confidential memoranda or privileged work product. Yet Senate Democrats persisted in this demand, knowing full well that for sound reasons the administration, with the support of all seven living former Solicitors General, both Democrat and Republican--four of them were Democrats--would not and could not accede to that request.

When all other tactics failed, opponents turned to their ultimate weapon, the filibuster. Filibusters of judicial nominees allow a vocal majority to prevent the majority of Senators from voting on the confirmation of a Federal judge, a prospective member of our third, coequal branch of Government. It is tyranny of the minority and it is unfair to the nominee, to the judiciary, and to the majority of the Members of this body, and to the President. The unprecedented filibuster of Mr. Estrada was certainly unfair to a majority of Senators who stood ready to fulfill their constitutional responsibility by voting on Mr. Estrada's nomination.

It has been more than 2 years since Miguel Estrada was nominated by President Bush, on May 9, 2001, and nearly a year since his hearing before the committee. In all of that time, my Democratic colleagues had unlimited opportunities to make their case. Some of them opposed him. Others supported him. But one thing remained clear through this whole debate: There was no good reason to deny Mr. Estrada an up-or-down vote, the dignity of an up-or-down vote.

On the merits, Mr. Estrada was extremely qualified to serve on the court to which he was nominated. The qualifications of Miguel Estrada are well known to the Senate. He represents an American success story. After immigrating to the United States, after overcoming a language barrier and speech impediment, he graduated magna cum laud and Phi Beta Kappa in 1983 from Columbia College. At Harvard Law School he was an editor of the Harvard Law Review and graduated magna cum laude in 1986.

Mr. Estrada's professional career has been marked by one success after another. After graduation, he clerked for Second Circuit Judge Amalya Kearse, a Carter appointee and then Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. He worked as an associate in the distinguished firm of Wachtell Lipton in New York. He then worked as a Federal prosecutor in Manhattan, rising to become deputy chief of the appellate division. In recognition of his appellate skills, he was hired by the Solicitor General's office during the first Bush administration. He stayed with the Solicitor General's office for most of the Clinton administration. When he left

the Solicitor General's office, he joined the DC office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, one of the great law firms in this country, where he continued to excel as a partner and rose to the top of the ranks of oral advocates nationwide, having argued 15 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.

The legal bar's wide regard for Mr. Estrada is reflected in his evaluation by the American Bar Association. The ABA evaluates judicial nominees based on their professional qualifications, their integrity, their professional competence, and their judicial temperament. Based on an assessment of all of those factors, the ABA bestowed upon Mr. Estrada its highest rating of ``unanimously well qualified.''

Yet despite the superb record of Miguel Estrada, opponents chose to deny him a simple up-or-down vote, injecting politics into the judicial confirmation process. Opponents have not only treated Miguel Estrada unfairly; they have further damaged this process.

One casualty is enough. I hope all Senators will consider the dangerous ramifications of the actions of the Senate in causing Miguel Estrada to withdraw his nomination through the use of the filibuster. This should never happen again.

Just one other thing on this. He was asked to comply when he couldn't do it, with a fishing expedition into the Solicitor General's most privileged documents, documents that have never been given in toto as requested by the Democrats, never before. Four Democrat former Solicitors General said they would never give these documents. Those Democrat former Solicitors General and three others said they opposed the release of these documents.

If this was a legitimate request, why didn't they ask for similar documents in the case of John Roberts? In other words, Miguel Estrada was treated completely different from other people. Why didn't Senate Democrats ask for these documents in the case of others through the years who worked in the Solicitor General's office? It was just a red herring that some in the media bought off on, to prevent this man from ever having the dignity of an up-or-down vote on the Senate floor.

The reason they prevented that is because they knew he would have won and he would have won a bipartisan vote in the Senate.

Frankly, filibusters should never occur again. Yet more judicial nominees face continuing filibusters on the Senate floor. We will soon once again put to the test the respect the Members of our body have for our constitutional duty to advise and consent on judicial nominations. We will continue to file for cloture to end debate and to give Priscilla Owen, Bill Pryor, and other judicial nominees that the left is intent on blocking the up-or-down votes they deserve.

These are outstanding nominees. Priscilla Owen broke through the glass ceiling, becoming one of the great partners of a major law firm in this country, and broke through the glass ceiling for women, yet she is being treated like dirt on the Senate floor. Also, Bill Pryor, who has more than shown his propensity to always follow the law, even though the law may differ from his own personal, deeply held beliefs.

There are, no doubt, factions of far left interest groups that are delighted to see Miguel Estrada has withdrawn his nomination. These same groups no doubt will declare victory and mount even more vigorous campaigns in an effort to ensure that other judicial nominees suffer the same fate. From what I understand, some of my colleagues in the Senate share those sentiments. But let me tell you right now, this is no occasion for celebration. We should be embarrassed that Miguel Estrada, having had enough of serving as a political football instead of as a Federal judge, decided to end his nomination. And we should be embarrassed of the continued attempts to usurp the nomination function from the President and the consent function from the Senate majority.

We should not stand back and allow a minority of Senators to prevent an up-or-down vote on any judicial nominee and especially those once they have come to the floor.

We should not inflict upon Priscilla Owen, Bill Pryor, or any others the same shabby treatment that led Miguel Estrada to withdraw his nomination. These all deserve better. And nominees in the future deserve better. The majority of the Senate that stands ready to confirm the ones I have mentioned deserve better. Most importantly, the American people expect their Senators to hold up-or-down votes on judicial nominees and deserve the opportunity to hold their Senators accountable for the votes they cast on the President's judicial nominees.

I have been around here a long time. Both sides have committed errors with regard to judicial nominees over the years. But nothing has ever reached the dimensions of what has been done to Miguel Estrada. Nothing has even come close. He has been treated in an especially onerous way that no other nominee I know of in the history of the Senate has been treated. He has been singled out primarily because he was viewed as being on the fast track to the Supreme Court, and because he is a conservative Republican Hispanic who might be pro-life and who is on the fast track to the Supreme Court. I don't think anybody who is honest can refute that statement.

I think it is pitiful what has happened. I just hope we wake up in this body and start treating people with fairness which the advise and consent clause of the Constitution demands. I hope that works on both sides.

There were those who wanted to filibuster on our side during the Clinton years. We stopped it. We were not going to set that precedent, nor were we going to do that type of activity. Frankly, everyone who came to the floor had a vote, and only one, if I recall correctly, was defeated by an up-and-down vote. But at least he had a vote. And Miguel Estrada deserved that just as much as any of the past nominees.

Yes, I yield for a question.

They both did, and both were nominated at the same time, over 2 years ago.

Absolutely right. They were not requested. There was a different standard used with regard to Mr. Estrada--a very unfair standard knowing that the Solicitor General's Office could not allow a fishing expedition into those documents.

That is correct. Four of the seven former Solicitors General who are living today are Democrats, and all seven of them came out and said that these documents should not be given to the Senators of the United States because of their sensitivity and their privileged nature.

It is true that he was confirmed unanimously.

The Senator is correct.

If my friend from Kentucky has concluded.

The illustration should not be limited to just John Roberts and Miguel Estrada. There are a number of people who are on the Federal bench and who have served on the Federal bench who also served in the Solicitor's Office who were never asked those questions, and rightly so. They should

never have been asked. It was a red herring that many of my colleagues hid behind to justify this outrageous and, I think, shabby treatment of Miguel Estrada.

I yield to my friend for a question.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Religious Workers' Act of 2003. It provides permanent authority for 5,000 visas per year for non-minister religious workers. These religious workers fulfill a need in the religious communities around this nation. I would like to thank Senators Kennedy and Chambliss for cosponsoring this bill.

The provision relating to the ``non-minister'' religious workers was enacted through the Immigration Act of 1990. Prior to 1990, churches, synagogues, mosques, and their affiliated organizations experienced significant difficulties in trying to gain admission for a much needed minister or other persons necessary to provide religious services to the communities. Through the 1990 Act, Congress recognized that religious institutions deserved to be on equal footing as the business and educational institutions in terms of having their human resources needs addressed.

I would like to quote from a letter written by the last Mother Theresa to Senator Abraham shortly before her passing, asking for continuation of this visa category when it was about to sunset in 1997. Mother Theresa said:

It means so much to our poor people, to have Sisters who

understand them and their culture. It takes a long time for a

Sister to understand the people and a culture, so now our

Society wants to keep our Sisters in their mission countries

on a more long-term basis. Please help us and our poor by

extending this law.

The simple plea of this great humanitarian speak volumes regarding why this law is needed.

In addition, I recently received a letter from Bishop Thomas Wenski, Chairman of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on Migration. Bishop Wenski tells me that the religious workers covered by this act would provide humanitarian services to the most needy, such as shelter and nutrition. They would care for and minister to the sick, aged, and dying in hospitals. They counsel adolescents and others suffering hardship, and support families in crisis. Bishop Wenski further advises that there is a ``rapid decrease in the number of Americans turning to religious vocations. . . . In these times of uncertainty, it is more important than ever that faith based organizations be able to serve the communities through the essential services provided by religious workers.''

The extension would allow religious organizations to continue their important programs and would provide a measure of stability that religious organizations need to set long term objectives. It is very important that faith-based organizations be able to serve the community through the essential services provided by religious workers.

I ask for the support of my colleagues for the Religious Workers' Act of 2003.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Religious Workers' Act of 2003. It provides permanent authority for 5,000 visas per year for non-minister religious workers. These religious workers fulfill a need in the religious communities around this nation. I would like to thank Senators Kennedy and Chambliss for cosponsoring this bill.

The provision relating to the ``non-minister'' religious workers was enacted through the Immigration Act of 1990. Prior to 1990, churches, synagogues, mosques, and their affiliated organizations experienced significant difficulties in trying to gain admission for a much needed minister or other persons necessary to provide religious services to the communities. Through the 1990 Act, Congress recognized that religious institutions deserved to be on equal footing as the business and educational institutions in terms of having their human resources needs addressed.

I would like to quote from a letter written by the last Mother Theresa to Senator Abraham shortly before her passing, asking for continuation of this visa category when it was about to sunset in 1997. Mother Theresa said:

It means so much to our poor people, to have Sisters who

understand them and their culture. It takes a long time for a

Sister to understand the people and a culture, so now our

Society wants to keep our Sisters in their mission countries

on a more long-term basis. Please help us and our poor by

extending this law.

The simple plea of this great humanitarian speak volumes regarding why this law is needed.

In addition, I recently received a letter from Bishop Thomas Wenski, Chairman of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on Migration. Bishop Wenski tells me that the religious workers covered by this act would provide humanitarian services to the most needy, such as shelter and nutrition. They would care for and minister to the sick, aged, and dying in hospitals. They counsel adolescents and others suffering hardship, and support families in crisis. Bishop Wenski further advises that there is a ``rapid decrease in the number of Americans turning to religious vocations. . . . In these times of uncertainty, it is more important than ever that faith based organizations be able to serve the communities through the essential services provided by religious workers.''

The extension would allow religious organizations to continue their important programs and would provide a measure of stability that religious organizations need to set long term objectives. It is very important that faith-based organizations be able to serve the community through the essential services provided by religious workers.

I ask for the support of my colleagues for the Religious Workers' Act of 2003.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, along with my good friends and colleagues, Senators Breaux, Smith, Lott, and Snowe, I rise today to introduce the Real Estate Investment Trust Improvement Act of 2003. This legislation would update the tax rules governing real estate investment trusts, commonly referred to as REITs, by making a number of minor but important changes to remove uncertainties in the law and improve their investment climate. Identical legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives.

REITs are publicly traded real estate companies that pass through their earnings to individual shareholders. Congress originally created REITs in 1960 to enable small investors to make investments in large- scale, income producing real estate. By doing so, Congress made commercial real estate more accessible, more liquid, more transparent, and more attuned to investor interests. REITs have evolved to own properties across the country, including office buildings, apartments, shopping centers, and warehouses. As a result, these entities play a key role in helping our economy move forward by promoting investment and creating jobs.

The Internal Revenue Code includes detailed rules governing the operations of REITs, the types of income they can earn, and the assets they hold. Congress last amended these provisions in 1999. The REIT Improvement Act is the product of almost two years of discussions with the staffs of the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation on how to find solutions to several thorny problem areas where the rules are in need of clarification or modification.

The REIT Improvement Act includes three titles: Title I--REIT Corrections; Title II--FIRPTA Corrections; and Title III--REIT Savings.

Title I includes several corrections to the REIT tax rules to remove some uncertainties and provide corrections largely arising from enactment of the REIT Modernization Act in 1999. Although these provisions have very little effect on revenue to the Treasury, they are of considerable importance to REITs because they remove uncertainties that interfere with the efficient operation of their businesses.

Because publicly-held REITs have to report quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission that they are in compliance with the specialized income and asset tests applicable to REITs, the uncertain application of these tax rules creates greater difficulties in REIT business operators than unclear tax rules generally do for other corporations.

The most important, time-sensitive provision in this title deals with what is called the ``straight debt'' rule. This rule, which was adopted in the REIT Modernization Act of 1999, prohibits REITs from owning more than 10 percent of the value of any other entity's securities. Although this rule was intended to prevent REITs from owning more than 10 percent of the equity of another corporation, as drafted the rules potentially apply to many situations when individuals and businesses owe some sort of debt, ``security'' defined broadly, to a REIT.

There are many situations in which REITs make non-abusive, ordinary loans in the course of business for which they could face loss of REIT status because the loans do not qualify as

``straight debt.'' The most common context for this situation is in the REIT's relationship with its tenants. For example, the REIT might lend the tenant money for leasehold improvements. In some circumstances such a loan could represent more than 10 percent of the tenant's total debt obligations. In such a case, although the amount owed could be small, it could lead to REIT disqualification. The bill we are introducing today would exempt from the 10 percent rule certain categories of loans that are non-abusive and present little or no opportunity for the REIT to participate in the profits of the issuer's business. This includes any loan from a REIT to an individual or to a government, and any debt arising from a real property rent arrangement.

Other provisions in this title clarify the related party rent rules that limit the amount of space a taxable subsidiary may lease from its parent REIT, update the hedging definitions in the REIT rules, remove a safe harbor protection for a taxable subsidiary providing customary services to a REIT's tenants, and restore a formula for imposing a tax on REITs that fail to meet the 95 percent gross income test.

Finally, the bill would modify a safe harbor to the prohibited transaction rule that imposes a 100 percent tax on the income REITs earn from sales of ``dealer property.'' Currently, the safe harbor is limited to sales of property held for the production of rental income that meet a series of tests. The change proposed in this title would extend the safe harbor to other REIT property, not just that held for the production of rental income.

Title II of the bill would modify the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (``FIRPTA'') to remove barriers to foreign investment in REITs. Today, there is very little foreign investment in REITs. We understand that U.S. money managers routinely receive assignments to place foreign investment capital in the United States under which they have complete discretion to invest in any U.S. stocks except REITs. The reason they are expressly told to avoid REITs is that under FIRPTA, foreign investors that receive REIT capital gains distributions are treated as doing business in the United States.

Title II would modify the FIRPTA rules so that a publicly traded REIT's payment of capital gains dividends to a foreign portfolio investor would no longer cause the REIT investor to be considered doing business in the United States. The effect of this would be to threat investments in REITs like investment in other corporations, and the provision would parallel current law governing a portfolio investor's sale of REIT stock.

Title III of our bill, REIT Savings, would modify a number so-called ``death trap'' provisions in the REIT tax rules that result in the disqualification of the REIT if various rules are not met. The loss of REIT status would be a catastrophic occurrence that the management of a REIT tries to avoid at all costs, so much so that they expend significant resources to put in place compliance measures to avoid such a result. A better, simpler alternative would be to build in some flexibility to the REIT tax rules and impose monetary penalties, in lieu of REIT disqualification, for the failure to meet these strict rules that lead to REIT disqualification.

For example, under current law, a REIT is disqualified if more than 5 percent of its assets are comprised of the securities of any entity, or if it owns more than 10 percent of the voting power or value of any entity. In lieu of disqualification of the REIT status for violations of these rules, our bill would first give REITs an opportunity to comply with the asset tests with respect to any violation that does not exceed 1 percent of their total assets. Assets in excess of the 1 percent de minimis amount would be subject to a tax of the greater of $50,000 or the highest corporate tax rate multiplied by the net income from the assets if the violation was justified by reasonable cause.

Under current law, a REIT is disqualified if it does not meet certain other tests relating to its organizational structure, the distribution of its income, its annual elections to the IRS, the transferability of its shares, and other requirements. In lieu of this disqualification, Title III would change the law, assess a monetary penalty of $50,000 for each reasonable cause failure to satisfy these rules. This is a much more reasonable solution.

These changes are similar to ``intermediate sanctions'' legislation that Congress approved a few years ago dealing with nonprofit organizations. That legislation imposed monetary penalties on nonprofit organizations for violation of certain tax rules in lieu of a devastating loss of the organizations' tax-exempt status. Those changes, like the ones we are proposing today, recognize that it is far more likely that an entity will be sanctioned under a penalty regime than under draconian rules that entirely disqualify the organization.

The REIT Improvement Act would provide reasonable and much needed reforms to the rules governing a key component of our economy. We urge our colleagues to join with us in sponsoring this legislation and supporting its inclusion in tax legislation heading for passage this year.

Mr. President, along with my good friends and colleagues, Senators Breaux, Smith, Lott, and Snowe, I rise today to introduce the Real Estate Investment Trust Improvement Act of 2003. This legislation would update the tax rules governing real estate investment trusts, commonly referred to as REITs, by making a number of minor but important changes to remove uncertainties in the law and improve their investment climate. Identical legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives.

REITs are publicly traded real estate companies that pass through their earnings to individual shareholders. Congress originally created REITs in 1960 to enable small investors to make investments in large- scale, income producing real estate. By doing so, Congress made commercial real estate more accessible, more liquid, more transparent, and more attuned to investor interests. REITs have evolved to own properties across the country, including office buildings, apartments, shopping centers, and warehouses. As a result, these entities play a key role in helping our economy move forward by promoting investment and creating jobs.

The Internal Revenue Code includes detailed rules governing the operations of REITs, the types of income they can earn, and the assets they hold. Congress last amended these provisions in 1999. The REIT Improvement Act is the product of almost two years of discussions with the staffs of the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation on how to find solutions to several thorny problem areas where the rules are in need of clarification or modification.

The REIT Improvement Act includes three titles: Title I--REIT Corrections; Title II--FIRPTA Corrections; and Title III--REIT Savings.

Title I includes several corrections to the REIT tax rules to remove some uncertainties and provide corrections largely arising from enactment of the REIT Modernization Act in 1999. Although these provisions have very little effect on revenue to the Treasury, they are of considerable importance to REITs because they remove uncertainties that interfere with the efficient operation of their businesses.

Because publicly-held REITs have to report quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission that they are in compliance with the specialized income and asset tests applicable to REITs, the uncertain application of these tax rules creates greater difficulties in REIT business operators than unclear tax rules generally do for other corporations.

The most important, time-sensitive provision in this title deals with what is called the ``straight debt'' rule. This rule, which was adopted in the REIT Modernization Act of 1999, prohibits REITs from owning more than 10 percent of the value of any other entity's securities. Although this rule was intended to prevent REITs from owning more than 10 percent of the equity of another corporation, as drafted the rules potentially apply to many situations when individuals and businesses owe some sort of debt, ``security'' defined broadly, to a REIT.

There are many situations in which REITs make non-abusive, ordinary loans in the course of business for which they could face loss of REIT status because the loans do not qualify as

``straight debt.'' The most common context for this situation is in the REIT's relationship with its tenants. For example, the REIT might lend the tenant money for leasehold improvements. In some circumstances such a loan could represent more than 10 percent of the tenant's total debt obligations. In such a case, although the amount owed could be small, it could lead to REIT disqualification. The bill we are introducing today would exempt from the 10 percent rule certain categories of loans that are non-abusive and present little or no opportunity for the REIT to participate in the profits of the issuer's business. This includes any loan from a REIT to an individual or to a government, and any debt arising from a real property rent arrangement.

Other provisions in this title clarify the related party rent rules that limit the amount of space a taxable subsidiary may lease from its parent REIT, update the hedging definitions in the REIT rules, remove a safe harbor protection for a taxable subsidiary providing customary services to a REIT's tenants, and restore a formula for imposing a tax on REITs that fail to meet the 95 percent gross income test.

Finally, the bill would modify a safe harbor to the prohibited transaction rule that imposes a 100 percent tax on the income REITs earn from sales of ``dealer property.'' Currently, the safe harbor is limited to sales of property held for the production of rental income that meet a series of tests. The change proposed in this title would extend the safe harbor to other REIT property, not just that held for the production of rental income.

Title II of the bill would modify the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (``FIRPTA'') to remove barriers to foreign investment in REITs. Today, there is very little foreign investment in REITs. We understand that U.S. money managers routinely receive assignments to place foreign investment capital in the United States under which they have complete discretion to invest in any U.S. stocks except REITs. The reason they are expressly told to avoid REITs is that under FIRPTA, foreign investors that receive REIT capital gains distributions are treated as doing business in the United States.

Title II would modify the FIRPTA rules so that a publicly traded REIT's payment of capital gains dividends to a foreign portfolio investor would no longer cause the REIT investor to be considered doing business in the United States. The effect of this would be to threat investments in REITs like investment in other corporations, and the provision would parallel current law governing a portfolio investor's sale of REIT stock.

Title III of our bill, REIT Savings, would modify a number so-called ``death trap'' provisions in the REIT tax rules that result in the disqualification of the REIT if various rules are not met. The loss of REIT status would be a catastrophic occurrence that the management of a REIT tries to avoid at all costs, so much so that they expend significant resources to put in place compliance measures to avoid such a result. A better, simpler alternative would be to build in some flexibility to the REIT tax rules and impose monetary penalties, in lieu of REIT disqualification, for the failure to meet these strict rules that lead to REIT disqualification.

For example, under current law, a REIT is disqualified if more than 5 percent of its assets are comprised of the securities of any entity, or if it owns more than 10 percent of the voting power or value of any entity. In lieu of disqualification of the REIT status for violations of these rules, our bill would first give REITs an opportunity to comply with the asset tests with respect to any violation that does not exceed 1 percent of their total assets. Assets in excess of the 1 percent de minimis amount would be subject to a tax of the greater of $50,000 or the highest corporate tax rate multiplied by the net income from the assets if the violation was justified by reasonable cause.

Under current law, a REIT is disqualified if it does not meet certain other tests relating to its organizational structure, the distribution of its income, its annual elections to the IRS, the transferability of its shares, and other requirements. In lieu of this disqualification, Title III would change the law, assess a monetary penalty of $50,000 for each reasonable cause failure to satisfy these rules. This is a much more reasonable solution.

These changes are similar to ``intermediate sanctions'' legislation that Congress approved a few years ago dealing with nonprofit organizations. That legislation imposed monetary penalties on nonprofit organizations for violation of certain tax rules in lieu of a devastating loss of the organizations' tax-exempt status. Those changes, like the ones we are proposing today, recognize that it is far more likely that an entity will be sanctioned under a penalty regime than under draconian rules that entirely disqualify the organization.

The REIT Improvement Act would provide reasonable and much needed reforms to the rules governing a key component of our economy. We urge our colleagues to join with us in sponsoring this legislation and supporting its inclusion in tax legislation heading for passage this year.

Madam President, reserving the right to object--and I will object--let me make clear that when the issue of religion is raised, as it has been in the Pryor matter, and we think improperly so, and it seems to be continuously raised in some of these issues before the Judiciary Committee with various nominees--there are questions or statements like this: One Senator accused Attorney General Pryor of----

--``asserting an agenda of religious belief of your own.'' As long as those types of questions are going to be asked, I am going to have to object.

Then I object under those circumstances.

Madam President, I have been listening to this. I have to tell you, it is apparent that my friends on the other side who are stung a little bit by this. They should be. They should be. Naturally, they don't want religion mentioned because they are referring to it all the time, and it is almost always in the context of abortion.

Almost every question that Democrats ask those whom they consider controversial nominees is about abortion. Naturally, they cannot do that to every nominee, even though I believe some of them would like to. So they are selective in choosing certain nominees who have deeply held religious beliefs.

But let me just give you a few examples of why I am convinced General Pryor's religion was put squarely at issue during his hearing, and why, at the end of the hearing, I brought up the issue of religion--because I was sick and tired of hearing this kind of stuff, because when Democrats were questioning his deeply held beliefs, they really were questioning his religious beliefs.

One Senator--I believe it was Senator Durbin from Illinois--accused General Pryor, during the hearing, of ``asserting an agenda of your own, a religious belief of your own. . . .''

In his opening statement, Senator Schumer stated:

[I]n General Pryor's case his beliefs are so well known, so

deeply held, that it is very hard to believe, very hard to

believe that they are not going to deeply influence the way

he comes about saying, ``I will follow the law.'' And that

would be true of anybody who had very, very deeply held

views.

I think he had a right to say that, but the point is, there isn't anybody who doesn't understand, when you talk about deeply held views, what those are are religious beliefs. If they don't understand it, then they--well, I will not comment about that.

At another point, on the subject of Roe v. Wade--which came up in almost every question to Pryor from a Democratic questioner--Senator Schumer said:

I for one believe that a judge can be pro-life, yet be

fair, balanced, and uphold a woman's right to choose, but for

a judge to set aside his or her personal view, the commitment

to the rule of law must clearly supersede his or her personal

agenda. . . . But based on the comments Attorney General

Pryor has made on this subject, I have got some real concerns

that he cannot, because he feels these views so deeply and so

passionately.

There is only one reason he feels those views so deeply and passionately, and that is because of his religion and his religious beliefs. He is a traditional, conservative pro-life Catholic. I don't think my colleagues are against the Catholic Church, but it sure seems as if they are against the traditional pro-life conservative Catholic-- on a selective basis, of course, because they cannot do this to everybody.

Another Senator told General Pryor:

. . . I think the very legitimate issue in question with your

nomination is whether you have an agenda, that many of the

positions which you have taken reflect not just an advocacy

but a very deeply held view and a philosophy, which you are

entitled to have, but you are also not entitled to get

everyone's vote.

General Pryor is an openly pro-life Catholic. To me, these questions and comments about his deeply held personal views put his religious beliefs squarely in issue.

Some Democrats say that they have, generally, voted to confirm about 140 of President Bush's judicial nominees. And they say some may have been pro-life Catholics, so our charges that they refuse to confirm pro-life Catholics are baseless. But here's what they're really saying: if you're a pro-life Catholic, you'd better keep quiet during your entire legal or political career before you come before us on the Judiciary Committee, because if you have made public statements that indicate you actually believe in official Catholic doctrine or are actually pro-life, that's when you are in real trouble with us. If you are smart, you will keep your religious beliefs to yourself, and maybe we won't ask about them directly or indirectly. So at best, what some Democrats seem to want is a gag order enforced on nominees who have publicly espoused pro-life positions, even in the context of political campaigns. At worse, maybe some would rather that those publicly profess pro-life sentiments be excluded from public service--certainly service on the federal bench--altogether.

Let's assume that, as various polls seem to show, the American people are roughly equally divided on the policy questions regarding abortion. There's no question that tens of millions of Catholics, following the official doctrine of the church, and millions of other religious believers of all denominations in this country are on the pro-life side of that divide. An abortion litmus test--which is really a religious litmus test, where pro-life views arise from a person's faith-- effectively excludes judicial nominees from that side, from service on the Federal bench. That is wrong, particularly in the case of Bill Pryor, whose record of subordinating his personal beliefs to the law could not be clearer, and who, like Justice Owen, affirmed to our Committee that he would follow Roe v. Wade and other Supreme Court precedents with which he personally disagrees. He understands his role as a federal judge. It's time we act on a proper understanding of our role as Senators and vote for or against his confirmation.

We know that our Constitution prohibits religious tests for public office. Nobody would propose a law that excluded persons of certain religions from certain federal offices. But what can't be done overtly is no less objectionable when done indirectly.

Article VI of the Constitution states, ``[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.'' I do not believe that any Senator would intentionally impose a religious test on the President's judicial nominees, and I do not think any Senators are guilty of anti-religion bias. However, I am deeply concerned that some are indirectly putting at issue the religious beliefs of several judicial nominees--nominees who are avowedly pro-life as a result of their religious beliefs.

The most recent example emerged during the debate on the nomination of Bill Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit. During his confirmation hearing, General Pryor was asked repeatedly by some Committee Democrats about what one senator called his ``very, very deeply held views.'' In fact, in the portion of his opening statement addressing Roe v. Wade, one of my Democratic colleagues on the judiciary Committee stated

I for one believe that a judge can be pro-life, yet be

fair, balanced, and uphold a woman's right to choose, but for

a judge to set aside his or her personal view, the commitment

to the rule of law must clearly supersede his or her personal

agenda. . . . But based on the comments Attorney General

Pryor has made on this subject, I have got some real concerns

that he cannot, because he feels these views so deeply and so

passionately.

Another Senator accused General Pryor during the hearing of ``asserting an agenda of your own, a religious belief of your own. . . .'' And yet another Senator told General Pryor during the hearing:

. . . I think the very legitimate issue in question with your

nomination is whether you have an agenda, that many of the

positions which you have taken reflect not just an advocacy

but a very deeply held view and a philosophy, which you are

entitled to have, but you are also not entitled to get

everyone's vote.

Another colleague remarked:

Virtually in every area you have extraordinarily strong

views which continue and come out in a number of different

ways. Your comments about Roe make one believe, could he

really, suddenly, move away from those comments and be a

judge?

I became concerned after these comments that General Pryor was essentially being questioned about his deeply held religious beliefs, and that is the only reason I myself questioned General Pryor on the subject of religion during his hearing. In my view, it was time to call it like I saw it. But let me make one thing absolutely clear: My questions were an attempt to prevent General Pryor, and any other judicial

nominees, from being subjected to a religious test. In no way, shape or form did I attempt, or would I ever attempt, to impose such a test.

General Pryor is an openly pro-life Catholic, so there is little doubt in my mind about the nature or source of his ``deeply held views.'' He has publicly stated on numerous occasions, including during his confirmation hearing, that he believes abortion is the taking of innocent human life. My colleagues seem to be arguing that because General Pryor feels passionately that abortion is morally wrong and has publicly expressed his views, he will be unable to set aside his personal views on the subject and follow binding Supreme Court precedent as a judge. But General Pryor's record on the subject of abortion is crystal clear and beyond dispute. He has enforced the law despite his publicly expressed and conflicting personal beliefs.

For example, after the Alabama legislature passed a partial-birth abortion ban in 1997, General Pryor issued guidance to state law enforcement officials to ensure that the law was enforced consistent with the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Although there was considerable outcry against his decision from the pro-life community, the ACLU praised General Pryor's decision, emphasizing that his order had ``[s]everly [l]imited'' Alabama's ban. He issued similar guidance after the Supreme Court's 2000 ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck down another state's ban on partial- birth abortion.

I doubt that any Supreme Court decision could be more personally distasteful to General Pryor than Stenberg v. Carhart. And he specifically said he disagreed with the decision while emphasizing that it was the law and he would enforce it. Can we ask more of a judicial nominee, than to demonstrate such objectivity and enforce a law so at odds with his personal beliefs? I urge my colleagues to judge General Pryor and other pro-life nominees on their record as it relates to abortion and not on the nominees' person beliefs on the subject.

By the way, I am certainly not alone in my concern that the debate over General Pryor's nomination has put his religious beliefs at issue. The Mobile Register in a July 26 editorial wrote that :

. . . the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee have

repeatedly asserted that Mr. Pryor would be incapable of

enforcing the law . . . That's a serious charge, in effect

saying that if somebody believes deeply, because of his

religious faith, that abortion is morally wrong, then that

person is unfit for a judgeship. But that onus is on the

accusers to prove from Bill Pryor's record that he is thus

hampered from enforcing the law. Mr. Pryor has much evidence

on his side, but where is their evidence to the contrary? . .

. To look at that record and still assert, as the Senate

Democrats do, that the strength of Mr. Pryor's personal

beliefs disqualifies him, is indeed, effectively, to say that

his faith makes him ineligible for office. Their stance

against him should anger all people of deep faith, of all

religions.

In addition, Austin Rusc, President of the Catholic Family & Human Rights Institute, wrote in a letter dated July 29:

``I am deeply troubled by the recent turns of events in the

U.S. Senate regarding Catholic nominees to the Federal

Court. It appears to me that a faithful Catholic, that is

one who upholds the Catholic teaching on the inviolability

of innocent human life from conception onward, cannot be

confirmed for the Federal bench by this Senate. It very

clearly is a religious test for office, and therefore a

violation of our Constitution. Moreover, it is an insult

to millions of faithful Catholics in this country.

I also received a July 23 letter from the president and three other leaders of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America that stated:

As a community of religious believers committed to full

engagement with modern American society, we are deeply

troubled by those who have implied that a person of faith

cannot serve in a high level government post that may raise

issues at odds with his or her personal beliefs. There is

little question in our minds that this view has been the

subtext for some of the criticism of Mr. Pryor. We urge you

and your colleagues to empathetically reject this aspersion

and send a clear message that such suggestions, whether

explicit or implied, are beyond the pale of our politics.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Register editorial be printed in the Record.

Any suggestions that a person with deeply held religious beliefs cannot be trusted to follow the law, despite a proven track record of doing just that, is unconstitutional. I will continue to fight any form of religious test, direct or indirect, as long as I am a Member of this Senate. I have stood up for the free exercise of religion time and time again, through such measures as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I am proud of my accomplishments, and I will continue in my quest to ensure that the free exercise of religion is a right that remains uncompromised for everyone--including judicial nominees.

I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

[Mobile Register, July 26, 2003]

To Denigrate Pryor, How Low Can They Go?

On the matter of the judicial nomination of Alabama

Attorney General Bill Pryor, it's time for his Democratic

opponents to put up or shut up.

When all the smokescreens dissipate, the Senate Democrats'

objections to Mr. Pryor come down to two: First, that his

pro-life views are too ``extreme'' for him to be trusted to

uphold laws that contradict those views, and second, that

they have been denied ample time to investigate his fund-

raising activities.

Let's take them one at a time. Much has been made of Mr.

Pryor's supporters supposedly accusing his opponents of

deliberate anti-Catholic bias. But that's not what the

supporters have claimed. Instead, they've asserted--quite

believably--that the critics' pro-choice litmus test amounts

to the kind of ``religious test'' that, whether applied to

Catholics (such as Mr. Pryor) or conservative Protestants, or

for that matter members of any faith, are explicitly

prohibited by the Constitution.

Too Catholic?: It's not merely Catholics who say Bill

Pryor's faith is being unfairly used against him. The

president and three other leaders of the Orthodox Jewish

Union wrote this in a July 23 letter: ``As a community of

religious believers committed to full engagement with modern

American society, we are deeply troubled by those who have

implied that a person of faith cannot serve in a high level

government post that may raise issues at odds with his or her

personal beliefs. There is little question in our minds that

this view has been the subtext for some of the criticism of

Mr. Pryor. . . . In our view, Mr. Pryor's record as Alabama's

attorney general demonstrates his ability to faithfully

enforce the law, even when it may conflict with his

personal beliefs.''

Indeed, the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee

have repeatedly asserted that Mr. Pryor would be incapable of

enforcing the law. Here's Senator Charles Schumer of New

York: ``In General Pryor's case his beliefs are so well

known, so deeply held, that it is very hard to believe--very

hard to believe--that they are not going to deeply influence

the way he comes about saying, `I will follow the law,' and

that would be true of anybody who had very, very deeply held

views.''

Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois even suggested to Mr.

Pryor directly that he was ``asserting an agenda of your own,

a religious belief of your own, inconsistent with separation

of church and state.''

That's a serious charge, in effect saying that if somebody

believes deeply, because of his religious faith, that

abortion is morally wrong, then that person is unfit for a

judgeship.

But the onus is on the accusers to prove from Bill Pryor's

record that he is thus hampered from enforcing the law. Mr.

Pryor has much evidence on his side, but where is their

evidence to the contrary? The Alabama AG, after all, is a

white Republican who has taken the side of black Democrats in

a suit filed by white Republicans. He is a man who has

publicly intervened against the very Republican governor, Fob

James, who first appointed him. And on two separate occasions

he took stances, as the state's top legal officer, that

angered some of his anti-abortion allies.

To look at that record and still assert, as the Senate

Democrats do, that the strength of Mr. Pryor's personal

beliefs disqualifies him, is indeed, effectively, to say that

his faith makes him ineligible for office. Their stance

against him should anger all people of deep faith, of all

religions.

False testimony?: Senate Democrats also contend that

Republicans have unfairly cut off their ``investigation''

into whether Mr. Pryor testified truthfully about fund-

raising activities for the Republican Attorneys General

Association--activities the Democrats themselves

acknowledge were legal.

The truth is that the anti-Pryor forces are the ones whose

tactics should be in question. Using a close associate of a

man from whom Mr. Pryor recently secured a guilty plea to

bribery charges, the Democratic committee staff obtained

documents on July 2 that they claim raise questions about the

AG's own committee testimony. (It is not clear how long they

had been in contact with that associate, but some Republican

senators accused them of knowing weeks in advance.)

The Democrats did not bother to tell Republicans about the

documents until July 8. They did not interview former

staffers of the Republican group until July 15, two days

before the vote on Mr. Pryor was scheduled.

They have not yet put the original source under oath. And,

despite being given three opportunities to question Mr. Pryor

himself about the charges, Democrats declined all three times

to question him.

On July 17, the day the committee was scheduled to vote on

the nomination, the Democrats presented an ``investigation

plan'' that did not include giving Mr. Pryor himself a chance

to answer his accusers.

Not only that, but Republican Judiciary Committee Chairman

Orrin Hatch announced that, as of yesterday, the committee

had interviewed 20 witnesses, and that every one of them

``corroborated the testimony of General Pryor.''

In fact, said Chairman Hatch, ``what's notable'' is the

Democrats'' ``complete failure to specify any evidence that

General Pryor misled the committee.''

Indeed, they haven't even specified exactly what their

charges against him are. There is good reason, then, to agree

with Chairman Hatch that the Pryor opponents are engaged in a

``full-scale fishing expedition.''

Enough is enough. The campaign against Bill Pryor has sunk

to tawdry depths. Unless the Democrats ``put up'' a

legitimate reason to delay, instead of these faith-based and

procedural smears, they owe him an up-or-down confirmation

vote on the Senate floor, with no filibusters and no more

subterfuge.

Now, look, it is a little late to start saying we should have a rule that you can never mention religion. That means you could never mention Roe v. Wade. But that would take away the biggest argument that Democrats have against these people. I don't like to mention religion either--never have except in General Pryor's case, after Democrats had not so subtly raised the issue.

Now, with regard to the criticism of Boyden Gray's group, those terms were used first by People for the American Way in formal ads and letters, and then used by, I think, the Americans United for Separation of Church and State. These are two liberal groups.

Here is Americans United for Separation of Church and State, criticizing the nomination of John Ashcroft because he was for charitable choice legislation:

Ashcroft charitable choice provisions allow a Government-

funded program to hang a sign that says ``Catholics need not

apply.''

Where did that come from? That was long before Boyden Gray's group used such language--after all of Democrats' attacks on Pryor's deeply held beliefs during his hearing.

What about People for the American Way? People for the American Way, again, criticizing John Ashcroft because of the charitable choice legislation and saying:

An evangelical church running a Government-funded welfare

program could state that ``Catholics need not apply'' in a

help wanted ad.

Which I doubt any of them would do.

Now, leftist groups used such language, and all of a sudden we hear this screaming and shouting that Boyden Gray's group used the same language--after Democrats put Pryor's religious beliefs squarely at issue during his hearing and markup. Now some will say: Well, I certainly didn't mean for my questions to put his religion at issue. Well, what do you mean it to be? Religious beliefs are his deeply held beliefs and personal beliefs.

Now, look, my colleagues have a right to ask questions, but I also have a right to point out that I think those questions have led us into some very tender areas.

Frankly, what it all comes down to--I hate to say this, but it is true--is Roe v. Wade. That is what it comes down to. It is the be-all and end-all issue to most of our colleagues over here.

Now, it has been to a couple of my colleagues over here, too, but we stopped our side from using it as a litmus test. In fact, I don't know of anybody over here who has used it as a litmus test. But in virtually every case, that is the chief issue Democrats use against President Bush's nominees and the chief gripe about what kind of people they are--because they are traditional pro-life religious people. I don't know what other conclusion you can come to.

So to bring this resolution up is just a political show, because nobody in their right mind is going to let them get away with that type of treatment--or should I say mistreatment--of any President's judicial nominees. I do not want anybody on our side doing it either.

Also, frankly, for my colleague from Vermont, I know he is concerned about this. And I don't think any of these groups, including the conservative groups, should use this type of ``Catholics need not apply'' language. I don't think it is right. I don't think it should be done. But the ones who did it first, the ones who were never criticized by our media in this country, the ones who were never criticized by my colleagues on the other side, who are now decrying all of this, were the Democratic, liberal inside-the-beltway groups. And all of a sudden Boyden Gray's group is a very bad group because they have used the same language as People for the American Way and the group Americans United for Separation of Church and State.

I yield the remainder of my time to the distinguished Senator from Alabama.

Mr. President, as I understand it, the Presiding Officer would like to deliver his remarks. I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to speak and then I be permitted to speak.

I asked that the Senator from Texas, who is now presiding, be able to speak and then that I may speak immediately thereafter.

Not very long.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining time of the distinguished Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions, be yielded back.

I ask unanimous consent that immediately following my remarks on these two speeches, that Senator Max Baucus from Montana be permitted to speak.

Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of legislation implementing the free-trade agreements that have been negotiated between the United States and Chile, S. 1416, and between the United States and Singapore, S. 1417. I appreciated the remarks of my colleague who is the chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. I have great admiration for him, and I believe he has given an appropriate warning to the Trade Representative and the administration with regard to some of the criticisms that have been lodged against these agreements.

Let me begin by commending the Bush administration for negotiating these agreements with Chile and Singapore. Both Chile and Singapore are countries that represent economic stability and growth in their respective region of the world. These trade agreements will provide new market access for American workers and products including agricultural, manufactured products, telecommunications equipment and other high- technology products.

Let me also commend Senators Grassley and Baucus for bringing these agreements through the Finance Committee in the same bipartisan fashion that has characterized all of the recent congressional actions with respect to international trade. I am pleased to work with them on trade matters in the Finance Committee.

As chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I note that both of these agreements contain chapters on matters of great importance to our Committee. These include: intellectual property; antitrust; e-commerce; telecommunications; and, last and certainly not least, immigration. In many ways, the substance of the negotiations on matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee focused on ways to encourage our trading partners to harmonize their law with current U.S. standards. We should take pride in this dynamic.

Let me turn first to S. 1416, the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Despite its status as a relatively new democracy, Chile is regarded by many to be a model for the successful implementation of market-oriented economic reform measures since its first democratic elections in 1989. Although we have seen a slight trade deficit emerge in our trade with Chile over the past few years, I believe a free trade agreement between our countries is likely to stimulate growth in both economies.

The United States-Chile FTA will provide new market opportunities for United States workers and businesses. American companies currently operate at a competitive disadvantage in terms of trade with Chile, because many key foreign competitors, such as Canada, Mexico and the European Union already have executed free trade agreements with Chile. In fact, the National Association of Manufacturers estimates that without an FTA with Chile, U.S. exporters lose roughly $800 million per year in sales, which affects approximately 10,000 American jobs. With the adoption of the Chilean agreement, America would see an immediate elimination of tariffs on more than 85 percent of consumer and industrial goods. This will help eliminate the current trade deficit and will provide for increased export opportunities for U.S. companies.

Some estimates place the potential annual economic benefits of the United States--Chilean Free Trade Agreement at an impressive $4.2 billion annual increase in the U.S. gross domestic product and a $700 million increase in the Chilean GDP.

The Chilean FTA will provide numerous economic opportunities for my State of Utah, which is important to me. Currently, Utahns export approximately $657 million worth of consumer

goods to Chile every year. The major sectors of Utah's economy that will benefit most from a Chile FTA are manufacturers of computer machinery and components, high-tech computer software developers, manufacturers of medical devices, and dietary supplement companies.

Tariff-free trade with Chile will also result in expanded markets for America's farmers and ranchers, with more than 75 percent of U.S. farm goods becoming tariff-free within 4 years after enactment of the agreement. The agreement would also provide greater access for U.S.- based financial service companies to operate in the Chilean financial markets. This will result in new growth opportunities for U.S. banks, insurance companies, securities firms, and telecommunications companies.

Before entering into trade negotiations with the United States, Chile was required to adopt all provisions required for membership in the World Trade Organization. This includes the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Provisions, the so-called ``TRIPS'' provisions. The TRIPS provisions protect U.S. patent, copyright, and trademark owners.

The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement is a very important step in building stronger political and economic ties, not only with Chile, but with all of South America. As I see it, Chile is a strategic ally in South America. Chile provides a strong economic and political base in a region of the world that is currently experiencing extreme economic hardships. The adoption of the Chile FTA is an important first step toward the expansion of hemispheric wide-open trade relations throughout North and South America through the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.

The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, S. 1417, would have a similar effect on trade and economic liberalization in Southeast Asia. Like Chile, Singapore is a leader in its region for free trade- oriented reforms. It is very important to note that the United States- Singapore Free Trade Agreement is the first free trade agreement that the United States will have negotiated with an Asian nation.

Singapore is a relatively small nation geographically. It encompasses only 246 square miles and has a population of only four million people. Its economy is robust and highly competitive. It is one of the most open, well-regulated and secure markets for investment in Asia. Approximately 1,300 American firms have a significant presence in Singapore and all indications are that the establishment of an FTA with Singapore will provide additional opportunities for American industries through increased market access.

An FTA with Singapore also provides an opportunity for expansion in Utah's economy. Singapore currently receives almost 6 percent of Utah's international exports, amounting to more than $263 million. The top exports to Singapore from Utah include electronic machinery, plastics, perfumery, cosmetics, and telecommunications services and equipment.

The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement provides for reciprocal levels of market access, eventually eliminating the few remaining tariffs on American goods and services, and eliminating or reducing all non-tariff barriers to American exports. The Singapore FTA also requires observation of the TRIPS provisions.

The agreement with Singapore will provide opportunities for economic expansion and encourage free trade throughout Southeast Asia. This agreement merits the support of the Senate.

The Senate will soon have a chance to vote for, or against, both of these important free trade agreements. Last year a broad bipartisan group of 66 Senators voted for trade promotion authority. One of the chief reasons for adopting fast track procedures is to prevent trade treaties from death by amendment and procedural delays. Although no amendments are in order under the fast track rules, all Members of the Senate retain their ultimate authority to accept or reject any treaties or implementing legislation that the Administration proposes.

Because the Trade Act of 2002 calls for up or down votes without opportunity for amendment, it is important that Congress be fully consulted. This should occur at each step of the process. I know that this inability to amend the implementing language of these agreements has concerned many members of the Judiciary Committee.

From the perspective of the Judiciary Committee, I can tell my colleagues that the most controversial provisions of these trade agreements are those addressing the temporary entry of professional workers and intra-company transfers. Many members of the Judiciary Committee, Republicans and Democrats alike, have expressed their dismay over the immigration provisions.

Many Senators have unequivocally stated their objections to the manner in which the temporary entry provisions were transmitted to Congress. I share many of their concerns. The administration must consult with Congress, and specifically with the Judiciary Committee, on all matters within our committee's jurisdiction. At our mark-up on this implementing language, many members of the Committee made it plain that individual trade agreements are not the best forums for raising matters of general immigration law and policy. I trust that USTR will heed this message in the future.

To be fair to USTR, I understand that there were six briefings at the staff level prior to the transmission of the final implementing language. In addition, USTR briefed the committee staff on the proposed implementing language before it was finalized. There were also numerous additional informal consultations among committee staff on both sides of the aisle, and between committee staff and USTR and other administration officials over the last few weeks. Most, although not all, members of the Judiciary Committee sent representatives to these meetings.

Finally, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing on July 14 to allow the members of the committee to question USTR's principal negotiators on the draft implementing language for thee two agreements.

USTR worked to address the concerns expressed by Judiciary Committee members. Three main issues surfaced: first, time limits on the professional workers' visas; second, numerical limits on such professional workers; and, third protection of American workers. I want to discuss how these matters were resolved in the legislation.

With respect to the concern that there is a lack of a time limit for the professional workers' category, I note that contrary to how some may read the implementing language, the legislation does not allow indefinite stays. While it is true that the professional visa provision in the trade bills does not set a time limit, it does have to be renewed every year and is subject to section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This means that at each renewal, the applicant must show that the stay in the US is temporary and that there is not immigrant intent. In that sense, the safeguard against someone circumventing the permanent residence requirements is arguably greater than the safeguard contained in the traditional H1-B visa, which is expressly exempted from section 214(b).

Withe respect to the numerical cap, I would emphasize that the allocations for Chile and Singapore come under the overall cap for current H1-B visas. Therefore, there is no net increase of foreign workers because of these agreements. Moreover, the annual limits for Chile and Singapore, set at 1,400 and 5,400 respectively, are statutory ceilings. Our Government does not have to allocate the full amount every year.

Some of my colleagues are concerned about the fact that these agreements do not allow labor certification. First of all, I want to clarify that currently there are no labor certification requirements in our immigration laws for any visa category comparable to the ones described in the trade agreements. However, for the temporary professional workers, there is a requirement for certain employers to complete labor condition attestations. Before hiring a foreign worker, the employer must attest, among other things, that prevailing wages will be paid and the foreign workers will not be used as leverage in any labor dispute. In fact, if there is a strike or lock-out, foreign workers are not even permitted to come into the United States.

The implementing language also provides appropriate penalties for errors

and fraud in the attestations. Contrary to the suggestions made by some of my colleagues, the implementing language does indeed authtorize the Department of Labor to initiate random investigations of anyone who has failed to meet a condition of the attestation. The implementing language does expressly prohibit displacing American workers through lay-offs within 90 days of the filing of a visa application. As for labor certification or numerical limitations on business visitors, traders and investors, or intra-company transferees, we must understand that these visas, if used properly, are not intended to threaten American jobs at all. In fact, business visitors are not even permitted to receive a salary in the U.S. and may only remain for a few months just like tourists.

I appreciate the reality that some unscrupulous American employers have used the visa categories I just described to commit immigration and labor fraud. The visas have become ways for some to hire cheap foreign labor, and that has unfairly hurt American workers. I am sensitive to the difficulties faced by out-of-work Americans and their families. However, we need to understand that the existence of temporary worker visas in our laws is not the problem. The problem is the misuse of these visas by those who do not respect our laws.

We should not tolerate fraud and abuse of our immigration and labor laws. We should take appropriate actions to curb fraud and abuse in this area.

I understand that the Labor Department already has the authority to investigate visa fraud of this nature if a complaint is filed. But, if conferring more investigative authority upon the Labor Department is the key to solving the problem, then Congress should examine that option notwithstanding the lack of any labor certification. I was informed by USTR that the implementing language excluded some language in the current H1-B scheme because those provisions are due to sunset at the end of this fiscal year, but if those provisions are extended, they certainly may be applied to these treaty visas.

I would also like my colleagues to keep in mind that these agreements are reciprocal. Every gesture of courtesy extended to Chilean and Singaporean citizens is extended to American citizens. The same is true for all restrictions. A good illustration is the provision calling for disputes to be resolved in a so-called ``international review panel.'' The panel does not bind the U.S. government, and does not interpret U.S. law. It is a forum, however, where American businesses can address their grievances before an impartial reviewer. As Assistant USTR Ralph Ives testified before the Judiciary Committee the July 14 hearing, these review panels do not take the place of U.S. courts, and do not even review individual cases. Instead, they review allegations of patterns or practices by either party of the trade agreements.

Finally, some have raised a very good question about whether the Trade Act of 2002 confers authority to include matters of immigration in trade agreements. As early as the Commerce and Navigation Treaty with Great Britain of 1815, immigration provisions have been included in trade agreements that allowed for the entry of foreign nationals to conduct trade. Moreover, section 2102 of the Trade Act of 2002 calls for the President to reduce barriers to trade in services. Implicit in that authority is the mandate to provide access for U.S. businesses, including small to mid-size businesses, to foreign markets.

It is clear to me that the language we consider today has benefited from the interaction between Congress and the executive branch. Despite these improvements, some friction remains on the matter of taking up matters affecting general immigration policy as part of the negotiations on particular trade agreements.

Anyone present at either the Senate Judiciary Committee or House Judiciary Committee mark-up of the immigration implementing legislation for the Chile and Singapore FTAs got the message: Tread lightly and consult heavily.

Before I close, I want to reiterate that I have faith in the American worker. I have no doubt that with the right training, our workers can compete with the best in the world. I also believe that competition is good for America. We have no reason to fear foreign competition in the global economy so long as we are all playing by the same rules and on a level playing field.

I introduced The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act that authorizes funds collected from H1-B visa application fees to be invested in training American workers in the fields where we have traditionally relied on foreign workers. I ask my colleagues to join me in efforts and prepare American workers to fill the needs of our job market, especially in the fields of math, science, and high technology. It is my hope that, in due time, we will no longer rely on foreign workers to help fill our needs in any sector of the job market.

In a global marketplace, American workers and firms must be given the opportunity to conduct business abroad. Indeed, we live in a world economy where free trade is vital to our economy. As I see it, the flexibility to send essential personnel from the United States to another country in order to provide much-needed, service-oriented support is an essential part of international commerce. Consequently, within the parameters of sound immigration policy, the United States must reciprocate the courtesy that we expect our trading partners to extend to American citizens working and trading abroad.

I support these two implementing bills. the FTAs with Chile and Singapore are good treaties. On balance, this legislation, despite some of the sensitivities in the area of immigration, will help bring the benefits of these trade treaties to the American public.

I think that a review of the record shows that after extensive discussion with both the Senate staff and the House staff, the administration satisfactorily addressed the vast majority of the concerns expressed by Republican and Democratic members of the Judiciary Committee.

When all is said and done, these are good trade agreements. One of the lessons I hope the administration has learned is that including immigration-related provisions in individual trade agreements that raise General matters of immigration policy is a very, very sensitive issue to us up here. In the future, I expect the administration will avoid negotiating immigration matters in trade agreements unless the Congress is broadly supportive of the provisions. If there are compelling circumstances to negotiate such agreements, I expect extensive consultation between the administration and Congress at both the Member level and staff level so that all of our concerns can be adequately addressed.

The issue of immigration aside, I believe there is a wide consensus that, overall, we have two good trade treaties and two good implementing bills. I urge every Member to vote in favor of the United States-Chile and United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement implementing language.

Mr. President, I am grateful for the opportunity today to pay tribute to a wonderful man, dedicated public servant, and loyal friend, Ronald E. Madsen.

Ron is retiring from my Senate Staff after 21 years of dedicated service to the people of Utah, a time throughout which he worked tirelessly to promote and protect the values and ideals we all hold so dear.

Ron joined my staff in the early days of my Senate career and has always been a vital center of my Senate organization.

He has served in many capacities including Utah state director, environmental and lands advisor, and most recently as staff counsel.

Ron Madsen has been a guiding influence for me. Over the years, we have navigated through many challenges and enjoyed many successes.

He has always diligently strived to provide sound counsel and steady support as we have worked together on issues facing Utah and the Nation.

In addition, Ron has played a vital role in working with many Utah industries and associations.

He spent many years advising and helping to promote the tourism and air travel industries throughout Utah.

He is a strong advocate for the Second Amendment and was a key liaison for my office on issues affecting this important constitutional right.

Over the years, Ron has spent literally months traveling Utah, meeting with county and city officials and getting a good feel for the issues and challenges Utahns are facing throughout our State.

But perhaps the most important and lasting service Ron performed were the literally thousands of hours he spent listening to and counseling constituents who called my office looking for assistance with a myriad of problems.

In Ron, they not only found help, they made a good friend. He has always been willing to work with all constituents, no matter their circumstances.

The friendship and help Ron Madsen extended has been invaluable to hundreds if not thousands of Utahns and will be felt for many years to come.

Ron was born and raised in Provo, UT where his family played an integral role in the community. He attended Brigham Young University where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree and graduated with honors. He was then awarded a 3-year trustee scholarship to George Washington University School of Law in Washington, D.C., where he served on the Law Review.

Ron later received his Juris Doctorate Degree with honors and went on to establish a successful and prestigious law career and was admitted to practice law in Washington, D.C., Maryland, Utah, and before the United States Supreme Court.

In addition to the service Ron has rendered in his community and our office, Ron is a loving father and grandfather. He is the proud father of one son and 2 daughters, and grandfather to 5 grandsons and 1 granddaughter.

I have often admired the dedication and devotion Ron Madsen has always shown, not only to his children and grandchildren, but to his wife Kathryn who was sick for many years and is now deceased.

Ron stood by her side through her struggles with health and was a steadfast partner until the end.

Ron also has a true love for animals and has opened his home to many animals in need of shelter and care. He has helped his daughter, a veterinarian technician by trade, nurse many wounded creatures back to good health and improved their quality of life immeasurably.

He has sacrificed his talents, time and financial resources for the creatures of our earth--something truly noteworthy and honorable.

I am truly grateful for the service Ron Madsen has given to me, to his community and to Utah. He has been by my side for many, many years and I will always be extremely grateful for the service he has rendered.

I will miss Ron tremendously, but know that life holds many wonderful things for him to savor and enjoy.

And as Ron has always liked to quote--``you can go off the Hatch payroll, but never off the Hatch staff.''

In the future, I plan to continue to rely on Ron Madsen for his very expert advice, for his guidance and support.

Ron is a truly dedicated public servant, fervently patriotic American, loving father and grandfather, and loyal and cherished friend.

I want to wish him the very best in retirement and pray for his continued good health, success and happiness.

Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of Paul M. Warner of Salt Lake City, who has been renominated by President Bush for the position of U.S. attorney for the District of Utah.

Paul Warner has had a remarkable career in public service. After graduating from the J. Reuben Clark Law School in 1976, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy Reserve Judge Advocate General Corps, where he served as both prosecutor and defense counsel. From 1982 to 1989, Mr. Warner served in the Utah Attorney General's Office, where he did tremendous work on both civil and criminal matters. In 1983, he enlisted with the Utah Army National Guard, Judge Advocate Branch, where he has risen to the rank of colonel. Since 1989 he has served in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Utah, where he has worked on both civil litigation and criminal prosecution. He became the U.S. Attorney for the District of Utah in 1998 and has served ably in that office ever since.

I think it is important to have a career prosecutor with the reputation and ability of Paul Warner to lead the Federal law enforcement effort in Utah. He is a man committed to the rule of law and has a proven track record on the problems that affect Utah, notably methamphetamine proliferation and illegal reentry by criminal aliens.

Paul Warner has been able to be so effective because he has developed a great working relationship with Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel. I believe that without exception he is respected and trusted as a skillful prosecutor and an able administrator.

Paul Warner has had several notable career achievements. Most notably he rose to the Olympic challenge of presiding over one of the largest peace time mobilizations of law enforcement personnel in United States history. I can't give him enough credit for facilitating the cooperation of Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel that allowed the Salt Lake Olympic Games to run so smoothly. It was a tremendous undertaking, and the State of Utah, the United States of America, and the World Olympic Community owe a debt of gratitude to Paul Warner for negotiating the Herculean task of facilitating a safe environment that allowed the Salt Lake City Olympic Games to be enjoyed by so many throughout the world.

Paul Warner has also used his legal acumen and personal relationships to defuse several tense situations, including the controversies surrounding the Federal land use policies affecting Utah and the imposition of background checks at the Salt Lake International Airport following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Paul Warner has been honored on several occasions for his commitment to public service. He is the recipient of the United States Army Commendation Medal for meritorious service during Operation Desert Storm for legal work done in mobilizing members of the Utah Army National Guard. He later received two oak leaf clusters for meritorious service as Staff Judge Advocate. Mr. Warner was given a Special Achievement Award from the U.S. Department of Justice, and a Special Commendation from U.S. Attorney, District of Utah, for outstanding work as First Assistant U.S. Attorney. Finally, he has received the Community Relationship Award from the Salt Lake City branch of the